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Abstract 
This study represents an interdisciplinary investigation of music cognition from both theoretical 
and empirical perspectives drawing principally from research in neuropsychology, and 
philosophy. The main aim of the thesis is to produce a coherent model of music cognition, 
reconciling empirical fmdings, current accounts of musical expression, and broader cognitive 
models. With this aim the investigation divides into two parts: ftrst, examining musical 
expression of emotion, and second, exploring music cognition as a whole and its place within 
global models of cognition. A particular focus is the subdivision and independence of music 
subsystems, notably the separation of music and language and to what extent these are 
functionally, and neuro-anatomically separate cognitive systems. 
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Introduction 
Over the last 20 years music has increasingly become a part of our everyday lives. No longer restricted 
to the concert hall, we have music on the buses, in supermarkets, in our cars, and even at the swimming 
pool. Music can accompany us wherever we go and whatever we do and it would seem a difficult task 
to avoid music altogether in the course of a normal day. Despite this high level of musical involvement, 
relatively little is known about how the brain processes music, how we subdivide musical structure and 
abstract emotional significance, and how music cognition varies between the naive listener to the 
professional musician. 
We know much about the physics of sound and the workings of the ear, but how can we tell what is 
going on when these signals arrive at the brain? Historically, accounts of music 'cognition' and 
musical emotions have been derived from experience. Musicologists and music psychologists have 
developed experimental methods to verifY experiential models, but music has been largely neglected by 
experimental psychology as a whole, or has been treated as something of a novelty, not meriting 
rigorous investigation. Unfortunately this has also been the case within the medical sciences, with 
medical conditions relating to music being seen as novelty cases examined for fun rather than gaining 
neurological knowledge or with the aim of developing treatment for patients. Music is not an essential 
function, and not therefore a priority for research. This lack of interdisciplinary research has been 
detrimental to the development of any global understanding of music cognition as the 'functional' 
models developed by musicologists, psychologists and philosophers must ultimately be compatible with 
the physiological workings and structure of the brain. 
It is perhaps the communication sciences which have done much to reverse these trends, the advent of 
music therapy, and the examination of music within the more general study of auditory functions have 
fostered conceptions of music as a serious candidate for research. Within experimental psychology and 
the neurosciences there is now a substantial body of research which may be contrasted with the results 
of conceptual approaches in aesthetics and musicology. 
Recent research in Neuropsychology has been of particular significance, providing some interesting and 
astonishing fmdings regarding the independence of music cognition from other types of information 
processing, and its relationships with language, emotion and other functions. We want to know what 
happens to musical signals when they reach the brain - how are they separated from other sounds, 
how is music recognised, and how do we go about analysing the musical signal? Neuropsychological 
studies attempt to answer such problems by studying damaged cognitive systems, for example, 
examining impairments following a stroke, and contrasting findings with studies of normal subjects. 
But what can a damaged system tell us about normal cognitive function? Why not just study normal 
function? After all, normal function is what we want to explain. 
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The main problem is that normal behaviour is 'seamless', in many cases we simply caMOt see the 
boundaries between different cognitive functions. Brain damage, however, literally seems to carve 
nature at the seams allowing us to see both physical and functional damage and allowing inferences as 
to the interaction and autonomy of cognitive subsystems. Neuropsychological studies reveal specific 
patterns of impairment, for example, showing that the processing of sound is divided into three areas of 
processing: speech, music and environmental sound and each of these processes can be damaged 
independently without affecting the other parts of sound processing. 
This study provides an interdisciplinary investigation of music cognition, drawing principally from 
research in philosophy and studies of brain damage conducted in neuropsychology in an attempt to 
provide a general framework for music cognition, and musical expression of emotion. One might well 
question why neuropsychology and philosophy should be paired in this investigation, but the 
interrelation of philosophy and neuropsychology is not a new one. Recent work within philosophy of 
mind has drawn heavily on neuropsychological deficits such as aphasias and agnosias (impairments of 
language and recognition) in support of functional models of the mind and neuropsychological findings 
relate strikingly to theoretical models of mental function produced, for example, by Fodor, Gardner, 
and Jackendoff. In turn, neuropsychology has started to look towards functional accounts of mental 
architectures in an attempt to synthesise findings in terms of a whole-brain theory. Whilst empirical 
fmdings bolster functional models, philosophy contributes to neuropsychology by offering 
methodological criticisms, and as regards epistemological concerns being dependent on perceptual 
processes. Ultimately, if cognitive deficits are relevant to broader models of the mind, musical deficits 
seem likely to have bearing on models of music cognition. 
The aim of the discussion as a whole is to evaluate conceptual and empirical analyses of music and 
emotion, with the intention of assimilating fmdings into a unified theory of music cognition and music-
emotion processing. That is, to provide a functional account of music cognition which is consistent 
with, and supported by empirical findings. 
An Introduction to The Neuropsychology of Music 
It is easy to formulate theoretical hypotheses about which aspects of music (e.g. rhythm or melody), 
might be processed by specific cognitive subsystems. However, such hypotheses are extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to verify experimentally (with normal subjects). Brain damaged subjects 
however, offer us the opportunity to hypothesise regarding processing systems and strategies, to 
develop tests for normal subjects, and by evidence of selective damage, to conceptuaJiy formulate 
whether there are indeed music specific as opposed to general-purpose auditory processing 
mechanisms. 
To begin, there are many anecdotal stories of brain damaged musicians. A Russian composer, Shebalin 
lost all language abilities following a stroke but managed to continue composing works which were 
highly acclaimed. And perhaps the most famous case of aphasia (loss of language abilities) in a 
composer is that of Ravel, who lost written and verbal language abilities. Although physical difficulties 
prevented Ravel from performing and composing, he was still able to enjoy music, teach students and 
criticise compositions and performances of his contemporaries. Such anecdotes about composers with 
brain damage are certainly interesting, but might not be thought to reveal much about the ordinary 
person's musical experiences. One might be tempted to explain away such fmdings as a result of the 
exceptional musical abilities possessed by these professional musicians, and indeed this seems to have 
been the case until the recent flurry of investigations into neuropsychology of music. In addition, the 
anecdotal approach to studies of music was not conducive to rigorous scientific investigation and many 
early cases are lacking in this respect. 
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Current findings have examined both amateur musicians and non-musicians with music specific deficits 
or sparing. In addition to providing convergent evidence for earlier investigations, these studies also 
offer clues as regards the nature of processing strategies in musicians and non-musicians. 
After brain injury, musical abilities may be selectively spared or impaired. Subsequently, subjects are 
unable to 'process' musical information, hearing music as squeaking and grating sounds despite intact 
physiological mechanisms for hearing, as demonstrated by their abilities to hear other sounds. 
Occasionally specific musical functions are impaired, for example, reading music, playing an 
instrument, memory for music, and even the ability to identify melodic and rhythmic aspects of music. 
Further empirical studies may show that music, language, and environmental sounds can all be 
selectively spared or impaired, suggesting that to a great extent these categories of sound are processed 
separately and are also 'channel specific': This means that we can not choose how to hear a sound-
instead the mind is 'programmed' to process sounds in a certain way - as speech, music or 
environmental sound. Not only do such fmdings offer clues as to how music is organised and 
subdivided, they also give evidence regarding the broader subdivisions of auditory processing of which 
music is a part. 
Perhaps the most startling evidence from neuropsychology of music is the separation of music and 
emotion processing observed in brain-injured subjects. Subjects with musical deficits have reported 
being unable to recognise or interpret music, whilst they still reported feeling a sense of enjoyment from 
music. Such subjects could still tell if a piece of music was sad or happy, and respond well within the 
scope of normal subjects on tests of musical-emotion detection. These findings raise many questions 
for this inquiry: How is it that subjects who cannot recognise music 'as music' or discriminate between 
musical features, can still identify the emotion being conveyed? What is it being detected which allows 
emotional distinctions to be made? 
From this brief overview of musical deficits, one can see the scope for neuropsychological findings in 
developing a music specific framework, and a general model of music's place within auditory cognition 
and a global cognitive architecture. Indeed one might think, in light of the wealth of findings, that 
neuropsychological evidence alone is a sufficient basis upon which to build a cognitive model. 
Neuropsychological evidence, whilst certainly enlightening, requires convergence from other disciplines 
and importantly evidence from normal cognition. Whilst neuropsychological evidence is revealing, it 
leaves us with pressing problems regarding the interaction of music with other cognitive functions -
specifically language and emotion. Here philosophical accounts of musical expression, conceptual 
analysis of emotions, and functional models of normal cognition provide some of the convergent 
evidence required to develop a comprehensive model. 
Understandably empirical and theoretical evidence does not always converge, and in light of this I will 
make attempts to reconcile or reject hypotheses within the context of the interdisciplinary account 
proposed, that is, that any functional proposition should ultimately be compatible with neuroanatomical 
and neurophysiological findings. The functional 'software• is constrained by the physical 'hardware' of 
the system. 
Part I of the discussion is concerned chiefly with explaining the musical expression of emotion and 
outlining different methods by which music may express emotion, in relation to different patterns of 
recognition and arousal in the listener. Part II is then concerned with more general issues of music 
cognition and how it may be incorporated within both auditory cognition and a global cognitive 
architecture. At various points, particularly in presenting the case for cognitivism about the emotions 
in Chapter 2, I rely upon conceptual analysis, which is necessary if the considerations that have 
persuaded many philosophers of mind are to be faithfully represented. But it is important to remember 
that there are serious questions about methodology lurking here, about what reliance we can place upon 
intuitions or consideration of ordinary language. We cannot keep consideration of folk psychology out 
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of the discussion at this point. Reflection on our ordinary practice and our ordinary concepts would 
seem to involve simply a process of making explicit ways of thinking that are implicit within folk 
psychology. This is what much of conceptual analysis of emotional terms consists. A criticism here is 
whether this approach is legitimate, or just an armchair prejudice in favour of common-sense thinking? 
My position (as I have stated above in relation to functional and anatomical models), is that I reject 
wholesale eliminativism and accept folk psychological classifications as working hypotheses, but this 
provisional acceptance is tempered with the realisation that they may reflect limited interests and may 
turn out to be both inadequate for theoretical purposes, and also vulnerable to empirical results from 
psychology. Importantly though, I aim to develop an explanatory account which is compatible with the 
experience of music, and in this regard conceptual analyses are invaluable. 
Chapter 1 offers a critical analysis of philosophical models of emotion and aesthetic accounts of 
musical expression, questioning their adequacy to account for musically evoked and expressed emotions 
in light of empirical findings. A large number of studies within aesthetics have addressed the issue of 
musical emotions and their expression. Yet within the wider philosophical debate on emotion, music 
has been largely neglected. This exclusion is problematic, as any successful theory of the emotions 
should yield an adequate account of the emotional potency of music without relegating musical 
emotions to some anomalous category. Whereas musicologists have tended to look towards music itself 
to explain its expressive abilities, it would be beneficial to investigate the emotions directly and to 
consider whether music may be integrated in existing accounts of emotion. One reason for the 
exclusion of music must surely be the nature of inquiry into the emotions. Until recently, emotion was 
not considered a subject worthy of investigation in its own right, being driven by more general 
psychological theorising. Consequently, theories of emotion are often tailored by the presuppositions of 
particular theories about the nature of the mind in general. Moreover, their assessment is to a large 
extent dominated by linguistic phenomena concerning the description and expression of the emotions, 
even though emotions existed pre-linguistically and, as the case of music shows, may well be expressed 
in a non-linguistic medium. Chapter 1 offers a general analysis of approaches to emotion theory and 
highlights some of the problems inherent in attempts to define and categorise affective states, both in 
terms of general theorising about the emotions and specifically in relation to the analysis of musical 
emotions. 
This paves the way for Chapter 2 in which the limitations of cognitivism - now the dominant account 
within contemporary emotion theory, are considered in more detail. In light of the problems raised in 
Chapter 1, I raise the suggestion that cognitivism in fact fails as a comprehensive theory of the 
emotions, rather, it serves only to outline necessary cognitive prerequisites for a few specific emotion 
types. In reply to this critique, I provide a 'general account of emotionally affective states' which 
incorporates both musical emotions and empirical findings, and serves to outline the scope of affective 
constructs which are the concern of the enquiry. 
Chapter 3 moves on to advance a revised model of musical expression encompassing both theoretical 
and empirical perspectives outlined in Chapters l and 2, and introducing the main body of 
neuropsychological findings. Some of the neuropsychological findings certainly undermine many past 
and present theories regarding musical expression, in particular questioning music's relationship with 
language. Further evidence that brain damage can allow subjects to determine the emotional content of 
a piece without being able to process musical features leaves us in the position to make a number of 
hypotheses about music-emotional relationships, and the independence of music cognition. 
In Jight of the model outlined in Chapter 3, and the empirical findings, Chapter 4 then offers a critical 
analysis of an expression theory advanced recently within aesthetics to demonstrate the implications 
and relevance of empirical fmdings for such accounts. The aim of the discussion is not only to refute 
the specific account in question, but also to highlight the wider implications of empirical evidence in 
relation to aesthetic investigations of music and musical expression. This is not to say that aesthetic 
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accounts are to be rejected indiscriminately, for in many cases they converge well with empirical 
findings and offer an accurate account of musical experience. However, the discussion within this 
chapter serves to highlight the necessity of considering underlying perceptual processes, and the errors 
which can arise through failure to make sufficient distinctions between the varieties of expression and 
reception involved. To conclude Part One, I re-iterate the view that aesthetic accounts need not be 
rejected but that many can be incorporated within a general account of expression. To consolidate this 
point I offer such a broad construct by means of a 'response-dependent' account of musical expression. 
Part 11 of the thesis is concerned with music cognition as a whole, its subdivisions, and place within 
broader theories of mind Chapter 5 introduces a detailed neuropsychological case study, which allows 
me to challenge some current assumptions within neuropsychology of music and adds support to the 
hypotheses advanced in Part I. The study examines M~ a musician with severe aphasia following 
damage to the left hemisphere, but with spared musical abilities. MR shows remarkable sparing of 
highly complex musical abilities in the presence of severe language deficits. Whilst MR is severely 
impaired for sentence reading, he has no problems following a complex orchestral score and detecting 
errors in performance, continuing to perform complex musical tasks with ease. Not only does it appear 
that music and language function to a large degree independently, but that there seem to be highly 
complex perceptual music skills, music reading and seemingly musical memory which are independent 
of language processing and even other musical functions. Case MR sheds light on hypothesised 
neurological differences between musicians and non-musicians, and allows me to challenge some 
existing hypotheses, and the assimilation of findings from Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 gives a conceptually 
and empirically sound basis upon which to begin developing a model of music cognition. 
The findings presented suggest a highly fractionated system involving many autonomous subdivisions 
in processing. In light of this, Chapters 6 considers music in relation to a modular hypothesis, which 
matches the patterns of neurological and functional impairment seen. Chapter 6 gives a general 
overview of the modular hypothesis and considers critiques in relation to its application in the 
neurosciences. It seems that in general terms a modular hypothesis may be an appropriate architecture 
on which to develop a model. Chapter 7 then has the task of assessing the degrees of processing 
autonomy exhibited by musical functions, and the patterns of organisation demonstrated by findings. 
Music is assessed as a candidate for modularity and associated possibilities for modular hypotheses are 
considered: whether music is innate or developed, whether it is neurally as well as functionally distinct, 
and whether modularity applies to all or only parts of the system. I am particularly concerned here to 
offer an account of receptive musical processing which is also compatible with the account of 
expression proposed in Part I. Having proposed a receptive model, I then go on to consider this in 
relation to auditory processing and in relation to other cognitive functions. I am not uncritical of 
empirical findings or indeed methodologies and Chapter 7 provides a forum for raising these issues in 
relation to the model developed, particularly the unequivocal neglect to account for initial auditory 
perception within neuropsychological studies. 
Throughout the discussion I aim to maintain a critical stance on the plausibility of the developing model 
in relation to evolutionary concerns, neuroanatomical constraints and importantly how the account 
relates to our actual perceptions of music and the musical expression of emotion. 
Part I 
Musical Expression of Emotion 
Chapter 1 
What are Emotions? 
1.1 Introduction 
It would be imprudent to attempt an explanation of musical expression of emotion without first 
offering some discussion of the emotions in question. Chapter 1 provides some preliminary 
discussion of emotion theory, highlighting some of the more wide-ranging problems for analyses 
of emotion, many of which are seen to cut across methodological divides: attempts to categorise 
types of affective state, the reliance upon language as an accurate reflection of psychological 
states, the cultural diversity of emotions and the actual relationships of cognitive and 
physiological affective components. In light of these issues further discussion examines 
problems specific to the analysis of musical emotions (1.4), paving the way for Chapter 2 in 
which more detailed critical discussion of existing accounts will attempt to reconcile the diverse 
analyses presented here. 
The chief divergence in analyses of emotion is between, on the one hand conceptions of 
emotions as primarily cognitive and, on the other, as primarily physiological phenomena. This 
divergence underlies different methodological approaches for the investigation of affective 
states, (corresponding roughly to a divide between theoretical and empirical investigations), and 
features heavily in the history of emotion theory. The thought of Aristotle for example, can be 
seen to anticipate contemporary cognitivism, (explaining emotions in terms of beliefs and 
desires). However, the widespread adoption of cognitivism as a theory of emotion, is a 
relatively recent conversion, reflecting the rise of cognitivism in philosophy of mind. 
Physiological or feeling-centred theories have intermittently held sway for the past two 
millennia, regarding emotions as essentially non-cognitive states and suggesting a conflict 
between 'reason' and the emotions as 'passions'. The 17th century saw the rise of new 
'scientific' methods, based on observation and experiment and the study of emotion was soon 
redeveloped as a truly 'scientific' endeavour. Emotions were explained in terms of observable, 
and felt physiological arousal, our conscious recognition of these bodily states constituting 
emotions. It was a natural progression, then, for feeling-centred theorists to categorise emotions 
in terms of their patterns of physiological arousal, (James 1884, 1890). These 'Feeling-centred' 
studies of emotion focused on descriptions of one's own bodily sensations, and little progress 
was made apart from an ever increasing catalogue of first-person accounts describing emotional 
experiences, which did little to extend understanding of emotion as a general concept. 
Introspection was widely accepted as the primary method of looking at the mind. Nonetheless, 
we can see clearly by looking at introspectionist accounts (e.g., those of James 1884 1890, and 
Lange, 1887), that these are heavily influenced by their preconceptions of emotion within the 
subtext of broader concepts of mind, noticeably the dominant Cartesian account.1 Personal 
reportage on emotion completely left out causes of emotions, concentrating on the physical 
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effects and feelings, to the exclusion of any relationship emotions have to the external world or 
even to cognitive states. 
The twentieth century, and the rise of psychology as an independent field saw widespread 
adoption of behaviourist accounts, explaining emotions in terms of their behavioural 
characteristics (Watson, 1913, 1919, 1930, Skinner, 1938, 1953). Philosophy however, was 
soon to reject behaviourist accounts for their failure to account for mental processes - being 
subject to the same critiques surrounding feeling-centred accounts. The move then was back to 
the Aristotelian (cognitivist) account of emotions explained in terms of beliefs and desires. The 
advantage of cognitivist accounts is that we may readily assess emotions as rational or irrational 
in light of their cognitive content and this allows type-differentiation of emotions, by reference 
to their characteristic causes and objects. The ability of cognitivism to distinguish clearly 
between individual emotions was a distinct advance on the lack of specificity available to 
feeling-centred accounts. The divide between cognitive and feeling-centred (or the 
contemporary 'physiological') accounts, remains in place, despite acknowledgement that both 
cognitive and physiological aspects play a role in the explanation of emotion in general. 
Cognitive accounts having been offered by Gordon, 1987; Solomon, 1976; and Lyons, 1980; 
and physiological accounts by Panksepp, 1982; Zajonc, 1980; LeDoux, 1989. However, we 
will see in Chapter 2 that hybrid accounts are becoming more widely acknowledged and I will 
consider the compatibility of cognitive and physiological/perceptual accounts of emotion. 
Investigation of the physiological aspects of emotion has flourished in the last few years, and I 
will consider some specific empirical fmdings below (1.3). 
1.2 The Rise of Cognltlvlsm 
Three main criticisms are directed at feeling-centred accounts. First, they fail to account for the 
intentionality of emotions. Second, they are unable to account for the extent to which emotions 
are assessed in terms of rationality. Lastly - and this is perhaps widely regarded as their main 
weakness - they are unable to provide any fine-grained distinctions of emotions by type. Let us 
look at these shortcomings in a little more detail (bearing in mind the methodological remarks 
about reliance on introspectionism in the general introduction). 
Emotions typically have the property of intentionality, being directed at or towards something. 
For example, we are saddened that you had that accident, but are relieved that the chances of a 
complete recovery are so high. I am disappointed at not getting that article accepted for 
publication. The passengers are afraid that the plane is going to crash. And so on. Feeling-
centred accounts fail here in that we cannot attribute this complex property to emotions and 
maintain that they are simply bodily sensations. Reflection on ordinary language reveals 
important and systematic distinctions between intentional and non-intentional states. Typically, 
if someone declares they are angry, we might legitimately ask what they are angry about. 
Although we might ask for a causal explanation of bodily sensations - • Why are you in pain?', 
'What can have made you feel nauseous?', etc. - we do not ask what such sensations are 
directed towards. It would not make sense to say 'What are you hungry/warm about?' Bodily 
sensations simply do not have intentionality, we cannot describe toothache or feelings of warmth 
as directed at or about anything.2 
Similarly, we cannot describe headaches or pangs of hunger as unreasonable or irrational. So 
the assimilation of emotions to bodily sensations would mean that one cannot account for 
emotions as open to rational assessment. But it is commonplace to acknowledge, for example, 
that one was wrong to get so angry, because so much anger was not justified in the 
circumstances; or that you ought to feel gratitude towards one's benefactor because that would 
What are Emotions? 3 
be an appropriate response given the fact that she has done so much for your sake. Notice 
further that, if you were subsequently to learn that what that supposed benefactor had done had 
not been undertaken for your sake, but for quite other and self-interested motives, then it would 
no longer be appropriate to continue feeling grateful towards her. One can multiply examples of 
the appropriateness, suitable adjustment, justification, and rationality of emotional states at will, 
(and, by contrast, cases of inappropriate, unsuitable, unjustified, and irrational emotion). 
However, it should be acknowledged that there are certain emotions which do not fit the 
standard pattern of rational assessment. For example, it is not clear that endogenous 
(objectJess) depression (unlike, say, disappointment) is ever appropriate or justified, even 
though there are circumstances in which reactive depression (e.g. in response to bereavement) is 
accepted as an understandable and properly human reaction. Also there are certain emotions 
which may have basic conditions for rational comprehensibility (e.g., concerning what sort of 
thing you envy or are jealous of), but which are so strongly negative that it is questionable 
whether an emotionally well-adjusted person would ever be fully justified in feeling them (e.g., 
hate). Whatever the verdict on those complications, it is clear that in general emotions allow a 
form of assessment (as rational or appropriate) which is simply inapplicable to bodily 
sensations. 
This brings us to the third main critique of feeling-centred accounts. We can clearly distinguish 
between object-directed emotions and mere bodily sensations. But feeling-centred accounts 
have no means of distinguishing between these, or between specific emotions, other than to 
summarise how they feel. In terms of feeling, some fears and some joyous excitements may be 
very similar, or even indistinguishable. What distinguishes indignation from other forms of 
anger is not how it feels (as if there were some distinctive indignation quale), but rather the fact 
that in order for someone to feel indignant they must think that they have been treated 
unworthily. In other words, for a whole range of emotional types, there are necessary conditions 
for being in just that particular kind of emotional state which must be expressed in cognitive 
terms. One cannot feel grief unless one thinks one has suffered a loss. One cannot feel remorse 
unless one believes that one has acted wrongly. One cannot feel hope without believing that 
there is at least some possibility of a happier future state. And so on. That cognitive 
prerequisites (or components) are built into our ordinary concepts of emotional states seems to 
be one of the least contestable results of conceptual analysis. 
The case for cognitivism, and its limitations, will be reviewed more thoroughly in Chapter 2. 
But here I would just like to draw attention to the following point. In so far as cognitivism 
about the emotions is based upon the above considerations, it is doubtful whether it amounts to 
a fuJI theory of the emotions, even though one does quite frequently encounter references to 
"The Cognitivist Theory of the Emotions". For what the arguments establish is that there are 
necessary conditions, of a cognitive kind, for being in various emotional states. This falls some 
way short of telling us what emotions are. For it does not even settle the question of whether 
those cognitive aspects of the emotions are parts of the emotional state, whether they are 
necessary causal antecedents of the emotional state, or whether they are conceptually required 
accompaniments of the emotion in question. 
1.3 What are Emotions? 
Before turning our attention specifically to musical emotions, we need to clarify which affective 
states fall within the scope of this investigation. For ease of discussion I will refer to 'affective 
states', as a broad category, to encompass, emotions, moods, feelings, and any physiological 
and cognitive states that might be referred to in affective terms. As they are already prevalent in 
What are Emotions? 4 
the discussion of affective states, I will refer to 'emotions', and 'moods' as used in the ordinary 
description of affective categories (moods used typically to describe unfocused. long-term 
affective states and emotions to describe focused short term affective states). I feel that use of 
the term 'feelings' requires further comment as it is used ambiguously to describe both 
'emotions' and bodily sensations. Here I will take 'feelings' to be a blanket term for any 
affective state involving self-awareness of one's bodily state and also to include bodily feelings 
such as pains and aches. I take affect as the broadest category, referring to chiefly 
physiological responses of which one may or may not be aware and importantly which underlie 
other more complex affective states. The idea I propose here (and which will be developed in 
Chapter 2) is that these varieties of affective state may be variously combined. Emotive 
'episodes' which might be described as 'sadness', 'happiness' etc., may in fact involve a 
transition through one or more of these affective states. The following discussion will in fact, 
serve to reveal some of the difficulties in any attempt to classifY affective states in terms of 
distinct categories, and will consider existing methods of classification. 
For the musical case, many theorists talk of the musical expression of emotion, feeling or mood 
without explaining what their notion of 'emotion', 'feeling' or 'mood' amounts to. How for 
example, might one effectively distinguish emotions from moods, feelings and affect? Current 
emotional vocabulary seems to presuppose that 'emotions' are a distinct and easily identifiable 
category of affective state. Yet despite the ease with which we might be able to compile a list of 
'emotions' (as opposed to what we might call moods, feelings and bodily sensations), we are 
still in no better position as regards identifying emotions as a distinct kind of mental states. 
Indeed, it is by no means obvious that we should acknowledge the existence of a distinct 
psychological kind, all instances of which can be appropriately labelled as emotions. Robert 
Gordon raises this issue in The Structure of Emotions, making the important point that the 
classification of 'emotions' as a single psychological category is only a recent addition to our 
discussion of emotional life and, rather than being a useful addition, it invites confusion in any 
attempt to identify and classify affective mental states. 3 
Some examples may illustrate the difficulties in attempting to distinguish between categories of 
affective state. The fact that we have a word, which is commonly taken to name an emotion, 
does not preclude that same word from being used in connection with other types of affective 
state. Fear is typically taken to be an emotion, as opposed to a mood or other affective state. 
Yet fears seem to be a pretty mixed bag. There are purely cognitive fears, physiological 
aversive responses, phobic responses, and both long and short-term episodes of fear. Thus, you 
may be afraid that your seedlings will be killed by the overnight frost. (A purely cognitive fear: 
it's something that you think might happen and you would rather it didn't, but it is unlikely to 
cause trembling. One often says 'I am afraid that •.. ', meaning not much more than 'I think 
that. .. ' with an associated attitude of something less than satisfaction.) The startle response, 
triggered by sudden, unexpected sound or movement, may make you jump in the air and reduce 
you, at least momentarily, to a quivering wreck. But it doesn't make you think anything in 
particular (it is a physiological aversive response, behaviourally rather a dramatic example of 
fear). Children are liable to be afraid of the dark, although one does not expect them to be able 
to explain what threat or danger there is in the absence of light. (Perhaps this is not a clear 
example of a phobia - like claustrophobia or arachnophobia - but something of a further 
category). An explanatory account capable of incorporating all of these variations would 
necessarily include states we may not want to class as emotions proper at all. 
One might think, however, it would be possible to distinguish at least between broader 
categories such as mood and emotion, which are typically taken to denote different kinds of 
mental states. Perhaps the most common distinction made here is in terms of duration. 
Emotions are seen as episodic states, whilst moods are taken to be of longer duration. 
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Exceptions though, immediately spring to mind. Love is considered an emotion but is not 
necessarily episodic, and depression seems to fall awkwardly on the boundary between moods 
and emotions. Others have suggested distinguishing between affective states in terms of their 
modes of production. After all, it is common to explain emotions by referring to their causes. 4 
Emotions are usually attributed to a definite set of events, that is, determinate antecedent events 
can usual1y be identified for each instance of emotion. Moods however, do not typically have 
such identifiable causes {or at least not causes that are readily open to introspection). People 
are usually unable to cite a distinct cause of their moods, which are often the result of a 
cumulative series of events. Indeed, the same event might variously evoke affect, mood or 
emotion dependent upon the emoter, so problems would be invoked in attempting to distinguish 
categories of affective state principally in terms of causal antecedents. The cause of a mood 
does not become its intentional object as is often (but not necessarily) the case with emotion. 
Rather it is the case that moods are directed towards 'events in general' and lack determinate 
cognitive content. 
In light of this last point perhaps the most obvious distinction to make concerns intentionality, 
with emotions having identifiable intentional objects, and moods interpreted as 'objectless' 
mental states. Yet, identification of an affective state as belonging to a particular category does 
not account for its intentionality. Fridja notes, 
"It is natural that that the domain of"non-intentional affective states" coincides 
with that of states called "moods" only roughly because natural-language 
words like "mood" never are used in a fully consistent fashion and do not 
correspond to a particular necessary feature" (Fridja, 1994, p.60). 
Whilst I do not want to endorse Frijda's rather grand claims about consistency of language use, 
he nonetheless makes a valid point. In addition to linguistic inconsistencies, intentionality is not 
a sufficient measure for identifying categories of affective state. As I will discuss below { 1.4 ), 
emotions can be produced without conscious awareness of an object {Gazzaniga, 1988) but one 
would not want to call these states 'moods' purely because the emoter can not identify the 
relevant cause or object. The relationship of emotion, cause and object is far from 
straightforward. Similar problems arise for distinguishing emotions and moods from more basic 
affective responses. Even empirical measurements of physiological responses are not sufficient 
for type differentiation (See p.412, Ekman & Davidson 1994). Indeed, even if it were possible 
to identifY different neural circuitries subserving 'moods' and 'emotions', this would not solve 
problems of reforence to affective states, nor interaction between these affective constructs. 
The more general issue is that a wide range of affective concepts would be redundant if we 
could offer such simplistic definitions. 
1.3.1 Emotional States and Emotional Vocabulary 
An underlying problem is the confusion between emotive language itself and the emotional 
states referred to. A variety of terms exist for describing emotional states, and at first glance, it 
might seem that we have a highly specific lexicon for discussing emotional states. On closer 
investigation, terms such as moods, feelings, emotion and affect have no definite ranges of 
application and may be loosely (and perhaps incorrectly) applied to many affective states, 
actions, or thoughts. As noted above (p.4) one often remarks 'I'm afraid that,' without referring 
or intending to refer to an affective state, but rather to an unsatisfactory state of affairs. 
Emotion names themselves invariably have different modes of application, to both observable 
behavioural states and felt psychological states. Ordinary names for emotions cannot therefore 
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be regarded as providing a satisfactory, fully articulated taxonomy for the emotions. Ultimately 
the range of phenomena identified by the ordinary language word 'emotion' does not exclusively 
define the category of mental states to be addressed in this inquiry. It seems implausible to 
suggest that such a limited vocabulary of emotion might be able to distinguish between (and 
fully describe) every instance of an emotion, and to equate emotional states themselves with 
their lexicaJised forms is certainly restrictive. The case of the German emotion term 
Schadenfreude provides a good illustration of this. We have no English equivalent for this 
emotion term but this is not to say we cannot and do not experience this state. s Typically 
though, theorists have assumed emotive language to offer a fairly accurate reflection of the 
emotions. Shibbles states that "An examination of the relationship between emotion and 
language shows what emotions are and also suggests why and how we may control and change 
them.'' (Shibbles, 1974, p.l18}. However, vocabularies of emotion are not theoretically 
substantial, the recognition and naming of emotion types are areas in which we see cultural 
diversity in folk psychology. 
Referring back to my comments on methodology in the general introduction, two distinct 
problems concern me here. First, what we consider to be the function of emotion names and 
terminology in any particular emotional lexicon and second, cultural diversity exhibited in the 
naming and recognition of emotions. Turning our attention to the first issue, use of emotive 
language would suggest there to be a distinct feeling corresponding to each emotion term. Errol 
Bedford comments quite extensively on this problem, arguing against the misconception of 
emotion words as names and the misinterpretation of their function which ensues. In Bedford's 
view "it would be a mistake to imagine that the primary function of these statements is to 
communicate psychological facts.•t6 Rather, we should consider such terms may be used as 
reports, judgements and explanations of behaviour, varying in relation to social context and not 
to be given primarily as a description of a qualitatively distinct experience which is the emotion 
itself. Bedford's point put simply is that emotive language fails to distinguish between the feel 
or experience of emotions, and their outward expression or behavioural characteristics. 
Ultimately the descriptive functions of emotion terms cannot be separated from their more 
general usage. 7 Bedford comments, 
"does the truth of such a statement as 'He is afraid' logically require the 
existence of a specific feeling? I imagine that it would nowadays be generally 
conceded that emotion words are commonly used without any implication that 
the person they refer to is having a particular experience at any given time." 
(Bedford, 1957, p283}. 
Importantly then 'being angry' does not entail 'feeling angry', but as Bedford notes "this does 
not accord with the confidence we have in our beliefs about our own and other peoples' emotions 
respectively." (ibid. p.28S) and emotion terms apply whether we know someone is feeling an 
emotion or not. These problems stem from both the dominance of feeling-centred concepts of 
emotion and uncertainty about introspection and states of consciousness. This is not to say we 
should reject emotion terminology in favour of empirical findings, but we should bear in mind 
that emotion terms cannot function as names, offering intersubjectively shared meanings, due to 
the essentially private nature of emotional experiences. 
For musical emotions the distinction between experience and expression of emotion is 
important. A frequently raised argument against musically aroused emotions being real 
emotions, is that they typically lack associated behavioural components. People listening to 
'sad' music do not typicaJly manifest sad behaviour. However, in making the distinction 
between 'is sad' and 'feels sad', one can see that expression of an emotion is not necessary to 
the experience or recognition of that emotion. (A notable characteristic of some emotions is that 
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we may control their behavioural expression e.g. amusement, resentment etc.). Indeed we would 
not deny that someone incapable of behavioural expressions of emotion was incapable of 
experiencing emotions, only that they are incapable of demonstrating standard behavioural 
characteristics. Conversely it is quite reasonable to suggest that (as actors must commonly do), 
we could simulate the correct behavioural responses for an emotion yet not feel that emotion 
ourselves. 8 
The second issue here concerns the cultural diversity of emotions. Whilst we are trying to 
separate emotional states from emotive language, language nonetheless plays a key part in the 
social construction of emotions, and can certainly influence how many, and in what way 
emotions are conceptualised. Emotions as social constructs reflect culturally variable 
conceptions of the self and in this sense we see cultural diversity in emotional classification. 
"Emotions such as pride, ambition, guilt and remorse, imply a certain view of 
ourselves. They are probably not felt in cultures in which little importance is 
attached to individual effort and responsibility." (Peters 1974 p.402). 
In attempting to analyse emotions in terms of cultural variance, we can at least draw a 
distinction between purely physiological symptoms, which may be universal, and culturally, and 
socially constructed emotional behaviours, e.g. expressions of grief or anger.9 A good example 
here which again allows us to distinguish between mandatory physiological and conventionally 
adopted expressions of emotion, may be drawn from studies of autism. Autistic children are 
poor at recognising both facial and vocal expressions of emotion, and relating such emotional 
input to correct emotional states or situations, demonstrating specific emotional deficits in the 
presence of normal perceptual processing. In expressing emotions, some autistic children do 
however, exhibit emotional behaviour. But they do not typically adopt conventional (learnt) 
expressions of emotion, rather they choose their own idiosyncratic emotional vocalisations and 
facial expressions (for further references see Willliams, D, 1 996; Schopler, E & Mesibov, 0 B, 
1986 pp.ll2-113). 
Cultural diversity then is demonstrated in naming, recognising and expressing emotion. The 
number of emotions identified by different cultures exemplifies this, ranging from just 8 to over 
700 (p.238 The Social Construction of Emotions). Putting aside the ambiguity of emotional 
language, the existence of mandatory affective behaviours leads us to question whether there 
may nonetheless be a common core of emotional representations that operates universally and 
given the insufficiency of emotional language, how this might be identified. I am wary of 
referring to 'basic' emotions, this being a controversial issue in the psychology of emotion. An 
important distinction needs to be made between identifying emotions as 'basic' (i.e. prototypical 
cases) within a specific classificatory schema, and 'basic' referring to emotions having 
universally shared features. I am concerned with the latter, that is in what respects emotions 
may have common physiological patterns of arousal, behavioural characteristics, cognitive 
components or causal antecedents. Many schemas have identified 'basic' emotions according to 
their own particular biases. James A verill comments on this issue: 
"simply because an emotional concept is basic within some classification 
scheme, it does not follow that the corresponding emotion is somehow more 
fundamental than other emotions." "If our goal is a general theory of emotion, 
we must transcend parochial alJegiances. Basic emotion has no more place in 
psychology than basic animals in zoology or basic diseases in medicine." (p.8, 
p.14. Averill in Ekman and Davidson). 
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Many theorists do hold that it is however, possible to identifY universal affective features or 
components of emotion e.g. facial expressions corresponding to e.g., anger, fear, disgust and 
sadness, which appear across all cultures (see Ekman and Davidson ( eds.) 1994, ch.l ). 
relating this to music, due to perceptual restraints in auditory processing, certain structural 
elements of music - rhythmic, melodic and harmonic, are consistent across cultures and perhaps 
these will be sufficient to produce uniform responses to and recognition of emotional content in 
music. An example of cross-cultural emotional responses to music might lend support to either 
an empirical perspective, that emotions are evoked primarily due to physiological responses or 
to a view that emotions are evoked and recognised due to acculturation. What seems most likely 
is that like ordinary emotions, musical emotions involve a combination of mandatory universal 
responses to stimuli and also culture specific, acquired responses and the relationship of these 
types of responses will be given further consideration in Chapter 3. 
Importantly then, for music, we want to talk in terms of both universal and culture specific 
affective features and any comprehensive theory of emotion must also encompass this 
distinction. Music, like emotion, is culturally variable and so it is worth considering in what 
respect emotional responses to music could be universal, and how these responses might relate 
to universal affective features. What degree of uniformity is observed in the number and type of 
emotions aroused by and recognised in music? Indeed, why should sad music evoke sadness, 
joyful music happiness, yet angry music be unable to evoke anger in the listener? Music chiefly 
makes us sad and happy, sometimes scared or amused perhaps, but rarely if ever does the 
music's content provoke anger (unless directed at some relationship of the music and extra-
musical events, or an aspect of its performance). Music's inability to arouse certain emotions 
does not obviously correspond to its lack in representational powers. Music does not seem 
markedly better at representing sadness, happiness, or fear, than it does anger. A different 
approach is to consider how emotion is transferred between people, and empirical findings might 
then be integrated into a unified account of expression. 
Studying which emotions are transferred between people may assist us in explaining which 
emotions music is capable of arousing. As an example, Table 1.1 offers a classification of 
emotions as contagious and non-contagious. An initial consideration is whether we may identity 
any similarities amongst 'contagious and non-contagious• emotions. 

















It would appear that there are different degrees of contagion, and we also need to make a 
distinction here between contagious and merely detectable emotions. Anger is non-contagious 
but is detectable: we can recognise anger in music and people but it does not make us feel 
angry. Sadness and happiness seem to be highly contagious and neither are they easily 
concealed, whereas emotions such as fear and grief can be contagious but are also concealable. 
This offers a fairly puzzling picture of emotions once again, but turning to an evolutionary 
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explanation might be fruitful. The detectability and contagiousness of emotions may well be 
explained in terms of their evolutionary necessity. An immediate observation is that most of the 
'contagious' emotions are those that would be advantageous in evolutionary terms, both as 
survival aids for the individual and for successful social groups. It would be a useful tool if 
emotions such as fear and distress could both be detectable and contagious, so that not only 
oneself, but also others were prepared for flight in the presence of a harmful stimulus. Similarly 
it would be necessary to both successful social interaction and a survival aid to detect anger, but 
not necessary that this is contagious. Those who could identify, respond to and convey 
emotional states, would be better fitted to effective co-operation than those lacking these 
abilities. 
1.4 Empirical Investigation of the Emotions 
Increasingly theorists are becoming aware that, whilst components of emotions usually form a 
cohesive whole, it is possible for them to occur in isolation. One can have a distinct feeling, 
whilst lacking cognitive content, or one can have certain evaluative beliefs about an object and 
behave in a certain way towards it, without feeling an emotion oneself or recognising one's 
emotional state. One can forget or fail to recognise the object of one's emotion, yet continue to 
be in an emotional state. Attempts to classify affective states need to invoke both physiological 
and cognitive characteristics and, before proposing my own general account of affective states 
(2.5) which attempts to do just this, I wish to highlight some empirical findings which are 
particularly relevant as regards the relationship between cognitive and physiological components 
of emotion. Specifically, I examine the possibility of there being entirely non-cognitive 
emotions or non-conscious affect. Certainly not all affective processing is post-cognitive. 
Affective responses (realised in terms of preference for certain objects), are developed when 
presentation of stimuli is too fast to allow for recognition of objects presented (see LeDoux in 
Gazzaniga, (ed.) 1984). 
In terms of perceptual processing, an initial distinction needs to be made between recognition of 
emotional content (e.g. facial expressions, behaviour, emotional contours of the voice) and 
recognition of perceptual features themselves (e.g. identity of faces, content of an utterance). 
Emotion recognition is not always dependent on conscious recognition of perceptual input, but 
may in many cases be more automatic. This suggests there is a need for caution in contrasting 
examples of 'emotion', some of which may be the result of conscious cognitive evaluations, 
whilst others may be largely non-cognitive. Good examples of this are seen in the 
neuropsychological literature. There is evidence for separate processing of facial identity and 
facial expression and similarly, a distinction between identity and emotional content of the 
voice. A subject may recognise facial expressions of emotion, but not identity of faces, or may 
identify the voice as belonging to a particular person but not recognise its emotional tone. 
Peretz and Gagnon (1998) observe that 
"It has been recurrently reported that brain damage can produce selective 
deficits in the recognition of identities of seen faces while leaving intact the 
recognition of expressions. Inversely, selective deficits affecting the recognition 
of emotions from facial expressions without disturbing recognition of their 
identity have been reported (e.g. Etcoff, 1984; Parry et al., 1991; Young et al., 
1993). These observations entail that certain aspects of face identity and facial 
expression are analysed separately in the human brain." (p.21, Peretz and 
Gagnon, Neurocase, 1999). 
This evidence suggests there may be separate 'channels' for processing emotional content and 
calls for a clear distinction between affective processing and processing of identity. This 
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distinction is neglected in conceptual analysis of emotion, where emotion recognition is typically 
explained in terms of conscious awareness and evaluation of causes and objects. 
Further evidence supports the claim that it is possible to have an emotional response to an object 
without having recognised the object itself. We may have a positive affective response to, e.g. 
music or speech, without knowledge of its content (Jauregui, 1995, p.l79-l8l), or one might 
have a positive response to a smiling face without being able to recognise it as a face. The idea 
of having emotions in response to 'unknown' (or unidentifiable) stimuli gains further support 
from the neuropsychological literature. To give a further example, split-brain patients may 
experience an emotion and its associated feelings but without awareness of its cause. 
"Thus Gazzaniga (1988) reports on a split-brain patient to whose right cortex 
was shown a film clip of a person being thrown onto a fire. This patient could 
not describe what she saw since expressive language abilities/verbal language 
depends on the left side. She said: 'I don't really know what I saw; I think just 
a white flash maybe some trees, red trees like in the fall.' Then she continued, 
speaking to Gazzaniga: 'I feel kind of scared. I feel jumpy I don't like this 
room or maybe it's you getting me nervous" (p.l46, Understanding Emotions). 
This example shows emotional recognition and experience might occur without the usual 
cognitive content associated with the emotion and certainly should lead us to re-evaluate the 
relationship between cognitive awareness and emotional experience. 10 All the same, one must be 
cautious about the strength of claims made on the basis of this evidence. Can one judge from 
the inability to verbalise, that the patient had not perceived the event? Further evidence would 
suggest not, LeDoux reports on split-brain subjects, that; 
"If stimuli are presented in such a way that only the right hemisphere sees 
them, the split brain person is not able to verbally describe what the stimulus is. 
However, if you give the right hemisphere the opportunity to respond without 
having to talk, it becomes clear that the stimulus has registered. For example, 
if the left hand, which sends touch information to the right hemisphere, reaches 
into a bag of objects, it is able to sort through them and pull out the one that 
matches the picture seen by the right hemisphere." (LeDoux, 1996 pp.13-14 ). 
What these examples do show is that information about emotion may be processed without the 
ability to verbalise or have awareness of an emotion-object or affective state in terms of 
language. That is, one may have an emotion aroused even if one is unable to verbalise its cause 
or object. These findings support my comments in I .3, that one should be cautious of over-
emphasising verbalisation as an accurate measure of underlying psychological states. 
1.4.1 Emotion and the Brain: Neural Mechanisms of Emotion 
The above findings are chiefly concerned with functional models of emotion. But given that 
emotion processing can be both affected by, and resistant to brain damage, the question 
naturally arises as to whether there are any localisable neural structures associated with 
affective processes. Two main areas of the brain have been associated with emotion, but these 
are involved in the mediation of radically different affective functions. Subjects with frontal 
lobe damage have been seen to exhibit emotional 'detachment' and deficits in 'emotional and 
social reasoning, often with patients losing the emotional 'feeling' that should accompany 
events, memories, and responses to people. These subjects are often unable to judge the 
appropriateness of emotional behaviour and language, unable to involve affective implications 
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in reasoning, and unable to control affective behaviour. These subject seem to be suffering from 
deficits in emotional cognition. Another area of the brain (or rather set of brain structures) 
called the limbic system has long been associated with emotion. But the functions mediated by 
these areas are markedly different from the frontal lobe patients above. The limbic system 
would seem to be involved in 'affective perception' as opposed to 'emotional cognition'. (See 
Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1996). The limbic system lies beneath the neocortex, surrounding the 
brain stem, and consists of evolutionarily older structures which are also seen in animals. The 
limbic system is functionally concerned with visceral processes including monitoring of one's 
physiological affective states. We might say that the limbic system is involved in primitive 
emotional processes as opposed to the higher cognitive processes associated with neocortical 
structures. 
Much current research focuses on a component of the limbic system called the amygdala 
(LeDoux, 1996, New Scientist, April 1996, Aggleton, 1992) as an important centre for emotion 
processing (see Appendix I for a summary of amygdala function). Notably, as well as auditory 
and visual inputs, the amygdala receives sensory information directly from the thalamus, that is 
before auditory and visual input has been otherwise processed. So emotion is processed 
directly, but as Oatley & Jenkins put it "not via routes that result in the recognition of objects or 
distinctive sounds. "11 This brings into our discussion the concept of nonconscious affect • that 
we may have non-conscious affective responses involving split-second processing of sensory 
information. The hypothesis is that with such high-speed reactions we may have emotions 
without cognitive awareness. A positive or negative state may be induced without knowledge of 
its cause (rather like the split brain subject above). Primitive emotional circuitries (supposedly 
a throwback to evolutionary survival mechanisms) produce a 'feel' prior to cognitive awareness. 
Although tests with subliminal images show that this initial 'feel' may subsequently change 
when the subject becomes aware of the source, it seems possible this initial emotional reaction 
may have influence on subsequent cognitive states. Zajonc (New Scientist, April 1996) states 
"our brains are wired to 'feel' before they 'think' •.. and what they feel in those first few 
thousandths of a second may influence subsequent thoughts, even ones which appear to be 
rational and emotionless" (ibid. p.21). And it seems such split-second responses are certainly 
what occur when we react in fear to harmless objects. An object resembling a snake will trigger 
a flight (aversive) reaction before we have evaluated or processed the visual information to teJI 
us that it is in fact something harmless. 
From a philosophical point of view, this raises the question whether we should include such 
'emotions' or reflexive physiological responses within our analysis when they seemingly lack 
any cognitive content (particularly if one adopts the cognitivist model). It is interesting to 
consider to what extent such initial positive or negative reactions influence our 'conscious' 
emotions. This hypothesis might explain why we appear to have distinct types of fear and 
happiness but not distinct types of shame or embarrassment, which are dependent on cognitive 
content, the former being perhaps influenced by strong reflexive responses. However, this is 
certainly not to say that individual emotions may have anything like dedicated neural circuitries 
and neither do these initial reflexive responses predetermine our subsequent emotional states 
which involve many other factors. That is, it is not to say that cognition cannot subsequently 
alter affective states induced by reflexive responses rather, for example that subsequent 
cognition maintains or suppresses the physiological response e.g., calming down when one 
realises an object is a harmless piece of rope and not a snake. Importantly, as LeDoux 
comments, the "wiring of the brain at this point in our evolutionary history is such that 
connections from the emotional systems to the cognitive systems are stronger than connections 
from the cognitive systems to the emotional systems.".12 In light of this it would be problematic 
to exclude reflexive responses if they form part of, or influence subsequent emotional states. 
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1.4.2 Reflexive and Intentional Emotional Behaviour 
In addition to considering the relationship of reflexive responses to cognition, we should also 
consider whether their relationship to emotional behaviour. As noted in 1.1, behaviourist 
theories of the emotions were largely rejected by philosophers. Nonetheless, Behaviourism as a 
theory of human conduct continued to flourish and led to the development of new experimental 
methods. Importantly Behaviourism has been interpreted as an account of intentional action and 
therefore having little or nothing to do with underlying neural mechanisms of emotion. 
However, as we have seen above, some emotional behaviours may be a consequence of 
mandatory responses to stimuli. Therefore the examination of emotional behaviour may be 
fruitful if one makes important distinctions between the types of action observed. 
The need for this distinction is exemplified in the behaviourist analysis below (Table 1.2). 
Emotions are categorised as regards 'tendency' to action. One can see from such attempts to 
define emotion in terms of action tendencies that again there are many insufficiencies. Action 
tendencies are neither necessarily unique nor sufficient to define emotions in this way and in this 


















Table 1.2 Classlfteation of Emotion by Aetion Tendenc:ies13 
Definition 
Tendency to get closer 
Tendency to stay close 
tendency to watch or think about 
Tendency towards undirected action 
Generalised action readiness 
Acceptance of Absence of action readiness 
Generalised absence of action readiness 
Absence of goals for action 
Action readiness in the absence of action 
Uncertainty about direction action readiness should take 
Tendency to submit to control 
Tendency to avoid, flee, or protect oneself 
Tendency to reject or break contact 
Tendency to remove obstacle, hurt, oppose or resist 
Tendency to control 


















The most obvious criticism is indeed that the behaviourist categorisation fails to distinguish 
between motivations for emotional behaviour, or rather how affective states are realised as 
action. Affective states may be realised as intentional actions relating to the cognitive content 
of an emotion, or associated beliefs and desires. If you are angry with someone, you may take 
action such as to avoid meeting them (an intentional, long term behavioural strategy). In other 
cases, affective states may be accompanied by culture specific (acquired) but nonetheless 
mandatory physiological responses, for example, particular mannerisms accompanying anger • 
clenching fists and teeth, pointing. stamping etc. As discussed above (pp 10-11 ), there appear to 
be two distinct areas of the brain, damage to which causes emotional dysfunctions. Subjects 
with frontal lobe damage exhibit problems in emotional cognition (judging appropriate 
emotional behaviour and involving affective considerations in reasoning) and subjects with 
damage to the amygdala display difficulties with affective perception (recognising displays of 
emotion). It would seem that these distinctions in emotional functions relate well to the kind of 
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distinction seen in terms of emotional behaviour - intentional behaviour relating to emotional 
cognition, and reflexive responses to affective perception. In view of this, some emotional 
'behaviours• may be direct responses to stimuli, and it may be worth considering how these 
mandatory affective responses relate to underlying neural structures. 
Importantly, this is exactly the distinction which behaviourism fails to account for. That is, 
between actions as reflexive and intentional. Emotional behaviour may be realised as 'reflexive' 
affective responses through immediate and often 'uncontrollable' responses to perceptual input 
e.g. retreating in response to a noxious stimulus, blushing, and trembling. These are responses 
of the autonomic nervous system and are universal affective actions. (The amygdala is one of 
the 'control centres' of the ANS). A particular concern then is to what extent our common-
sense notions of emotions as motives for actions as in the behaviourist account, relate to actual 
levels of emotional arousal. It seems we may intuitively refer to emotional feelings and 
physiological effects as 'active' or 'passive' in terms of recognising emotions' action tendencies 
or lack of. Purely physiological affective responses may be quite successfully defmed in terms 
of their 'action potential' or arousal level and subsequently may be classified as 'active' or 
'passive.' However, these descriptions are not merely intuitive measures of 'tendencies' for 
intentional action, An important function of the ANS "is to provide support for behavioural 
demands" (Ekman and Davidson p.253). The autonomic nervous system (ANS) controls 
responses to sensory stimuli, provoking mandatory attractive/aversive responses. The ANS 
controls mobilisation and energy conservation of the body, heart rate and blood flow. The 
sympathetic division increases metabolic rate, resulting in vascular dilation and pupil dilation, 
(arousal). The parasympathetic division conserves energy, resulting in vascular and pupil 
constriction (lowered arousal). Different combinations of autonomic responses will be elicited 
in relation to the emotion or perceptual input - e.g. a fear response triggered by the amygdala 
may result in a flight response and regulation of blood to particular groups of muscles. It seems 
we have an unconscious awareness of the autonomic states of others too, for example, we will 
consistently pick a face with dilated pupils (aroused) as more attractive, without knowing why 
we find it so. Such responses are universal and largely involuntary processes, although in some 
instances we may learn to control them. Musicians and athletes, for example, may learn to 
control their 'nerves' so their performance is not affected, or indeed may be enhanced by such 
physiological reactions. 
Further studies (Damasio, 1994; Levenson, 1992) show that autonomic responses may be 
measured whether subjects themselves are aware of any affective arousal or not. It is not 
possible however, (and likely never to be possible) to identifY emotion-specific physiological 
effects at this level of physiological arousal. One can identify arousal and lowered-arousal 
corresponding to positive and negative affective states, and differing arousal patterns for gross 
categories of emotion (e.g., grief, contentment, resentment). This is easily explained when one 
considers that the function of arousal responses is to mediate necessary action - running, 
withdrawing, fighting, or their function (by means of lowered arousal) is returning the body to a 
state of rest. In light of these facts it is unlikely that specific emotions themselves (e.g. pride, 
jealousy etc.) would exhibit autonomically unique arousal patterns although they might be 
initiated by autonomic responses. Nonetheless, the findings do indicate that there are universal 
physiological affective features. Music also evokes affective responses and this raises the 
question whether there are universal affective responses to music which function as affective 
responses to stimuli in the same way as the affective responses outlined above. Indeed, this 
hypothesis would seem to gain support from empirical measurements of affective responses to 
music. 14 The interaction of physiological and cognitive aspects of emotion will be reviewed in · 
Chapters 2 and 3. Certainly classification in terms of intensity would add a missing dimension 
to the cognitivist account. This will be considered further in Chapter 2 
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1.5 Problems Within the Analysis of Musical Emotions 
In the light of both theoretical and empirical analyses of emotion, I would now like to consider 
some problems specific to musical emotions. Historically, disagreements have centred on 
whether music could or could not express emotion. Alongside these studies, consideration was 
given as to how the description of music in expressive terms might be properly understood. It is 
now generally accepted (given an appropriate explanation of the application of expressive 
predicates to music) that music does express emotion, that is, it may typically sound sad, happy, 
etc. to a listener. Nonetheless, distinct problems occur in the explanation of expression and 
arousal of emotion by music. For listeners to recognise emotional states as expressed by music 
(e.g. to describe music as sounding sad, happy and the like), one must explain how music as a 
non-representational art form can provide sufficient information to convey specific emotional 
states. 
Taken alone, the recognition of emotions expressed by music might not seem so problematic. 
Many accounts provide promising explanations of the phenomenon, for example, music 
mimicking the characteristics of a person in an emotional state, music mimicking emotional 
contours or the 'feel' of an emotion, music conveying emotion by its associations with certain 
events, or even that music just 'sounds' sad' due to the effects of its formal properties on our 
perceptual systems. Some or all of these accounts may hold some truth but aestheticians have 
been roughly divided in response to this issue. This division occurs on two fronts: Firstly, 
whether the affective states music arouses differ from ordinary instances of emotion, whether 
they are truly emotions, (as opposed to moods, feelings or other affective states). Secondly, how 
music evokes these states, whether by musical features themselves without any external 
reference, or music's associations with external (extra-musical) events. This opposition in 
accounts of expression will be subject to detailed criticism in Chapters 2 - 4. For the moment 
however, I should like to consider the relationship of expressed emotion to its arousal in the 
listener in light of the empirical and theoretical analyses of emotion discussed. This will offer a 
brief overview of the approach to musical arousal within aesthetics which will be subject to 
criticism in Chapters 2 - 4. A particular aim is to make it clear that in light of empirical 
findings, commitments to differing recognition theories have strong implications for arousal. I 
should add here that, when referring to 'emotions', I am concerned with music's arousal of 
affective states in general. Music undoubtedly arouses affective states however these might be 
described. 
Initially I want to dispense with the claim that music merely evokes moods or feelings. Whilst 
this is one solution to music's lack of intentional objects, it is not strictly true to say that 
expressive music provokes 'moods' of sadness as opposed to instances of emotion. Musically 
evoked states Jack the duration associated with moods and this is one feature that theorists do 
largely agree upon in attempting to distinguish between moods and emotions. Also we do 
(usually) know it is the music which is responsible for our emotional state and in this sense we 
have the determinate antecedent event typically associated with emotions rather than moods. 15 
Moreover, the reasons behind these claims are not substantial. If one ties music's Jack of 
intentional object to its inability to represent, this conflicts with explanations of objectless 
emotion in non-musical contexts. An ordinary occurrence of objectless anxiety would hardly be 
put down to an inability of the context to provide a representation of an intentional object, and 
neither would the lack of intentional object legitimate calling this state a mood rather than an 
emotion. Nonetheless, I do not claim that all musically aroused affective states conform to 
paradigm cases of emotion, rather, that claiming musically aroused states to be feelings and 
moods is no answer to the problem ·or how these states are aroused. It would seem music is 
capable of arousing a wide range of affective states which may encompass moods and feelings 
but also encompasses what are ordinarily taken to be emotions. The nub of current debate is 
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how music may arouse 'emotions' in the listener. Furthermore, what is the nature of these 
aroused emotions and, importantly, in relation to ordinary occurrences of emotion, what 
functions as the object of these musical emotions? 
1.5.1 What are Musically Aroused Emotions 'About'? 
One way in which musically aroused emotions seem to differ from everyday occurrences of 
emotion, is their lack or apparent lack of an intentional object. This is arguably the chief 
problem if one wants to maintain that music arouses emotions: What are musically aroused 
emotions about or directed towards? In all other senses we might arguably want to describe 
them as 'fully fledged' emotions. That is, emotions not differing substantially from their 
ordinary occurrences. There are two routes which may be taken here: the first is to attempt to 
identify what might act as the intentional object of musical emotions whether real, imaginary, or 
identified by reference to extra-musical features. The second is to consider how musical 
emotions might function as 'objectless' emotions without being explained away as moods or 
feelings - affective types which are no more appropriate categorisations than emotion itself. 
Let us begin by considering what musically aroused emotions might possibly be 'about'. 
Perhaps the most obvious suggestion is to say that the emotion aroused is directed towards the 
music itself which then becomes the intentional object. Several problems arise on this account. 
Suppose we listen to a particularly 'sad' piece of music, and sadness is aroused in us in virtue 
of hearing this piece. It is difficult to conceive how the music itself might function as the object 
of our emotion. Our sadness is not 'directed at' the music, we are not sad because it is badly 
composed. indeed one may eJ:\ioy the sadness aroused by music. Note also that the arousal of 
sadness in response to music is distinct from being sad about a piece of music, for example in 
response to some aspect of its composition (being badly written), or to some aspect of its 
performance, (being poorly played) or to the context in which a work is being performed (one is 
being forced to listen against one's will). 16 Without further qualification, suggesting music is 
the object of our emotion does not mark a distinction between being saddened by a piece of 
music and being sad about a piece of music. It seems this explanation also fails to capture the 
negative aspect of sadness in its ordinary occurrence: if we are sad about something, then we 
would wish that thing to be otherwise. However, we surely can both experience sadness through 
music and yet not want the music to be otherwise. 
An alternative response to the problem of intentionality is to take a line similar to Levinson's in 
Music and Negative Emotions. ( 1982) and to suggest that the objects of musical emotions are 
imaginary objects. Levinson explains, 
ccwhen one hears sad music, begins to feel sad, and imagines one is actually 
sad, [my italics] one must, according to the logic of the concept, be imagining 
that there is an object for one's sadness and that one maintains certain 
evaluative beliefs (or attitudes) regarding it' .••. 'I feel sad but my sadness has 
no determinate object;' it is directed only to 'some featureless object posited 
vaguely in my imagination." (Levinson, Music and Negative Emotions, p.337). 
It is certainly plausible considering the complex associations of music with external features 
that it might readily suggest by imitation or otherwise an object for the aroused emotion. 
However, it is difficult to see why it would be advantageous to posit that musically aroused 
emotions are imaginary. If music may provide an object by reference to external features, 
whether in fact or is imagination, this nonetheless an object (just as in ordinary instances of 
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emotion, objects may be real or imaginary). Why then for music, should one need to 'imagine 
one is actually sad' as in Levinson's description? 
To return to Levinson's account, he goes on to claim that the feelings evoked by music are 
aroused as empathic responses to the recognition of emotions expressed by music, 17 and these 
empathic responses are like but not identical with real emotions (Jacking determinate cognitive 
content). His claim then is that one imagines that one is sad, whilst the object and related 
evaluative beliefs remain indeterminate. This then avoids him having to explain how music may 
provide specific objects and evaluative beliefs, whilst still maintaining that music is capable of 
arousing cognitively complex emotions. On Levinson's view then 'music accomplishes this 
without actually having to represent cognitive content' (Kart & Robinson, p.404). It does seem 
unclear though how one can maintain evaluative beliefs towards an indeterminate object. 
Levinson does not explain this in sufficient detail, except to suggest that he interprets 
indeterminate content to be that music can represent emotion types e.g., hope and grief, as 
opposed to tokens e.g., John's hope for a reward. Perhaps what he has in mind for 
indeterminate content of hope, is merely a general concept of a happier future state • in musical 
terms, a resolution oftension. 
This seems to offer no better solution than suggesting musical emotions are objectless emotions. 
Levinson's account does not reflect the 'immediate' nature of affective responses to music, and 
draws us away from the idea that affective responses to music are essentially like ordinary 
instances of emotion. More often than not we do not enter into any process of imagination (at 
least, not a process of imagination that is subject to introspection), although it is certainly 
plausible that we might do so in relation to music with strong extra-musical associations: music 
with lyrics, programme music, conventionally used musical styles. Whilst Levinson's account 
seems plausible in light of the specific piece he takes as his example (Mendelssohn's Hebrides 
overture), it still does not seem to provide an explanation of how music in general, (and musical 
structures in general) might cause or produce these responses. If it is really just a matter of our 
imagination producing an object irrespective of the musical content, then the music itself would 
seem to be redundant. But quite apart from this, if Levinson's account were correct it would 
seem that music could arouse quite a variety of emotions, but the fact remains that pure 
instrumental music itself has a fairly limited repertoire of emotions which it may arouse in the 
listener. 
The fact that music itself only has the capacity to arouse a limited range of emotions has 
reinforced the view that responses to music may be empathic in nature, that is we recognise 
musical expression of emotion and respond to the music as if it were an expression of emotion 
by a person (or state of affairs). This view is chiefly represented by the behavioural similarity 
thesis • that music may imitate or otherwise represent characteristics of emotional expression. 
Certainty the 'imitative' account seems credible if the music is to imitate gross behavioural 
characteristics of a person in an emotional state or imitation of sounds such as thunder, crashing 
waves etc. But suppose the object to be imitated Is an inanimate object, or a belief • for 
example, the object of my fear is a dark menacing cave, or the belief that I may be mugged. 
This makes it difficult to see how music independent of extra-musical associations (convention 
etc.) might be able to imitate or represent such objects. Aaron Ridley presents exactly this 
critique: 
"music is poor at representing persons, things, ideas, or states of affairs: and so 
the melismatic gesture is unable to resemble behaviour expressive of responses 
to persons, things, ideas, or states of affairs. This is important inasmuch as 
what an emotion is about, what an emotions object is, will very often be its 
chief distinguishing feature ..... Many of our emotions are what they are, then -
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can be characterised or expressed -just because their objects are what they are. 
But music can never show us what an emotion is about; and hence music 
cannot resemble behaviour which is expressive of any emotion whose prime 
distinguishing features include its object." (Musical Sympathies. p.SO) 
Ridley's critique, like Levinson's account suggests that music cannot represent tokens of 
emotion as opposed to types. But this does not seem unduly problematic, as we have noted the 
range of pure music's expressive powers is limited and it is rare, if at all possible, that music 
without narrative or lyrics or contextual information could represent or imitate the specific 
cognitive content necessary to convey a particular instance (or token) of emotion. All that 
music can do, claims Ridley, is represent or mimic 'snapshots' of expressive behaviour in 
isolation. This does not refute the behavioural similarity view, it only serves to say that music 
may struggle to express emotions which are characterised in terms of their objects. For 
example, complex emotions- those that necessarily take objects e.g., grief, love, and hate (and 
emotions whose objects are propositional as rather than actual) as opposed to emotions that may 
be generalised and also function as moods, such as happiness and sadness. Indeed Putman in 
Why Instrumental Music Has no Shame, suggests that rather than refuting the behavioural 
similarity view, the object dependency of some emotions, and music's Jack of representational 
powers, just outlines why pure music has a limited range of expression and arousal. 
Nonetheless there is still a more damaging problem for this view. If one wants to adhere to the 
view that emotions (as intentional states) must have objects, then this carries over to the 
empathic states which are aroused. For even in the case of empathic responses, these are still 
intentional states - they are stiJI directed at or towards some object. If, for example, one 
responds to a person or situation with pity • one feels pity for someone, if one responds with 
shared pride, anger, shock etc., one still requires an intentional object for one's empathic 
response and it does not seem true to say that one pities, envies, or is happy for the music or 
even that these responses are directed towards the expression of emotion by the music. So in 
terms of arousal a general imitative account the behavioural similarity view fails. Music may 
still be able to express by means of behavioural similarity, but specificity will be restricted to 
gross behavioural characteristics which music can successfully imitate. Music may then still 
express strongly physiological affective states which do not need an intentional object, without 
needing to refer to extra-musical information. 
In light of these criticisms, this offers an opportunity to see both how empirical findings might 
offer alternative solutions and also how the nature of arousal might bear upon the problem of 
intentionality. Considering the communicative properties of emotions themselves might offer a 
different perspective on imitative accounts of music. Mimicry plays an important role in the 
contagion of emotions. We naturally mimic the behavioural gestures, vocal contours, postures 
and facial expressions of others and synchronise our own movements with theirs. This may be 
an evolutionary feature enabling us to learn about others emotional states and to adopt 
appropriate emotional behaviours. In adopting the emotional behaviourisms of others, we may 
induce emotions in ourselves and a variety of empirical data supports this: 
"Nina Bull (19Sl) ... observed that attitudes comprise both mental and motor 
components and that the two are tightly linked. To test this notion, she 
conducted a series of S3 experiments. In the first set, she found that when 
men and women were hypnotised and were instructed to experience certain 
emotions (joy, triumph, disgust, fear, anger, and depression), they 
automatically adopted appropriate bodily postures. In the second set, she 
required subjects to adopt a series of emotional postures. Some examples: 
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Depression: "you feel heavy all over. There is a slumping sensation in your 
chest." 
Fear: "Your whole body feels stiffened up You can't catch your breath. You 
want to run away but you can't" 
Anger: "Your hands are getting tense and your arms are getting tense. You 
can feel your jaw tightening." 
Joy: "There is a feeling of relaxation and lightness in your whole body." 
When subjects were required to adopt these postures, they soon came to 
experience the emotions associated with them. When instructed to try to 
experience emotions incompatible with these postures, they had great difficulty 
in doing so." (p. 69 Emotional Contagion. For more recent examples see 
Riskind and Gotay, 1982; Ekman, 1992). 
This analysis of emotion may offer further clues as to how an imitative account of musical 
expression might work, and bears similarities to the examples of objectless emotions 
(nonconscious affect) discussed in 1.4. However, I do not want to claim simply that music 
mimics gestura( or vocal contours as empirical evidence contradicts this claim A more 
sophisticated account of mimicry for music would be that music has a direct physiological effect 
on the ANS inducing positive or negative affective state and importantly perhaps inducing their 
associated postures In inducing these postures, emotions may be aroused in the listener. This 
suggestion will be examined further in Chapter 4. 
One thing that is evident from the aesthetic accounts is the insistence that aroused emotions 
must have an intentional object. While this may be true of some emotions, there are surely 
many instances of ordinary emotions for which this is not the case. Certainly, in light of the 
empirical findings this claim must surely be brought into question. As in the account of 
mimicry above, how the aroused emotion is induced may bear heavily on whether it is focused 
upon any particular object. Indeed within emotion theory there is some acceptance that not all 
emotions have to conform to paradigm cases. Most theorists would agree to some extent on the 
existence of 'objectless emotions, • with musical examples most famously being attributed to this 
category. ta 
Whilst most theorists have now come to accept that the expression of emotion in music is 
ultimately dependent on perceptual properties of music, few concessions have been made to 
psychological and neuropsychological accounts. Most aestheticians seem to adopt a fairly 
analytic conception of the listening experience which does not match the experience of the narve 
listener, (and in many cases, does not seem to match the experience of any listener). Evident 
within the preceding discussion is that many explanations of musical emotion neglect the 
immediate physiological effects of music. However, these will form a significant part of the 
investigation into musical expression. Particularly how physiological and cognitive responses to 
music interact. It is clear that music can evoke a wide range of affective states, in a variety of 
ways. And the above example of mimicry is only one example whereby empirical studies may 
be a useful addition to the issue of musical expression. Chapter 2 will examine the limitations 
of the cognitivism to account for varieties of affective state, and will outline an attempt to 
incorporate musical and ordinary instances of emotion into a general account of emotionally 
affective states. 
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Notes 
1 See Lyons, 1992 fur an overview offueting-centred accounts. 
2 Michael Tye, in Ten Problems of Consciousness actually tries to account for sensations as a species of 
intentional or representational states. One merit of his account is that it is able to deal with phantom limb cases 
via intentional inexistence (that the intentional object may or may not exist) e.g., you can still represent your foot 
as hurting even when you no longer have a foot. This might seem to offer support to feeling centred accounts but 
in fuct, we do not have to concede much to Tye. Bodily sensations all involve representing parts or areas of the 
body as having certain qualities, which is not normally the case with emotions. although in some cases it is: e.g., 
one can be relieved that one's foot isn't hurting any longer, or can be upset that one has toothache. The bodily 
sensations in these standard cases are still non-intentional states. The subject of the intentional state is the bodily 
sensation (e.g. I am upset that my foot hurts) it is not the bodily sensation itself which has intentionality. 
3 See Gordon pp. 21-22. This echoes the comments of James (1890); "the merely desaiptive literature of the 
emotions is one of the most tedious parts of psycllology. And not only is it tedious, but you fuel that its 
subdivisions are to a great extent either fictitious or unimportant, and that its pretences to accuracy are a sham. 
..... "The trouble with the emotions in psychology is that they are regarded too much as absolutely individual 
things. So long as they are set down as so many eternal and saaed psychic entities like the old immutable species 
in natural history, so long all that can be done with them is reverently to catalogue their separate characters, 
points, and effects .. (James The principles of Psychology Dover edition 1950, Vol. 2, p.449). 
4 See Donellan. Causes, Objects, and Producers of the Emotions, and Ekman/Davidson, The Nature of Emotion: 
Question 4 on evidence of universals in antecedents of emotion. 
5 The best translation we have of this is 'the pleasure taken in someone else's misfortune' certainly a 
psychological state which occurs in English culture. Perhaps though this corresponds to the ooncept of retribution, 
though we would not consider this to be an emotion. This underlines the lad: of boundaries between 'emotions' 
as a psychological category distinct from other types of mental state. 
6 p.26-27 The Social Construction of Emotions 
7 The application of emotion terms is discussed further in Chapter 4: 4.2.1. 
1 This point is of particular relevance to music as empirical evidence suggests that we often respond emotionally 
to music without overtly rooognising our physiological responses. lt seems quite likely that in such cases 
conditioned responses override our recognition of physiological responses. This issue ls discussed in detail in 
Chapter 6. However, see also Damasio's Point (1994, p.209, that one cannot have a full emotional response in 
the absence of certain physiological responses.) 
9 What I have in mind as examples of these divisions are firstly universal aspects as basic physiological responses 
of the autonomic nervous system, universal behavioural aspects as for example, facial expressions (see Ekman) 
and culture specific expressions of emotion for example variations in the expression of grief as seen in western 
and eastern European cultures. 
10 I concede it might be argued that it depends what we determine to be cognitive content. The subject here may 
have cognitive content in some sense, despite it not being lexicalised or available to introspe<:tion. Perceptual 
events have nonetheless been interpreted to produced a specific and appropriate emotional response. 
11 Note that this relates closely to my two-stage theory for emotional expression below (Chapter 4) where this idea 
will be expanded upon. 
12 The amygdala also receives cortical (non-sensory inputs) so initial responses may subsequently be altered in 
light of subsequent infOrmation. This issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
13 From Parkinson: Ideas and Realities of Emotion (p.73) 
14 See for example, Trehub. Human Processing Predispositions and Musical Universa/s (In Wallin, Merker and 
Brown, The Origins of Music.) 
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15 I do however, acknowledge that it seems possible for music to emotionally affect us without us realising it is the 
music which has caused our emotional state. 
16 I will discuss in Chapter 2 what is asserted when we say music 'expresses' emotion. For the moment, I will 
take this statement in its common form to describe the experience of hearing music as an expression of emotion. 
17 This idea of empathic responses will be subject to specific criticism in Chapter 4. 
18 Thalberg for example, comments "It is not self-contradictory to suppose that some emotions are not founded on 
thoughts. I shall attempt to show .•. that this holds only for emotions without objects", Emotion and Thought p.46. 
Chapter 2 
Limitations of the Cognitivist Account 
2.1 Introduction 
There have been many attempts to solve the problems of musical expression within aesthetics 
and within musicology. Nonetheless these issues are typically dealt with in isolation. Even 
between musicology and aesthetics there is often little overlap, with musicians tending to look at 
musical features for an explanation of its expressive properties, whilst aestheticians look 
towards the experience of expressive music and emotion theorists tend to avoid musical 
emotions altogether. As a result we have numerous accounts of musical expression of emotion, 
but relatively few attempts to incorporate music within a broader theory of emotion. 
The aim of Part I of the present thesis is to consider how these issues may be reconciled. This 
chapter will be particularly concerned with cognitivism, which has become the dominant theory 
in philosophy of emotion. Some of the attractions of the cognitivist position have already been 
made apparent in Chapter 1, in terms of its advantages over feeling-centred approaches to 
emotion. I am sensible of those advantages and have no desire to neglect them. However. in so 
far as the expression of emotion via music is concerned, cognitivism seems liable to make what 
might otherwise be just enigmatic, either highly problematic, or outright impossible. For, if 
what is distinctive of a particular type of emotion is some linguistically specifiable cognitive 
content, then music would not seem to be an appropriate medium for its expression or 
transmission. At least, it is hard to see how it could be. This is because, without the 
accompanying information supplied by lyrics or a libretto, the representational capacities of 
music seem severely limited. Despite these limitations, music nonetheless successfully conveys 
a wide range of affective states, some of which seem too closely allied to ordinary instances of 
emotion merely to be cited as anomalous cases. Referring to several theorists who have adopted 
a cognitivist conception of emotion, 2.3 examines the problems cognitivism poses for the 
musical account. In conclusion I offer my own general account of emotionally affective states 
which outlines the domain of cognitive and physiological affective constructs of concern to this 
inquiry. 
2.2 The Case for Cognltlvism 
Cognitivism has been widely embraced as shedding new light on the analysis of emotions and 
broadening our understanding of emotions as essentially 'cognitive processes.' Common to 
cognitivist theories is the view that some form of cognitive content is a conceptually necessary 
constituent of emotional states. Cognitivism holds that the bodily feelings which accompany an 
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emotion, e.g. twinges or palpitations etc., are not sufficient to distinguish between different 
types of emotion, e.g. anger and indignation, yearning and longing and so on. Indeed it seems 
that there are emotions which are almost entirely 'cognitive' ones, (e.g. resentment), lacking 
many of the physiological features identified with emotions in feeling-centred accounts, yet we 
would undoubtedly call these occurrences emotions. On the cognitivist account, we may 
distinguish between emotion types by referring to the content of the emoter's beliefs. With grief 
for example, it is essential that the emoter believe they have suffered a loss. We would find it 
incoherent if someone were to say "I am angry at my sister but I don't believe she can be 
criticised in any way" (Calhoun and Solomon p.22}. In addition to this method of classification, 
identification of cognitive content allows an assessment of emotions in terms of rationality and 
intentionality. 
The identification of cognitive and physiological elements as separate components leads to an 
important distinction between 'controllable and uncontroJJabJe' states, which has contributed to 
an assessment of emotions as rational or irrational. We would not describe certain 
physiological responses, e.g. blushing as irrational yet we would be able to evaluate other 
behavioural responses, e.g. angry gestures as rational or irrational, in light of relevant beliefs. 
The difficulty remains to distinguish between spontaneous or reflexive behaviour on the one 
hand, and intentional actions on the other. The rationality assessment therefore has different 
dimensions: behavioural, cognitive and attitudinal (one's evaluation of the emotion as positive 
or negative), but the cognitivist schema nonetheless allows for emotions to be analysed as 
rational or irrational just as beliefs can be. The problem for the cognitivist lies in establishing 
how evaluative cognition fits as a component of emotional states. That is, what causal role does 
it play and what is its relationship to physiological aspects and felt qualities of emotion. One 
particular criticism of the rationality argument is important. There is a problem in that not all 
emotions seem capable of being distinguished by reference to conceptual elements, for example, 
objectless emotions and those with indeterminate cognitive content such as musical emotions, or 
emotions in response to fiction. Indeed emotions produced by subliminal images or directly by 
perceptual input (as opposed to those having propositional antecedents) might even be evaluated 
as irrational by the emoter, if they are unaware of the cause of their emotion. Indeed, we often 
find ourselves puzzled as to why we should feel a certain way, and unaware of any particular 
cause. A further question then is whether emotions without objects open to conscious 
awareness (such as those described in Chapter 1) may be accounted for within the cognitivist 
schema. 
As outlined in Chapter 1, one of the problems for feeling-centred accounts was their inability to 
account for emotions as intentional states, being directed at or towards objects or which are 
about something. Conceiving emotions as principally cognitive states has a distinct advantage 
in that the intentionality of emotions may be successfully explained in terms of their cognitive 
content. Nonetheless, intentionality still raises problems for the cognitivist. There do seem to 
be mental states that lack intentional objects, but which we nonetheless characterise as 
emotions, for example, objectless (or general) anxiety, depression and frustration. It seems 
inconsistent to accept the cognitive account in light of this problem, whilst feeling-centred 
accounts are rejected for their inability to account for intentionality. The cognitivist therefore 
needs to offer a satisfactory explanation of objectless mental states for the account to be a 
viable alternative. The usual responses to this are either that such objectless emotions are not in 
fact emotions proper, or that they have subconscious objects. However, to exclude objectless 
emotions from the class of emotions proper would certainly cause problems for the musical 
case. Accounts which reject emotions with indeterminate cognitive content, or claim objectless 
mental states are insufficient to warrant status as emotions will automatically exclude many 
instances of musical emotions. Interestingly, whilst musical emotions have been highlighted as 
an anomalous category, other instances of emotions suffer problems of intentionality. 
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Emotional responses to fiction, objectless anxiety, and depression also deviate from the 
paradigm case. 
2.2.1 Classifying Emotions. 
Perhaps the most sophisticated exposition of the cognitivist account is that given by Robert 
Gordon in The Structure of Emotions. Gordon acknowledges many ofthe problems involved in 
the classification of emotion and I will refer to his account in some detail below. 
Emotions clearly lend themselves to classification and hence there seem to be 'natural' divisions 
between 'positive and negative', 'rational and irrational' etc. However, these are still 
unsatisfactory, and frequently emotions fall into two or more categories, or are excluded 
altogether. Perhaps it would be best to begin with a classification that appears on the surface to 
be unproblematic: the positive/negative distinction. It seems natural to class emotions as 
positive or negative, and when asked, we can give clear examples of what we have in mind. We 
intuitively take fear to be a negative emotion, happiness a positive one. When asked however, to 
explain what is meant by 'positive' and 'negative' in emotional terms, the confusion sets in. An 
initial explanation might be to take 'positive' as entailing pleasant, and negative, unpleasant 
states to be in. However, as is the case with musical emotions, this distinction does not hold: 
Whereas we would intuitively class sadness as negative, we enjoy the sadness of a Mozart Piano 
Sonata, and similarly we enjoy fear-provoking fairground rides. As Gordon rightly points out, 
we can only say that positive and negative emotional states are 'typically' attractive or aversive. 
'There seems no reason to rule out the possibility that someone might find it pleasant and 
therefore attractive to be sad or angry and unpleasant and aversive to be proud'1• The hedonic 
qualities or typical 'feel' of the emotion is not sufficient for classification. 
Such binary classifications as they stand make only gross distinctions, which as in the examples 
above, still fail to cater for a number of cases, thus further qualification is required. With this 
in mind, Gordon seeks out an alternative position for making this distinction, that the negative 
and positive emotions involve a negative or positive attitude toward something (which Gordon 
loosely calJs the object of the emotion). 
"For example if Mary is embarrassed by (or about) the publicity about her 
wedding. She has a negative attitude toward there being publicity about it • 
roughly, a wishing there not be such publicity. But if she is glad that there is 
publicity, she has a positive attitude toward there being publicity about it" 
(p.29, The Structure of Emotions). 
Lyons also makes such an 'approval-disapproval' distinction (Emotions, 1980) which he 
describes as a 'distinction in the evaluative aspect of different emotions'. Lyons refers to 
positive and negative attitudes as pro-evaluations and disapproval evaluations respectively. He 
asserts that this 'evaluative distinction' is sound and 'it is hard to think of an emotion whose 
evaluation does not fall into either the approval or disapproval category' (p.90). From my point 
of view though, Lyons acceptance of this distinction is a little too eager. It is fair to say that we 
should guard against thinking of emotions solely in terms of positive and negative as these terms 
bring with them certain connotations, as in Lyons' account, negative emotions incur disapproval 
evaluations, and positive emotions an approval evaluation. Yet evaluative dispositions towards 
emotional states may vary for a single emotional state or instance of that emotion. It is quite 
conceivable that one might disapprove of being in a positive state • perhaps one did not want to 
be amused by the joke as it distracted you from the task at hand. For the case of negative 
emotions music provides a prime example. On Lyons' account, music expressing a negative 
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emotion, e.g. sadness, would invoke a 'disapproval evaluation', although we commonly enjoy 
the evocation of negative emotions by music and explicitly choose to undergo the experience. 
One can see that it is not always useful to categorise emotions exclusively in terms of positive 
and negative. Music may be emotionally classified as negative for a variety of reasons2, not 
necessarily due to the positive or negative hedonic quality of the emotion type in question. 
Notably the positive/negative distinction has been taken as one which may be used 
interchangeably with an approach/avoidance distinction (in terms of survival instincts). One 
must be careful to avoid confusion here as the positive/negative distinction as used in relation to 
emotion typically infers a more complex cognitive component, or more importantly infers a self-
assessment of emotions as positive and negative, as opposed to uncontrollable physiological 
responses to perceptual stimuli. The approach/avoidance distinction captures a far more basic 
emotional response in terms of innate or conditioned physiological responses to specific patterns 
of perceptual input. As has been generally acknowledged, the positive/negative distinction is 
useful in terms of our explaining the 'feelings' we associate with emotions. However, it is not 
sufficient to categorise emotions fully and we are intuitively aware of other distinctions which 
we will now consider. 
To return to Gordon's account, alongside the positive/negative categorisation, he makes another 
fundamental distinction between emotion types and a distinction upon which much of 
contemporary cognitivism has focused. In evaluating the tendency to classify emotions as 
forward-looking or backward-looking, Gordon explains that backward-looking emotions are 
"directed towards things. persons or states of affairs that exist presently or in the past. Forward 
looking emotions are said to be directed towards future possibilities.'o3 E.g., I am afraid I will 
crash my car. Tense however, cannot exclusively categorise emotions as Gordon noticed there 
are anomalies within this backward/forward looking distinction. For example, we can hope that 
things have not happened· I hope he didn't open the letter (a forward-looking emotion directed 
at the past) or 'I am disappointed my poem won't be published' (a backward-looking emotion 
directed at the future). This led Gordon to the conclusion that there must be some conditions 
relating to forwards and backwards looking emotions that would explain these anomalies. The 
response was that the distinction depends upon the emoter's knowledge of the event or object. 
That a person may only be for example, happy that p, if they know that p, and only afraid or 
hopeful ofp ifthey do not know that p. This distinction characterises what Gordon calls factive 
and epistemic emotions respectively. Some examples may make this distinction clearer. I may 
only say, 'I hope he didn't open the letter', if I do not know whether or not he has in fact opened 
the letter and it would not make sense to say 'I am disappointed that my poem will not be 
published' unless I know that it will not be (for further examples see Gordon, The Structure of 
Emotions and Thalberg, Emotion and Thought}. With this distinction in mind we may readily 
draw a line between what Gordon terms as factive and epistemic emotions (Table 2.1) and also 
between positive and negative factive and epistemic emotions (Table 2.2). 
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Table l.l. Positive and Negative Fadive and Epistemi~ Classili~ation. 
Positive Faetive Negative Factive 
Delight Anger Indignation 
Gladness Annoyance Resentment 
Gratefulness Disappointment Horror 
Happiness Disgust Sorrow 
Pleasure Sadness Embarrassmen 
Pride Shame Fury 




In combining this factive/epistemic distinction with the positive/negative distinction, we have a 
fairly accurate method of distinguishing between emotion types, acknowledging the 
positive/negative affective content and emoter's beliefs and desires as so: 
Table 2.3. Classification by Type and Content. 
Emotion Type Cognitive Content 
Positive Fac:tive The emoter has a positive attitude toward p- wishing that p and knowing 
(or believing) that p 
Negative Faetive The emoter has a negative attitude toward p - wishing that not p and 
knowing (or believing) that p 
Positive Epistemie The emoter has a positive attitude toward p - wishes that p but does not 
know whether p or not-p 
Negative Epistemie The emoter has a negative attitude toward p -wishes that not-p but does not 
know whether p or not-p 
The factivelepistemic and positive/negative distinctions seem a satisfactory method of 
classifying the emotions listed. However, it seems that this schema is really only successful by 
default for it avoids many problematic issues entirely. Cognitivism seems hard pressed, for 
example, to adequately account for love, 'aesthetic emotion', musically aroused emotion and 
emotion provoked by fiction. Most importantly, it fails to account in any detail for the 
physiological aspects of emotion. This is problematic as the empirical investigations discussed 
in Chapter 1 demonstrate that physiological affective responses may have influence on 
subsequent cognitive processing. In addition, the modern cognitivist account takes a culture-
specific approach to both emotion concepts and terminology and consequently loses its 
explanatory force in wider cultural contexts. Any global account of emotion needs to allow for 
universality of emotions as psychological states.• From the preceding discussion of emotion-
classification we have noted that there are many further methods of classification other than by 
cognitive content and, indeed, many emotion distinctions are not catered for by cognitivist 
account in terms of classification by type and content. Notably cognitivism also seems 
incapable of dealing with finer distinctions between emotional types, for example, we seem to 
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experience characteristically distinct types of fear: long term fears, (e.g. of ill health), phobic 
responses, (fear of spiders), and short term fears, (fear of missing the plane). These seem 
identifiable as distinct sub-classifications of one particular emotional type (see Chapter 1, p.4 
for examples). That emotional states which vary as regards 'intensity,' cognitive content, 
evaluation and physiological symptoms may still fall under the same classification is potentially 
problematic. 
2.3 Cognltiviam and Music 
Whilst cognitivism is obviously subject to general critiques as a theory of the emotions, it poses 
specific problems for the explanation of musical expression and arousal. Despite these 
problems many contemporary theorists (e.g. Budd, Kivy, Karl and Robinson) still adopt a 
cognitivist analysis. Perhaps this is due to the fact that cognitivism has something of a history 
in musical aesthetics, being central to one of the most influential accounts of musical expression 
to date, Hanslick's, thesis 'The Beautiful in Music', (Von Musikalisch-Schonen, 1854). 
No discussion of musical emotions would be complete without some reference to Hanslick's 
musical aesthetics. His thesis 'The Beautiful in Music' has undoubtedly been a major influence 
on accounts of expression to follow. Hanslick's concern was to give an autonomist account of 
aesthetic value in music- that music's value lies in nothing beyond the formal properties of the 
music itself. This formalist approach was a response to the Romantic Movement and ideas that 
music's aesthetic value could be explained solely terms of its ability to express and evoke 
emotion. Hanslick referred to music's non-representational nature, arguing that it cannot 
provide thoughts or beliefs necessary for definite emotions and feelings, and therefore can 
neither represent nor express definite feelings or emotions. As a result, Hanslick argued that 
music may express nothing more than the 'dynamic properties of emotions' through changes of 
strength (intensity), speed and texture. Hanslick's thought can still be seen to mark divisions 
between contemporary aestheticians, despite the change of focus within musical aesthetics. 
Previously aesthetic accounts of musical expression were centred on value claims or with 
problems of reference: how music could properly be said to express anything, and the aesthetic 
value of its expression. Recently attention has turned more specifically to analyses of the 
emotions themselves as aroused and recognised in music, and how these may relate to ordinary 
instances of emotion. 
A particular concern will be to show how adopting a cognitivist account of emotions is 
restrictive for the explanation of musical expression. Music may express and arouse a variety 
of affective states in differing ways. And, as in Chapter 1, it seems we may explain the 
apparent absence of intentional objects for musically expressed and aroused states. The 
cognitivist classification nonetheless, may serve to explain why music cannot express certain 
types of emotion without extra-musical reference. 
Two alternate camps can be outlined. First, those adopting a cognitivist analysis of emotions 
(e.g. Kivy, Robinson) claim that, whilst music is capable of expressing emotions and it moves 
us, it does not move us to sadness or happiness as it cannot provide an intentional object for 
emotion (a contemporary version of Hanslick's position). In contrast, the 'emotivists' claim 
that music can and does arouse full-blown emotions (e.g. sadness). For the purposes of this 
discussion, 'emotivist' and 'cognitivist' labels can function as a general means of outlining 
opposing positions. However, there is some variation in the use of this terminology. The 
cognitivist account of expression relates to, but should not be unequivocally equated with 
cognitivism in the philosophy of emotion. Importantly emotivism has on occasions been equated 
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with the arousal theory of expression5 - that music expresses emotion in virtue of its arousal in 
the listener. I explicitly do not want to equate the emotivist position with arousal theory. 
An initial cognitivist claim is that music merely evokes moods and feelings as opposed to 
emotions. However, this is an easy escape for the cognitivist and, as seen in Chapter 1 (p.l 0-
11 ), the grounds for making this distinction are sketchy to say the least. An alternative response 
is the claim that people listening to sad music are not really sad, for they enjoy the music, hence 
it cannot truly be sadness that they feel. Paradoxically, say the cognitivists, we enjoy sad music 
and one might argue that, if we were truly sad about the music itself, we would remove 
ourselves from the concert hall or attempt to stop the performance. 
On the cognitivist account, the problem for musically aroused emotions is that subjects do not 
have the cognitive content typically associated with the emotion. For sadness, (a negative 
factive emotion), the emoter typically has a negative attitude towards the (sad) event p as in 
Table 2.3 above; wishing that not-p, whilst knowing or believing that p. For example, if I am 
sad that my house caught fire, I wish that it has not happened, whilst knowing it has in fact 
burnt to the ground. My response to this is that the cognitivist confuses the emotion aroused 
with an evaluation of the emotional state. The emotion aroused by music is sadness, though I 
suspect that evaluation of the emotional state itself may lead to an appraisal of the musical 
experience as a positive and appropriate response (not therefore leading to a desire to leave the 
concert hall). An analogous case might be fear evoked by funfair rides. The emotion evoked is 
fear (typically a negative emotion), yet an evaluation of the emotional state may be positive· the 
ride is exhilarating. For the musical case, the emotion aroused is sadness nonetheless and 
empirical studies (e.g., Panksepp, 1996) would agree with this claim that musically aroused 
emotions, (and indeed fear aroused by the funfair) share the same physiological aspects or 
patterns of arousal as ordinary instances of emotion. Intensity of emotion seems to mark an 
important distinction here between those emotions which are accompanied by 'uncontrollable' 
behavioural characteristics, and those we may control, or which lack behavioural expression. 
Rather than behavioural expressions being associated with specific emotion types, (e.g., fear, 
sadness, anger) more importantly they correspond to the intensity of individual occurrences. 
This makes a useful addition to the analysis of musical emotions offering an explanation of how 
they may differ, but still relate to ordinary occurrences of emotion. 
Peter Kivy has addressed the problem of musical arousal on a number of occasions, and 
explicitly supports a cognitivist account ofthe emotions (How Music Moves, in Alperson, 1987; 
Feeling The Musical Emotions, 1999). Kivy advances a rather compelling account where the 
music itself functions as the object of the aroused emotion. Kivy is concerned only with 
instrumental music in the concert hall and its equivalent as recorded music in the home 
(Auditor's Emotions, 1993, pp.l-2). He makes a slightly different claim to the standard 
cognitivist position. 6 Rather than claiming musically evoked states to be moods, or feelings, he 
claims that music does indeed move us but rather it moves us to a generalised emotional state. 
Nonetheless Kivy does not want to equate this with ordinary occurrences of emotion and to this 
end he highlights the lack of accompanying behavioural characteristics of musical emotions. 
This is no defence for the cognitivist, many ordinary instances of emotion lack distinct 
behavioural characteristics or lack their expression. For example, if one is sad one does not 
necessarily burst into tears under any circumstances, indeed whilst we might find something 
humorous, we are able to suppress our laughter if we deem it is inappropriate. As noted above 
our behavioural expressions often depend on the intensity of the emotional state. Indeed, a 
relevant feature of many emotions is that we are able to suppress their modes of expression and, 
in the musical case, this would seem most appropriate. Kivy's claim is also inconsistent with 
examples of emotional responses to fiction. If we were to respond to emotional films and books 
with behavioural outbursts of anger, fear, hatred or depression, we would certainly not take 
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these to be rational responses. Neither would we take responses to fiction to reflect some 
'generalised emotion' - we can clearly identifY such responses as fear, sadness joy, etc. 
Responses to music are no different in this respect. 7 
Nonetheless Kivy's explanation of music itself functioning as the intentional object has a certain 
plausibility. Kivy claims that the beauty of the music acts as the object of our aroused emotion, 
providing the determinate cognitive content necessary to emotions on the cognitivist account 
which he supports. On Kivy's account, the specific beliefs or thoughts towards which the 
emotion is directed, concern the beauty of the music, (its internal relationships and structure 
being recognised by the listener). However, Kivy also claims this cognitive content is 
insufficient to identify specific types of emotion, but only a 'generalised state.' It is at this 
juncture that Kivy's account seems to conflict with the cognitivist theory of emotions he claims 
to adhere to. One advantage the cognitivist account holds over feeling conceptions, is that 
intentionality allows us to distinguish between specific emotion types. 
Kivy's position also seems contrary to our experience of expressive music. Most listeners, even 
musically naiVe listeners, have no problems describing the specific nature of emotions generated 
by music (see appendix A5.13). Although we might grant that in response to pure or absolute 
music (with which Kivy is primarily concerned), emotions aroused might only be given in terms 
of broad categorisations, we would still not call these 'nameless emotions'. Kivy's idea 
suggests an emotion specific to musical experience, but, as we noted above, one issue is that 
musical emotions do not differ significantly in feeling from ordinary instances of emotion. In 
addition, if Kivy suggests nameless or non-specific emotions are evoked, exactly how many 
varieties of non-specific emotion is he proposing? It is clear that emotional responses to music 
do vary significantly, so how then do we differentiate between these 'nameless emotions', other 
than by relating them to their closest counterparts in ordinary occurrences of emotion? 
Kivy's claim is that we cannot differentiate between these states, except by reference to their 
individual intentional objects {specific pieces of music). He comments: 
"But to say that the emotional excitement stimulated in me by the music is a 
nameless emotion is not to mark it out as in any way mysterious or ineffable. 
Lots of perfectly ordinary emotions have just that nameless character. If I am 
moved by a sunset, or the face of a child, or a kind and generous action, not 
done to me but to someone else, those emotions have no names: they are not 
sadness or fear, anger or gratitude: their names are their descriptions. I can do 
no better than to say: the feeling one gets in watching the sun go down, seeing 
the face of a child, hearing about a benevolent act to a perfect stranger!' (p.S, 
Feeling the Musical Emotions, 1999) 
But Kivy's description leads me to think he has a very unusual affective life indeed. We are on 
the whole very good at giving voice to our emotions, and what Kivy fails to explain is that the 
examples he uses may differ according to context. Seeing the sunset may evoke awe, (at the 
wonder of the solar system), sadness, (as the day has ended), fear (as one is afraid of the dark) 
etc. It is not the case that these examples represent nameless emotion, rather that they require 
further qualification. 8 In addition, one must acknowledge there is variability in naming both in 
ordinary and musical instances of emotion. Kivy goes on to say that these instances of emotion 
are differentiated by their objects, and in the musical case, he concedes that we have differing 
emotional responses to e.g. Bach, Brahms, and Mozart. But it simply does not follow that 
object dependent emotions are nameless ones and this seems to be the error in Kivy's analogy. 
This seems to highlight a flaw with the cognitivist account itself as a theory of the emotions. 
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Whilst cognitive content may be sufficient to differentiate between specific emotional states, it 
is by no means sufficient to identify those emotions. 
2.3.1 Speclficity of Musically Expressed Emotion 
A further problem for music is how we may attribute the arousal or expression of 'cognitively 
complex' emotions - those which require specific evaluative beliefs and desires. Some emotions 
necessarily take objects in this way, for example, grief, love and pity. To feel grief, for 
example, one has to believe one has suffered a loss, to feel pity, one has to believe that someone 
(or something) is suffering unnecessarily. Kart & Robinson (1995), attempt to address this 
problem, but their account offers a very convoluted conception of musical listening, referring in 
great detail to specific musical features, motifs, key changes, and particular instruments. In line 
with the views of Levinson (1990) and Cone (1974), they suggest that music may convey 
specific cognitive content through a musical persona, represented by formal properties of the 
work. Although they present a convincing account for the particular extract in question, (a 
section from Shostakovich's IOih Symphony), they stress that the work needs to be placed in its 
historical context, providing us with knowledge of the work in a quasi-narrative sense, and 
biographical information about the composer. This presents some problems, first, by conceding 
that an understanding of the work requires extra-musical information, this entirely contradicts 
the specificity attributed to musical detail. (For example, why bother to analyse the details of a 
funeral march when the title alone is enough to attribute grief to the work, let alone all that can 
be gleaned from its full historical context?). And second, what are we to say about works 
whose origin is largely unknown? If historical context is a necessary condition for the 
attribution of cognitively complex emotions, unknown works would be incapable of evoking or 
expressing such emotions. 
This draws us towards a problem frequently raised in aesthetics, that we begin to attribute 
musical expression to extra-musical information itself and not the music, so the musical content 
itself becomes redundant. Kart and Robinson's initial position seems quite plausible and they 
make a commendable interpretation of musical features which could feasibly be related to the 
cognitive content of hope. However, even if we granted that music could represent the cognitive 
content of resentment, for example, purely by relationships of features, motifs or harmony, etc., 
it seems unlikely that musically nal've listeners, who nonetheless claim to recognise such 
emotions, could recognise such complex relationships in music. This would be the case even if, 
as Peter Kivy suggests, they recognise them, whilst being unaware of the terminology or musical 
function of such features. 9 All it seems music could express in such a way are again gross 
behavioural aspects of emotion, as in the imitation accounts of expression discussed in Chapter 
One that is, the ups and downs of emotional life, much like Hanslick's 'dynamics' of emotion. 
Having criticised Karl and Robinson's account, I do not want to dismiss the role of 
acculturation in accounting for at least some emotional expression and arousal. The focus of my 
critique above is directed at the contradictory analysis of musical features, when extra-musical 
information is available. My point is that the extra-musical alone is often sufficient. Clearly 
music can be highly conventionalised, if we consider musical propaganda, particular styles of 
music or even specific motifs can come to represent specific ideas to culturally or institutionally 
situated listeners, and in this way provide determinate cognitive content. 10 One only has to look 
at contemporary film to see this is true and to recognise the strength of these associations (e.g. 
our immediate recognition of music from Jaws or Psycho, and stereotypical music 
accompanying many horror movies). An important point here is not to generalise about musical 
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emotions, it is clear that certain types of music, opera and other lyric forms, can provide the 
necessary cognitive content for specific emotions, and emotional recognition or arousal will 
evidently be relative to the listeners' musical experience and knowledge. For my part, I hold 
that cognitively complex emotions require extra-musical information for both their expression 
and arousal and it seems Karl and Robinson failed to show otherwise. 
The problems of cognitively complex emotions do however, offer an insight into which emotions 
pure music may express and arouse. Putman (1987) says it is exactly those emotions that 
require determinate cognitive content for their identity which instrumental music cannot express. 
Putman's view is that rather than classing musical emotions as an exclusive category of 
'objectless' emotions, we should refer to examples of objectless emotions in non-musical 
contexts. Putman's view might certainly be thought to conflict with Kart and Robinson's, 
however, this conflict can be resolved if we acknowledge their differing conceptions of pure or 
absolute music. Putman takes this to refer to music without any extra-musical associations, 
perhaps Bach chorales or instrumental music without conventionalised emotional responses. 
Kart and Robinson's theory on the other hand depends on just these responses: highly 
conventionalised interpretations of music and a highly acculturated musical audience. 
Importantly within this investigation, whilst acknowledging such responses might in theory be 
possible, I am concerned with musical responses of the ordinary listener, not those of a specific 
culturally or institutionally located group. (Although this is not to say the ordinary listeners 
responses cannot be highly conventionalised too as in the examples above). , 
Both Karl and Robinson, and Putman's accounts bring us back to Hanslick's problem that 
music itself lacks representational powers. Cognitivism within music, it seems, is more 
appropriate to exemplifY the limitations of pure musical expression, than to offer a theory ofthe 
emotions which may satisfactorily encompass musical affect. As Radford noted above, 
(Chapter I, p.15) "music is poor at representing persons, things, ideas, or states of affairs." 
This is certainly a problem for instrumental music and I am happy to concede that in terms of 
specificity, music alone has a limited range of expressive powers. Again though this brings me 
back to a central concern which is to analyse the range of music's expressive powers: from 
music's formal properties alone, to music in specific context, accompanied by extra musical 
information and conditioned responses of the ordinary listener. 
2.4 The Limitations of Cognltlvlsm 
The time has come to reveal the limitations of cognitivism. It has become almost a 
commonplace within the philosophy of mind to refer to 'the cognitivist theory of the emotions'. 
But this is at best seriously misleading. For cognitivism is not a fully-fledged theory of the 
emotions at all. It is much better understood as an analysis of explicit and articulated emotional 
concepts, which focuses upon their differentiation from each other, rather than upon what 
distinguishes the emotional in general from other psychological states and processes. 
Indeed. the common interpretation of Gordon's account as a cognitivist theory of the emotions 
exemplifies this. Gordon in fact explicitly states 
"I shall not pretend to be talking about every state we are wont to call an 
emotion. nor indeed that my generalizations do not apply to some states one 
might balk as calling emotions. The term 'emotions' will serve only as a rough 
guide as to the initial scope of this investigation. The final scope may be 
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defined as those states of which my generalizations hold true." (p.22, The 
Structure of Emotions). 
Nonetheless, Gordon's account is often cited as the prototypical cognitivist theory and it is 
widespread in philosophy of mind that cognitivism constitutes a theory of the emotions as 
opposed to merely a classificatory system for certain emotion-types. 
One way in which we can see this is by drawing attention to the characteristic way in which 
cognitivism is argued for. The advocate selects some appropriate type of emotion, E, and says 
that no subject could be in state E unless they thought that p (or something like it). It can 
emerge from this sort of consideration that it is a necessary condition for having E that one 
should think that p. This may well be so. But revealing a necessary condition is by no means 
the same thing as providing a general theory. Let's say the cognitivist's conceptual analysis is 
correct about the concept E. Just how much does that tell us? Only that thinking p is a 
necessary condition for having E, rather than some other emotion. This leaves out an awful lot. 
It does not tell us what the emotion E consists in. It.doesn't even tell us exactly how the thought 
that p. is involved in the emotion E. For the fact that the thought that p is a necessary condition 
forE leaves open at least the three following possibilities: 
(I) that the thought that p is part of E, actually one of the constituents of the emotional state; 
(2) that the thought that p, while not a constituent of E, is a necessary accompaniment to it in 
this sense: that no one would count as having E unless they thought that p; 
(3) that the thought that p is a cause of E, and a conceptually required cause at that, in that one 
cannot have an £-type state without a p-type thought causing it. 
These are clearly quite distinct possibilities, and we hardly have a complete cognitivist theory 
without grounds for opting for one or other of them. Clearly cognitivism does not offer a full, 
explanatory account of the relationship between emotion and thought. 
But quite apart from that, the cognitivist approach falls short of supplying a theory of the 
emotions, in at least two distinct ways. Firstly, it does not tell us what else has to be true of an 
individual who has E (or some other emotion) besides thinking that p (or whatever the 
appropriate cognitive component/accompaniment/cause might be). Secondly, it does not tell us 
what is in general the difference between being in an emotionally affective state and not being in 
any such state. One might, I suppose, say that cognitivism is a theory of these emotions (rather 
than those others). But since it dwells on what distinguishes emotions, rather than on what they 
have in common, it hardly qualifies as a theory of emotion at all. This point is all too regularly 
missed in philosophical discussions of the emotions. Missing it threatens to warp such 
discussions badly, since being pro-cognitivist and anti-cognitivist would both be erroneous 
options. The important thing is to realise the limitations of the cognitivist view. 
It may be helpful to have a recurrent argument, in the form of a schematic thought-experiment, 
in order to remind ourselves of the limitations of cognitivism. Cognitivism fails to provide 
sufficient conditions for having an emotion, and so it does not tell us (properly construed does 
not even attempt to tell us) what emotions are. This should really be fairly obvious. Yet since 
it seems so often to be overlooked, we can propose a 'Vu/can' thought-experiment. Taking the 
proposed cognitive requirements for a given emotion, we may then ask whether somebody (Mr. 
Spock, say) who satisfied those cognitive requirements would necessarily be in the specified 
emotional state. · 
Taking resentment as our example: Can somebody coherently say: A: I think that somebody did 
such and such .... B: I think they really ought not to have treated me like that ... C: I wish that 
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they had not treated me that way ... and yet D: I do not feel any resentment. The belief and 
desire states alone do not constitute resentment. Similarly for Jealousy: I might think that A: 
x has won prize this year, B: I wanted to win the prize, and made a great effort to do so. C: I do 
not believe x deserved to win and yet, D: I do not feel jealous ofx. It is certainly plausible then 
that one might have the relevant beliefs and desires yet not feel any emotion. Indeed in light of 
this thought experiment the suggestion (as made in Chapter 1) that there may be purely 
cognitive emotions seems somewhat lacking. (Having the cognitive component does not equate 
to having an emotion). Perhaps it is better to say there may be emotions that are principally 
cognitive, and what is lacking, indeed what the cognitivist theory fails to offer is a distinction 
between emotional and non-emotional evaluative thoughts. What is distinctive about the beliefs 
and desires accompanying emotions, as opposed to non-emotional mental states? 
Along similar lines to the Vulcan thought-experiment above, Alston comments that 
"we cannot identify emotions with evaluations alone, without completely losing 
contact with such phrases as "emotional reaction," "getting emotional over it," 
and "controlling one's emotions." An evaluation can be either emotional or 
unemotional. Two people can see a snake as equally dangerous, and yet one is 
gripped with fear while the other is calm" (Alston 1967, p.485). 
Cognitivism may in some respects be an improvement on feeling-centred accounts, but it also 
seems to neglect something they emphasise. Cognitivism on its own lacks an account of the feel 
of emotions - what it is like to be in an emotional state, as opposed to merely acquiring a 
relevant set of beJiefs and desires. It seems we can coherently distinguish between having the 
relevant belief7desire states, and having the relevant belief/desire state and the emotion. 
Two replies are typically offered to this problem: the first is to identify emotional mental states 
as those which are somehow marked by their intensity. One might be tempted to reply that 
desire states themselves entail an affective or pro-evaluative component. Or perhaps that the 
intensity of the desire itself is relevant. Yet I can have desires, even strong desires without 
feeling emotion. A further reply to this critique has been made by evaluative theorists - those 
holding that the cognitive content involves an evaluation. Solomon comments: 
"what is distinctive about emotional judgements is that they are self-involved 
and relatively intensejudgements ..... Thejudgements and objects that constitute 
our emotions are those which are especially important to us, meaningful to us, 
concerning matters in which we have invested ourselves." (1976, p.188). 
But this reply fails on two parts. First, that judgements themselves hardly seem subject to 
degrees of intensity. If I judge, for example, that my colleague is mistaken, how might this be 
more intense than my judgement that I will not make the 5.30 train? It seems rather, that where 
judgements already involve emotional components, only then may they be evaluated in terms of 
their intensity. Second, it is far from clear that judgements which are meaningful are necessarily 
emotional. Perhaps what Solomon intended to capture is the pre-occupation which occurs in 
relation to emotional thoughts, that they can dominate our thought such that our attention is 
completely focused upon the emotional event. Whilst cognitivism might incorporate this 'pre-
occupation' into its account of the cognitive components, it is neither a necessary nor sufficient 
feature of emotional mental states. Non-emotional evaluations may similarly pre-occupy us, 
whilst emotional ones may be consciously put to one side. 
The second reply to this problem is exemplified by Lyons. He comments, 
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"Excepting their denial that emotions are feelings, philosophers have had very 
little to say about the 'bodily motions' parts of emotions, particularly in recent 
times, even though, somewhat ironically, it is this very aspect of emotions 
which distinguishes them from being just beliefs and desires of certain sorts., 
(1980, p.ll5). 
However, identifying behavioural responses alone is not sufficient. A purely cognitive 
interpretation of emotion as in the Vulcan experiment might still succeed here, after all by 
rational thought the subject could still produce appropriate 'emotional' action. Nash comments 
along similar lines, that an account of emotion must be "sufficient to distinguish, e.g., the 
terrified man who flees out of fear from the fearless man who flees out of prudence."(1989, 
p.487). He proposes a similar thought experiment to the Vulcan account above. 
"Suppose for example that a human being lacked the neurological mechanisms 
that give rise to these bodily disturbances; and suppose the mechanisms in 
question have no other causal role. Would this defective human lack emotion?" 
(ibid. p.486). 
If emotions were analysed in terms of behavioural responses, then the subject might still have 
'emotions' - despite the fact that they wouldn't e.g., tremble with fright, blush with 
embarrassment or feel emotional. It seems then that even identifYing cognitive content and 
behavioural expression does not account for the 'feel' of emotion, and cannot distinguish 
between actions caused by emotional and non-emotional evaluations. Indeed I am wary about 
claiming bodily sensations to be what distinguishes emotional and non-emotional states. It 
would seem wrong to suggest that a paralysed subject would lack emotional feeling simply due 
to their lack of bodily feelings. Would they not still be in an emotionally charged state as 
opposed to merely having appropriate beliefs and desires? A good response to this problem is 
offered by Tye ( 1996). His suggestion is that one does not require actual bodily sensations, but 
only sensory representations. Thus ''you might even feel anger if you lose your body altogether 
and you are kept alive as a brain in a vat, stimulated to undergo the very brain states you do 
when you are angry in normal circumstances" (p.l26). Indeed it is quite plausible to suggest 
that those brain states need not be caused only by perceptual information but also in some cases 
directly by beliefs and desires. In any case this would require more than the pure cognitive 
account can offer, requiring some acknowledgement of both affective perception and affective 
cognition. Whilst cognitivism may add to its account by outlining further requirements of 
cognitive content. none of these provide necessary and sufficient conditions for what emotions 
are, however well they outline what emotions typically tend to be. It seems that a pure cognitive 
account has to be rejected. 
2.5 Proposing a General Account of Emotionally Affective States 
Taking into account the failure to adequately identify what constitutes specific categories of 
affective state and where the boundaries between these states lie, I would like to propose my 
own general account, with the purpose of outlining the range of affective states to be addressed 
by this inquiry. This will provide me with a more elegant method than referring to individual 
emotion types by name. 
I do not wish to enter into the debate regarding whether music may evoke a specific type of 
state, e.g. moods, emotions, feeling, etc., as music is clearly capable of evoking or representing 
a range of emotionaJJy affective states. Within psychological thought, affect has perhaps the 
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widest range of application, incorporating the most basic (universal) perceptual responses and 
also a basic positive/negative distinction reflecting underlying physiological arousal of the 
nervous system (see discussion of autonomic nervous system Chapter l, p.ll). However, I 
want to refer to more complex states in this analysis, so affect as it stands will not suffice. In 
addition, I have noted above that neither the existing categories of mood or emotion are 
sufficiently unambiguous. Attempts to define differing branches of affective states are 
seemingly misdirected due to the very nature of affective states themselves. William Alston puts 
this very succinctly, 
"it may be that the concept of emotion is like many other concepts such as 
religion, poetry, and science, in that we cannot explicate it without making a 
distinction between central (paradigm) cases and cases which deviate from the 
paradigm in lacking some central feature but do not deviate sufficiently to 
completely inhibit the application of the term. Thus the full range of cases 
exhibits what Wittgenstein called "family resemblances." There is a list of 
typical features, such that some are present in all cases, no one feature is 
present in all cases, and only the paradigm cases exhibit all the features. "(p.486 
Emotive Meaning). 
For this reason I wish to refer to musically evoked responses and musical expression in terms of 
emotionally affective states and to include affect, mood, emotion and feeling within this 
category, encompassing both cognitive and physiological, culture specific and universal 
responses to music. 
Perhaps at best what might be offered is a general conception of what I take this category of 
emotionally affective states to cover: Affect referring to purely physiological components of 
emotional states, involving positive and negative dimensions; Moods, involving cognitive 
elements, in terms of limited but not necessarily determinate cognitive content and object/cause 
relationships, and moods also being typically longer in duration. Emotions may be markedly 
different in terms of their cognitive components and determinate causes and objects, including 
states that are almost entirely cognitive, lacking behavioural components. However, none of 
these may exclusively define each category. As Frijda notes, (Ekman and Davidson p.63) 
affective states are perhaps better described in terms of processes than categories, in this sense it 
is wrong to talk of emotions as if they are distinct events. We should consider affective states in 
terms of a continuum. 11 Affective states are always present, merely moving from one 'focus • or 
degree of intensity to another, moods becoming emotions, emotions moods, and both perceptual 
and conceptual input influencing our affective lives. This might be loosely represented in terms 
of a hierarchy of emotion processing as opposed to affective categorisations (Fig.2.1 ). Some 
affective states are principally cognitive, others physiological. But emotion names typically 
cross these boundaries, i.e. fear applies to feelings, emotions, affect states etc. Whilst this 
perhaps says more about use of emotive vocabulary than emotional states, this is not to say 
emotion naming is arbitrary. 
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Fig. 2.1: Schematic model of affective processing routes. 
Inevitably it needs to be acknowledged that emotions must be discussed in terms of the 
vocabulary available (21st Century English). However, this does not mean that we may neglect 
to consider the distinction between states themselves and language used to describe them. 
Neither should we forget that the target of this enquiry is exactly these mental states as opposed 
to their descriptions and the capacity of music to represent or evoke these psychological states 
whether lexicalised or not. 
The overview of emotion theories in Chapters I and 2 demonstrates that there is still largely a 
cognitive/perceptual split. 12 Categorisations of emotion have been (and remain) largely 
constructed for theoretical purposes, but perceptual/cognitive accounts need not necessarily be 
rivals. There has been some acknowledgement that emotion must involve both affective 
cognition and affective perception. 'Hybrid' theories of emotion do seem to be gaining favour. 
Gordon, and de Sousa (Rationality of Emotion) do enter into some interdisciplinary discussion 
and hybrid accounts are explicitly proposed by Charland, ( 1996), Damasio, ( 1994) and 
Greenspan ( 1989). Empirical findings do support a distinct model of underlying emotion 
processes, and allow some insight the actual role of conscious cognitive evaluations. This will 
be born in mind in the further investigation of musical emotions, looking towards some level of 
convergence between conceptual analysis and empirical findings. This theme will be maintained 
throughout the investigation of music cognition with the aim of developing a coherent account of 
both music emotion processing and musical experience. 
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Notes 
1 Gordon The Structure of Emotions p.28. We might also consider here that there are cultures where conrept of 
emotions are different, for example, where anger is seen as a positive emotion. I will consider this within my 
further examination of culture specificity in Chapters 4-7. 
2 A good example of a 'negative' piece of music that also produces a negative response is Penderecki 's Threnody 
to the victims of Hiroshima which has been described as harrowing as well as producing strong emotions of 
sadness but without the usual experience of enjoyment for 'sad' music. Although we might perhaps enjoy the 
piece for the unusual textures, orchestration and other techniques employed. 
3 Gordon, p.25 The Structure of Emotions 
4 One must acknowledge fur example that other cultures may have emotion terms and conrepts, which are not 
adequately explained by our own terminology. For example the German notion of Schadenfroide the name given 
to a particular kind of pleasure taken in the suffering of others. 
5 Kivy, (in Alperson, 1987) may be Interpreted as equating emotivism with the arousal theory although l feel his 
use of emotivism and cognitivism is intended rather to outline the distinction made above. Stecker in Nolt on 
Expression and Emotion refers to 'emotionalism' -again defining what is commonly taken to be the Arousal 
theory of expression. This might also be wrongly confused with the interpretation of emotivism which I intend 
here. 
6 Kivy assimilates his account with the contemporary cognitivist account in Philosophy of emotion, however, as 
we will see in the fullowing critique, his account contradicts the cognitivist position. 
7 The cognitivist may reply to this by asserting that for fiction, there are identifiable objects available, whether 
fictitious or not. However, have seen some of the problems invoked by such claims in the discussion of 
Levinson' s account in Chapter 1. 
1 Perhaps this context dependence is what Kivy intends when he says 'their names are their descriptions' but If so 
he fails to make this clear. 
9 It would be interesting to consider the frequency of musically nal've listeners reporting cognitively complex 
emotions. It seems unlikely they would be capable of distinguishing between and formulating such complex 
relations between musical features, but nonetheless they do seem to report cognitively complex emotions. See 
Appendix A5.13 
10 In a very famous case, the composer Hans Eisler was accused of attempting a communist infiltration of 
Hollywood through his music, which, heard in context did have strong political significance. One prosecutor went 
so far as to say, "Mr Eisler is the Kart Marx of communism in the musical field and he is well aware of it." 
(Betz, 1982, 'Hans Eisler Political Musician' p.200). Nonetheless, in court, the charges were hard to prove, out 
of context and not heard by its intended audience, the music lost its significance. 
11 This idea rereives some support from lzard (1993, 1994). 
12 The recent debate between Zajonc and Lazarus, highlights the division between cognitive and perceptual 
accounts. Neither willing to acknowledge that emotion may In fact involve both affect and cognition. See 
Charland 1997, pp.561·2. 
Chapter 3 
New Perspectives on Philosophy of Music: 
Towards A new Theory of Musical Expression 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 introduces the main body of neuropsychological evidence, and the second part of this 
thesis will draw heavily on these findings. Recent neuropsychological studies have made 
considerable progress in the investigation of music cognition with far-reaching implications for 
philosophy of music. The aim of this chapter is to outline an underlying structure for music-
emotion cognition, which is currently lacking in attempts to explain musical expression of 
emotions. 1 Implicit in the development of this framework will be a critique of existing accounts 
of musical expression. Within philosophy of mind, cognitive deficits have been extensively 
drawn upon in order to support functional models of the mind, and it is now deemed acceptable 
both in philosophy and the cognitive sciences that we may infer albeit carefully from damaged 
to normal cognitive systems. Adopting a more cognitive approach to philosophy of music may 
enable us to reconcile traditional aesthetic accounts with neuropsychological insights, and 
develop an empirically sound theory of musical expression which also matches our musical 
experiences. 
3.2 What Is Wrong With Traditional Accounts of Musical Expression ? 
There is now a wealth of empirical research. yet this body of information is largely ignored by 
philosophical inquiries. Fundamental problems for expression theories are rooted in the nature 
of aesthetic inquiry. Mcdonald Meidner explains, 
"the aesthetics of music is a hybrid study. Informal, non-professional 
psychology, formerly very prominent in musical aesthetics has understandably 
declined over the last forty or fifty years. Aestheticians have been intimidated 
or alienated by academic professional and laboratory psychology. To what 
extent we have been neglecting to inform ourselves of developments in those 
fields, which might be profitably instructive to musical aesthetics, would 
demand a special inquiry." (McDonald Meidner, 1985, p.349). 
There is no reason however, why such a 'special inquiry' cannot be undertaken, yet this 
portrayal seems to accurately describe the situation for musical aesthetics, with aestheticians 
blindly continuing to discuss musical expression, and arousal, without any notion of an 
underlying cognitive framework for music. It is not enough to acknowledge that, 
"an explanation of emotional expression in western music requires, besides 
musical knowledge and experience, some acquaintance with the physics of 
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sound, the physiology of the ear and the perception of auditory stimuli" 
(Mcdonald Meidner, 1985) 
Few aestheticians take time to explain these aspects in relation to their proposed theories of 
expression. If they were to do so, it seems likely that most would be relying on 'traditional (and 
out-of date) psychological aesthetics' such as Pratt's The Meaning of Music (1931) for 
empirical data. However, the empirical developments made in the last forty or fifty years 
(particularly those in neuropsychology) have serious implications for aesthetics, and it is these 
findings which are to be the focus of this inquiry. The aim is to provide an underlying 
framework for music-emotion cognition, upon which we might build on such expression theories 
as those proposed in Aesthetics, and explore music from a more cognitive stance. 
In addition to the enigma of music's emotional relationships, the issue of emotional expression is 
intimately attached to central problems of aesthetics, for example: aesthetic value, aesthetic 
experience, and aesthetic properties, to name but a few. Yet contemporary accounts of musical 
expression still fail to hit the mark and disagreement between aestheticians remains high, even at 
the fundamental level regarding whether music itself(without referring to the extra-musical) can 
or cannot express emotion. In fact the issue of musical expression in aesthetics has not really 
made any substantial progress in the last hundred years or so since Hanslick denied music could 
express any definite emotions. The nub of this controversy lies with the division between 
holders of the expressionist thesis. The debate remains whether music can express emotion 
directly (i.e. emotion having an intrinsic relationship with musical properties and a causal 
relationship with listeners' responses), or only with reference to the non-musical world. In this 
respect there still seems to be an 'all or nothing' approach in aesthetics· either music expresses 
and arouses emotion directly or it is entirely a result of socially and institutionally conditioned 
responses to music. 
Despite the fact that neither of these approaches has yielded satisfactory results, there is rarely 
any middle ground or any serious attempt to explain how it may be some combination of these 
effects which allows us our musico-emotional experiences. Indeed it seems that both attempts 
to explain emotion recognition capture something which seems intuitively right about musical 
experience. So it might seem that rather than being two opposing theses, these accounts may be 
better explained as components of a multi-level theory of music and emotion cognition, though 
this is not to say all aesthetic accounts can be reconciled with empirical findings. Further 
problems for aesthetics are invoked by the 'over-theoretical'2 approach adopted, and selective 
use (and abuse) of empirical findings. All in all this has led to many accounts of musical 
expression which simply do not match our experiences of listening to music. Accounts such as 
Cooke's in The Language of Music3 (attempting to give particular musical phrases analogous 
expressive properties), seem counterintuitive, and as we will see are not compatible with models 
of music cognition suggested by empirical findings. In many cases we would agree that we do 
not make a detailed cognitive evaluation, we just seem to have an awareness of the emotion 
expressed, and this is not captured by aesthetic theory. I feel however, there is still more to be 
said about the specific claims of expressionism before moving on. 
The development of expressionist theories must owe at least something to the fact that music 
does not fit within the dominant 'representational' theory of art. While music lacks powers to 
represent persons, actions and events in any reliable sense, expressionism in music maintains 
that music is capable (in whatever way), of reliably expressing emotion. Claims vary 
considerably regarding what sort of emotions, (moods, feelings, affect), how they are expressed, 
and whether emotions are also aroused. As noted in Chapter I, the debate is no longer whether 
music per se can or cannot express emotion, but rather how it does so, with nobody wanting to 
deny music's emotional links altogether. 
There are many ways in which expression theories might be categorised (e.g. the 
cognitivist/emotivist dichotomy in Chapter 1 ). However, the division between direct and extra-
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musical modes of expression is fairly well represented.4 Direct expressionism (which I shall call 
natural expressionism) is represented by two main accounts. First, accounts such as Kivy's, 
claim that the relationships of music's formal properties alone, chords, melodic lines and 
harmonies are sufficient to convey emotion. Second, arousal theorists (e.g., Matravers) suggest 
that music expresses emotions directly, in virtue of arousing them in the listener. Extra-musical 
accounts (which I shall call cultural expressionism) vary significantly. with theorists such as 
Karl and Robinson claiming that music must be heard in context and with biographical 
information about the work for it to properly express some emotions. Other theories (Putman) 
suggest that music may imitate the behavioural characteristics of a person in an emotional state, 
or (Levinson) that it may represent an imaginary person with whom we may empathise. A 
popular imitative account is that music may imitate other emotional sounds - vocal contours, 
cries or other sounds of the environment - perhaps thunder or animal cries. 
These accounts have been criticised in Chapter l in relation to emotion theory and they will be 
subject to further scrutiny in Chapter 4 in light of neuropsychological findings. Despite the 
difftculties expressionist theories have encountered in providing a comprehensive account of 
music-emotion cognition, some accounts are still effective in explaining our conscious cognitive 
evaluations of music (how it is that we might hear musical phrases, or pieces, as representative 
of a certain concept, e.g. by acculturation or musical convention). Some aesthetic accounts 
seem able to explain this aspect of music cognition well and for this reason I would still like to 
offer support to the expressionist thesis. Far from being passe as some (Sharpe, 1983) would 
like to hold, I believe expressionist theories for music may still have much to offer, even if in a 
revised form in light of recent empirical findings. 
Through our discussions below we will see that it is first necessary to have a basic picture or 
framework for music-emotion cognition before attempting to explain emotional expression in 
music. An initial objection might well be raised here - that aesthetic accounts do not need to 
give a full explanation of music processing, they are merely satisfied with giving an account at 
the cognitive level of musical evaluation. But this objection is not satisfactory for two reasons. 
Firstly, this is not all that aesthetic theories claim to be doing. Many accounts make 
assumptions clearly dependent upon certain types of perceptual processing. 5 Secondly, 
emotional responses are, as we have seen in Chapters 1 and 2, an amalgamation of both 
cognitive and non-cognitive (affective) responses. Consequently we need to understand whether 
cognitive evaluations are guided by or dependent upon lower level responses (something which 
will be considered further in Chapter 4). To explain the conceptual element therefore is not 
enough· it is not a full account of how we recognise emotion in music. The underlying structure 
we propose of emotion cognition is important as this will undoubtedly impinge upon how we 
may explain music's ability to convey emotions. 
3.3 Introduction to Neuropsychology 
Whilst philosophical methods of investigation are largely self-explanatory, neuropsychology 
requires some introduction, and indeed some reply to critiques of its methodologies. 
Neuropsychology6 focuses on study of the damaged brain, being concerned with disorders of 
language, perception, and action, the relationship of mental function to brain structure, and of 
specific functions to comprehensive mental structure. Initially one might question what a 
damaged system can tell us about the workings of a normal system. In most cases normal 
behaviour is 'seamless', we simply cannot tell where the boundaries between different functions 
are. Brain damage literally seems to carve nature at the seams allowing us to see cognitive 
functions as both physically and functionally distinct, and suggesting which systems interact 
with each other and which are independent. The two main aims of neuropsychological inquiry 
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are, first, to explain patterns of impaired performance seen in brain-injured subjects in light of 
cognitive models. Second, to make inferences about normal cognitive processing in light of 
these patterns of impaired performance. Neuropsychology is now a well established field within 
the cognitive sciences. Its recent growth over the last twenty years perhaps owing to the coming 
of age of behavioural sciences in general and linguistics in particular. 
Nonetheless neuropsychological fmdings have not always been readily accepted. Originally a 
theory driven enterprise, neuropsychology was largely rejected by those interested in normal 
cognition. The late nineteenth century saw the rise of the 'diagram-makers', the founders of 
neuropsychology, who produced complex theoretical models capable of explaining dysfunctions 
observed. To some extent these models were supported by empirical fmdings but the approach 
soon came under attack for its weak empirical methods and claims that the functions identified 
could be precisely localised. In many cases, the citing of neuroanatomical locations was highly 
speculative and theoretically advanced accounts were not matched by adequate empirical 
support. The critics held sway well into the twentieth century, until a move towards group 
studies, marking an attempt to make investigations more scientific in light of the empirical 
shortfalls of single case studies. Group studies soon became the norm, but, while large volumes 
of data were generated, few theoretical advances were made. The development of 
neuropsychology as it is known today, began in the 1960's. Cognitive psychologists found that 
many models devised for normal brain function could not account for function observed in brain 
impairment. However, models developed by studying impaired processing could account for 
both the effects of damage, and normal function. (For a full review see Shallice, 1988). 
3.3.1 Neuropsychological Methods 
Specific methods within neuropsychology are given prominence. Associations are demonstrated 
by eo-occurrence of two deficits on tasks (fig.J.la), for example, two musical perception tasks. 
There are limits, however, to the inferences which can be made from associations. 
Hypothesised relationships between tasks may be purely due to lesion localisation, not due to 
shared processing strategies.' Just because two things correlate does not mean that there is 
necessarily a relationship between them, e.g. hair colour and car ownership. There might well 
be a correlation between fair-haired people and people owning red cars, but this correlation 
might well be arbitrary or, non-causal. The major problem for associations then is that of 
interpreting any correlation between deficits. It is perhaps dissociations in processing tasks 
which form the main body of evidence from neuropsychological findings. A single dissociation 
is demonstrated when a subject shows intact performance on one task, whilst performance on 
another is impaired (fig. 3.1b). An example might be intact discrimination of melody and 
impaired rhythm discrimination on musical tasks. 
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Fig 3.1 Patterns of Normal And Impaired Performanee: 3.la; assodation: J.lb single 
dissociation: J.le double dissociation. 
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There are problems too for single dissociations. For example, the intact performance may be 
the result of a revised processing strategy. A task might be completed by trial and error, from 
memory, or conditioned responses may come into play when the task would ordinarily be 
undertaken by a specific processing strategy in normal subjects. For example. someone 
impaired for prosodic (intonational) aspects of speech might nonetheless be able to 'work out' 
the emotional tone from the content of the words and facial expression of the speaker as 
opposed to merely having an 'automatic' response to intonational aspects (e.g. vocal contours). 
Alternatively, the intact task may simply be easier than the task showing impaired performance. 
These problems limit the powers of inference from single dissociations. Stronger evidence 
though is provided by double dissociations. In such cases, subject A shows intact performance 
on task 1, but impaired performance on task 2; whilst a second subject B shows the reverse 
pattern of impairment (fig.3.lc). This eliminates the 'task difficulty' factor as an explanation of 
a single dissociation. Taken with converging evidence from normal behaviour, double 
dissociations are a useful tool in the development of both functional and neuroanatomical 
hypotheses. 
3.3.2 Critiques of Neuropsychology 
There are many critiques aimed at neuropsychological investigations, concerning methodologies, 
preconceptions of cognitive structure, and to what extent findings have relevance to normal 
cognition. The critics of neuropsychological methods have to some extent been assisted by the 
rapid transitions in methodology during the development of the discipline. 
Goldberg (1995) argues that studies have become biased in their dependence on dissociations 
and in turn are approached from a narrow perspective. He stresses that "isolated 
demonstrations of strong dissociations should not be treated with an unrestrained enthusiasm as 
the major tool of neuropsychological discovery and theory building." (Goldberg, 1995, p.l9S). 
Philosophers and faculty psychologists should equally guard against over-enthusiasm towards 
isolated clinical observations which seem to support theoretical studies. On the whole though, it 
is not the aim of neuropsychologists to develop a theoretical framework based entirely on single 
dissociations. but to evaluate hypotheses in light of the dissociations observed and where 
possible in light of findings from normal brain studies. Neuropsychologists have been at pains 
to stress that we cannot develop a model of a whole system based only on a few subsystems and 
it is still the case that relatively few subsystems have been studied in any detail - mainly 
language, memory, and vision and we cannot infer about global systems purely from these. 
This brings us to perhaps the most frequently advanced criticisms of neuropsychology: the 
validity of inferring from damaged to normal cognitive systems, which in effect is a critique of 
the field itself. A key issue is whether damaged systems reflect normal processing with damaged 
components, or damaged systems using compensatory strategies. In making inferences from 
brain damage, we are commonly inferring that the damaged brain is working as a normal system 
with a selectively damaged component, as opposed to operating as a restructured cognitive 
system, compensating for such a loss. This approach however can be defended. From a very 
basic physiological perspective, the brain cannot repair itself. One cannot grow new parts to 
replace those lost, so a damaged system must work with what is available. Although there is 
greater plasticity in the pre-pubescent brain (which demonstrates better outcomes after damage 
than mature cognitive systems), this is a matter of re-organisation and re-distribution of 
functions to 'functionally uncommitted' areas. Basic functions take priority, and consequently, 
later teamed skills such as literacy, numeracy, and quite possibly music, are eclipsed by re-
organisation of basic functions. Functional models support the view that one can infer from 
damage to normal systems. If conceptually 'lesioned', many models will produce results 
consistent with those seen in brain injured subjects. A difficulty is to identifY what processing 
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strategies are at work. A damaged system may apply a different strategy to a task, resulting in 
a performance which is not analogous to normal cognition. In some cases though, processing 
strategies may be identified or at least narrowed down and we can have some knowledge about 
the stages of processing which are being identified (see Peretz; 1990, 1993: Auditory agnosia: A 
functional analysis). 
In most scientific studies we have the opportunity to replicate experiments. A particular 
problem for neuropsychological methodology is the failure to replicate single-case studies. 8 
There needs to be much caution in making comparisons across cases, and it is often difficult to 
reproduce the same conditions both across single cases and within group case studies. While 
one might have patients with functionally similar deficits, and neuroanatomically similar lesions, 
there are a variety of factors which remain unaccounted for and one has to acknowledge 
variability in both individual function and neuroanatomy. The pre-morbid variation across 
subjects therefore invites caution when attempting to generalise about particular subject groups. 
However, standardisation of testing is rapidly developing allowing genuine comparison of single 
case studies, so long as individual variance is considered. 
While neuropsychological evidence intuitively invites assumptions of modularity, this has 
produced further criticisms ofthe approach. As Shallice (1988) notes, it is possible to provide 
examples of non-modular systems which may conceptually be lesioned such as to produce 
dissociations.9 Chapter 6 will deal with such criticisms arising from assumptions ofmodularity. 
In any case, there is unquestioningly an implicit understanding that double dissociations alone 
neither predict, nor prove the existence of a specific cognitive architecture. Needless to say, the 
most powerful defence for neuropsychology is convergence of evidence. Where 
neuropsychological findings converge with normal evidence, brain imaging and animal evidence 
(as they frequently do), one is then likely to have a robust theory. Any field can be important in 
developing a novel hypothesis which can then be tested across other disciplines. 
3.3.3 Current Findings In Neuropsychology of Music. 
The term 'amusia' was introduced by Steinhals in 1871 to describe musical deficits and brain 
damage specifically affecting musical function. The first case report of musical dysfunction 
was published by Proust in 1886.10 Whilst clinicians have long been aware of such cases, there 
is not a vast literature on musical deficits simply because music has not been considered an 
essential function. Where detailed studies have been made, the subjects are usually professional 
musicians, (as seen in Table 3.3 below), so historically the investigations are biased towards 
cases of highly developed musical abilities. Recently however, musical function has been 
studied in both musicians and non-musicians, although subjects studied are still typically those 
who have an interest in music • avid listeners or amateur performers. It seems that the 
musically non-literate population is not well represented, quite possibly due to the fact that those 
not interested in music would not be overly concerned with its loss in the face of more pressing 
problems. 
Music has nevertheless become subject to ongoing empirical studies in neuropsychology, but 
there are still methodological problems to be considered. To begin, there is a lack of 
standardised musical tests and normative data for musical function. Some psychological 
batteries exist for testing musical ability, but these are ill-suited to assessment of the effects of 
neurological damage on musical function. Individual musical abilities vary dramatically, posing 
the problem of catering for both musically literate and musically illiterate populations. Unlike 
language, the development of musical skills varies greatly. There is not always a correlation 
between receptive and expressive musical abilities, or between formal training and level of 
musical ability. There is certainly no universally adopted clinical method for musical 
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assessment and many clinicians themselves are not musically literate. The lack of 
standardisation for classifying musicality and lack of standardised test batteries have 
consequently lead to many inconsistencies in the literature. Perhaps the most frequently used 
tests are those by Seashore, Wing, Bentley, and Gordon, but the use of these tests is perhaps 
marked by the lack of suitable ahernatives, as opposed to their suitability for application across 
cases. (see Henson and Wyke's critique of Seashore's tests). 11 
There are a wide range of documented dissociations involving music, including both selective 
damage and sparing of specific musical functions, e.g., rhythm, melody, or reading musical 
notation. Both receptive and expressive aspects of musical performance may be affected. 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 provide a summary of selective musical impairments. It is worth noting that 
terminology used is not always consistent. Often musical deficits are described under the more 
general title of auditory agnosia, a blanket term which can be applied to the inability to interpret 
all sounds or all non speech sounds. 
Defteit 
Instrumental Apraxia 










Table 3.1: Expressive Amusias 
Deftaition 
Loss of ability to play instrument in absence of motor deficit. 
Loss of ability to sing hum or whistle melodies by imitation or from 
memory 
Loss of ability to produce musical notation, either copying, 
transcribing, or from memory. 
Table 3.2: Re«ptive Amusia• 
Definition 
Loss of ability to interpret all aspects of musical stimuli, (can 
include loss of expressive musical abilities). 
Loss of ability to read musical notation 
Loss ofability to discriminate rhythmic aspects of musical stimuli 
Loss of ability to interpret melodic aspect of musical stimuli 
Inability to use tonal cues for music discrimination 
Inability to recognise familiar melodies. 
In some cases, isolated musical deficits have been recorded, but more often, they are 
accompanied by further disorders e.g. language deficits, motor deficits, or dysfunction 
encompassing a range of musical deficits. Table 3.3 provides a summary of some documented 
cases. 
Table 3.3: Summary of Documented Cases of Sparing and Damage of Musical Function 
See Appendix ll for details of lesion localisations. A summary of the associated deficits listed is given below in Table 3.4 
Case Sparing/Damage to Musical Other Deficits at Time Pre-morbid Musical Lesion localisation Laterality 
Function of Testing Abilities 
Souques & Spared Musical abilities Wernicke's aphasia Professional musician Left hemisphere, lesion covering Inconclusive 
Baruk, 1930 (piano teacher) almost all of left temporal lobe. 
Alajouanine Spared musical abilities Wernicke' s aphasia, Professional composer & (Bilateral ventricular enlargement) Not Given 
1948, (Ravel) ideomotor apraxia performer. 
Luria et. al Spared musical abilities. Severe (global) aphasia Professional composer Left hemisphere: massive lesion to Not Given 
1965, (Shebalin) temporal and inferior parietal 
regions (haemorrhagic cyst in left 
temporo-parietal region) 
Assal 1973 Expressive musical abilities intact, Wernicke's aphasia Professional pianist Left temporo-parietal Suggests right-
(H. B) some receptive deficits: rhythmic handed (writing 
processing and naming familiar hand) -but no other 
melodies. evidence given. 
Mavlov 1980 Global amusia & music agnosia. Acalculia, mild Professional violinist Left hemisphere, occlusion of Right-handed 
(receptive and expressive) orthographic deficit, left- posterior parietal artery. 
right disorientation. 
Brust 1980 Expressive amusia, with severe Conduction aphasia Professional musician Left hemisphere Right-handed 
(Case 2) alexia and agraphia 
Brust, 1980 Musical alexia & agraphia, other Transcortical sensory Professional musician Left hemisphere Right-handed 
(Case 1) musical abilities intact aphasia, mild alexia, 
severe agraphia 
McFarland & Expressive amusia, difficulty None Accomplished organist -not Right temporo-parietal Right-handed 
Fortin 1982 recognising familiar melodies. musically literate, no formal 
musical trainin . 
""" ~ 
Table 3.3 Continued 
Case Sparing/Damage to Musical Other Deficits at Time Pre morbid Musical Lesion localisation Laterality 
Function of Testing Abilities 
Eustache et al Impaired melodic discrimination, Left sensory-motor Non-Musician Right capsulolenticular and frontal Right-handed 
1990 (R.L) expressive arhythmia, oral - hemiplegia. Left visual ischaemic lesion 
expressive amusia (restricted to neglect, mild 
examples without words.) constructional apraxja, 
(and anosognosia) 
Eustache et. al Inability to identify familiar tunes, Mild word-finding No formal musical training, Left temporo-parietal Right-handed 
1990 (M.H) oral expressive amusia, mild difficulty, impairment in avid listener enjoyed singing. 
expressive arhythmia. writing to dictation, oral 
comprehension deficit 
apparent in conversation. 
Peretz & Vocal amusia, global receptive None No formal musical training, Bilateral temporal lobe lesions Right-handed 
Kolinsky 1993 amusia some spared temporal enjoyed singing. 
(CN) processing for music. 
Peretz et. al 1994 Receptive amusia, (auditory Mild receptive language No formal musical training, Bilateral temporo-parietal Right-handed 
GL atonalia) spared temporal difficulty avid listener to classical 
processing for music music. 
Johannes et.al, Sound agnosia (non-verbal) and None Sound engineer with perfect Right perisylvian Right-handed 
1998 amusia pitch . 
1998 Peretz et. al Can no longer sing or recognise Mild articulation No formal musical training Bilateral lesions. Left temporal Right-handed 
(IR) familiar melodies. Spared emotion difficulty. Left hemiplegic but raised in musical gyrus, right inferior and middle 
recognition for music. arm. environment: Brother and frontal gyri. 
grandmother professional 
musicians. 
Estanol , B & Receptive amusia Mild Wernicke's aphasia Pre-morbidly musical Bilateral damage to superior temporal Not given 




Other cases of interest are: Ustvedt (1937); Jellinek (1956); Botez & Wertheim (1959); Trethowan, (1977); Shapiro et. al (1981 ); M organ & Tilluckdharry (1982); 
Munte et.al (1998); Schuppert et. al (2000). 12 Note that this is not a fully comprehensive list of cases, but includes those which are of particular relevance to this 
investigation. It may seem that contrary to my remarks above, that there is in fact a vast literature on musical deficits. The large number of papers, however, does 
not reflect the relatively few robust cases which have been subject to detailed investigation (although I might add that this situation has improved in the last three 
years whilst I have undertaken this study). Many cases of musical dysfunction are mentioned in passing, as interesting asides discovered in the investigation of eo-
occurring deficits. Often (particularly in earlier cases) there is no detailed assessment of musical skills, and assessment of pre-morbid abilities relies on self-
assessment by the subject. Hence one should be wary when contrasting cases. 














Disorder of calculation following brain damage. 
Loss of ability to write, may be specific to language or music 
Loss of ability to read, may be specific to language or music, and may occur independently of 
agraphia. 
Denial of deficit or rather a lack of awareness of a deficit. 
Collective term for impairment of language skms following brain damage. Some, or all 
language functions (global aphasia) may be damaged in both receptive and expressive 
modalities. 
An aphasia characterised by halting effortful speech, associated with damage to ' Broca's 
area, a portion of the left inferior frontal gyrus. 
An aphasia characterised by difficulties repeating heard utterances. 
(Also known as sensory aphasia) an aphasia characterised by fluent but meaningless speech, 
consisting of strings of neologisms, may include semantic errors, and often accompanied by 
impaired comprehension. 
loss ofloss of ability to make purposeful fine body movements 
An Apraxia characterised by a distortion of movements. Execution of movements is only 
impaired when they are executed out of context. 
loss of voluntary movements on the contralateral side, due to brain damage affecting the 
motor cortex. 
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3.3.3.1 The Independence of Music Cognition 
In light of the eo-occurrence of music with other deficits, many suggestions have been offered as 
regards how music relates to other functions, both in terms of its physical localisation and 
processing strategies. Implicit in many accounts is a view of music as integrated with other 
auditory functions and ultimately dependent on language. Historically, the approach has been to 
assess music's interaction with language as opposed to assessing its independence as a cognitive 
function. This is despite well documented phenomena in the history of neuropsychology, e.g. 
high profile cases such as Ravel, and Shebalin, composers who retained musical abilities in the 
face of severe aphasias. And there is also the frequently reported ability of aphasic patients 13 to 
sing songs containing words they could not speak. These observations would surely suggest a 
lack of dependence of music upon language. However, often cases of dissociation were 
dismissed as interesting asides, and the retained abilities of musicians were attributed to 
unusually advanced pr~morbid musical skills. 
Whilst it is becoming more widely accepted in neuropsychology that music functions more or 
less autonomously, this view is not shared across other disciplines. There are still wide ranging 
assumptions that music is languag~dependent. For example, comparisons between music and 
prosodic aspects of speech are frequently made. Storr, comments that 
"There are many similarities between prosodic communication and music. 
Infants respond to the rhythm, pitch intensity, and timbre of the mother's voice; 
all of which are part of music." (Storr, 1992, p. 9). 
The following quote by Henson exemplifies similar thoughts within neuropsychology. Henson 
suggests that for musically experienced listeners, 
"it is difficult to divorce the music heard from the internal verbal analysis, say, 
'modulation' or 'full close', which accompanies the auditory experience. And 
then words are required to describe, discuss, direct, sing and teach music." 
(1985, p.488). 
These shared perceptual features of music and language however, do not in any way legitimise 
inferring shared processing capacities. Not only do such remarks overlook the non-linguistic 
nature of music itself, but they view music cognition and indeed the listening process itself as 
part of a far more complex behavioural context. Ultimately language is not required to listen to 
music, rather assumptions of language dependence arise as a consequence of music's 
involvement within the language dominant culture. 
Nonetheless, the suggestion that music may be functionally autonomous has been criticised from 
the standpoint that, whilst musical function is occasionally selectively spared or impaired, more 
often amusia is accompanied by aphasia. Benton, for example, ( 1977) reported that 7/1 0 
amusic subjects also suffered some form of aphasia, however, as I noted above, associations 
have multiple interpretations, and one shouldn't jump towards the simplest explanation. 
Clarifying the relationship of aphasia and amusia may go some way towards supporting the 
claim for a functionally autonomous music processing capacity. However, investigation is also 
needed regarding how and whether musical function may develop in the absence of language, in 
addition to functioning autonomously in the presence of acquired language deficits. 
Neuropsychology (focusing on acquired damage) has little to say about the possibility of mutual 
dependence in acquisition, yet this may be of importance in any attempt to suggest autonomous 
processes for music. The evidence from developmental psychology is contradictory. Cases of 
good musical ability in the absence of language e.g. in autism suggest that music may develop 
independently. However, where developmental language disorders are present, musical ability 
varies greatly. Controversially it has been suggested (Cox, 1993; Edwards 1979) that lack of 
linguistic communication may encourage development of right hemisphere functions as a 
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compensatory mechanism. Developmental evidence may then offer some further support for a 
model of music as an independent cognitive function and will be considered further in Chapter 
7. 
3.3.4 Lateralisatlon of Musical Function 
A prominent finding in the history of neuropsychology was the hemisphere dominance exhibited 
by language, and following in the footsteps of language studies one of the main aims of studying 
amusias has been to establish hemisphere dominance for music cognition. Many functions 
exhibit hemisphere dominance. While different processes may be bilateralJy distributed, one 
hemisphere often has control for specific functions. The most notable example is language for 
which the left hemisphere is dominant in over 95% of cases in right handed subjects (in left 
handed subjects the figure is closer to 70%, and left handers may show very different patterns of 
brain organisation)14• A further example is visuo-spatial cognition, which typically exhibits 
right hemisphere dominance in right handed subjects. While this does not mean one can neatly 
identify specific locations for individual functions, it gives a map of their typical asymmetrical 
distribution. These cases are weU matched by neuropsychological findings with damage to left 
and right hemispheres affecting specific cognitive functions. 
For music however, lateralisation of function to one hemisphere has not been straightforward. 
Bearing in mind the hemisphere dominance of language, and the coexistence of language and 
music deficits, to some theorists it seemed obvious to suggest music and language both exhibit 
left hemisphere dominance. But one only needs to scratch the surface of popular psychology to 
be confronted with the strongly ingrained view that music (and other creative arts) are mediated 
by the right hemisphere. Indeed, the move towards single case studies has turned 
neuropsychologists in favour of this view, with cases of pure amusia being the result of right 
hemisphere damage. Nonetheless, (as Table 3.3 shows), left. right and bilateral lesions, (and of 
varying localisations), have all resulted in musical deficits, so it would not seem appropriate to 
attempt to Jateralise 'music' in a uniform way, as a unified function, to either hemisphere. But 
perhaps the more influential factor in this approach has been the attribution of general 
processing capacities or strategies to left and right hemispheres • analytic processes mediated by 
the left (or language dominant) hemisphere, holistic processes by the right. It is unsurprising 
then that contradictory claims for hemisphere lateralisation persist as do problems for localising 
musical faculties. Table 3.4 summarises some contradictory claims for hemisphericity of 
musical functions, but one must note the consistency with regard to non-musicians. 
Table 3.4. Claims For Bemispheridty of Music in 
Musical And Non-Musical Subjeets 
Author(s) 
Musician Non-Musician 
Milner (1962) RH RH 
Kimura (1964) RH RH 
Bever & Chiarello(l974) LH RH 
McFarland & Fortin (1982) RH RH 
Basso & Capitani (1985) LH RH 
Peretz ~1980-~ LH RH 
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A new approach towards establishing hemisphere dominance was initiated by the findings of 
Bever and Chiarello (1974). The findings were significant as they led to revised thought on both 
hemisphere dominance and the nature of processing strategies employed in musically 
sophisticated and naive subjects, suggesting that musicians and non-musicians used very 
different processing strategies, and importantly, different hemispheres for analysing music. 
Sever and Chiarello used a dichotic listening task, a method where different stimuli are 
presented to each ear at the same time, and the subject is asked to report what they hear. When 
listening to linguistic material, a right ear (left hemisphere) advantage is generally displayed. 
Sever & Chiarello found that musically experienced listeners demonstrated a right ear 
advantage for the recognition of melodies, (supporting a left hemisphere dominance), whereas 
musically nai"ve subjects demonstrated a left ear superiority (and right hemisphere dominance). 
Bever and Chiarello's findings also supported the analytic/holistic conception of processing 
strategies, with the left hemisphere operating via an analytic processing strategy and the right 
hemisphere via a holistic strategy. On such accounts 'analytic' strategies refer to algorithmic, 
sequential processing, whereas holistic strategies refer to parallel or simultaneous processing. 
Following Sever & Chiarellos' findings there has been widespread acceptance of their 
hypothesis. Gates and Bradshaw ( 1977), Peretz ( 1990), and Basso & Capitani ( 1985) have all 
supported revised models of hemisphere dominance where lateralisation is variable in relation to 
musical experience. It is suggested that musically sophisticated subjects who know the 'musical 
code' (i.e. have a music lexicon and syntax) employ analytic processing strategies mediated by 
the left hemisphere (or language dominant hemisphere), whereas musically naive subjects 
employ holistic processing strategies mediated by right hemisphere functions. This is supported 
by findings that musically experienced subjects do refer to local features in processing musical 
information (intervals between notes in a melody), whilst non-musicians refer to global features 
such as melodic contour (Peretz 1990). (Fig. 3.2) (And would also account for the consistency 
seen in Table 3.4). 
Left Hemisphere 
LH superiority for processing 
verbal material (as indicated by REA) 
Musically sophisticated listeners 
Analytic processing strategies 
....... ~ ~rJJ*rj = ~ J 
Analysis of internal features e.g. intervals between 
notes. 
Right Hemisphere 
RH superiority for processing non-verbal 
material (as indicated by LEA) 
Musically naive listeners 
Holistic processing strategies 
Analy is of global features e.g. melodic contour 
Fig. 3.2 
Suggested Lateralisation of Music For Musical and Non-Musical Subjects. LH = left hemisphere, 
RH = Right hemisphere. LEA = Left Ear Advantage, REA = Right Ear Advantage. 
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Nonetheless, this acceptance is very puzzling. Not only have Bever and Chiarellos findings 
been largely unreplicated, the test also depends upon experimental techniques (dichotic listening) 
which are unreliable, difficult to administer and verifY. And it is a very weak claim to ground 
hemisphere dominance on ear advantage for one type of musical task. Other tasks may well 
demonstrate an opposite ear advantage, and therefore contradictory hemisphere lateralisation. 
Indeed, contradictory evidence for hemisphericity is provided from several sources: Milner, 
1962; Kimura, 1964; McFarland & Fortin, 1982; Johannes, 1998. 
The heart of the problem however, seems to be the misdirection of laterality claims which is in 
part due to the global/local conception of hemispheric function. This has lead to attempts to 
lateralise music as a unified function without considering laterality of individual subjects. This 
is of particular concern in the case of music where there is a higher proportion of left-handed 
and ambidextrous subjects amongst the musical population15• And as I noted above, cerebral 
organisation (particularly lateralisation of language) in such subjects is variable. Rather than 
attempting to lateralise functions full stop or even just to lateralise in terms of musicians and 
non-musicians the focus has to be on individual subjects and individual cognitive organisation. 
If as we shall later see, one considers laterality issues, musical experience, and the nature of the 
musical task involved, one may then be in a position to examine whether specific musical tasks 
are undertaken by a particular hemisphere in a particular group of subjects. 
There is growing support for bilateral processing of music (and auditory processing in general), 
and in light of the above considerations, one can see why the dominance debate is becoming 
somewhat obsolete. Indeed it is hard to see why the brain would be 'structured' to process in 
such radically different ways across hemispheres. A far more plausible explanation is that 
differences that have been identified in hemispheric processing strategies reflect what is 
processed in each hemisphere (with strategies used being those most suited to the task), rather 
than suggesting there are fixed strategies for each hemisphere which determine what is 
processed. For example, language, (a serially organised, rule governed system) in the left 
hemisphere, and visuo-spatial information (lending itself to gestalt, integrative processing) in the 
right hemisphere. The case study presented in Chapter S also provides further evidence on this 
issue and I will return to this in detail in Chapter 6. Although operating on a different level, 
localisation of musical function is also an issue. This will be considered further in Chapters 6 
& 7 but it is worth noting that some of the issues concerning lateralisation will impinge upon 
issues of localisation - e.g. the type of processing strategy assumed for each hemisphere, in 
relation to the localisation of a particular musical function. 
3.4 Drawing on Musical Dlssoclations 
In this section I shall ftrst discuss dissociations relevant to a general picture of music cognition, 
before examining those specific to music and emotion. and giving a more precise picture of the 
musical deficits concerned. Some intriguing and surprising discoveries have been made giving 
us a radically different perspective of music in relation to other general cognitive processes and 
indeed other auditory processes. 
To begin, it would be useful to have a clearer concept of what it means to be 'amusic' (and 
what we mean when we say amusic patients cannot process music). Amusic patients have no 
physiological problems with hearing, the mechanisms for receiving auditory input are intact, and 
are proven to be so by subjects' other auditory abilities. Amusic subjects cannot interpret or 
recognise the musical information and complain of hearing music as 'garbled' sounds. We can 
imagine more clearly the similar case of a subject with auditory agnosia (inabiJity to recognise 
and identifY auditory input) who says 
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"I know exactly what I want to say but I don't know whether it is right or 
wrong .. .I know I am speaking but I can't hear the words right, not the actual 
words, I can hear the voice.'' (Kiein and Harper 1956, p.l14). An amusic 
patient might say 'I know it's music- I can see the orchestra playing ... .! can 
hear the sounds - but I can't hear the actual notes'. 
As seen in 3.3.3, music exhibits dissociation16 from other cognitive systems in various ways. 
Firstly, there is evidence of music as independent of other auditory functions. Some subjects 
with amusic deficits can process (recognise and interpret) both environmental sounds and speech 
without any difficulty, and there are examples where subjects are unimpaired in all other 
cognitive functions. Non-musical deficits are also of relevance here - that environmental sound 
and speech can be selectively spared and impaired may provide a key to understanding the 
organisation of the auditory system as a whole .. 17 Double dissociations observed between music 
and speech (where music is spared in one subject with speech damaged, and selectively impaired 
in another subject with speech intact), offer a new perspective as regards music's relationship to 
speech (and indeed environmental sound.) Expression theories suggesting that music conveys 
emotion via its similarity to speech and environmental sounds (Pole, 1924; Spencer, 1857; 
Cooke 1959; Revesz, 1953), begin to lose credence on further examination of this evidence. In 
particular, those accounts suggesting musically expressed emotion is a subsidiary of prosodic 
elements of speech seem too simplistic. 18 Evolutionary considerations may offer some insights 
here as to whether music and language may share common roots. It may be that musical 
emotion developed from prosodic aspects of language, but once developed, the two systems now 
operate independently. If it can be shown, however, that prosodic aspects of speech (i.e., 
recognition of emotional tone of voice) are independent of music-emotion recognition, then this 
will refute the expression theories which depend on similarity of music to other auditory 
domains. However, there is also the possibility that some 'music' tasks are performed by 
general auditory processing mechanisms, whilst others have their own dedicated systems. The 
empirical evidence and controversy surrounding this issue will be reviewed in detail below. For 
the present, it does seem that emotion in music and affective prosody in speech can be 
independently processed and this calls for rejection of the brute similarity views outlined 
above. 19 
So far we have discussed mainly auditory dissociations, but music can be dissociated from other 
systems too. The most startling dissociation, and that which leads us to seriously review 
theories of musical expression, is the dissociation witnessed between music and emotional 
processing in amusic subjects. Amusic subjects have frequently reported being unable to 
recognise or interpret music, whilst they still reported feeling a sense of enjoyment from music 
as they were aware of its emotional content. They could still tell if a piece was happy or sad, 
and recent tests have shown amusic subjects respond well within the range of normal subjects in 
correctly identifying the emotional tone of musical works (see Peretz et. al, 1998). This initially 
seems somewhat paradoxical, and new questions arise: How is it that subjects who cannot 
recognise music 'as music', or discriminate between musical features, can still identify the 
emotion being conveyed? and, what is it being detected which allows emotional distinctions to 
be made? The idea of being somehow able to process or recognise the emotional content 
without the recognising musical features is initially a difficult one to accept. Peretz (Neurocase, 
1999), makes a useful analogy with face recognition through which the situation does not seem 
quite so paradoxical. We may be able to progress from here towards our new theory. 
"One striking finding that emerges from studies of processing impairments due 
to brain damage is the double dissociation observed between recognition of 
identity and of emotion in faces. It has been recurrently reported that brain 
damage can produce selective deficits in the recognition of identities of seen 
faces while leaving intact the recognition of expressions. Inversely, selective 
deficits affecting the recognition of emotions from facial expressions without 
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disturbing recognition of their identity have been reported (e.g. Etcoff, 1984; 
Parry et al., 1991; Young et al., 1993 ). These observations entail that certain 
aspects of face identity and facial expression are analysed separately in the 
human brain." 
Peretz goes on to compare this to music, commenting on the lack of musical studies and 
similarity of the two cases. 
"The situation is odd because, like faces, melodies are highly structured, easily 
recognisable and conceived as an emotional medium. Just like for faces, brain 
damage can produce a selective loss of recognition abilities for 
melodies ..... while leaving intact recognition of speech and familiar 
environmental sounds" 
This analogy can hopeful1y make the idea clearer, particularly if we think in terms that the 
emotional recognition is not dependent on recognising musical (identity) features (or even 
recognising music 'as music'), just as interpreting facial expression is not dependent on 
recognising identity of faces. 20 Indeed, the analogy with face recognition may give us further 
help if we look to current neuropsychological models of face recognition. Most such models 
suggest three separate routes for information processing in recognising faces • "for processing 
information required in the recognition of a familiar face, for matching unfamiliar faces, and for 
the analysis of facial expressions., (Peretz, J. Cog. Neuroscience 1996). 
With this in mind, the dissociations observed in music might lead us to suggest different routes 
for music processing: (on the surface) it certainly seems to be the case that separate pathways 
exist for the recognition of musical affect and the recognition of musical identity features. 
However, I suggest some caution in using this analogy. Whilst it is a useful means of 
explaining the independent processing of identity and expression, one should be wary of 
comparing functions across modalities. Identifying faces has strong adaptive value, as may be 
the case for voice identity too, but whether music might have inherited all the characteristics of 
these systems is questionable. It is possible that music itself offers some adaptive advantage by 
functioning in this way and I will consider this in Chapter 6. 
Nonetheless, one can see the concerns for aesthetic theories of musical expression whether 
attributing emotional expression to context, particular musical features, its similarity to vocal 
contours, or by imitating human behaviour. None of these accounts alone seems able to match 
the picture of music cognition as exemplified by neuropsychological studies. There are 
discrepancies between the way in which aesthetic accounts are proposing music expresses (the 
specificity, and reliability they claim for such methods), and the picture neuropsychological data 
paints of music and emotion cognition21• 
An initial reply from the aesthetician might be that cognition in brain damaged subjects is 
different· that it is 'damaged processing' we are seeing and this does not reflect normal patterns 
of music cognition. However, as noted above these claims are unfounded. Further tests on 
normal subjects, and evidence from other domains of cognitive science indicate that the 
damaged brain is giving an accurate picture of normal cognition. The findings point to musical 
identity features and musically expressed emotion being recognised by two different systems. 
There is also some evidence of a double dissociation for emotion processing where subjects 
whose recognition abilities remain, complain of loss of musical enjoyment, saying the music 
sounds flat and unemotional, although such cases have not been objectively tested22• While firm 
evidence of such a double dissociation would strengthen the case for separate affective and 
perceptual processes, other empirical support is readily available. Subsequent evidence shows 
that emotion recognition is faster than recognition of familiarity. In tests, subjects (normal and 
amusic) were able to correctly identifY the emotional tone of an excerpt on hearing only the first 
half-second, whilst recognition of the extract as familiar or novel occurs at around two seconds. 
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(Peretz, Cognition, 1998). This picture suggests not only that emotion judgements are prior to 
familiarity judgements, but that emotional judgements are made before a subject has time to 
recognise any substantial musical features. In combination with the evidence from amusia, this 
suggests that emotion in music can indeed be perceived independently, and emotion processing 
can work very fast without needing to recognise musical features i.e. without needing to 
recognise the music as music that is, as novel or familiar or identifying musical features. So 
amusic subjects who report hearing music as 'grating and squeaking sounds' can interpret the 
emotional content nonetheless, and this hypothesis seems highly plausible in light of the account 
of affective perception given in Chapter I. We can conclude from neuropsychological findings 
that: (1) Music (in mature cognitive systems) is a highly independent cognitive function; (2) 
Music is subdivided, into melodic and rhythmic components in processing (this is demonstrated 
by cases of dissociation as documented in Table 3.3. One can selectively lose the ability to 
process either rhythm or melody. Other further subdivisions seem to be suggested and these will 
be examined further in Chapters 5-7). (3) Music has a separate memory, (again this is 
demonstrated by examples in table 3.3. One can lose the ability to recognise melodies as 
familiar, and to sing or play from memory.) and (4) Music appears to have a separate pathway 
for the processing of emotional information. We now need to begin to make sense of this data, 
in our attempts to formulate a new framework for emotional expression in music. 
3.5 Towards a New Theory of Expression 
The (philosophical) problem here is whether we may reconcile aesthetic accounts of expression 
with empirical findings as discussed above {and obviously what are the constraints on 
expression theories imposed by these findings). In order for existing expression theories to hold 
we may have to say that they explain responses at a higher 'cognitive level'. Basic emotional 
responses, which are produced independently of recognising musical identity features and 
familiarity, do not include sufficient information to make a more detailed emotional ascription. 
What we are inferring from the empirical data is that, by the time music has been processed 
{that is before we can make any cognitive evaluations), the basic emotional content has already 
been determined, and we have evidence to show music as a completely independent process at 
this stage23• So therefore, only after an initial emotional evaluation has been made can we build 
on the picture and relate musical features to emotional terms etc. in a detailed way i.e. as in 
Cooke's The Language of Music, "whereby predicates in the English language are matched 
with intervals, harmonic progressions and phrases of different shapes." (Sharpe, 1983, pp. 100-
101). This could not be a part of any initial processing of music due to the independence 
exhibited by music as a cognitive function. Only after initial processing could this happen. That 
we are able, and do in practice, make far more detailed attributions of musical expression of 
emotion, leads us to suggest a two-stage notion of identifying emotional expression in music 
involving 'a music sf:Cific affective response {which I shall call 'musical affect'), and a further 
cognitive evaluation 4• I would suggest that due to the nature of initial affective processing, 
{direct non-cognitive responses to auditory stimuli as discussed in Chapter 1), only a 'positive, 
negative, or neutral' evaluation could be made here, {neutral interpreted as perceptual stimuli 
failing to trigger any affective response). This is supported by studies of amusic subjects in 
that, while amusics may have intact affective recognition, they have not been shown to give 
detailed responses but only classification in terms of 'happy and sad' ·which accord with my 
positive and negative dimensions. I will be concerned here only with specifically musical 
responses - 'musical affect' and 'cognitive evaluations', which I will call primary and 
seconda.ys stages of expression recognition. (These correspond to natural and acquired modes 
of expression outlined in Chapters 1 and 2). 
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3.5.1 Primary Stage Processing 
Before continuing, we need to clarify the picture of music cognition we are proposing, and 
explain exactly what these 'primary' and 'secondary' stages of expression-recognition may 
entail. From the analysis of neuropsychological findings, and our discussion of emotion 
cognition, it seems that initial emotional responses to music may be physiologicaUy very basic. 
J aak Panksepp has been investigating such a hypothesis and has identified a reaction he refers to 
as 'musical chill.' 
Panksepp believes this may be related to an 'ancient emotional mechanism' to "make mammals 
and other animals emotionally responsive to the needy cries of their offspring."26 They may 
involve very basic emotional mechanisms, (the limbic system) and induce physiological 
responses - typically a shiver down the spine. It has been suggested that such reactions may be 
throwbacks to basic evolutionary mechanisms. After all, it would be an important survival aid 
to be able to decipher the emotional state of others, whether it be fear anger, sadness etc. The 
term 'musical chill' or (musical thrills) has now been adopted more widely, to incorporate other 
affective responses (e.g., a lump in the throat, tears, racing pulse). However, chill seems to be 
equated with responses to negative emotions so I would prefer to adopt my own terminology for 
such responses - musical affect to refer to physiological (non-cognitive) affective responses to 
music which might also involve positive affect. For the two-stage model, I am suggesting that 
such basic responses would consist in a 'positive, negative or neutral response to music.' In 
keeping with our suggestion that this may be an evolutionary trait, it may be appropriate to 
consider 'positive and negative' in terms of pleasant and unpleasant emotional classifications: 
positive being happy and derivatives of this, negative being sadness and its derivatives, (see 
Blood et.al, 1999). Gordon comments on this intuitive characterisation of emotions as positive 
and negative, despite our difficulties in offering a full explanation of this distinction. However, 
I think Gordon' s initial explanation may serve to underline the distinction I am attempting to 
make and I would like to agree with the clarification he gives (see also discussion in Chapter 2, 
p. ). 
"One might be tempted to say that the typical hedonic quality of the former is 
positive, that of the latter negative: Typically, it is pleasant or "feels good," to 
be pleased about something; it is unpleasant or "feels bad," to be sad, angry, or 
embarrassed about something. One might also say that, because of their 
respective hedonic qualities, being pleased and being proud are attractive states, 
states we are typically disposed to being in. On the other hand, sadness, 
embarrassment are aversive or repellent states, states we are typically disposed 
not to be in. One must add "typically:• however. There seems no reason to 
rule out the possibility that someone might find it pleasant, and therefore 
attractive to be sad or angry ... "27 
This is much like the example of fair ground rides given in Chapter 2 and, for example, horror 
movies, both examples of negative emotions which are nonetheless enjoyable and attractive 
states to some people in these contexts. Gordon stresses the addition of states we are 'typically' 
disposed not to be in, which is useful as it will allow us to hold that musically expressed 
'sadness', for example, needn't be aversive or repellent. Obviously we do not respond to music 
in exactly the same way as to a crying child, but it is possible that music somehow tricks this 
same circuitry and we experience the result as recognition and sometimes arousal of emotion on 
listening to music.28 Typical 'musical affective' responses are characterised by particular 
physiological changes and arousal of the nervous system. We commonly experience musical 
affective responses though as a shiver down the spine, and we respond more to 'sad' music than 
any other emotional expression, which ties in with the idea of a response to offspring or others 
Towards a new Theory of Musical Expression 55 
in pain On the whole, women experience stronger and more frequent responses, again tying in 
with the idea that it is a throwback to basic parental responses - we would expect the maternal 
response to be stronger. If this is the case, such basic responses should be universal, and this is 
indeed something we can test for. The evidence of young infants' responses to music also 
support the hypothesis that such responses are physiologically very basic, as do the findings that 
animals too experience physiological affective responses to music. 29 
At this point, one objection is frequently raised (i.e., see Peretz & Morais, 1989 and also see 
Wallin, Merker & Brown, 2000}, why should music feature at all in relation to early 
evolutionary mechanisms - and why indeed it should have it's own independent processing 
system. After all, music is not a biologically essential function. A frequent reply is that we may 
be able to justify music-emotion responses as an early evolutionary trait if we look to music's 
importance as a social function, and music's ability to allow shared emotional response. Every 
culture has music, and in addition we have an instinctive ability to create music through our 
voices, even where individuals have grown up deprived of musical input, they develop the ability 
to sing, hum, etc. (see examples of auditory deprivation in developmental psychology). It 
appears music's ability to allow us to express our emotions non-linguistically may account for 
its success, because it provides an alternative medium for the communication and expression of 
emotion. In particular, music's ability to allow shared emotional response may account for the 
enjoyment of negative emotions. In this sense, it might seem that music has exploited a 
necessary evolutionary mechanism - to be able to express and recognise emotional states - prior 
to a linguistic ability to do so. 30 Such sociological defences of music's adaptive advantage and 
evolutionary force are fairly common (e.g., Peretz, also see Wallin, Merker & Brown, The 
Origins of Music). Nonetheless one might well question the force behind such attempts to 
justify music's evolutionary advantage. After all, any theory of musical evolution is at least 
largely speculative. In addition, one does not have to propose specialised musical mechanisms 
at this stage of processing, it may be that general purpose mechanisms are in fact in operation. 
This is a contentious issue within music cognition, and one which requires more detailed 
discussion than can be offered within this chapter. I return to the issue in Chapters 6 and 7 and 
discuss the problem with reference to specific empirical findings. Nonetheless, in relation to 
many models the evolutionary critique is certainly relevant and the reply deserves some further 
elaboration. 
A further flaw for sociological accounts is that they seem to explain the pressures for retaining 
music as an existing function, and social tool, as opposed to accounting for its initial 
development. It may well be a useful social tool, but this does not really seem to account for its 
development in terms of the auditory and affective mechanisms involved. 
There is, however, a tension between claiming that music has colonised pre-existing auditory 
systems, in place for detecting emotion in offspring etc., and also to claim that it is music per se 
that is selected for in evolution (as in the sociological account). But we don't have to make such 
concessions to the evolutionary criticism as in the sociological account (e.g., Peretz & Morais 
1993). Perhaps one does have to, if one wants to claim complex music-specific predispositions. 
But one can have musical predispostions which are a function of general purpose auditory 
processing mechanisms, and by fine-tuning auditory perception mechanisms, one can develop 
music-specific processes. This does not cause any problem in terms of the evolutionary 
selectivity argument. What is adaptively advantageous are fine-tuned auditory processing 
abilities, in addition to an auditory-motoric conversion ability (e.g., allowing imitation of sounds 
or movement to sounds). With these mechanisms in place, one can acquire an endless variety of 
complex capacities, including the subsequent development of music specific cognition and music 
specific affective cognition. 
To continue then, we have sufficient evidence to support the idea of such a 'primary stagt;' that 
is initial processing of music by an independent cognitive processing system. The pertinent 
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question within the following chapters will be whether this system is a general purpose auditory 
system or whether it is music specific, and, whether affective responses to music are also the 
result of a music specific system. We cannot deny, given the empirical evidence, that there are 
very basic physiological emotional responses to music, although we still need to determine the 
universality of this, what range of distinctions can be made and how this occurs. We must 
conclude that there are underlying and seemingly powerful responses to music even if we cannot 
yet give full explanations of these, and this fits the general model of music cognition suggested 
by neuropsychological observations. 
3.5.2 Secondary Stage Processing 
We know from experience that we (both musically literate and illiterate) feel able to make 
stronger claims about the range of emotions music can express than 'positive, negative, or 
neutral' and this is done quite reliably too. So we are now in the position to ask how further 
emotional classifications are made. It seems they cannot be arrived at purely by initial music 
processing as this does not involve anything more complex than the basic 'physiological 
affective response'31• Neither does it seem to be a process of consciously evaluating a piece for 
emotional content whilst listening, as this certainly does not match our experiences of listening 
to music, and does not match empirical findings either. So it must be something else - but 
what? We must therefore suppose that there is a secondary stage whereby we attribute 
emotional expressions to music and it is here that we make more detailed emotional 
classifications. 
We are now faced with the problem of just what this 'secondary stage' of emotional recognition 
might be, and how existing theories might fare within this model. In light of our proposed 
model, one might suggest that a secondary evaluation is the result of sociological, cultural, and 
developmental influences on our music-perception which we will call acculturation. 32 
The idea of 'expression via convention' (acculturation) is a popular one in aesthetics. Although 
commonly put forward as the only method by which music may express, my model would 
suggest acculturation acts as a supplementary faculty - so we can build on lower level responses 
of the primary system. 33 Acculturation would allow us to explain the attribution of more 
complex emotional labels to music, including cognitively complex emotions if we so wish. 
What the idea entails is that, after initial affective processing, detailed emotional responses can 
be made, which relate to musical knowledge, current emotional arousal, extra-musical factors • 
lyrics, visual effects, narrative etc. For example, we might learn that particular types of music 
are used to represent fear, or grief, and we would then recognise similar types of music ~s 
expressing fear or grief. In this way, cognitively complex emotions could be attributed to mustc 
and 'recognition' of these might be explained in terms of emotions realised in the listener and 
projected onto the music. It may be that we have the ability to override our immediate 
instinctive responses (as discussed in relation to the ANS above, p.ll ). This may be 
responsible for the often cited lack of consensus in emotional response to music. Or, we may 
have to acknowledge the underlying affective reaction (even if subconsciously) and attribute a 
similar, though more complex, positive or negative emotion to the piece. This is certainly 
something that might be. empirically tested. So according to this model, anything more than 
happy, sad (positive negative), and derivatives of these, will be our own expansions on the 
music's expression, reflecting a process of acculturation, and musical training. 
Alternatively, we could suggest there is something about specific musical features which enable 
us to attribute emotional qualities to them directly: that music somehow mimics components of 
human autonomic nervous systern,34 e.g. racing pulse, trembling, or human expressive 
behaviour- an idea which is still prevalent in aesthetics (Budd, 1983; Kivy, 1990). It is also 
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perfectly plausible that secondary emotion processing may employ an amalgamation of these 
two possibilities. For 'known' pieces • acculturation being predominant, whilst 'unknown' 
pieces chiefly utilise this autonomic "palette of sound". 
The idea of imitation also has much support in aesthetics, however, I want to show that attempts 
to use mimicry at this 'secondary level' to explain detailed emotional ascriptions are misguided, 
and that mimicry, if it belongs anywhere should be a primary level explanation. The idea 
behind this is a kind of musical onomatopoeia - that music uses a 'cheap trick' to convey 
emotion, by mimicking components of the human autonomic nervous system, that is, mimicking 
our physiological expressions of emotional states. The autonomic nervous system divides into 
sympathetic and parasympathetic: The sympathetic division is responsible for fight/flight 
responses and hence is responsible for very basic yet powerful arousal. Physiological symptoms 
are increased heart rate, pupil dilation, dilated airways, increased sweating and also pilo-
erection (hair standing on end) which relate to feelings of musical 'chill'. The parasympathetic 
system exhibits the opposite of these. The important issue here is that there are 'automatic'. 
non-cognitive responses, and the suggestion is that music may mimic these features or other 
gross symptoms of human expressive behaviour and in this way directly convey specific 
emotions e.g. by rhythm imitating the increase in heartbeat accompanying fear. 
There are several problems for reconciling this thesis within our proposed model. Firstly, one 
might argue that it is not clear just how music could use such tricks to express emotion without 
some form of conventional association between musical structures and emotional labels 
(reducing this to a convention/acculturation theory). Secondly. it does not seem that mimicry 
could be effective enough to allow us to make the detailed classifications we want to claim are 
possible at this stage (without using conventional associations). For example. we do attribute 
very specific terms to music such as grief, terror, arrogance, and it seems hard to see how 
mimicry could convey specific states, particularly those lacking imitable components. For this 
reason mimicry would have to refer to specific. and less obvious physiological signs of emotion. 
We possibly would not admit to conscious recognition of these features however. we do 
consistently recognise them. Overtly, we recognise peoples' emotional states reliably, and 
subconsciously people recognise more subtle features. e.g. we wiJI consistently pick a face with 
dilated pupils as 'attractive', showing an implicit awareness of such arousal signals. However, 
if mimicry were to work in such a way, by 'subconscious• recognition of musical features 
resembling subtle physiological symptoms. (as in the case of recognising pupil dilation), it 
would seem this account belongs in a primary notion of expression recognition. Indeed this 
would correspond to the account of mimicry that I suggested earlier in Chapter 1, to account for 
the arousal of musical emotions. Music might cause affective responses. inducing subjects to 
adopt particular postures and facial expressions, which in turn cause them to feel a specific 
emotion despite lacking a determinate object. 
3.5.3 Summary 
To conclude, although this two-stage model seems highly plausible and is clearly subject to 
further empirical testing, there are still difficulties to be explained. The relationship between the 
two proposed stages certainly requires further consideration. It seems recognition via 
acculturation may be very fast and very strong. For example, we have immediate recognition of 
emotional significance when we hear music from film soundtracks such as Jaws or Psycho.35 If 
this is the case. one might even see a higher level of consensus at the conventional level than the 
basic level. And the boundaries between these modes of expression seem to become less 
distinct. Indeed perhaps certain types of music are so successful because they combine primary 
stage outputs (e.g., heightened arousal) with equally successful acculturation. 
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It also remains to be seen whether basic affective responses can reliably detect anything more 
than positive or negative. Shouldn't we be able to immediately detect fear, or anger? To add to 
this, having begun by making a distinction between arousal and expression, we are left with the 
problem of whether musical 'chill', consisting in physiological responses to music, can really be 
classed as emotional recognition as opposed to arousal. This again calls for a deeper 
understanding of the relationship between the types of recognition (conscious and non-
conscious), otherwise this model may only be seen as a version of the arousal theory • that 
music is expressing (secondary level) in virtue of the underlying physical responses (arousal) of 
emotion in the primary level. 
Wherever the boundaries lie between primary and secondary processes, music clearly does have 
different means of expression. It is clearly mistaken to maintain that music can only express in 
one way: either by acculturation or by musically expressive properties. Rather than continuing 
this supposed conflict, it might be better to consider music in terms of both naturalistic 
expressionism and cultural expressionism, as outlined above in terms of primary and secondary 
stages. And it seems we may successfully reconcile at least some of the expressionist accounts 
within a comprehensive framework for music-emotion cognition whilst carefully considering 
degree of reliability and specificity of emotional expression. 
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Notes 
1 It is important here to disambiguate the use of expression in relation to expression of emotions by music and 
'expression' as used in relation to expressive deficits where a subject has a difficulty in some productive aspect of 
musical (or linguistic) function. 
2 By 'over-theoretical' I mean that attempts to explain musical expression have become concerned with 
oognitively complex musical evaluations, and in some cases the evaluation of musical features in precise detail • 
almost to the extent of suggesting a oomplex oode for 'deciphering' musical expression. This doesn't match our 
everyday experiences of music listening. We do not usually make such detailed cognitive evaluations when 
listening just as we do not make a detailed critical analysis of musical features as we listen. Such explanations 
have become increasingly detached from the actual experience of music. 
3 Cooke's account "is an attempt to assemble evidence to justifY this assimilation of music to verbal language in 
certain respects." Hanfling p.195. Cooke took a large number of phrases and passages from western tonal music 
and attempted to match these with linguistic explanations of the emotion expressed· that we could decode music 
in this way, and objectively identifY the expressive content. 
4 This division corresponds with autonomist and heteronomist theories of value respectively. Rather than being 
'anti-expressionist' as is often assumed, the autonomist claim is that music may express, but only in virtue of 
conventional associations, not in virtue of musical properties themselves. The chief concerns of such autonomist 
and heteronomist theories however, are claims that music's value is located in either intrinsically musical or 
extra-musical features respectively. Although I do not want to become drawn into problems of aesthetic value, 
expression theories do bear heavily on this issue so it deserves at least some consideration and I will return to it in 
Chapter4. 
5 Cooke in particular explains expression in terms of recognising specific musical features, which are ultimately 
perceptual distinctions. However, he makes no attempt to explain the perceptual processes involved. See 
Hanfling p.197 for discussion of this. 
6 There is a lack of consistency in the use of terms within the cognitive sciences. Neuropsychology: how specific 
brain structures and processes relate to behaviour. Cognitive Neuropsychology: (EIIis & Young, 83) (i) To 
explain the patterns of impaired and intact cognitiv9 performance seen in brain-ir\iured patients in terms of 
damage to one or more of the components of a theory or model of normal cognitive functioning. (ii) to draw 
conclusions about normal, intact cognitive processes from the patterns of impaired and intact performance seen in 
brain-injured patients. Neuropsychology is more interested in physical brain processes than cognitive 
neuropsychology which is more interested in function. However, with functional imaging techniques becoming 
prevalent there begins to be a breakdown of this divide. 
7 Similarly, because we do not see damage to specific tasks in isolation does not imply that they share processing 
strategies. Whilst the organisation of some processes may prevent them being damaged in isolation, it may 
equally be that some functions occupy an area of the brain which is particularly resistant to damage. 
8 It is often perceived as less interesting to replicate • and more difficult to get a replication published, than to 
report novel dissociations. 
9 Shallice (1988) Chapter 11 provides five non-modular accounts capable giving rise to dissociations. 
10 See Wertheim, (1969) p.l96. 
11 Seashore, C. E., Lewis, D, aad Saitveit, J, Seashore Musical Talents' Manual (revised). New York, 
Psychological Corporation (1960); Wiag, H. D, Tests of Musical Ability and Appreciation (second edition). Br. 
J. Psychology. Monographs, Suppl. 27 (1968); Bentley, A. Musical Ability In Children and its Measurement, 
London, Harrap (196); Gordoa, E, Musical Aptitude Profile Manual. Boston, Houghton Mitllin (1965). For a 
critique of Seashore see Henson, R. A. Wyke, M. A. The Performance of Professional Musicians on the Seashore 
Measures of Musical Talent. Cortex 18 (1982) 153·1S7. 
12 Ustvedt, H., (1937), study of 14 cases of amusia, Acta Med. Scand. Suppl. 86.: JelUnek, A. (1956) Amusia. 
On The Phenomenology and Investigation of Central Disorders of Musical Functions. Folia Phoniatr.8, 124-129: 
Botez M. I. and Wertheim, N. (1959) Expressive aphasia and amusia following right frontal lesion in a right 
handed man. Brain 82, 186. 202: Trethowaa, W. H., (1977) Music and Mental disorder, in Critchley and 
Henson (eds.) Music and the Brain, London, Heinemann Medical Books: Shapiro, B. E., Grossmaa, M., 
Gardner, M., (1981) Selective Musical Processing Deficits in Brain Damaged Populations, Neuropsychologia 19 
161-169. Moraan, 0 S, Tilluekdharry R, (1982) Preservation of singing function in Severe Aphasia, West 
Indian Medical Journal, 3113 (159-161; Muate et. al, (1998) Brain Potentials in Patients With Music Perception 
deficits: Evidence For an Early Locus. Neuroscience Letters 1998 pr; 256/2 (85-88): Schuppert M, Munte, TF, 
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Wieringa BM, Altenmuller E, (2000) Receptive Amusia: Evidence for Cross-hemispheric Neural networks 
Underlying Music Processing Strategies. Brain 123/3 (546-559). 
13 Aphasia is an acquired disorder of language resulting from focal lesion of the cerebral oortex and associated 
subcortical structures which results in impairments in the oomprehension and production of linguistic messages. 
14 It should be noted that this is a romp lex issue, left handers may show the reverse pattern to right handers (e.g., 
right hemisphere "" language; left hemisphere • visuo-spatial cognition), some may have bilateral processing. 
(e.g., language in both right and left hemispheres); and some are like right handers. 
15 See for example, Aggleton et.al, 1994; Byrne, 1979; Hassler et al, 1990. 
16 Unless otherwise indicated we will be referring to cases of double dissociation which involves evidence of two 
subjects one with function A intact and B damaged and a second patient where A is damaged and B intact. The 
value of double dissociation is that it can counter the criticisms surrounding single dissociations (that they only 
show spared tasks to be easier to perform than the damaged ones). To give a relevant example where rhythm 
recognition is spared and melody selectively damaged, if we did not have examples of double dissociation this 
could simply be dismissed by saying that rhythm is easier to process. 
17 While selective damage and sparing to environmental sound is rare, there are examples in the literature. 
Spreen et.al (1965) report selective damage., Tanaka et al. 1987, & Eustache et al. (1990) report on sparing. 
18 It has been shown that prosodic elements of speech are independent of 'musical' prosody. Pole (The 
Philosophy of Music), suggests "The earliest forms of music probably arose out of the natural inflections of the 
voice in speaking." 
19 See Gorelick, P. B. & Ross, E. D. (1987) but also Patel et. al for conflicting evidence. These cases will be 
examined in detail in Chapters 6 and 7. 
20 I want to stress that this analogy does not hold exactly but only serves to clarify our ooncept of amusia. 
Particularly as prosopagnosic subjects may still recognise a face as a face whereas amusic subjects do not always 
recognise music as music, (only in that they no longer recognise it as anything) Also there may obviously be 
decided ditrerences between auditory and visual processing. 
21 For example, the expressionist may claim both that music expresses emotion directly, (without extra-musical 
reference) and that it expresses specific emotions. This is contradicted by empirical findings. 
22 Peretz 1996 notes "Several brain damaged patients whose reoognition abilities seemed intact oomplained about 
having lost interest in music or that music sounded "flat" or without emotion after brain injury." (see Mazzuchi et. 
al 1982, Mazzoni at. al 1993). This is supported by Damas!o's (1994) evidence from subjects with frontal lobe 
damage. 
23 Music at this level functions as an independent 'module' being able to process music without access to other 
oognitive functions. 
24 Reflex responses to sound would be for example startle responses, on hearing a loud noise (not necessarily 
music), and recognising and turning towards new sounds in the environment. So the effects of some musical 
works, which might be claimed as emotional responses are actually reflex responses to sound. e.g. Haydn's 
Surprise Symphony. I have excluded these from the discussion at present as l am concerned specifically with 
atrective responses. 
25 I intend to use 'primary' and secondary' only for simplicity in referring to the stages within the proposed 
models. I do not intend by using these classifications to make any claims as regards whether processing is serial 
as opposed to parallel processing. 
26 New Scientist supplement, 'Emotions', Aprill996, p.l8 
rr Gordon, 1987. p28. Gordon does go on to give a different explanation of the positive/negative distinction in 
terms of attitudes towards the object of emotion which does not apply to musical cases. 
28 It would seem more likely that we have developed music in particular ways precisely because it has this ability 
to use ancient emotional circuits, and we may oontrol our experience of'chill' responses. 
29 Panksepp, New scientist Supplement, Emotions April 1996. 
30 It is plausible that music may in fact offer some adaptive advantage, this will be discussed in Chapter 6 below. 
31 At this stage music operates independently, does not and seemingly cannot access other faculties for extra-
musical information which would enable more detailed ascriptions of emotion to be made. 
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32 I would like to use acculturation as opposed to convention, as convention seems to bring to mind something 
more flexible which we may choose not to adopt, or which we may put to one side in our musical evaluation. 
33 This relates closely to Damasio's account of affective processing: Descartes Error (1996). 
34 This relates to ideas in The Meaning of Music by Carroll C. Pratt and Malcolm Budd's article Motion and 
Emotion in Music: How Music Sounds. 
35 It therefore needs to be investigated whether responses to such pieces are non-cognitive responses. It may be 
that such pieces merely exploit the 'chill' response. 
Chapter4 
The Arousal Theory and Musical Expression 
4.1 Introduction 
The framework for musical expression presented in Chapter 3 suggests that initial affective 
responses to music may impinge upon subsequent cognitive evaluations, and that recognition of 
emotion in music may involve radicaUy different methods both 'automatic' physiological 
responses and cognitive evaluations (naturalistic and cultural expressionism). The framework 
as a whole adds support to the claim that we need to consider the nature of music's cognitive 
foundations far more carefully. What this model will mean for aesthetic accounts is that the 
way in which they propose music is expressed, (by natural or cultural modes of expression), 
will determine the level of specificity they may claim for musically expressed affective states. 
In light of the empirical evidence, many existing accounts no longer seem capable of providing a 
full account of expression. For example, in light ofthe proposed model, it is no longer plausible 
to claim that music can express specific affective states directly (by natural expressionism). If 
one wishes to hold that music expresses directly, one must accept that music may only convey a 
basic positive or negative affective state in line with the nature of physiological affective 
responses. If, on the other hand, one wants to support the claim that music can reliably express 
specific affective states, then one must acknowledge that it does so via some process of 
acculturation or convention. The most problematic issue for expression theories is that music 
seems capable of expressing at least some emotional content without requiring recognition of 
musical features. 
This is specificalJy a problem as regards value claims in aesthetics. Malcolm Budd in his book 
Values of Art notes that; 
"it has often been thought that the sole and sufficient explanation, or at least a 
considerable part of the explanation, of music's eminence as an abstract art is 
its ability to express emotion." (Budd 1995, p.133) 
He goes on to say that for this to hold three propositions must be true, and it is the second of 
these which concerns me, the claim that 
"abstract musical works must be valuable in proportion to their merit in 
expressing emotion, that is to say in proportion to the extent that, or to the 
degree to which or the manner in which they do so, or to the nature of the 
emotions they express."(/bid. p.l33). 
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There seems to be something inherently wrong with the claim that music's value is proportional 
to its ability to express directly. If recognition of emotional expression is independent of 
musical feature recognition, this supposes that we might value music purely for the emotional 
experience it provides by tapping into certain auditory channels. If this were the case, an 
amusic person would be at no disadvantage in determining music's aesthetic value, and such 
value would be largely independent of musical identity features themselves which clearly seems 
wrong. So it would seem that, if we wish to ground value claims on emotional content, we must 
refer to a comprehensive picture of emotional expression and arousal. Whilst I do not want to 
be drawn too much into problems of aesthetic value, this example serves to highlight why it is 
necessary for aesthetic explanations to consider the underlying architecture of music cognition. 
As yet, the relationship between natural and cultural methods of emotion-recognition is largely 
speculative. It seems likely though that underlying physiological responses may be overridden 
or suppressed, and indeed may not even be reliably recognised by some listeners although they 
may be objectively recorded e.g. change in pulse, temperature etc. (see the examples by 
Damasio, Chapter 1 p.13, and p.l9, Note 8). The physiological affective responses to music 
outline a further problem in terms of the relationship between arousal and recognition of 
emotion. If basic responses to music are physiologically induced affective responses, do they 
not constitute arousal rather than recognition? In terms of physiology perhaps the answer is 
yes, but in terms of auditory perception things are not as straightforward. Responses by amusic 
subjects are not reported as aroused emotion, but as recognition of the music's emotional 
content. 
Similarly, many subjects may not recognise the physiological arousal in themselves in response 
to music, but rather they report that the music sounds sad. For example, while a shiver down 
the spine is not sufficient to make one feel sad, it may nonetheless be sufficient for one to 
attribute sadness to the music - that is, it may be experienced as recognition of expressed 
emotion. Indeed, referring back to the discussion of the amygdala in Chapter l, the split-second 
'feel' produced by direct affective perception is not always recognised as a felt emotional 
response but may nonetheless direct perception towards a particular emotionally affective 
response or evaluation. While the relationship between arousal and recognition is complicated 
by these early perceptual responses, they are not damaging to the model of expression as a 
whole, so long as one accepts that there are multiple modes of recognition. 
The nature of primary responses might nonetheless be interpreted as support for arousal theories 
of expression. While arousal and recognition may in some cases be intimately related (as in the 
case of physiological affective responses to music), this relationship is grossly misrepresented 
by the arousal theory, which cannot provide a full account of music's expressive powers. There 
have been many attempts to reject the arousal thesis, and in light of the empirical evidence 
presented in Chapters 1 to 3, I now offer a critique of the theory both as an account of 
expression, and to exemplify specific problems for expression theories in light of empirical 
claims. 
I will begin with a critical analysis of the arousal theory taking as an example Derek Matravers' 
recent attempts to revive a brute version of the arousal thesis. Specifically I will claim that the 
arousal theorists' interpretation of expression is flawed, and that any attempt to revise the thesis 
in light of the objections raised necessarily constitutes a radical departure from the central 
claims of the arousal thesis. 
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4.2 Why Reconsider the Arousal Theory? 
Simply stated, the arousal thesis claims that a piece of music x expresses emotion e if and only 
if it arouses that same emotion e in a suitably qualified listener. The central claim of the theory 
is that arousal of emotion is both necessary and sufficient for its expression. Whilst strong 
versions ofthe thesis maintain that the emotions aroused are 'real' 1 emotions, weaker versions 
of the theory suppose that aroused emotions may be imagined or simulated. In both versions 
however, it is assumed that the listener then projects the aroused emotion onto the music. On 
the arousal theorist's account, the listener attributes emotional qualities to the music by virtue of 
the feelings the music provokes, such that the music is said to be 'expressing' an emotion, and 
the experience is such that the emotion appears to emanate from the music. 
Both weak and strong versions of the thesis have attracted sustained criticism. Wittgenstein 
declared the theory 'stupid and ridiculous', Nelson Goodman described it as 'preposterous' and 
'crude', and Peter Kivy dismissed it as being 'profoundly wrong', an 'utterly hopeless view.'2 
The most common rejections are that to describe one's reaction to something is not to describe 
what it is expressive of, and that we simply do not 'project' our feelings onto the music in the 
way described by the arousal theory. There have, nonetheless, been a number of recent attempts 
to revive the thesis in both weak and strong forms. In light of the above criticisms, this seems 
puzzling. How and why has the arousal theory retained such popularity? 
The arousal theorist appeals strongly to the simple claim that we would not describe music in 
terms of specific emotions unless it had the capacity to arouse those emotions in the listener, but 
this claim alone simply cannot account for the status currently accorded to the arousal theory. 
In fact, much of the theory's attraction seems to lie not in its success as an explanation of 
expression, but its position as a viable alternative to representational theories which seek to 
explain music's expressive powers by its resembling or otherwise representing aspects of human 
expressions of emotion. 3 In contrast to representational theories, arousal is, on the surface, a 
simple way to explain the fact that we describe a non-sentient thing such as music in expressive 
terms. At the heart of this appeal lies an over-simplistic interpretation of arousal itself, 
expressive language, and importantly a misunderstanding of the distinct commitments of 
expression, arousal and recognition of emotion as regards the listener. 
4.2.1 Music and Expressive Description 
The most serious problems for the arousal theory stem from the distinct aspects of reception 
involved. That is, confusion between the listener's aroused state, and the experience of hearing 
emotion as expressed by music. The arousal theory also involves difficulties regarding 
•production aspects' of emotion- how music itself can be said to express. We can approach 
the problem of production from two perspectives. In addition to critiques advanced from an 
empirical viewpoint we also need to address the problem of what we mean when describing 
music in expressive terms. From an empirical point of view, the arousal theory is simply wrong 
to attempt to analyse expression purely in terms of arousal. With regards to auditory 
processing, expression is an 'output' function (a function of the sound source), whereas arousal, 
where it does occur, occurs at the 'input side' of the process - in the audience. Put bluntly, 
expression cannot be explained in terms of reception. 
The difficulties of describing music in expressive terms exemplify an underlying problem for 
musical aesthetics. How can a piece of music, as a non-sentient entity, 'express' anything at 
all? Music after all has no emotions to express. To talk of music expressing 'emotions' as 
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intentional states requires us to identify the intentional objects of emotions, that is what they are 
'about' or directed towards and this (as seen in 1.5) is problematic. Music as a largely non-
representational art form seemingly can not provide such objects or cognitive content necessary 
for emotional expression. As seen in Chapter 1, this problem has attracted many attempts at 
solution, for example, claiming that musically expressed emotions are 'objectJess emotions'4 or 
attributing the intentional component to the composer, listener or performer. The arousal theory 
is formulated in response to this problem, attributing the emotion expressed to the listener (who 
projects the emotion onto the music) and analysing musical expression in terms of arousal of 
emotion in the listener. I wish to maintain that the concept of expression cannot be analysed in 
terms of arousal and that attempting to do so constitutes a flawed conception of expression. I 
will attempt to show this by examining the problem of how intentions are involved in the 
emotions conveyed by music, and clarification of the distinct commitments of arousal and 
expression. 
One such attempt to solve the intentionality problem is advanced by Alan Tormey in The 
Concept of Expression 1971. Tormey distinguishes between what it is to be 'expressing' 
something and 'expressive of something. His ultimate concern is to establish intention as a 
necessary condition of expression and to do so he attempts to distinguish between inference 
warranting and merely descriptive applications of expression. The latter being marked by a 
difference in syntactic form. 
"The outlines of this distinction can be sketched briefly. Wherever the qualifier 
appears before the noun ('; expression'), the phrase (A) is a description of 
certain observable features of a situation; and whenever the form 'expression of 
;• (B) occurs, it may be taken to be an inference warranting expression, relating 
some intentional state of a person to particular aspects of his observable 
behaviour."(Tormey 1971, p.40) 
Earlier in his discussion, Tormey noted that a successful explanation of the concept of 
expression must be able to distinguish between 'expressions' of emotion and •signs' of emotion. 
However, Tormey's account is deficient here, a scream of anguish as described in this way (B) 
has inference warranting status and as such is intentional. Tormey's distinction between these 
syntactic arrangements is not immune to ambiguities of language use - for unless a scream is 
used as an instrument, such a description might merely refer to an involuntary physiological 
response and as such this would be non-intentional. What is missing from Tormey's account is 
a distinction between agent and instrument. The subject of our ascriptions of expression may be 
a person or an instrument - he expressed sadness by an anguished scream - his anguished 
scream expressed sadness. This highlights the problem with Tormey's account, that, unless ~he 
scream is used as an instrument, it cannot count as an 'expression' of emotion as expressiOn 
must (on Tormey's account) be intentional. The syntactic form of the expressive description 
itself is insufficient to guarantee its intentional status. As Bedford noted in Chapter I, our 
ascriptions of emotions to people do not logically entail that they are in any particular feeling-
state. One might well say (syntactic form (B)) 'his trembling was an expression of (or 
expressed his), fear'. On Tormey's account, therefore, descriptions of behaviour such as 
trembling, blushing, twitching, or screaming may be inference warranting and as such have 
intentional implications, being linked inferentially to intentional states of persons. It would seem 
these would be more appropriately labeiJed as involuntary physiological responses - as signs 
or symptoms of emotion rather than intentional expressions of emotion, particularly as the 
subject may not be aware they are exhibiting such behavioural characteristics. (As noted in 
Chapter 1, an important distinction between behavioural expressions of affective state is that 
some may be non·intentional but mandatory while others are intentional, 1.4.2). Thus Tormey's 
account fails to fully realise the difference in intentional content between these two cases, failing 
The Arousal Theory & Musical Expression 66 
to sufficiently account for the distinction between manifestation of an emotion and expression 
of an emotion. Whilst expressive language, talk of communication, expression, arousal and 
manifestation of emotions may be used ambiguously in ordinary use, it is nonetheless important 
to stress the distinct commitments of these affective modes in terms of effects on the auditor. 
4.2.2 Arousal, Communication and Expression 
The differences between expression, arousal and communication in terms of auditor 
commitments can be explained by drawing on Austin's distinction between perlocution and 
illocution within his analysis of speech acts5• Specifically speaker and audience commitments 
mark distinctions between content and meaning of an utterance. 
"For example, it might be perfectly possible, with regard to an utterance, say 'It 
· is going to charge\ [referring to a bull] to make entirely plain 'what we were 
saying' in issuing the utterance, in all the senses so far distinguished, and yet 
not at all to have cleared up whether or not in issuing the utterance I was 
performing the act of warning or not. It may be perfectly clear what I mean by 
'It is going to charge' or 'Shut the door', but not clear whether it is meant as a 
statement or warning ... " (Austin, 1962, p.98). 
It is the further distinctions Austin makes which are important to us, that is between linguistic 
acts corresponding to various types of action. Austin distinguishes here between what he calls 
illocutionary and perlocutionary acts - the former being performance of an act in saying 
something, the latter by saying something. Examples of illocutionary acts are telling someone, 
promising something, admitting something. Examples of perlocutionary acts are persuading 
someone, scaring someone, annoying someone. 
This distinction can serve to highlight the important issue as regards the differing status of 
expression and arousal, as do Austin's further comments in explaining perlocutionary acts: 
"saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain consequential 
effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, 
or of other persons: and it may be done with the design, intention or purpose of 
producing them .... " (ibid. p.lOI). 
Whilst illocutionary acts may make claims upon the speaker, perlocutionary acts require a 
certain response to occur in the auditor. In performing a perlocutionary act we bring about 
certain responses by saying something. Whereas one might say I argue that. ... or, I advise 
that... One cannot say I convince you that .... or, I persuade you that .... , these latter claims 
require a response from another party and this marks the distinction between illocutionary and 
perlocutionary acts. In Austinian terms expression is illocutionary, (done in saying something), 
whilst arousal is perlocutionary (done by producing some effect in the listener). The expression 
of emotion by music does not depend on whether any effect has been produced in the listener (it 
may or may not produce such an effect dependent on the means of expression but there is no 
necessary relationship here). This emphasises again why it is mistaken to analyse expression in 
terms of arousal as these have distinct commitments in terms of the listeners' involvement. 
It might be objected that this critique is just begging the question against the arousal theorist as 
it requires assuming a distinction between arousal and expression. However, the 
arousaVexpression distinction is supported through the clear separation of arousal and 
recognition both empiricaJly and in terms of musical experience. Austin's distinction merely 
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serves to highlight this. In addition, we can distinguish between communication, expression and 
arousal of emotion. · I can express my anger by means of angry stares without anyone 
recognising this, but I have nonetheless expressed my anger. I can communicate my anger to a 
perceiver without this necessitating arousal of anger (or even a related emotion) in them. To 
arouse anger however, requires that my actions whether intended to arouse anger or not, 
produce an appropriate response in the perceiver. The failure of the arousal theory to 
acknowledge these distinctions is one of the most notable objections to the theory, that we do not 
attribute expression of an emotion in virtue of our own emotional responses. I may be angered 
by a state of affairs, but it by no means follows that the cause of my emotion was an expression 
of anger. Having clarified the relationship between expression and arousal it may be useful to 
return to the problem of intentionality of musically expressed emotions. 
Linguistic analyses may again prove to be useful, rather than analysing the intentionality 
problem by attempting to attribute expression to a person e.g. in the mind of the listener or 
composer. We can attempt to explain the intention/emotion problem in terms of expressive 
description. And rather than adopting Tormey's strategy - how we use 'expreSsion' and 
'expressive' in emotional descriptions, we might focus on how we apply specific expressive 
predicates to works of art. In Languages of Art 1968, Nelson Goodman provides such an 
account, offering a re-conception of the expression-intention problem as essentially a linguistic 
one. His aim is to offer an explanation of the application of expressive descriptions to works of 
art6• Goodman explains the application of expressive terms to music as 'metaphorical' and 
stresses that the intention of the artist or auditor is not important and more specifically, does not 
define whether or not a work can be described as 'sad' 'angry' and the like. Goodman goes on 
to explain how music may be described in expressive terms: 
"since, strictly speaking only sentient beings or events can be sad, a picture is 
only figuratively sad. A picture literally possesses a gray colour, really belongs 
to the class of gray things; but only metaphorically does it possess sadness or 
belong to the class ofthings that feel sad" (Goodman 1968, pp.S0-51). 
His claim is that music expresses by metaphorical possession of expressive properties. Whilst 
we can say music literally possesses properties such as tone or rhythm, it metaphorically 
possesses properties such as sadness. Just as particular musical sequences metaphorically 
possess the quality of having movement because they move from high to low in our mental 
representation of musical content - we cannot say music literally moves anywhere. Goodman 
goes on to say that 
"Conflict arises because the picture's being insentient implies that it is neither 
sad nor gay. Nothing can be both sad and not sad unless "sad" has two 
different ranges of application. If the picture is (literally) not sad and yet is 
(metaphorically) sad, "sad" is used first as a label for certain sentient things or 
events, and then for certain insentient ones. To ascribe the predicate to 
something within either range is to make a statement that it is true either 
literally or metaphorically. "(ibid. p. 70). 
Although I do not want to explain musical expression explicitly in terms of metaphor, on the 
point of interpreting expressive descriptions, I would agree at least to some extent with 
Goodman's account as we do have to explain in what sense we apply expressive predicates to 
music. Goodman's notion of metaphor and ranges of application for expressive predicates in 
aesthetics is useful as he explains the difficulties in the relationship between metaphorical and 
literal use of such terms. 
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"a term like "cold color" or "high note" is a frozen metaphor, - though it 
differs from a fresh one in age rather than temperature. A frozen metaphor has 
lost the vigor of youth, but remains a metaphor. Strangely, though, with 
progressive loss of its virility as a figure of speech, a metaphor becomes not 
less but more like literal truth." (ibid. p.68). 
Goodman's interpretation will allow us to account for the problem of intention in our 
applications of emotional expression to music by explaining them in terms of metaphor, 
although we will have to explain in what sense such metaphors might be paraphrased. 
4.2.3 Emotion Terms and Central Usage 
Matravers also considers metaphor as an explanation of expressive description. He describes 
his approach to the problem of expressive descriptions in terms of finding a link between the 
central uses of expressive predicates, and their extension to works of art. He comments 
however, that it is an 'obvious' response to interpret the problem as one of metaphor, and is 
highly critical of Goodman's account, arguing that Goodman does not explain what it is for a 
predicate to apply metaphorically. He goes on to say, 
"the problem [description of music in emotive terms] arises because judgements 
which attribute feelings or emotions to works of art are not reducible to 
judgements which do not. This means, among other things, that the problematic 
judgements are not metaphorical, since, as Kendall Walton has shown, 
metaphors can always be paraphrased. In other words, these judgements if 
correct are literally correct applications of feeling or emotion terms to objects." 
(ibid p.322). 
However, Matravers' case is weakened by letting Walton's explanation pass without sufficient 
qualification and it is not by any means clear how Matravers interprets Walton's view, having 
substituted 'judgements' for •expressive descriptions' in the above argument. 
To claim that expressive judgements of artworks are literally correct applications of feeling or 
emotion terms, requires quite some explanation. Without such, a literal substitution theory may 
allow the expressive description 'music is sad' to be substituted for example by 'music is 
upset'. The lack of explanation here is particularly unfortunate, given that, the view of 
metaphors always having literal substitutions is no longer widely held. 7 To claim expressive 
descriptions are literally correct in this way seems ludicrous. The music itself is not 'sad' 
despairing or 'hopeful' about anything, and neither do we respond to music as we do to 
expressions of emotion in central cases. As Aaron Ridley notes 
"If one conclusion of an argument is that we attribute 'sadness' to a piece of 
music in virtue of the pity it arouses in us, then this should tell us at once that 
something somewhere has gone seriously wrong. Pitying a piece of music? 
Feeling sorry for a series of sounds?, (Ridley 1993, p. 72). 
It would seem certain that Matravers does not want to make such a claim. However. he does 
little in the way of offering an alternative explanation and so far his bid to link central and 
aesthetic applications of expressive terms seems lacking. He comments further that 
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"unlike metaphor, to utter 'the music is anguished' is not to attempt to cause a 
belief other than that expressed by the words uttered." (Art and Emotion, 
p.l09) 
Again this claim lacks qualification. Not only does it leave Matravers open to Ridley's criticism 
of literal interpretation, but it fails to account for context. Unqualified expressive descriptions 
are ambiguous, and consequently without further clarification, a variety of beliefs might be 
caused by the utterance 'the music is anguished'. For example, (a) Music is actually anguished 
(b) Music somehow resembles an anguished person, or (c) Our response to music is parasitic 
upon our response to an anguished person. Matravers nonetheless attempts to defend his 
position by noting. 
"The statement 'That piece of music is sad' is more akin to such 
uncontroversiaUy literal statements such as 'That piece was long', 'That was a 
waltz', than to statements such as the uncontroversially metaphorical 'That 
music set the place alight'. (Matravers 1998, p.ll 0 
The reason expressive judgements do appear this way would however seem to be more elegantly 
captured by Goodman's notion of a frozen metaphor, than the claim that expressive judgements 
are literaJiy correct applications of expressive predicates. 
Leaving the issue of metaphor aside, Matravers examines the similarities between central and 
aesthetic applications of expressive predicates, with the view that aesthetic uses are parasitic 
upon central cases: 
"In short, our application of 'sad' to sad works of art is somehow parasitic on 
our application of it to people, just as our application of it to sad situations, 
faces and attempts at making an omelette is parasitic on this central application. 
Our aesthetic use of feeling and emotion terms is just as essentially linked to, 
and constrained by, their central uses. The problem is, that in the aesthetic 
case, the link is much harder to see and to explain. To find what it is, I think 
that we should first look more closely at those central uses: that is, at what we 
take people's feelings and emotions to be" (Matravers 199lb, p.323). 
Again however, Goodman's account seems able to adequately explain the centraVaesthetic link. 
The link between aesthetic and central cases is harder to see, precisely because aesthetic use of 
expressive predicates has become somewhat detached from central uses. Expressive predicates 
now have their own range of application within the sphere of aesthetics, albeit ultimately 
dependent upon the central reference of emotion terms to our own and others' psychological and 
behavioural states. 8 
But Matravers seemingly has another motive for defending the links between central and 
aesthetic cases. By strengthening the analogy he attempts to defend the felt response to music in 
relation to felt responses in the central case, thus strengthening the central claim of the arousal 
thesis. His argument is that the appropriate response to an expressed emotion is to foe/ an 
emotion, not merely to recognise it. He states, 
"I argued that it is inappropriate, when faced with a human expression of 
emotion, merely to form a belief to this effect. The appropriate reaction is, 
rather to feel some kind of emotion oneself." He goes on to say "The same is 
true of our reactions to expressive art. It is inappropriate merely to recognise 
that a work expresses an emotion and register the fact in the form of a belief." 
(Matravers, 1998, p.l45). 
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But this in itself is a weak claim as appropriateness of response is largely context dependent. 
Whilst one might claim that someone's behaviour in response to expressed emotion is 
inappropriate, one cannot say this about their felt psychological states. It seems wrong to claim 
that it is inappropriate not to have a response - either an emotion is aroused or it is not. There 
may well be people in whom emotions are not aroused and whilst they may be deficient in terms 
of feeling emotional states, one would not say their lack of felt emotion is inappropriate. The 
fact that one just does not feel sad in response to a piece of music should not invite 
condemnation. Tormey notes that a claim such as 'That's a sad piece of music' is countered 
not by objections such as, 'No, he wasn't' or 'He was just pretending' (referring to the 
composer [or listener/performer]), but by remarking 'You haven't listened carefully' or 'You 
must listen again; there are almost no minor progress ions and the tempo is allegro moderato.' " 
(Tormey 1971, p.l 05). That is to say, it is not inappropriate to justify ones expressive 
descriptions of music in terms of musical features, rather than ones own felt emotion. We can 
(quite appropriately) make expressive descriptions of music without feeling an emotion. 
The explanation of expressive descriptions as extensions of central uses does not legitimate the 
analogy between emotional responses to people and to works of art. More to the point, even if 
one were able to formulate some coherent notion of appropriate responses to emotions expressed 
by people, it does not follow that this would be applicable in the musical case, or that it would 
be reflected somehow in the nature of expressive descriptions. While linguistic analyses prove 
useful to an extent, limitations quickly become apparent. Matravers acknowledges the 
difficulties of distinguishing between central and aesthetic cases in terms of a purely semantic 
analysis, which does not capture the distinct experience of hearing emotions as expressed by 
music. 
4.3 The Experience of Expressive Music 
In opposition to the view that arousal is a necessary condition for expression, I want to maintain 
that the only necessary condition of a piece of music's being expressive of emotion is that the 
expressive qualities should emanate or seem to emanate from the music itself. This view 
underpins a recurrent objection to the arousal theory, that the emotion experienced when 
listening to music is phenomenologically in the music and not in the listener. Contrary to the 
projectivist claims of the arousal theorist it would seem that it is the experience of hearing 
emotion as emanating from music that is our reason for declaring such music to be expressive 
of emotion. Importantly, we are not apt to make mistakes about the location of emotions: 
When we experience an emotion in ourselves it does not follow that we attribute that emotion or 
expression of that emotion to its cause. This I think is clearly expressed in Aaron Ridley's 
example, 
"To describe one's own reaction to something is not to describe what that thing 
is expressive of: if a person irritates me, then it by no means follows that his 
irritating action expresses irritation. "9 
Similarly I may express my anger by means of angry stares without anyone recognising that my 
behaviour is expressive of anger. And, whilst I will have failed to communicate my anger I will 
nonetheless have expressed it. 
In Arousal Theory Reconsidered, Stanley Speck gives the standard response to this objection. 
Speck claims that the problem with music lies in the complex interconnection between the 
listener's emotion and the formal properties of music: 
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"the distinction between the feelings caused by an insult or a threat, which we 
clearly locate in ourselves, and the feelings caused by music, which we locate in 
the music, is that the latter are so closely and immediately conjoined to the 
melodic and rhythmic contours of the tonal sequence that no separation is 
intuited ... (Speck, 1988, pp.40-41). 
This Speck claims, is why musically evoked emotions are short Jived. As a result of this 
interconnection, musical emotions are dependent upon the music itself for their realisation, they 
do not and cannot persist independently of the musical experience. Speck's interpretation does 
not seem entirely true. There is no evidence to suggest musical emotions are 'short-lived' - no 
more so than ordinary emotions, and the link between our felt emotions and the musical 
experience can seemingly be separated. In Sloboda's study 1991, musicians were able to 
identify and agree upon specific features of musical extracts which provoked their emotional 
responses. 10 This would seem to indicate an ability to identify the cause of our emotion. If we 
were unable as Speck suggests, to separate our felt emotions from the cause, we would be 
surely unable to identify the cause of our emotion. Speck's example of feelings aroused by an 
insult and by music also seems to miss the mark, for we do locate the emotion aroused by music 
in ourselves, it is only the expression of emotions which we attribute to the music. 
Further problems develop from the projectivist view. On this account the arousal theory cannot 
distinguish between emotions as 'evoked' or 'provoked' by music11• That is, emotions produced 
by extra-musical features or elements of performance, (the music being too loud or badly 
played) and emotions aroused by the musical content or formal properties themselves. It is not 
correct to claim that music is expressive of the emotion it arouses in every instance. Anger may 
be evoked by the music itself, but also anger may be evoked by the poor quality of the music or 
the loud volume etc. or even the failure of the piece to evoke an emotion. In none of the latter 
cases would we want to claim that music is expressive of the emotion it evokes. The problem 
for arousal theory is that it cannot distinguish between emotions as directed towards the music's 
formal properties, or towards beliefs about extra-musical aspects (that it is too loud, poorly 
played etc.). The arousalist notion of projection in fact rules out a possible method of 
identifying these different emotional sources with the claim that we phenomenologically locate 
all emotions within ourselves. In opposition to the arousal theory, it would seem that this is one 
way in which we do distinguish between emotions - coming from within ourselves as the result 
of beliefs about music (i.e. we don't like Brahrns) or emanating from the music and aroused by 
the music's formal properties alone. To reply to this necessitates acknowledging the 
arousal/recognition distinction and therefore rejection of the brute claims of the arousal thesis. 
4.3.1 Arousal and Recognition of Emotion 
The arousal theory rejects entirely the notion that one may identify emotions by 'recognising' 
them and this is problematic from a number of perspectives. Bearing in mind the arousal 
theorists' close comparison of responses to emotion in people and music, adopting this opinion 
presents something of a disanalogy. We would often claim to 'recognise' emotions expressed by 
others without necessarily experiencing the same emotion in response. For example, we might 
observe an argument between two strangers, but this does not entail that we recognise anger by 
being made angry ourselves. (In fact, if we experience any emotion at all, it seems unlikely to 
be anger.) In response to this problem, the arousal theorist may claim that the emotion aroused 
here need not be the same as that attributed to the source (and presumably need not be of the 
same intensity etc.) Indeed, this is precisely how Matravers does respond to the critique. He 
revises the thesis to claim that "we do not usually respond to the expression of an emotion with 
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the same emotion"(Matravers, 1991, p.325). This permits him to reformulate the thesis 
allowing him to reject the claim that we [only] attribute an emotion when we feel the same 
emotion, in favour of the claim that we attribute an emotion when we experience a related 
emotion. 
There is nonetheless a more serious problem for the arousal theory, which is probably the most 
damaging criticism of all. Not only do we respond to emotional situations with decidedly 
different emotions from those we ascribe, more often than not we may recognise emotions as 
expressed without feeling any emotion at all. This again marks a distinction between 
recognition and arousal of emotion and there is empirical data to support this claim. Listeners 
can reliably identifY emotion expressed without feeling that emotion. 12 There seem to be only 
two responses available to the arousal theorist which does not necessitate revising the thesis and 
that is to claim that the listener misinterprets the emotion aroused by the music, or that the 
listener misattributes a differing emotion to the work. Both these replies contradict the above 
claim of an inseparable link between the feelings caused by music and the formal properties of 
the work. Indeed, if arousal was subject to misinterpretation, it would hardly seem to be a 
sufficient condition for expression. In the face of this objection, and the empirical evidence 
which supports it13, the original claims of the arousal thesis cannot be maintained and to reply to 
this objection requires a revised version of the thesis in weak form. 
Matravers nevertheless attempts to respond to the arousaVrecognition critique, and we will see 
how his reply necessitates radical revision of the thesis. He claims that 
"before we can pity someone's sadness, we need to become aware that they are 
sad. Such awareness may arise from direct perception: for example, we might 
see from their face that they are sad .... " 14 
This creates problems for the notion of expression being achieved directly through arousal, 15 
and seems to point towards a separation of arousal and recognition - something implicitly 
denied by the arousal thesis. At this point Matravers is still attempting to maintain that 
emotions aroused and expressed are 'real' emotions. However, this leads to further problems, 
not only must Matravers explain how musical emotions might provide cognitive content, but this 
also contradicts his explanation of the transfer of emotion terms to music. In reply, he concedes 
that 'we need not acquire the cognitive component of an emotion directly, we can acquire it 
through some pictorial or linguistic representation.' (ibid. p.325). Matravers acknowledges the 
lack of cognitive content in responses to music and what follows from this is a conception of 
responses to music as 'feeling components' of emotions. This requires both an explanation of 
• feeling components' of emotion, and a reformulation of the analogy between music and 
responses to human expression of emotion. 
4.3.2 Musical Emotion as 'Feeling' 
Matravers' claim then is that emotion states have separable components such that (in response 
to music) one may experience the physiological and phenomenological components in the 
absence of cognitive content - a response of this kind being termed a 'feeling' and not an 
emotion. Matravers acknowledges that this conception of emotional responses as 'feelings' 
causes problems for the analogy: 
"that the appropriate reaction to expression of emotion is a feeling and not an 
emotion - might be thought to be in conflict with the guiding analogy between 
our response to art which expresses emotion and our response to people who 
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express emotion. For it is certainly appropriate to respond to the latter with an 
emotion - that is a state with a cognitive component." (Matravers, 1998, 
pp.l48-9). 
His response is to say that, despite such differences "the basic structures of the responses are 
analogous", nonetheless he is forced to revise his formulation of the thesis as follows: 
"a piece of music expresses an emotion e if it causes a listener to experience a 
feeling a, where a is the feeling component of the emotion it would be 
appropriate to feel (in the central case) when faced with a person expressing e. 
Hence music expressive of sadness will cause a listener to feel sad (or maybe 
the feeling component of pity if that is a different state), and this feeling will 
cause him to believe that the work expresses sadness. The cognitive component 
is necessary neither to the arousal theory in general nor the analogy in 
particular" (ibid. p.l49). 
Although we might grant that components of emotions are separable in such a way, this 
reformulation is not without problems. Indeed it contradicts one of the underlying assumptions 
of the cognitivist theory of emotions - that we cannot discriminate between feeling components 
of emotions. Surprisingly Matravers acknowledges that the reformulation invokes such 
problems, though he believes this only serves to highlight the explanatory power of the arousal 
thesis. He refers to the causal relationship between the feelings and associated beliefs, adopting 
the position that the feelings in fact cause a belief that the music expresses an emotion and not 
that we must infer that the music expresses an emotion because we feel the associated feeling. 
Matravers however, neglects to explain how feelings may cause beliefs in the central case and 
indeed a belief that the music expresses a particular emotion is not to be equated with the 
cognitive component of that emotion. Although a 'feeling' might cause us to believe that the 
music is expressing something it does not seem plausible to accept that it might cause a belief 
that the music is sad, jolly, or otherwise. Indeed, if it were the case that feeling components 
caused specific beliefs, music would surely be able to express every conceivable emotional 
nuance by means of that specific feeling component causing a relevant belief. This is obviously 
not the case, and therefore this still leaves us with the problem of distinguishing between feeling 
components of emotions. 
On Matravers' account then, we would have to specifically identify 'pity' by means of its 
phenomenological and physiological components. This would still be lacking the determinate 
cognitive content necessary to this emotion on the cognitivist account. (To pity X one must hold 
a belief that X is suffering in some way.) These problems lead Matravers to his final 
formulation of the thesis that: 
"A work of art x expresses the emotion e if, for a qualified observer p 
experiencing x in normal conditions, x arouses in p a feeling which would be an 
aspect of the appropriate reaction to the expression of e by a person, or to a 
representation the content of which was the expression of e by a person."16 
This then confirms my claim that we would have to be aware of and identify the feeling 
component ourselves, for one must judge whether it is an 'aspect of the appropriate response to 
the expression of e by a person.' 
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4.3.3 Imaginary Emotions? Evaluating the Weak Arousal Thesis 
Matravers has seemingly failed to defend the thesis in either weak or strong form, but one might 
think a weak version of the thesis could be interpreted rather differently. I will now offer a brief 
critique of weaker versions of the arousal thesis and expand upon my earlier claim that many 
theories of expression are wrongly labeiJed as weak versions of the arousal theory. The 
fundamental problem with weak versions of the arousal theory is the notion of aroused 
emotions as simulated or imagined. We will begin with Kendall Walton's account as presented 
in his paper What is Abstract About the Art of Music? Walton's explanation is that musical 
expression occurs as an awareness of our own feelings and auditory sensations and his notion of 
arousal being in terms of our own imaginary feelings. So emotions provoked by music on 
Walton's account are not actually emotions as in everyday life but the imagination or simulation 
of emotional experiences. This view of musical emotions as 'imaginary' is subject to heavy 
criticism as the 'feel' of such emotions is not sufficiently different from our everyday emotional 
experiences, such as to warrant this distinction. 17 Neither does it seem appropriate to adopt 
such a notion which construes arousal solely in terms of a cognitive process. Arousal 
necessarily entails some level of physiological response. Empirical evidence supports the 
former claim, with musical emotions producing similar physiological responses to those in 
everyday life. (See Sloboda). Whilst hypothesising 'imaginary' emotions (with imaginary 
objects) may solve the problem of music providing determinate cognitive content, this still 
saddles the weak version of the theory with a projectivist position and its associated problems, 
as well as the difficulty of explaining in what sense emotions could be 'imaginary. • 
A slightly different account of arousal-expression is offered by Jerrold Levinson, his 
explanation of musical expression focusing on the structure of musically provoked emotions. 
Levinson explains that on his account aroused emotions are 
"something very like experience of the emotion expressed in the music" but not 
exactly like it. In both cases the physiological and affective components of 
emotion are present and in both cases there is cognitive content, but the 
"emphatic" response lacks determinate content:, 11 [my emphasis]. 
Levinson explains the difference between 'everyday' emotions and musically provoked emotions 
as exactly this difference in cognitive content. Claiming that musically aroused emotions lack 
determinate cognitive content, he argues that music (as non-representational) simply cannot 
provide such content. Music may only therefore provide an imagined or simulated object 
towards which the emotion may be directed, along with evoking the affective and physiological 
components of an emotion. Jenefer Robinson (The Expression and Arousal of Emotion in 
Music) is heavily critical of both Walton and Levinson's accounts. Indeed she criticises 
Levinson and Walton for their failure to show (in any detail) just how their respective accounts 
might work with reference to musical examples. Robinson also notes their failure to 
acknowledge the distinction between arousal and recognition of emotion which both accounts 
nevertheless seem to suggest (even if not specifically in the musical case.) As Robinson notes, 
"both writers find a connection between the presence of an emotional quality in 
music and the arousal of that emotion in the listener's imagination. I have 
urged, however, that neither Walton nor Levinson has shown how complex 
feelings such as unrequited passion, stabs of pain, or even sadness can be 
aroused by music whether in fact or in imagination." 19 
Whilst this criticism is true for Walton's account, Levinson makes an important comment which 
should influence how his account is to be interpreted. He states "When a person has a 'deep 
emotional response' to music, this is 'general1y in virtue of the recognition of emotions 
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expressed in music"20 It is for this reason, that I would suggest his account has been wrongly 
labelled as an arousal thesis. Levinson himself does not call his account an arousal theory, nor 
does he even claim to have a coherent theory of expression and specifically Levinson does make 
a clear distinction between recognition and arousal. My standard objection to such versions 
would be that in claiming musical emotions are not 'real' emotions, this violates the arousal 
thesis - that music expresses X in virtue of arousing X in the listener and not music expresses X 
in virtue of producing simulated/imaginary X in the listener. The problem is that weak versions 
of the thesis attempt to use the arousalist approach to solve the problem of intention whilst 
proposing versions of the thesis with different implications. Introducing imaginary or simulated 
emotions does not counter the standard objections nor empirical findings which contradict the 
arousal theory. 
4.4 Empirical Concerns 
In addition to specific findings considered within this discussion, the empirical findings as a 
whole deserve further mention. Although the Arousal theory has previously managed to escape 
criticisms raised through conceptual analysis of the account, it seems empirical studies may 
allow us to finally reject the thesis. The model of music processing suggested by empirical 
studies shows music to be a highly independent function and recognition of emotion and arousal 
of emotion are shown to be separable responses. Importantly music is not dependent on 
language, which is an implicit assumption of the arousal theory and aesthetic accounts as a 
whole. Musical deficits (as discussed in Chapter 3) show a clear separation of musical feature 
and emotion recognition. Musical emotion (certain types) may be reliably identified in the 
absence of ability to recognise musical features. The empirical findings also present a picture of 
music cognition with different methods of emotion recognition, both direct and via extra-musical 
associations, which again contradicts many accounts presented within aesthetics. Importantly, 
music cognition, and specifically musical emotion recognition, is not dependent on language, 
and we should be wary of restricting the discussion of musical emotion by thinking in terms of 
existing emotional vocabulary. Ultimately we should consider emotions in terms of 
psychological states, and consider that music may naturally be an alternative medium to convey 
emotion than language. 
To summarise, it is implausible that one could maintain a strong version of the arousal theory in 
light of the criticisms discussed. Reverting to a weaker version of the theory does little good, as 
this brings with it the problem of defining imaginary or simulated emotions in addition to its 
failure to counter the remaining objections. Empirical findings support this rejection of the 
thesis and its underlying conception of expression. As a result, to counter the objections and 
reply to the empirical findings necessitates significant reformulation of the original thesis, such 
that any attempt to revise the thesis inherently constitutes a radical departure from the central 
claims of the arousal theory. If Matravers is trying to propose an experiential model of music 
(processing) and emotional response, then his attempt is far off the mark. Matravers over-
theorises in his account of musical interpretation (see Art and Emotion p.167) advocating a 
cognitive evaluation of our own emotional responses and their causes as part of the listening 
process. Whilst it is perhaps true that a critic attends to music in such a way, the ordinary 
listener does not and it is the ordinary listener and their emotional responses to all types of 
music which are of primary interest. Empirical studies would support such a criticism that this 
simply is not how we experience and respond to music. If, however, Matravers intends this to 
be an account of music cognition, again it is flawed as he really needs to take account of the 
functional separation of music and other faculties. It is all very well to hypothesise about music 
cognition from a conceptual viewpoint, but one can not propose (or infer) cognitive processes 
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for music which are incompatible with functional separation of music and other cognitive 
functions, specifically auditory processing and other modes of expression recognition. As 
discussed earlier in Chapter 3, the underlying architecture of auditory processing will 
undoubtedly influence any model seeking to explain musical experience. Hence models of 
musical experience and underlying processing need to be carefully reconciled. Although arousal 
of emotions by music does need to be accounted for within any account of expression, it needs 
to be acknowledged that recognition of music as expressive does not necessitate arousal. 
4.5 An Alternative Analysis of Expression 
While the arousal theory fails as a theory of expression, it still has a certain appeal in its 
explanation of some instances of expression, and as noted in 4.1, and Chapter 3, arousal and 
recognition are intertwined due to the nature of initial affective perceptions. Without further 
discussion it might well seem inconsistent to discard the arousal theory but also to accept that 
auditory affective responses might mediate recognition of emotion in music. In light of 
criticisms of the arousal theory, and general criticisms of aesthetic theory, it would seem 
appropriate to offer some kind of alternative account which can encompass the varieties of 
expression outlined in Chapter 3. It is not that revised notions of expression caJI for rejection of 
aesthetic theories, but rather that these require appropriate placement within some kind of 
general framework for musical expression (and affective perception). Some further critiques of 
the arousal theory will highlight the deficiencies in existing accounts as comprehensive theories 
of expression. In addition to the arousal theory contradicting empirical fmdings, a further 
distinction is lacking in both weak and strong versions of the thesis. The theory fails to offer a 
sufficient distinction between music's formal and expressive properties. In particular, the 
arousal theory cannot offer a unified account of music's expressive properties {neglecting to 
account for those properties which are not emotions themselves but are nonetheless expressed 
by music). For example, we can clearly distinguish between formal and expressive features 
(Table 4.1 ). However, within the group of what one might term 'expressive• properties, there 
are further subdivisions - expressive descriptions of states which are not 'emotions•. For 
example, object characteristics and character traits are typically included within the category of 
'expressive• descriptions. 
Table 4.1 

















If the arousal theory were true, claims about the expressive character of music would implicitly 
be claims about the normal effects of such music on an audience. E.g., calling a work sad 
would imply that 'when played it will make people feel sad., This analysis highlights a 
continual flaw in the investigation of musical emotion. Empirical studies show, (and surely 
introspective analysis supports this), that subjects (under normal conditions) may consistently 
recognise a work as expressive without necessarily feeling that emotion oneself. That is to say, 
discussions of musical expression continue with increasing detachment from the issue of 
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listeners' actual responses. As seen in Chapter 1, theorists are quick to involve themselves in 
the details of musical works and their powers of representation, without first considering 
broader relationships between listener and sound, and indeed the nature of expressive 
descriptions. This is supported by the fact that expressive descriptions are not typically 
explained in terms of listeners' felt responses but rather by referring to formal properties of the 
work. As noted above, a claim such as 'That's a sad piece of music' is countered not by 
objections such as, 'No, he wasn't' or 'He was just pretending' (referring to the composer [or 
listener/performer}), but by remarking 'You haven't listened carefully' or 'You must listen 
again; there are almost no minor progressions and the tempo is allegro moderato.' " (Tormey 
1971, p.l05). 
Imitative accounts (Davies 1980; Putman 1985; Budd 1995}, arousal theory, and 
representational accounts (Karl and Robinson; 1995) all make much of relating specific musical 
features to expressive descriptions of music. Cooke's language of music, for example, explains 
expression by relating formal properties (particular musical phrases) to expressive properties. 
Although I have criticised Cooke's account for its formulaic approach, the distinction between 
formal and expressive properties still needs to be outlined. Moreover, I would wish to draw the 
distinction in such a way as to accord with the two-stage model proposed in Chapter 3. One 
cannot simply construct (as in Cooke's account) formulae for creating specific emotional 
responses, but nonetheless there are causal relationships between formal and expressive 
properties which need to be accounted for. In fact, it seems there are strikingly different 
relations between formal and expressive properties, for the natural and acquired modes of 
expression. The problem for aesthetic accounts is that they do not present this distinction in 
sufficient detail. Expression theories offer us competing explanations of how music's formal 
properties might 'express' emotion, rather than accounting for the varying ways in which formal 
properties do cause (or allow us to attribute) different kinds of expressive properties to music. 
This can be seen as a result of philosophers focusing on 'aesthetic' properties as a whole, rather 
than expressive properties. As a result, expressive properties become subsumed within 
generalised attempts to defend the objectivity of aesthetic properties and value claims. 
What is required then is a means of effectively capturing the relationships between formal and 
expressive properties, allowing a distinction between these categories in terms of their differing 
perceiver relationships. A method by which these relationships might be outlined is by reference 
to a distinction between primary and secondary qualities. That is, a distinction between those 
qualities which are intrinsic to an object (e.g. size and shape,} and those which are in some sense 
related to perceiver responses (e.g., smell and colour).21 Though this distinction can be traced 
back to GaliJeo, perhaps the most famous historical source is John Locke's treatment (An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding bk. ii Ch.8). Locke describes primary qualities (solidity, 
extension, figure, motion or rest) as 
"utterly inseparable from the body, in what state soever it be; and such as in all the 
alterations and changes it suffers, all the force can be used upon it, it constantly 
keeps." (EHU bk. ii Ch8.9). He goes on to describe secondary qualities as "such 
qualities which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves but powers to produce 
various sensations in us by their primary qualities, i.e. by the bulk, figure, texture, 
and motion of their insensible parts, as colours, sounds, tastes etc. These I call 
secondary qualities." (EHU bk. ii Ch.8.10). 
Subsequently, many attempts have been made to formulate this distinction, though there is still 
quite some disagreement about how best to do so. 22 
The Arousal Theory & Musical Expression 78 
There has nonetheless been some discussion of whether aesthetic properties can be treated in a 
way analogous to colours, and this may be useful in relation to the analysis of expressive 
properties. Hume uses the primary/secondary distinction to support his account of beauty, by 
drawing an analogy between secondary qualities (e.g.) colour and aesthetic qualities (e.g. 
beauty). In his attempt to define beauty, Hume maintained that beauty 
"is such an order and construction of parts, as .. .is fitted to give a pleasure and 
satisfaction to the soul .... beauty is nothing but a form, which produces 
pleasure, as deformity is a structure of parts, which conveys pain; and .... the 
power of producing pain and pleasure make in this manner the essence of 
beauty and deformity". 23 
Hume's account can be seen to stem from Locke's primary/secondary quality distinction, indeed 
his idea of beauty as a 'power' relates strikingly to Locke's comments that secondary qualities 
"are in truth nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various 
sensations in us; and depend on those primary qualities, viz. bulk, figure, 
texture, and motion of parts." (EHU bk. II ch.8.14). 
Still, there are difficulties for Hume's comparison. In the case of secondary qualities (colour for 
example), one cannot be argued or persuaded into altering one's colour perception, (e.g., be 
argued into seeing something as a different colour). However, one can be persuaded or shown 
that a painting is graceful or beautiful, where one did not previously see these qualities in the 
artwork. That is to say, there does seem to be a possibility of educating tastes, in a way in 
which it is not possible to "educate" colour vision. This highlights a problem for the 
comparison, that one is comparing perceptual judgements (e.g. for colour) with evaluative 
judgements in aesthetics. There is typically no evaluative element in colour perception and the 
standards for application of colour concepts are relatively rigid, being fixed by the reflective 
properties of surfaces and the nature of human vision. 24 It is perhaps the failure of the analogy 
between secondary qualities and aesthetic qualities which has deterred theorists from continuing 
this line of thought. However, there may still be scope for the primary/secondary distinction 
specifically in relation to expressive properties. The focus within aesthetics has been the 
objectivity of 'aesthetic' properties as a whole, rather than just expressive properties. Indeed 
Hume's idea that objects are disposed to look a certain way to us, that "Some particular forms 
or qualities, from the original structure of the internal fabric are calculated to please, and others 
to displease" (SOT, Hume's Essays p.238) has been assimilated with attempts to identifY 
formal properties as necessary and sufficient conditions for aesthetic properties (and in turn 
objecticy value claims e.g. artwork x is aesthetically valuable because it has properties a, b, and 
c). The problems with this view are summarised by Bender's comments: 
"there seems to be no entailment relations connecting the aesthetic and the non-
aesthetic. Nor are there any universal, empirical, psycho-aesthetic 
generalizations, such as "all paintings with smooth curving lines and lightly 
saturated colours are delicate and balanced," under which to subsume given 
instances" (Bender p.3l ). 
Whilst this might perhaps be true in the case of aesthetic properties, this is partly because much 
depends upon what falls within the realm of 'aesthetic'. The case for expressive or even more 
specifically expressive properties would seem clearer cut. For example, there would seem to be 
less room for dispute regarding whether something is sad, happy or angry as opposed to being 
'balanced' 'gaudy' or 'graceful'.2s Despite the problems for value claims, then, one may still be 
able to draw on the analogy in relation to expressive properties. 
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Turning back to emotion. its recognition and arousal would indeed seem to be more closely 
analogous to colour perception than judgements of beauty. Applications of emotive concepts 
being relatively well fixed in relation to music and (at least in many cases) showing more direct 
relationships to formal properties of the object in question than value claims or ascriptions of 
beauty. Yet despite these similarities, and the fact that we do seem to ground emotive 
descriptions on objective formal properties, emotive descriptions of music, like aesthetic 
judgements, are notoriously subject to dispute. At the heart of the issue in aesthetics has been 
the paradox that on the one hand emotive judgements are subjective whilst on the other hand 
they are justifiable in terms of objective properties and normative standards. The simple 
solutions to this problem would be either to identifY objective features which are necessary and 
sufficient conditions for attributing emotional expression or to allow that emotive descriptions 
are subjective. Neither view alone is sufficient as there are both subjective and objective 
elements to the arousal and recognition of musical affect as recognised in Hume's sophisticated 
subjectivism. Whilst Hume's analogy between aesthetic and secondary properties, is subject to 
criticism, there is still an inherent appeal in the idea that beauty (or in our case expressive 
qualities) is a 'power' of an object's formal properties to act on us in certain ways such as to 
cause a relevant perception. If one thinks back to the chill responses, discussed in Chapter 3, 
this seems markedly plausible. In light of these considerations, disputes between 'subjective and 
objective' seem misdirected. As seen in Chapter 3, the disagreement can be explained in 
relation to the mode of expression, degree of specificity relating to that mode, and the 
supervenience relationship of primary and secondary modes of expression. What one can 
provide, then, is an analysis of expression in terms of relational properties which can 
encompass all these variables. 
The primary/secondary quality distinction alone though, does not seem sufficient to encompass 
the relationship between formal and expressive properties. An alternative means might be to 
analyse music's expressive properties in terms of'response-dependence'. Response dependence 
has chiefly focused on the problems of colour, and as yet very little attention has been devoted 
to sound (or emotion). Yet response dependence is surely a very widespread phenomenon 
indeed. A very large number of the attributes that we recognise and ascribe to objects, events, 
people, and performances are really response dependent. As there are different kinds of things 
that can have response dependent features and can have them in different ways, we should be 
ready to allow that there can be different varieties of response dependence. Giving an overall 
account of response dependence that can encompass all varieties of the genus is really a task 
that goes beyond my purposes in the present work. However, if I offer a rather permissive and 
inclusive account of response dependence in general, it should be possible to say something a bit 
more detailed and substantial about how the specific forms of response dependence exhibited by 
the expressive properties of music fit into this general account. It turns out that response 
dependence provides a powerful framework for understanding the expressive powers of music; 
and the varieties of response dependence, even in this particular modality, help to clear up a 
number of puzzling things about music's expressive capacity. There may still remain some 
conceptual difficulties with the notion of response-dependence, but it seems undeniable that it 
can serve as a useful way of analysing and understanding expressive properties and modes of 
expression. This has advantages over other accounts of expression in addition to the arousal 
theory. Importantly such an analysis can account for cultural and social variability, allows 
examination of supervenience relationships between primary (formal properties) and secondary 
(expressive properties) qualities, and will allow us to comment further on implications the 
revised model of expression entails for aesthetic accounts. 
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4.5.1 Response Dependence 
Response dependent properties generally conform to the notion of secondary qualities (e.g. 
colour and taste) and differ from primary qualities in that they causally implicate the perceiver, 
having an a priori connection with observer responses. Philip Pettit highlights the species-
specific nature of response dependent properties as he explains: 
"Secondary quality concepts implicate subjects in a way that primary quality 
concepts do not. Consider the concepts of smoothness, blandness, and redness. 
They are tailor made for creatures like us who are capable, as many 
intelligences may not be, of certain responses: capable of finding things smooth 
to the touch, bland to the taste, red to the eye. The concepts, as we may say are 
response-dependent. They are fashioned for beings with a capacity for certain 
responses and it is hard to see how creatures which lacked that capacity could 
get a proper, first-hand grasp ofthe concepts."26 
A basic formulation for response dependent properties, is that whether an object is or is not blue 
for example is determined by whether an object x looks or is judged to be blue by normal 
observers in normal conditions. (See McGinn, 1983; Tye, 1995; Johnston, 1989). 
In general it has been thought that in the case of response dependent concepts, whether an object 
x is or is not «P is determined by whether or not it is judged to be «P by an observer competent in 
applying that particular response dependent concept (lP). We can clarify this by giving a 
standard formula (or, as it turns out, a first attempt at such a formula) for response-dependent 
properties thus: 
RD 1: A property + is response dependent iff it is necessarily true that if x is +. then x seems (or 
is judged to be ) «P to normal observers under normal conditions. 
It seems then that music's emotional properties do fall within the category of response 
dependent properties and indeed the standard formula may be re-written to apply specifically to 
musical emotions. However, the above formulation, requires some revision before looking 
specifically at the musical case. A particular problem is that the response dependent property ( +) appears in both the analysis and the claim to be analysed so that the claim of response 
dependence seems to reduce to 'x is + iff it is judged to be +'· But doesn't this result in a 
circularity that is vicious'f7 It would, if analysis in terms of the most fundamental concepts 
required us to substitute in accordance with the formula RD l, within the right-hand side of that 
very formula itself; i.e., if what was to be understood as + within the phrase 'judged to be +' 
was to be analysed in terms of the biconditional 'x is + iff it is judged to be +'· This is a 
consequence which a number of analysts have tried to resist by arguing that in the case of 
colour concepts the most basic and primitive concepts in terms of conceptual analysis are not 
red, blue, green, etc., but rather looks red, looks blue, looks green, etc. (See Jackson F, 
Perception 1977; McGinn C, The Subjective View, 1983). 
That may have some plausibility in the case of colour concepts. But if that's so, then it only 
goes to show that concentrating on the case of colour is liable to stand in the way of developing 
an adequately general account of response dependence. The idea of a 'happy event' (a wedding, 
the birth of a child) involves a response dependent concept. It may weiJ be that happy events 
are those which will normally be judged to be happy. But it seems very clear in this case that 
'judged to be happy' cannot be a primitive concept from the point of view of conceptual 
analysis: what is judged to be happy must be judged so in virtue of perceived tendencies of 
events and occasions to make people be or feel happy. In other words the judgement needs to 
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track a psychological state or response which is not itself a judgement. In the case of emotion, 
the claim that 'music p evokes an emotion of sadness in x' (or even causes recognition of 
sadness in x), does not equate to: x forms a judgement that music pis sad. So perhaps a better, 
and more inclusive, formulation of response dependence would be the following: 
RD2: A property + is response dependent iff it is necessarily true that for any x, x is + iff 
normal perceivers in normal conditions would have some particular response, R, to x. 
For music then, sadness is response dependent iff it is necessarily true that for any music, the 
music is sad iff normal perceivers in normal conditions would have some particular type of 
response R to the music.28 My main concern is not to provide a full account of response 
dependence, but. rather to show how an interpretation of the expressive features of music as 
response dependent can be used to help provide an account of musical expression. Indeed, 
many other applications of response dependence will not be closely analogous to the musical 
case. However, the musical case is sufficiently far removed from the case of colour concepts to 
move us from RDI to RD2, which is clearly a movement in terms of greater generality. So 
there is some hope that a formulation like RD2 may be useful as an umbrella which covers a 
large variety of forms of response dependence. 
One point worth noting at this stage is that an account of musical expression in terms of 
response-dependence seems to be capable of "trumping" the Arousal Theory, in something like 
the way in which hypothetico-deductive accounts in the philosophy of science outflanked an 
inductivist view of scientific method. According to inductivism scientific theories were arrived 
at by a process of generalisation from regularities noted through a mass of observations. 
Hypothetico-deductivism insisted that we should distinguish between the context of discovery 
and the context of justification: the value of a scientific theory was determined by the way in 
which it stood up to testing, not by the way in which it came to be suggested in the first place. 
It might occur to scientists as a hypothesis worth testing for all sorts of different reasons. One 
way in which it might emerge as a hypothesis, of course, was through being suggested by a 
series of observations and regularities detected therein. So hypothetico-deductivism effectively 
swallowed any positive case that might have existed in the history of science that had previously 
appeared to be favourable to inductivism. Similarly, a general account in terms of response 
dependence can absorb any instances that might seem to bear out Arousal Theory, by the simple 
expedient of allowing that in some cases, for some expressive features, the psychological 
response R in the audience can be feeling or experiencing some emotion. 
So if there was ever any merit in the Arousal Theory, that can be retained by a suitable 
characterisation of the response R in a response-dependent account. In fact, there are rather few 
expressive properties of music for which this works at all well: one might perhaps cite happy 
music and calm music as examples where the expressive power does seem to be a matter of a 
tendency to make listeners feel happy/calm (rather than judging anything to be the case). The 
important point is that the response dependence account is capable of both explaining (and 
explaining away) the lingering attachment exhibited by theorists to the Arousal Theory as being 
due to instances of expressive power that can equally well be accommodated in terms of 
response dependence, with suitable R. 
4.5.2 Recognising the Scope of Response Dependence 
Leaving what the response R is to be so open in this way makes for a very broad conception of 
response-dependence. Although I might be accused of providing a very loose account, I think 
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this looseness is in fact all to the good, in that it enables us to recognise many different varieties 
of response-dependence. I cannot hope here to do justice to all the different varieties of this 
widespread phenomenon, but will at least try to show that even in the field of music, different 
forms of response dependence need to be acknowledged. Although I can only do a little in the 
way of showing the complex of varieties of what is a large subject, the present treatment may 
serve as a corrective to accounts of response dependence that are built around more familiar 
examples. The danger is that an account of response dependence that relies too heavily on a 
particular example will become too narrow, and in fact turn into an analysis of a particular 
variety of response dependence. Arguably, this is just what has happened in relation to the 
philosophers' favourite example of colour. 
By contrast, the permissiveness of the formulation RD2 enables us to see the full generality of 
response dependence and at least to make a start on differentiating some of its many varieties. 
Considering that formulation again: 
RD2: A property + is response dependent iff it is necessarily true that for any x, x is + iff 
normal perceivers in normal conditions would have some particular response, R, to x. 
We can see that the permissiveness of RD2 consists in the fact that it allows two 'degrees of 
freedom', two aspects in which different specifications many generate different varieties of 
response dependence. These two degrees of freedom are realised in the answers to the 
questions: 
1. What is normal- in the way of both perceivers and conditions? 
2. What is the response R? 
In order to show how answers to these questions can produce a number of varieties of response 
dependence I will go on to consider how normal conditions and normal perceivers are to be 
specified (and, importantly, how these relate to actual conditions). 
4.5.3 Requirements for Response-Dependence: What are Normal 
Perceivers and Normal Conditions? 
Examining what we take to be normal conditions and normal perceivers allows us to make 
distinctions between responses to music as universal, culture specific, natural or conventional 
(acquired), distinctions which were notably lacking in existing accounts. The model of 
expression I have proposed in Chapter 3 suggests that recognition of musical expression 
involves separable components (relating to extra-musical and intrinsically musical features). 
Clarifying the concepts of normal conditions and normal listeners here will help to explain 
expressive properties both in terms of 'natural' and 'acquired' responses. To recap, my account 
of emotional expression involves two stages: First, there are natural (mandatory) physiological 
responses' to music created by direct effects of the music on our auditory systems. These 
responses allow expression of very basic positive and negative 'affective states'. Second, music 
may build on such physiological responses by use of extra-musical associations, by means of 
music imitating or otherwise representing gross aspects of emotional behaviour, by extra-
musical features (lyrics, visual imagery etc.), familiarity with musical works and deeply 
embedded socio-cultural influences (e.g., types of music accompanying particular social events, 
or conventionally used to represent certain events). · 
It seems appropriate to begin by saying that a 'normal perceiver' should be free from perceptual 
defects, and that standard conditions should entail that musical works are perceived without 
other auditory distractions (speech or environmental sounds, except where these may be part of 
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a composition). These conditions however, need expanding in quite some detail. In addition to 
the 'normal perceiver' having no perceptual defects, it seems natural to add that they should 
have no extraordinary musical experiences, nor suffer from a complete lack of such experience, 
and this will be reflected in the notion of standard conditions. For example, one would not 
expect someone who has been deprived of musical exposure to be a normal perceiver. 29 There 
needs to be a reasonable awareness of, and exposure to musical norms of a society, e.g. 
Gamelan, or western tonal music. And one would expect a normal perceiver to respond in 
accordance with such norms even though they themselves may not be consciously aware of 
them. 
In the case of emotional response dependent properties of music, it is also necessary, in order 
for someone to quality as a normal perceiver, that they have an understanding of the relevant 
concept being applied. Thus, we should exclude from the group subjects with emotional 
disturbances, and those judged not to have a sufficient grasp of the relevant emotion concepts. 
Young children, for example, may well not have a full grasp of cognitively complex emotions 
such as regret or grief as these are dependent on understanding of relevant situations, beliefs and 
desires of both the emoter and others.30 
One can see immediately that 'actual conditions' and 'actual perceivers' differ significantly 
from 'normal conditions' and 'normal perceivers.' Within the range of what would be classed 
as 'normal' auditory perception, there are variations (thresholds of hearing vary across subjects 
both for range of pitch (frequency) and intensity of sounds). Also it is difficult for us to assess 
others' understanding of emotion concepts, and listeners may well experience temporary 
changes in emotional states which disturb them and affect their sensitivities. There exist no 
strict boundaries as to what is regarded as 'normal musical exposure' and it is certainly a rare 
occurrence for music to be perceived in an environment free from other auditory distractions. 
Hence our actual musical experiences and emotion-attributions must allow for such 
discrepancies rather than attempting to 'idealise' our notions of standard conditions and 
perceivers to minimise error. Indeed. as Holton explains in his discussion of response 
dependence, the standard conditions should not be such that they do not allow for error. He 
holds that standard conditions are trivialised if we make them ideal conditions. This would be 
the case for musical emotions if we were to restrict the category of normal perceiver to a 
particular school of professional critics. Although within such groups a very high degree of 
consensus may be reached as regards emotional content, this will be largely a result of 
conditioned responses and musical knowledge and would not reflect 'normal perceivers' 
responses. Janet Wolff comments on a similar point, that we should focus on musical emotion 
as it is experienced (by normal perceivers) and to make a careful distinction between emotional 
ascriptions as such and emotional ascriptions as value judgements which might be made by 
particular groups of 'institutionally and structurally located' perceivers. Indeed, given the 
breadth of RD2, you can perfectly well have expressive properties for the elite which differ 
from the expressive properties for a more numerous group of normal perceivers. 
The main point here however, must be that, although actual and normal do not exactly coincide, 
they must not fall too far apart. In general, we do not want complete fragmentation of response 
dependence. With this in mind one would readily understand a critique that the formulation of 
RD2 might be too broad and include just anything. Johnston also acknowledges this problem in 
relation to broader formulations of RD such as my own, and his reply provides a succinct 
answer to such criticisms: 
"[For the formulation:] xis C iff inK, S's are disposed to produce x-directed 
response R (or xis such as to produceR inS's under conditions K.) 
The Arousal Theory & Musical Expression 84 
...... for the concepts in question such a biconditional will not hold simply in 
virtue of a reading ofK., S or R which makes the biconditional trivial, imposing 
thereby no constraint on the concept C. Such a trivialising reading would be 
any reading which overtly or covertly specifies the conditions and subjects as 
whatever conditions and whatever subjects are required to get it right, or any 
reading which overtly or covertly specifies R as whatever response is truly C-
detecting under the conditions specified. Given a 'whatever-it-takes' reading at 
any of these three points, the a priori truth of the biconditional so read indicates 
nothing in the way of the conceptual (inter)dependence in which we are 
interested." (Johnston, 1989, p.l45). 
4.5.4 Expressive Properties and Intrinsic Possession. 
There are nonetheless, objections to the response dependence thesis and these are readily 
comprehensible given the way secondary qualities appear to us as properties of objects. This 
notion is put forwards by Michael Tye, who comments, 
"The obvious view, suggested by our color experiences .... is that the colors we 
see objects and surfaces to have are simply intrinsic, observer-independent 
properties ofthose objects and surfaces." (p.144). 
On this 'objectivist' account secondary qualities are if you like intrinsic properties of objects in 
the same way as primary properties. Tye criticises the response dependence thesis further, by 
claiming that it cannot accommodate the fact that according to perception, experience of 
redness, say, is an experience of the property as intrinsic to the object - that we experience 
colour as non-relational. But experience is not always an accurate guide to how things actually 
are, optical illusions and indeed Tye's own examples of phantom limbs are typical examples 
(see, Hardin, 1993; Tye, 1995.) By reverting back to an argument from experience, Tye seems 
to undermine the attempts he makes to cite 'objective' colour properties. 
It would also appear that Tye's notion of perceiver independent properties is more appropriate 
to his example of colours than secondary properties in general (and expressive properties). 
Whereas colours can seemingly be located in an object's surface, 'sadness, in music has no 
such analogous (spatial) location. Perhaps the most powerful argument against the strong 
objectivist approach is that even where we relate colour (or sadness) to specific formal 
properties, it does not follow that we can identify a further property 'redness' say, in the object, 
but only an arrangement of formal properties which produce certain effects in us. For example, 
whilst one can objectively measure the frequency of an acoustic signal, there is no intrinsic 
property 'pitch' which one may identicy. One simply cannot say that properties are intrinsic 
because we perceive them to be so. Whilst intrinsic properties are unchanging regardless of 
adaptations to our perceptual systems, secondary properties are ultimately relative to our 
perceptual abilities, they would alter in accordance with changes to the human perceptual 
system. 
Going back to question 2 above, 'What is the response R?', problems do arise for our 
conception of emotional responses if component parts are examined individually. Although 
physiological affective responses (chill responses) are component parts of emotional responses 
to music, they do not seem to conform to the standard conception of response dependent 
properties. As Johnston claims 
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"for response dependent concepts, subjects' responses essentially and 
intrinsically involve some mental process (responses like sweating and digesting 
are therefore excluded)"31 
Physiological affective responses to music are responses to certain auditory signals and as such 
are not even dependent on perceptual recognition of music as music. The music does cause the 
response but this does not mean we will necessarily call such music sad or happy if it lacks 
higher-order emotional components such as to produce relevant cognitive content or 
representation of emotional behaviour. Rather, what is going on in this sort of case is that 
music causes a physiological response which we may or may not relate to a particular emotional 
state. Musical 'chills' alone, are distinct from the ability of works to produce either a 
conceptual recognition of emotion or a feeling of a specific emotion. 
The worry here is whether chill responses and the like are psychological states or purely 
physiological states, and it is not clear that they are either, due to the interwoven nature of 
cognitive and affective responses. It certainly seems that affective responses can induce 
cognitive responses, and may even involve some basic cognitive aspect - for example, a 
recognition of one's state, or that perception is directed towards the cause of the affective 
response. It is not possible to entirely separate the purely physiological aspects of affective 
responses from their associated mental processes, and in light of this Johnston's criteria for 
response dependent concepts is clearly insufficient. 
That is a problem for Johnston, but it is not a problem for the broader account of response 
dependence, reflected in RD2, advanced here. While we cannot perhaps distinguish purely 
physiological and cognitive aspects of affective responses, this should not prevent us from 
analysing them within the response dependence account. All we need to say is that there are 
some fully psychological forms of response dependence in which the response R is clearly a 
psychological state. There are also some purely physiological varieties of response dependence 
in which the response R is simply a physiological state: the property of being poisonous (to 
humans) is an example of that. There are also mixed examples in which the response is both 
physiological and psychological- e.g., the property of being nauseating (of things tasted). 
This goes to show that the point that in relation to response dependence in general, the fact that 
our question 2 above (What is the response R?) is an open question, admitting of different 
specifications for different varieties of response dependence (rather than a single one-off, 
definitional answer), is really a strength, rather than an analytic weakness, allowing us to 
recognise the full scope of response dependence. In this connection there is an important 
distinction to be drawn within the range of psychological responses. This is that response 
dependent properties can be subject to focused and unfocused intentionality. Something can 
seem x to a perceiver, as in the case of evaluative responses to music, or something can just 
produce effect x in the perceiver, without the perceiver having a conscious awareness of the 
exact cause. (For example, music as a whole may just produce a response in the listener 
without them necessarily attributing the response to music or sadness may be attributed to 
particular passages, the way certain sections are orchestrated, harmonic progressions etc. See 
Sloboda 1991 ). This distinction is perfectly compatible with the given formulation of response 
dependence RD2, which requires only that perceivers have some response R to x, which might 
perfectly well be a largely physiological affective response or an evaluative response. It makes 
no claims about the type of response in the listener and therefore supports the wide range of 
emotionally affective states which may arise in response to music. 
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4.5.5 Natural and Acquired Response Dependence 
Within the two stage model of expression then. one may assert that listeners from any culture 
should be able to recognise32 expression of emotion belonging to the first stage, this being the 
result of basic physiological responses to auditory input mediated by primitive neural circuitry. 
The second stage of emotion recognition will be influenced by culture and musical knowledge, 
(e.g. conditioned responses to types of music used in particular social settings). 
It seems that culture specific emotionality is very strongly ingrained. Conventional uses of 
music for certain social events, lullabies, folk songs etc. create strong affective associations 
which may well be able to supervene upon basic physiological responses to music. For 
example, it is certainly plausible that a piece of music evoking a 'positive' physiological 
affective response might be used in a different context to accompany a 'sad' event, and as a 
result, conventionalised or conditioned responses to the piece as •sad' might override the initial 
physiological response.33 Over-familiarity is certainly a possible factor that might lead to 
suppression of initial arousal. For example, a piece that might on first hearing have produced a 
positive affective response may have been heard so many times that it produces irritation 
instead. Another example might be that music produces the relevant conceptual associations 
(e.g. a funeral march), but that it has been so over-used (e.g. commercially, and within fictional 
contexts) that it looses its direct affective powers. Indeed it may well be that attention is an 
important factor here. For example, music only being subject to secondary processing if it is 
allocated auditory attention. I.e. if we have become habituated to music in the background it is 
easy to ignore. 
Explaining emotional properties as response dependent allows us to account for cross-cultural 
variation, and changes in response to music over time. A 'normal' observer of the 18th century 
under standard conditions would be familiar with musical language of the time, and would 
recognise particular tunes as expressive of particular emotions and representing complex states 
of affairs (without undertaking any detailed musical analysis). An example of such 
acculturation can be found in Mozart, as many ofMozart's operas and some ofhis instrumental 
works contain musical 'jokes' and references to the different social classes. Most commonly 
Mozart used different types of dance music which were representative of the upper and lower 
classes, but also techniques such as using a string quartet in the background, which would refer 
to the upper class, whilst a lively gigue with alternative instrumentation would be a reference to 
the lower classes. 34 He aJso used different types of music such as Turkish music and religious 
music to set scenes. These features, whilst self-evident to the audiences of Mozart's era, are not 
always apparent to today's listener without prior knowledge that Mozart used such techniques 
and an understanding of their significance. 
For such reasons, one would not assume that a piece of music which is labelled 'sad' at present 
will necessarily be considered 'sad' in a few centuries time and this corresponds with historical 
examples. We no longer find Gregorian chants 'awe-inspiring' or even in most cases expressive 
of emotion. Nor do we find many works political or nationalistic, as they were ordinarily 
interpreted by the listeners of the day. Obviously this is not due to a change in the music, but to 
a change in the listeners' responses and the ability of extra-musical m~es of expression to 
supervene upon physiological responses (where present). On the other hand though, 
physiological affective responses, as responses to formal properties or a conjunction of formal 
properties of music, may consistently produce a positive or negative 'sad' or happy' emotional 
arousa~ and will consistently be produced in listeners with the same physiology as we have 
today. This seems to present us with different expressive properties, those relative to certain 
categories of perceiver (e.g .. , 17th century listeners), and a category of universal properties 
which act on any perceiver with a normal auditory-perceptual system. 
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We therefore need to recognise two different modes of response dependence, natural response 
dependence and acquired response dependence. Natural response dependence is analogous to 
colour concepts and will not change over time. In the case of acquired response dependence 
listeners' responses are relative to their cultural and social contexts, familiarity and musical 
knowledge. This is consistent with views of artworks in context, and as products of certain 
social and cultural institutions. 
As an example of 'natural' response dependence, physiological affective responses would seem 
analogous to colour perception. We do not require any explicit tutoring (other than general 
developmental exposure to colours and language) to apply colour concepts, and this is also true 
(if not more so) in the case of affective responses. 
Only basic expressive distinctions may be made in a sense analogous to colour concepts. That 
is, affective distinctions which show a high degree of consistency in application and have direct 
causal relationships to formal properties. However, the fact that that there are at least some 
causal relationships between formal properties and our perception of music, may offer 
something to the thesis that certain objects are just aesthetically pleasing due to their formal 
properties. This provides an interesting perspective to aestheticians as regards objectivity of 
expressive judgements. For example, it may allow us to explain certain enigmas as regards 
music's value. Why high classical music is still held in such high esteem may be in fact due to 
its exploitation of certain, melodic or harmonic properties which play directly on our perceptual 
systems. 
However, this is not to say that analysing the formal properties of a work is sufficient for us to 
determine its emotional effects, just as an analysis ofthe surface of an object is not sufficient for 
us to determine its colour (an object might have formal properties that would typically produce 
a red response when in fact the object looks blue). (Hardin, 1993 provides many examples of 
optical illusions for colour). If a coloured object were to produce physiological responses 
consistent with observing a red object (whilst the normal observer perceives the object to be 
green under normal conditions), this is not sufficient for us to attribute redness to the object. 
For example, 
"A circular disk that is half-red and half-green looks yellow when it is spinning 
to normal observers under normal lighting conditions. But such a disk does not 
become yellow when it spins" (AverilJ, 1982, p352) 
The perception of yellow is not sufficient for us to say the object is surface-yellow. Similarly 
the formal properties of an object are not sufficient for us to determine what colour something 
will appear to normal observers. This applies equally to emotion seen as a 'property' of music. 
Musical expression of emotion must be considered under the conditions outlined above - not as 
exclusively determined by formal properties, despite the fact that there is clearly a causal 
relationship between some music and physiological/affective responses in the listener. Janet 
Woltf comments similarly about sociological roles in the arts, 
"The very products which aesthetics and art history posit as 'works of art' 
cannot be uncritically taken as somehow distinguished by certain intrinsic 
features, but must be seen as produced in that history by specific practices in 
given conditions"35 
It does nonetheless seem, that problems of perception should be given a little more weight in 
aesthetic accounts of expression and, leading on from this point is something which I noted in 
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Chapter 3. Whilst affective responses themselves and physiological explanations are 
straightforward enough, what is problematic in any explanation of expression is the subsequent 
interaction of these basic pre-cognitive responses, with evaluative judgements of works of art. 
To what extent cognitive responses supervene upon these initial reactions might be something 
subject to further empirical testing. This indeed is an interesting question, as many responses to 
music may be conditioned responses, but at the same time, deeply ingrained, fast responses 
which may themselves not be the result of any conceptual analysis. 
4.6 Summary 
The response dependence analysis then. is both consistent with the two stage account of 
expression presented in Chapter 3, and offers advantages over traditional accounts of 
expression. It does seem that response dependence is in many cases inherently acknowledged, 
although the idea has not been explicitly outlined in aesthetics. 36 A response dependence 
analysis then allows causal and associative (natural and acquired) modes of expression to be 
reconciled within a broad architecture which is also compatible with empirical claims regarding 
auditory and affective perception, and also accounts for cross-cultural variance in responses to 
music. So long as claims regarding the specificity of expression are consistent with the mode of 
expression, causal and associative accounts may be reconciled within a global model of 
expression. 
In light of how little is known about the interaction of affective perception and affective 
cognition, it would seem necessary that both modes of expression are considered corUointly. 
Initial affective responses may colour subsequent cognitions. But also acquired modes of 
expression may be sufficiently strong to override initial affective responses. If aesthetic 
accounts allow for both natural and acquired modes of expression, this in turn allows many 
theories to be reconciled with empirical findings. However, this is not to say that just any 
aesthetic account may be reconciled, there has to be consistency between expressive claims and 
the mode of expression. Response dependence does not legitimate claims for expressive powers 
which depend on misconceptions of underlying processes. The formulation of response 
dependence in terms of seeming + to "normal observers" under "normal conditions" can be used 
to anatomise the expressive properties of music, distinguishing between those that depend upon 
nearly universal physiological and psychological responses, and those that depend upon highly 
trained ears attending in quite specific cultural settings. Importantly though, in light of 
empirical findings, one can specifY to some degree the range of expressive powers falling under 
each of these modes, allowing reconciliation of both opposing aesthetic accounts and empirical 
findings. In addition, it seems that the range of 'natural' expressive responses relates to those 
functions which are modular in nature, being universal, mandatory responses and it is this 
modular nature of musical expression and cognition will be the main focus of part 11. 
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Notes 
1 That is, emotions not varying in any significant way from emotions experienced in response to everyday events. 
2 John E. MacKinnon 'Expression and the Claims of Arousal Theory' p.278. 
3 Representational theories cover a variety of sub-categories of expressionism. These can be roughly divided into 
three groups, music imitating or otherwise representing: a) objects or causes of emotion b) people in an emotional 
state and c) The feelings associated with an emotion. The important distinction being that these are recognised 
without necessitating arousal. 
4 As I discussed in Chapter 1, describing musical emotions as 'objectless' reduces them to the status of moods or 
feelings, neither of which reflect the nature of musically aroused affective states, and neither category being any 
better defined than the category of emotions. 
5Austin's concern was to distinguish between constative and performative speech acts, that is to distinguish 
between utterances where something is done rather than merely stated- in saying something we are actually doing 
something, as opposed to just 'fact-stating.' 
6 Goodman's concern lies with the application of expressive terms themselves to works of art as opposed to 
Tormey's concern with the syntactic form of such statements. This allows Goodman to avoid problems caused by 
ambiguous use of'expression' in ordinary language which invariably undermine Tormey's account. 
7 For persuasive argument on this issue see Black, M 'Metaphor' Proc. Arist. Soc. (19S4-S), Ortony A, (Ed.) 
Metaphor & Thought Cambridge, 1979; Davidson, D. 'What Metaphors Mean' in Inquiries into Truth & 
Interpretation Oxford 1984. I would agree with Black's interaction theory of metaphors- that they are variously 
interpreted by the reader/hearer. This replaces substitution theory (as advocated by Walton) as a literal 
paraphrase would have to command agreement amongst the community of language users as regards what it 
expressed. 
8 A further criticism here is that whilst discussing central application of emotion terms Matravers does not make it 
clear whether he is referring to third-person ascriptions of emotion or both first and third person ascriptions. John 
MacKinnon offers a fairly detailed critique of this point in Artistic Expression And The Claims of Arousal Theory 
(1996). 
9 See Speck, Arousal Theory Reconsidered, p.40. 
10 This might seem to contradict the responses of amusic subjects which do not require recognition of musical 
features. Although we have responses which are not dependent on recognition of musical features. We also have 
conventionalised responses to musical structures. E.g. cadences, harmonies and resolutions etc. cl we can identifY 
which aspects, or where in the music relates to emotional responses. Conceivably amusic subjects might be able 
to indicate when in a piece of music they feel particularly aroused, despite being unable to IdentifY the musical 
structures at work. 
11 See Alien's discussion of this problem in The Arousal and Expression of Emotion by Music 
12 See Sloboda 1991 Lehmann, 1997 and my own empirical tests (Chapter .S). Listeners can identifY emotion in 
music without feeling the emotions themselves. and measuring brain activity, heart rates, and skin temperature 
etc. can confirm that they arc not physiologically experiencing any emotion whilst listening. 
13 In evolutionary terms it would hardly seem to be a well adapted survival aid u: in order to recognise and 
respond to emotions expressed by others, we were first required to feel and consciously identifY emotions in 
ourselves. 
J.f Matravers p.32S Art and the Feelings and Emotions 
15 This seems to be contradicted by empirical evidence that we may experience an emotion, and even respond to 
emotional stimuli without conscious awareness. See example of the split brain patient in Chapter 1 and 
discussion ofnonconscious affect. 
16 Matravers, Art And Emotion p.140. 
17 See Empirical studies comparing emotional response to music and in everyday situations: W. Gaver cl G. 
Mandler (1987) Play it again Sam: On Liking Music, Cognition and Emotion 1(3) 259-282. 
11 Roblnson, The Expression and Arousal of Emotion In Music, Journal of Aesthltics and Art Criticism Vol. 52: 
1, (1994) pp. IS-16. 
19 Robinson, "The Expression and Arousal of Emotion In Music" p. 18. 
20 Robinson, "The Expression and Arousal of Emotion In Music" p. IS. 
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21It might be argued that formal properties of music do not equate to primary acoustic properties of sound. While 
there are strong relationships between frequency and pitch, loudness and intensity, the former are objectively 
measurable properties of sound while the latter are subjective. There is no property 'pitch' which may be 
measured in an acoustic signal. And the subjectivity of 'loudness' for example, is reflected in the variation of 
sound (hearing) thresholds for individual subjects. Whilst one could refer to music's formal properties in terms of 
aooustic features it is commonplace to discuss them in terms of their subjectively perceived properties although 
we could very well refer to acoustic properties if necessary. Nonetheless, this point is worth bearing in mind fur 
many account neglect to consider these issues and in such cases one might argue that music's formal properties 
are not in fact intrinsic properties of the music but are one stage removed, the disclaimer above may counter this 
objection in the present case, but this point shows that there may be some ambiguity in aesthetic discussion where 
the issue is neglected. 
22 Certainly Locke's own view has been both disputed and misrepresented over the years (specifically by Berkeley 
in The Principles of Human Knowledge). See Berkeley, Locke and Boyle. For further discussion of the 
distinction see: Bennett 1965; Smith A, D 1990: Averilll982; Sandoe 1988. 
23 Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, bk.ll. 8. p.299 in Selby-Bigge (ed.) 1978. 
24 I acknowledge here that there are some psychological experiments which play around with people's claimed 
colour perceptions (i.e. whether they say an object is blue or green). Nonetheless in normal conditions there is a 
marked consistency in the application of colour concepts. 
25 This would appear to be supported by the narrower range of applications fur expressive predicates. As noted 
4.1.3, although the application of expressive predicates has its own relatively fixed range of application in relation 
to artworks, this is still ultimately dependent on central reference of expressive terms to psychological and 
behavioural states. Descriptive terms do not have any ultimately 'fixed' central reference 
26 Pettit 1991 p.S87. Significantly though musical chill responses are not human specific they are seen in other 
mammals and even in birds demonstrating that they result from something which is very primitive in evolutionary 
terms. 
27For further replies to this objection see McGinn 1983, pp. 6-9; Johnston 1989, pp.147·148. 
211 I should stress here that I intend this interpretation of emotions as response dependent only in relation to non· 
sentient objects or events. I do not imply, for example, that sadness in general is response dependent. 
29 Subjects who have lacked exposure to particular auditory inputs, or for example, who have been deaf as 
children and subsequently regained their hearing may have different perceptual abilities from 'normal' listeners. 
See Ponton et. at, Snik et. al, and Sininger et.al. It might be questioned that there are notable differences between 
musicians and non-musicians in emotional responses. I feel however, that empirical evidence shows clearly that 
any difference is not at a level sufficient to warrant the claim that there are significant perceptual differences 
affecting the respective emotional responses. (Whether there are cognitive differences between musical and non· 
musical subjects will be dealt with in chapters S-7). 
3
° For further discussion of children's understanding of emotions see Tsukamoto 1997; Hala 1997; &. Cutting 
1999, 
31 In reply to Johnston however, it would seem that we may experience non-cognitive responses to music. Though 
perhaps this is only true to say when we are not attending to the music itself. 
32 Listeners should be susceptible to (experience) chills even if they do not consciously recognise them as such or 
identifY them with specific emotional responses. 
33 It does seem unlikely that music which e.g., causes a strong positive affective response would be chosen to 
represent an event with negative emotional associations. Although, it is certainly true that 'happy' music which 
becomes associated with a tragic event may then take on strongly negative affective associations even to the extent 
of arousing sadness. It seems unlikely though that one would choose a piece which evoked a negative affective 
response if one wanted to convey a positive emotion. for example, a lullaby which produced a strongly negative 
chill response seems unlikely to be successful. 
34 In The Marriage ofFigaro, Mozart used a tune from the 1750's which had remained as a popular tune with the 
public through to the 1780's to represent the arrival of rustic pipers. (This would have been something played at 
social events and therefore familiar to the audience.) See Allanbrook. Rhythmic Gestures in Mozart, p.l43-44. 
35 Wolff(l983) p.IOS. 
36 Mostly this has been in relation to realism, supervenience and aesthetic properties. See for example, Mulder-
Eaton, 1998; Bender 1987; Levinson, Goldman & Gould, 1994). 
Part 11 
Music Cognition: 
Autonomous Music Subsystems and 
Their Place Within Auditory Cognition 
and Perception 
Chapter 5 
Case Study: Dissociation of Music and Language 
Abilities in a Case of Severe Aphasia 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I report the detailed study of a dissociation between language and music in a pre-
morbidly musical patient. The patient presented with severe language difficulties (severe 
aphasia)as a consequence of extensive left hemisphere damage. Musical function remained 
intact and was investigated with a detailed music test battery which is described in full in 5.3. 
The tests administered can be broadly divided into three categories: perceptual, emotional and 
notationaVsymbolic. The findings suggest that complex musical processing is being undertaken 
by the right hemisphere due to the extent of left hemisphere damage, contradicting claims of left 
hemisphere dominance for music in musically sophisticated subjects which were discussed in 
Chapter 3. The findings also support a high degree of separability between music and language 
functions. 
Over the last few years there have been a number of attempts to model music cognition and a lot 
of interest has arisen regarding music's role within larger models of mind. Although many such 
accounts do not claim to explain music processing systems themselves, they do nonetheless 
make inferences to the underlying cognitive architecture of auditory processing. Implicit in 
many accounts is a view of music as integrated with other auditory functions and ultimately 
dependent on language. Comparisons between music and prosodic aspects of speech are 
frequently made. As one author notes: "There are many similarities between prosodic 
communication and music. Infants respond to the rhythm, pitch intensity, and timbre of the 
mother's voice; all of which are part of music."' These shared surface features of music and 
language however, do not in any way legitimise inferring shared processing capacities. Such 
comparisons of music and prosodic features of speech lead to more general assumptions that 
melodic, rhythmic and emotional detection in music and speech are subserved by a general 
purpose auditory processing system. 
The fact that music is not considered to play a vital role as a cognitive function is reflected in 
the small number of documented cases of musical damage and sparing, particularly if one 
compares with the number of case reports of aphasia. Documented cases usually involve 
subjects for whom music plays a central role, professional performers, music teachers or 
conductors. Recently however, spared and damaged musical function has been studied in both 
musicians and non-musicians in some detail. The main focus of studying the amusias 
(impairment of musical function by acquired brain damage) has been to establish hemisphere 
dominance for music cognition. However, both left and right hemisphere lesions have 
reportedly resulted in musical deficits, leading to contradictory claims for hemisphere 
lateralisation. This in turn has implications for music's relationship with language in terms of 
both physical localisation and functional separation. 
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5.2.1 Assessment of Language Abilities 
Many of the musical and language tests administered relied on picture recognition, therefore the 
initial stage was to assess picture semantics, in order to establish that the patient could access 
semantic-conceptual knowledge from pictures. We used The Pyramids and Palm Trees Test (3 
picture version) for this purpose. MR scored 46/52 which is just on the boundaries of normal 
range, showing no significant deficit in semantic picture processing. 3 Assessment of language 
abilities across four modalities of language use {comprehension of speech, speaking, reading 
and writing) revealed marked impairments at both lexical and sentence processing levels. 
Reading and writing were severely limited at both lexical and sentence levels. In speech input 
and output, sentence processing was impaired to a greater degree than lexical processing. A full 
summary of specific test results is given (Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1 Results of Language As..~ment Across Modalities. 
MR Language Test Results (Feb/March-99) 
Picture Recognition & Semantics 
BORB Object decision 
Pyramids & Palm Trees (3 picture version) 
Lexical Input 
Auditory: 
P ALPA spoken word-picture match 
Pyramids & Palm Trees (3 word version) 
Semantic verification task (it's a ... with target/semantic 
distracter/unrelated distracter) 
Orthographic: 












P ALPA spoken sentence-picture match 
Orthographic: 




Short-term Memory Span 
Digit Span Recognition test 
Visual Span Corsi blocks 














Little evidence of 
productive syntax 
Not formally assessed 
3 items 
5 items 
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To provide an overview of MR's language impairments, the results are summarised in Figure 











Auditory lexical input Orthographic lexical input 
Moderate impairment Moderate impairment 
Spoken lexical output Written lexical output 
• Moderate/severe jmpairment Severe ill')pairment 
Sentence Processing 
Auditory sentence input 
Moderate impairment 





Written sentence output 
Severe Impairment 
Fig. 5.2 Summary of MR's Language Impairments 
5.3 Neuropsychological Assessment of Retained Musical Abilities 
General Methods and Procedure. 
The test battery described here was developed for this single case study, investigating 
dissociation of language and musical abilities in a pre-morbidly musical (and musically literate) 
subject with severe aphasia. Restrictions were placed on the nature of response mode by MR 's 
expressive deficits. However, the choice of non-linguistic response modes was also motivated 
by a desire to separate music and language processing wherever possible, in keeping with 
criticisms raised regarding current hypotheses concerning the functional and physiological 
autonomy of music and language cognition. 
The patient also had a right hemiplegia and tests were targeted at receptive music abilities as the 
hemiplegia affected the preferred hand (right). Thus any attempts to evaluate expressive 
performance were confounded by the presence of this movement disorder. However, MR had 
shown retained singing abilities and it appeared that some expressive abilities remained intact. 
A set of 17 sub-tests were developed, targeted at musically literate subjects (Table 5.2). As a 
guide, the level of difficulty ranged from grade I ABRSM4 tests to diploma level aural 
discrimination tests which may be equated with tasks undertaken by professional musicians. 
The tests were divided into three categories, perceptual, emotional and notational/symbolic. 
Comprehension of musical vocabulary was also tested. Test results are given in each of these 
categories, in addition to a full summary and discussion of results in 5.4 
Unless otherwise stated in test descriptions, all excerpts were composed in western tonal idiom 
and played on keyboard or taken from professional recordings. Excerpts were recorded onto 
audio-cassette and quantized to remove possible performance errors. All examples were 
recorded using a stereophonic cassette recorder. Transcriptions were provided for practice trials 
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and tests were presented in an environment free from other auditory distraction and at a volume 
comfortable for the listener. 
Table 5. 2 Summary of Tests and Categorisation. 
Perceptual 
Sound source discrimination 












Score reading and error 
detection. 




Ordering musical words 
Ordering musical symbols 
Identification of note/rest values 
Completion of dynamic markings 
Completion offamiliar and 
novel melodies 
Emotional 
Matching musical examples to 
human expression of emotion. 
Where aural examples were presented, standard procedures were followed. A stereophonic 
cassette player was used and the subject was seated at a table, with speakers placed at 
appropriate positions. Volume and tone levels were maintained throughout test sessions. 
Instructions were repeated during the test as necessary or as requested by the subject. The inter-
trial intervals stated below are given as a guide for response times and overall duration of each 
test. Where the subject was unable to complete the answer within the given time, the cassette 
was stopped until an answer was offered or subject was unable to offer a response. Where 
musical scores were provided these were presented such that the whole score was open to view 
during testing. Further details specific to individual tasks are detailed below. 
5.3.1 Experimental Investigations: Tests of Perceptual Discrimination. 
Experiment 1: Sound Source Discrimination 
Materials 
A cassette containing extracts of music, speech and environmental sounds was recorded. 
Stimuli were taken from professional recordings of music, environmental sound effects and 
language test batteries. Full references of recorded extract are provided below in Table 5.3 
Stimuli included a further subset of 'borderline' examples: e.g. Sprechtstimme5, music 
incorporating environmental sounds, and speech within the environment. These extracts have 
been taken out of their normal context and therefore involve finer levels of discrimination, 
having the possibility of being ambiguously interpreted. The set of 44 excerpts were recorded 
onto audio-cassette, 11 from each subset. Mean duration of extracts was 4.91 seconds. 
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Recording parameters (volume, tone, and sound quality) remained constant across the set. 
Stimuli were between 1 and 8 seconds duration and excerpts for practice trials were taken from 
each of the 4 categories. Stimuli were presented in random order with an inter-trial interval of 8 
seconds. 
Procedure 
The purpose of this task was to assess discrimination and classification of sound sources. The 
task was to match each extract to a pictorial representation of the source. Response choices are 
shown in Fig 5.3 a-c. Four practice trials were given, with unlimited repetitions of each 
excerpt. On subsequent trials excerpts were played once only. Only spontaneous self-
corrections were allowed. 
Table 5.3 Sound Sour~e Discrimination: List of Recorded Ex~erpts. 
See Appendix llLl for full details of ex~erpts. 
'Borderline' Sounds Environmental Sounds 
I. Sprechtstimme (Speech/Music) 12. Water: Running 
2. Piano (Birdsong.) (Music/Environmental) 13. Telephone: Ringing 
3. Clapping Music (Music/Environmental) 14. Bell 
4. Humming (Music/Environmental) 15. Dog Barking 
5. Barrel Organ (Music/Environmental) • 16. Hammering 
6. Football Match -Crowd (Speech/Environmental) 17. Laughter 
7. Canary Singing (Musk/Environmental) 18. Traffic 
8. Musical Box (Music/Environmental) 19. Dishes Breaking 
9 Restaurant- Light Chatter (Speech/Environmental) 20. Sheep & Lambs 
10. 'Come Out' tape loop Steve Reich, (Music/Speech) 21. Fire crackle 
11. Orchestra Tuning (Music/Environmental) 22. Swimming Pool: 
Speecb Music 
23. Woman's voice 34. Choral 
24. Man's voice 3S. Children singing 
25. Child's voice 36. Jan 
26. Woman's Voice: 'Division' 37. Orchestral 
27. Woman's voice 'Frown' (Synthesised & pitch violated) 38. Solo Instrument (Flute) 
28. Woman's Voice Nonsense Word 'Homster' 39. Female solo voice 
29. Man's Voice 40. Male solo voice 
30. Man's Voice 'it's gonna rain' Cassette Loop 41. String Quartet 
31. Woman's Voice Nonsense Word 'bis' 42. Contemporary Pop 
32. Man's Voice: (Tennis Umpire) 43. 20th Century Classical 
33. Woman's Voice: Nonsense word 'Squirren' (distorted) 44. Orchestral 
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Fig 5.3 Pictorial representations of sound sources: 
a) Speech b) Music c) Environmental sounds. 
Experiment 2: Detection of Pitch Change and Direction 
Materials 
A set of 28 musical excerpts (including 3 practice trials) was recorded onto audio-cassette. 
Each excerpt consisted of a sequence of 2 tones, each 1.5s duration. The set was constructed 
using intervals ranging from a semitone to 2 octaves, (pitches ranged from F to d"'). Examples 
were played on a keyboard and recorded onto audio-cassette, with recording parameters 
constant across the set. 8 'Higher pitch', 9 'Same pitch', and 8 'Lower pitch' sequences were 
presented in random order. Each excerpt was repeated once after a 4 second pause and an inter-
trial interval of 8 seconds. 
Procedure 
After presentation of each excerpt, the task was to determine whether the second note of the two 
note sequence was higher, lower or the same pitch. Each sequence was played twice. Response 
mode was from a fixed choice of musical representations (Fig. 5.4), and written notation (Fig. 
5.5) was provided to accompany practice trials. Full transcription of all extracts are given in 
Appendix IV. I. Although a set inter-trial interval of 8 seconds was pre-recorded, extra time 
was allowed between excerpts if necessary. 
.. ~ ~ I~ r f I~ j F I~ F J 
Same Higher Lower 
Fig 5.4 Choice of musical representations given as response mode 
J 11' r r 11 
Fig 5.5 Transcriptions of excerpts as provided to accompany practice trials 1-4. 
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Experiment 3: Melodic Contour Discrimination 
Materials 
A set of 24 excerpts (including 2 practice trials) was recorded. Excerpts were constructed from 
simple 2-4 bar melodic phrases in western tonal idiom varying in tempo, key and rhythmic 
structure.6 12 extracts were repeated to form a 'same' subset. The remaining excerpts were 
varied to form a 'different' subset. Variations to melodic structure included contour-violated 
and contour-preserved transformations (see transcriptions of examples 6 and 9 in Appendix 
IV.2). Other parameters, rhythm, tempo dynamics etc. remained fixed. Mean duration of 
excerpts was 5.17 seconds (range 3.5-9 seconds) and melodies were varied at different points 
(e.g. beginning, middle and end of excerpt). The number of notes altered varied from 1-7 and 
the range of alterations from I semitone to I octave. Excerpts were quantized to remove 
performance errors which might lead to perceived rhythm/tempo variations. Same/different 
trials were presented in random order. 
Procedure 
The subject was presented with a target melody followed by a comparison melody after a 4 
second silent interval. The task was to determine whether the melody of the two extracts was 
the same or different. The subject was required to select one of two pictorial response choices. 
One depicted identical melodic contours (Fig. 5.6A), the second different melodic contours (Fig. 
5.6B). Two practice trials were given with unlimited repetitions of excerpts. Transcriptions 
were provided to accompany practice trials (Fig. 5. 7). On trials, 1-2 repetitions were allowed 
on request. Full transcriptions of excerpts are provided in Appendix IV.2. 
A 
I FrrJ J J I I FrrJ J J I 
J 
B 
I JJ JJ J J I 
X 
Fig. 5.6 Same/different pictorial response choices 
'~ ~---j J r I £J d 
'i J?j J r I £] J 
14H J. J er F I r J j 
r 





Experiment 4: Tempo Discrimination 
Materials 
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A set of 24 examples, including 2 practice trials, was recorded onto audio-cassette. Excerpts 
were constructed using 2-4 bar melodies in western tonal idiom (excerpts were drawn from 
ABRSM Aural tests Allchin & Read Grades 1-V). Half the trials were repeated to form a 
'same' subset of comparison melodies. The remaining half were varied either faster or slower in 
tempo to form a subset of different comparison melodies. Target melodies were followed by 
comparison melodies after a 4 second silent interval Excerpt length ranged between 3 and I 0 
seconds (mean duration 6.02 seconds). Inter-trial interval was 8 seconds. Other parameters 
remained fixed and excerpts were pre-recorded in random order. Full transcriptions are given in 
Appendix IV.3. 
Procedure 
Target melodies 2-4 bars long were presented, followed by comparison melodies. The task was 
to determine whether the two extracts had the same or different tempo. (Tempo is defined as 
overall duration as opposed to variation of rhythm which refers to temporal variations of 
structures within the excerpt). Response mode was from a fixed choice of pictorial 
representations for same/different tempo (Fig. 5.8). Transcriptions were provided for both 
practice trials including metronome markings which were also verbally presented (Fig. 5.9). 
Excerpts were repeated 1-2 times on request. 
SAME DIFFERENT 
Fig. 5.8 Same/Different response cboices. 
MM =88 
rft; J. CO d. 11 
j: MM =88 fn J. err J. 11 
MM =66 
14i J J j I -E£151 ;;J f 11 
141 
MM = 132 ~ J J j f 11 eJ 
Fig 5.9 Transcriptions accompanying practice trials. 
Experiment 5: Chord Analysis 
Materials 
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A set of 25 excerpts (including 3 practice trials) were recorded onto audio-cassette. Stimuli 
consisted of single, two or three note tone sequences (8 seconds duration). Both consonant and 
dissonant chords and intervals were used. Subsets consisted of nine single note excerpts, nine 2 
note chords and seven 3 note chords. Pitches ranged from F to d' '. Excerpts were played on 
keyboard, quantized and recorded onto audio-cassette. Other parameters - dynamics and tempo 
remained constant across the set. Excerpts were pre-recorded and presented in random order. 
Full transcriptions of extracts are given in Appendix IV.4. 
Procedure 
The subject was presented with a tone sequence consisting of a single note or chord (4s 
duration), repeated after a 2 second silent interval with an inter-trial interval of 6 seconds. The 
task was to identify whether the tone sequence consisted of I, 2, or 3 notes. Response mode 
was from a fixed choice of musical representations of 1, 2, or 3 notes (Fig. 5.10). 3 Practice 
trials were given with unlimited repetitions. Transcriptions provided to accompany practice 
trials are detailed (Fig. 5.11 ). On trials, only one repetition was given (as pre-recorded). 
'' 
1 2 3 
Fig. 5.10 Representations offered as response mode 
Fig. 5.11 Transcriptions accompanying practice trials. 
Experiment 6: Rhythm Discrimination 1 
Materials 
A set of 24 excerpts was created, including 2 practice trials, and recorded onto audio-cassette. 
Excerpts were 2-4 bars long (mean duration 6.21 seconds) and rhythmic patterns were based 
upon western tonal idioms. Excerpts were played on a fixed pitch (concert A) so rhythm was 
the only variable. Target and comparison sequences7 were separated by a 2 second silent 
interval. Inter-trial interval was 10 seconds. Sequences were varied at different points (e.g. 
beginning, middle and end of excerpt). Rhythmic variations ranged from gross distortions, 
where several changes in rhythm were made throughout the sequence, to rhythmic changes 
involving only 2 notes. Excerpts were quantized to remove performance errors which might 
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lead to perceived rhythm/tempo variations. Same/different trials were presented in random 
order. Full transcriptions are given in Appendix IV.5. 
Procedure 
The subject was presented with recordings of rhythmic sequences in the following format: a 
target sequence followed after a 2 second silent interval by a comparison. The task was to 
identify the second sequence as same/different for rhythmic content. The subject was required 
to select one of two pictorial response choices. One depicted identical rhythmic structure, the 
second different rhythmic structure (Fig. 5.12). Transcriptions were provided for practice trials 
and unlimited repetitions permitted. On trials, repetitions were offered on request and 
spontaneous self-corrections were allowed. 
A B 
:J J J 
X 
Fig. 5.12: A 'Same'& B 'Different' Response choices. 
Experiment 7: Rhythm Discrimination 2 
Materials 
A set of24 excerpts including 2 practice trials was recorded onto audio-cassette. Excerpts were 
2-4 bars long (mean duration 6.10 seconds) and rhythmic patterns were based upon western 
tonal idioms. Examples were divided into 4 subsets: (I) Melody & rhythm same, (2) Melody 
varied, (3) Rhythm varied, (4) Melody and Rhythm varied. Sets (I) and (2) forming a 'same' 
rhythm subset, sets (3) and (4) a 'different' rhythm subset. Other parameters remained constant 
across the set. Target and comparison melodies were separated by a 2 second silent interval. 
Inter-trial interval was I 0 seconds. Rhythmic and melodic variations ranged from gross 
distinctions, where several features were altered, to rhythmic/melodic changes alterations to one 
note only. 
Procedure 
The subject was presented with two successive tunes, a target melody followed after a 2 second 
silent interval by a comparison melody. The task was to identify the second melody as 
same/different for rhythmic content. The subject was required to select one of two pictorial 
response choices. One depicted identical rhythmic structure, the second different rhythmic 
structure. (As above, Fig. 5.12). Transcriptions were provided for practice trials and unlimited 
repetitions permitted. On trials, repetitions were offered on request and spontaneous self-
corrections were allowed. Full transcriptions are given in Appendix IV.6 
Experiment 8: Discrimination of Musical Instruments 
Materials 
Case Study 102 
A cassette of 14 musical excerpts was recorded, taking examples of familiar musical 
instruments from professional recordings in western tonal tradition. Excerpt length ranged from 
13-19 seconds (mean duration 14.29 seconds) and were followed by a 12 second inter-trial 
interval. Recording parameters were constant across the set. Excerpts were presented as 
ordered below, Table 5.4 
Procedure 
Recorded excerpts were presented once only. The task was to identify musical instruments by 
indicating the correct pictorial representation of sound source. Response mode was multiple 
choice from fixed sets of 4 pictures of musical instruments. Response choices are detailed in 
Appendix IV.7. Distracter items varied in difficulty from gross distinctions between categories 
of instruments e.g. woodwind and brass, to discrimination between particular types of 
brass/stringed instruments. No practice trials were given. 
Table 5.4 See Appendis DL3 for full list of re(orded examples. 


















A cassette containing 26 extracts was recorded. Examples were taken from professional 
recordings and divided into 13 musical categories exemplifying different genres and cultural 
styles, with two examples being taken from each category. Excerpts were between 12 and I 6 
seconds duration (mean duration 14.92 seconds) with an inter-trial interval of 12 seconds. 
Examples were divided into the following categories: Jazz Quartet, Jazz-Big Band, Chinese, 
Hungarian, Opera, Indian, Gamelan, 'Orchestral' (classical western), 'Ballet', Rock/Pop, 
Schubert-Lieder, String ensemble (Quartet/Quintet), Flamenco. 
Procedure 
The subject was presented with recorded excerpts in the order given in Table 5.5. The task was 
to identify the correct musical genre from a fixed choice of 4 pictorial representations (response 
choices are documented in Appendix IV.8). Level of difficulty ranged from gross distinctions 
e.g. Flamenco/Jazz, to more subtle discriminations requiring recognition of orchestration and 
some musical knowledge e.g. Jazz band/Jazz quartet or Gamelanllndian instrumental music. No 
practice trials were given. 
Table 5.5 
See Appendix m.4 for full detaUs of reeorded eumples. 
Type Classification Excerpts in Order of 
Presentation 










11. String Quartet 
1 2. Orchestral 
13.Schubert 










23. Jazz quartet 
24. String Quartet 
25. Garnelan 
26. Jazz-big band 
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All results are listed in Table 5.6, MR performed well on the perceptual tests. He showed no 
problem discriminating between sound sources,- response time was very fast, if not immediate. 
MR spontaneously engaged in rhythmic tapping, and some physical movement in time to music, 
and showed recognition of musical types/genres/specific pieces and composers, identified in 
many instances after hearing only a short (0.5 second) burst of the excerpt. There were no 
difficulties with recognition of response modes given in musical notation. On many occasions, 
MR offered a more detailed response than required, indicating the location and nature of errors 
in addition to same/different classification. 
Table 5.6 Results of Pereeptual Discrimination tests 
Perceptual Tests 
Sound source discrimination (music. soeech. environmental sounds) 
Detection of pitch change and direction (pair of sounds -is second 
Melodic contour discrimination (two melodies, same/different judgement) 
Tempo discrimination (two melodies -same/faster/slower .iudgement) 
Chord analysis (identification of no. of notes 1/2/3 in a chord) 
Rhythm discrimination 1 (two melodies -same/different judgement) 
Rhythm discrimination 2 (two melodies -same/different judgement) 
Discrimination of musical instruments (multiple choice picture matching) 
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The result on Rhythm discrimination task 2 deserves some comment as this faJJs below the level 
of performance on other perceptual tests. This task involved discrimination of rhythmic changes 
according to four subcategories, (1) Melody & rhythm same, (2) Melody varied, (3) Rhythm 
varied, (4) Melody and Rhythm varied. On other discrimination tasks administered up until this 
test, only one dimension of the music was varied, e.g. only rhythm, melody, pitch direction etc. 
It is possible MR misinterpreted the task demands or followed a conditioned response to listen 
for change in one musical dimension only. This was also one of the more difficult perceptual 
tests, so it is quite possible the lower score merely reflects task difficulty and MR may fall well 
within normal response range. 
5.3.3 Symbolic Tests 
Experiment 1: Score Reading: Error Discrimination 
Materials 
An edited version of the reduced score piano/clarinet version8 of Mozart's Clarinet concerto 
K622 was created to include IS errors in notation (and 4 example errors); 11 changes in pitch, 3 
changes in rhythm, 3 changes of pitch and rhythm; and 2 changes in dynamics. 
Procedure 
The task was to identify written errors by listening to a correct performance of the music. The 
subject was supplied with the total number of errors present on each page of the score and the 
nature of errors e.g. dynamics, melodic, rhythmic etc. (Information regarding type of errors 
present did not correspond to order of their presentation). Unlimited repetitions were allowed 
due to the difficulty of the task. Responses were given by marking errors detected on the score. 
Full transcriptions of both the original score and edited version are provided in Appendix IV.9 
Experiment 2: Identification of Excerpts In Notational Form 
Materials 
14 Excerpts 1-2 bars long (Table 5.7) were taken from a professional recording of Nielson's 
Violin Concerto 1st movement (Largo). Excerpts were recorded onto audio-cassette, 9 and in 
addition a separate recording ofthe whole t• movement was provided. The score was provided, 
printed on single sided sheets such that the whole score was open to view during listening. The 
full score and list of excerpts is given in Appendix IV.l 0. Response mode was to indicate one 
location on the score where the excerpts were taken from. 
Table 5. 7 Notation Jdentifieatioa Task, Excerpts from NlelsoD's Violin Coneerto 
Excerpts in Order of Presentation 
1. Bar 1 8. Bars 18-21 
2. Bars 13-14 9. Bars 29-30 
3. Bars31-32 10. Bars 10-11 
4. Bars 24-25 11. Bars 26-27 
5. Bars 47-48 12. Bar 7 
6. Bar 38 13. Bars 16-17 
7. Bars 4-5 14. Bar 34 
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Procedure 
The subject was first played the complete extract, (1• movement ofthe concerto), then each of 
the target excerpts were presented {pre-recorded in random order as in table 5.7). Target 
excerpts were presented in aural form only and not accompanied by transcriptions other than the 
complete score provided. The subject's task was to read the score and identify the location of 
heard excerpts recorded excerpts by indicating the correct bar or bars. The target excerpts were 
initially presented twice, though unlimited repetitions were allowed due to the difficulty of the 
task and other processing skills required. 
Experiment 3: Discrimination of MusicaUNon-Musical Symbols. 
Materials 
A set of 24 picture cards was created. The set divided into 2 subsets: 12 standard musical 
symbols and 12 non-musical symbols: mathematical symbols, letters of the Greek alphabet, 
punctuation marks etc. (Table 5.8). 
Procedure 
Cards were presented in random order. The subject's task was to identify symbols on 
presentation, as musical or non-musical by reference to pictorial representations Fig.5.13. The 
purpose of this task is to examine recognition of musical symbols out of context. No practice 
trials were given. 
Table 5.8 Musical and Non-Musical symbols 
Musical Symbols Non-Musical symbols 
~: 0 
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A B 
Fig 5.13: A Musical & B Non-Musical Symbols. 
Experiment 4: Ordering Musical Symbols 
Materials 
3 sets of picture cards were created showing sets of ordered musical symbols. Dynamic 
markings (8 items), Musical Notes (7 items), and Rests (7 items). Dynamic markings ranged 
from quiet to loud, and notes and rests in order of duration. Symbols were pictured as they 
would typically be found in a musical score (e.g. dynamic markings given in italics). (Table 5.9) 
Procedure 
Each set was presented in random order, the task was to order these correctly, e.g. ppp, pp, p, 
mp, mf, f, ff, flf. (or reverse order). No time limit was placed on responses. 
Table 5.9 Musical symbols in order of duration/Dynamic Strength. 




p J ~ 
mp 
-.b 
' mf J y 
f J , 
If J , 
Experiment 5: Identifying Note/Rest Values. 
Materials 
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A set of picture cards was created, with a written set of 6 different values, - 1/8, 1/4, 1 2, 3, 4. 
Scores were provided containing a variety of notes and rests with values (duration in beats 
according to correct metre) corresponding to the picture cards. (2 practice trials were given for 
one note, and one rest value.) 
Procedure 
The subject was presented with cards in random order, the values given on cards (e.g., l, 3, 114) 
were also presented verbally. The subject was asked to identify in the score either notes or rests 
corresponding to the given value (number of beats in correct metre). For example, when 
presented with a value 1, and a score in 4/4 (4 beats per bar) the subject was required to identify 
a crotchet note (value 1 beat). Spontaneous self corrections were allowed. (See Appendix Ili.S 
for full references). The task could not be completed by simple matching as it required 
conversion of a numeric value in terms of musical notation. 
Experiment 8: Completion of Dynamic Markings 
Materials 
Three pieces for clarinet and piano, of similar style and approximate length, were chosen. 
Weber Grand duo Concertant op.48 Movement 1 (bars 1-69), Brahms clarinet sonata Op.l20 
No.2 Movement I (bars 1-47), Poulenc Clarinet sonata Movement 1 (bars 1-44). All three 
pieces had widely varying dynamics within the sections chosen. Excerpts from these were 
recorded onto audio-cassette. (See Appendix 111.6 for full references). 
Edited versions of the scores were created with missing dynamic markings. Some dynamic 
markings were left intact to provide reference points (see Appendix IV.ll ). 
Procedure 
The task was to indicate appropriate dynamic markings for those missing after presentation of 
correct performance of each work. A choice of dynamic markings was provided: ppp, pp, p, 
mp, mf, f, ff, fff. Transcriptions are given, Appendix IV.ll. 
Experiment 7: Completion of Familiar/Novel Melodies 
Materials 
A set of 22 2-4 bar melodies was constructed (including 2 practice trials): half were familiar 
melodies (Table 5.1 0), the remaining half were novel melodies constructed in western tonal 
format. All excerpts were played on keyboard, quantized and recorded onto audio-cassette. 
Edited transcriptions of excerpts were created (Fig. 5.14) with missing notes indicated by an 
asterisk. 
Procedure 
Subject was presented with excerpts as pre-recorded in random order. The task was to fill in 
the missing notes after listening to each excerpt. Transcriptions were provided with missing 
notes indicated (Fig. 5.14). Difficulty of excerpts increased progressively requiring completion 
of up to five missing notes. Excerpts were initially played twice with further repetitions on 
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I. Rule Britannia 7. Ode to Joy 
2. God Save the Queen 8. William Tell Overture 
3. Frere Jacques 9. Happy Birthday 
4. Eine Kleine Nachtmusik 10. Jingle Bells 
5. Greensleeves 11. Bocherini Minuet 
6. Brahms Lullab~ 
* 
]j 11 
Fig. 5.14 Response Mode as presented with missing note indicated 
5.3.4 Results & Discussion 
The symbolic tests were more complex and demanding due to the length of musical excerpts (up 
to 5 minutes) and accompanying scores. This placed extra demand on auditory memory and 
also motor co-ordination required for page turning. Full summary of scores is given below in 
Table 5.11. 
Table 5.11 Summary of Test Results 
Notational/Symbolic Discrimination Tests 
Discrimination of musical and non-musical symbols 
Score reading: error discrimination 
Score reading: identification of heard excerpts in notational form 
IdentifYing note values (within a score) 
Ordering musical symbols 
Completing dynamic markings within a score 
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Table 5.12: Breakdown of Seores for Melody completion task. 
Number of notes to Familiar Novel Melodies TotaiSeore 
COIDJ!Iete Melodies 
1 2/2 4/4 6/6 
2 4/6 2/2 618 
3 S/6 6/6 11112 
4 ~ 10112 13/16 
s 10/10 SilO lS/20 
Total Sc:ore 24128 27134 51162 
Again, MR performed very well on these tasks. Errors on the score reading tests were close to 
target, usually showing selection of bars with similar melodic line or orchestration to the target 
section. On experiments 2 (Identification of excerpts in Notational form), 6 (Completion of 
Dynamic Markings), and 7 (Completion of Familiar/Novel Melodies) although unlimited 
hearings were allowed, MR frequently gave decisive responses, some on the first hearing, the 
maximum number of hearings being 8. Expressive tasks, (completion of dynamic markings, and 
completion of familiar and novel melodies) were well performed. MR did not appear to be 
relying on theoretical music knowledge (e.g. typical patterns and constructions used western 
tonal music). This is supported by the fact that MR attended to auditory cues, preferring to 
hear excerpts again rather than studying the score during inter-trial intervals. ln addition 
performance on familiar and novel melodies was comparable. (See table S .12) including those 
which deviated from normal tonal progressions. 
5.3.5 Emotion Recognition and Discrimination 
Emotion Recognition Experiment 1 
Materials 
Examples were selected by running pilot tests on musicians and non-musicians to assess levels 
of consensus regarding emotional classification of pieces (both descriptive classification and 
arousal of emotion.). As a result of pilot testing, a set of 20 examples was constructed, 
consisting of 14 musical examples with pre-existing emotional labels (e.g., in existing critical 
commentary), 2 environmental sound excerpts with musical content. and 4 musical excerpts 
with no existing emotional labels (Table 5.13). Agreement that the pieces represented the 
specified emotions was then reached by two professional musicians (a performer and a 
composer), and by four non-musicians. 1° For 6 of the extracts, I 00% agreement was reached 
that they expressed the stated emotions. The remaining 8 extracts listed below did not reach 
100% agreement, however a high degree of consensus (S/6, 83.33%) was still obtained. Mean 
duration of excerpts was 44.7 seconds. Excerpts were separated by an inter-trial interval of 1 5 
seconds. (Details of pilot testing are given in Appendix V) 
Procedure 
This test required the subject to indicate the emotional content (or lack of emotional content) of 
extracts by choosing one of S facial representations of emotion: Happiness, sadness, anger, 
fear/surprise, neutral (Fig. 5.1 S). 
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Fig. 5.15: 
Representations of Facial Expressions of Emotion. 
Table 5.13: List of Recorded Excerpts: See Appendix ill. 7 for full references. 
Recorded Excerpts in Order of Presentation. 
I. Jools Holland: Lost Chord 11. Debussv: Clair de Lune 
2. Philip Glass: Facades 12. Steve Reich: Drumming Pt. 3 
3. Saint-Saens: Carnival of the Animals, Finale. 13. Hoist: Planet Sui te, Mars 
4. Birdsong: Canary Si nging 14. Beethoven Eroica, 2"d Movement 
5. Penderecki: Threnody for the Victims of IS. Julian Butcher: Untitl ed 
6. Jamiroquai : Travelling Without Moving, 16. Dukas: Sorcerers Apprentice 
7. Schubert: Standchen 17. Mozart: Piano concerto No. 21 , 
8. Dave Brubeck: Take Five 
9. Mussourgsky: Night on The Bare Mountain 
I 0. Sound effects: Barrel Organ 
Emotion Recognition: Experiment 2 
Materials and Procedure 
18. Hoist: Planets Suite, Jupiter 
19. Shostakovich: JO'h ymphony 3rd 
20. Prokoliev: Peter and The Wol C: 
A repeat of the Peretz emotion recognition test (Peretz, Gagnon & Bouchard, 1998) was 
administered. (We used the natural version of the test set: un-synthesised excerpts taken from 
professional recordings) Mean duration 15.8seconds, range 7 seconds to 33 seconds. This test 
involved discrimination between a set of 32 excerpts previously rated as 'sad' or ' happy. ' The 
purpose ofthis test was to compare MR's performance with amusic and normal subjects and to 
establish his ability to recognise musical emotion and discriminate between felt emotion and 
emotional description of works. The subject was required to describe pieces as sounding 'sad' 
or ' happy' by choosing one of 2 facial representations of emotion as given above in Fig. 5.15. 
Excerpts were presented twice only, with a 6 second inter-trial interval. 
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5.3.6 Results and Discussion 
Results are listed in Table 5.14. In the frrst emotion recognition test MR was 'correct' on only 
2/6 pieces which had gained 100% consensus in the pilot study, with 'sad' pieces rated as 
'happy'. However, emotional tests obviously carry a subjective element. Samples used were 
primarily taken from the classical western repertoire which MR dislikes. It seems likely that 
there is some bias towards liked/disliked extracts which influences emotion-labelling and MR 
may have shown a tendency to describe excerpts as he thought others (who enjoy such works) 
would classify them. Nonetheless, MR performed well on the Peretz test, scoring 30/32. This is 
represented as a percentage score of 94%, compared to Peretz's amusic subject, 97% and 
control subjects 94%, MR's score being equivalent to control subjects. 11 
MR did show a clear distinction between his own musical tastes and what he thought were 
'expected' or 'typical' classifications of emotional content. In addition his use of expressive 
gestures to describe music was good and comprehension of expressive elements of 
communication seem unimpaired suggesting there is no deficit in emotion recognition for music. 
Table 5.14: Summary of Results 
_E:IJ!OtiC)n~~fl&Riti()n T~sts-=----------- Score 
Emotion Recognition Test (Multiple choice picture matching) 11/20 
Peretz Emotion Recognition test (natural subset) 30/32 
5.3.7 Linguistic Comprehension of Musical Vocabulary 
In a further two experiments, we investigated linguistic comprehension of musical vocabulary 
which seemed well preserved in light of other language deficits. Whilst also testing 
identification of musical features, etc., these were not encapsulated musical tasks. 
Experiment 1: Identifying parts of the Score 
Materials 
Names of parts of a score (e.g. violin line, divided strings), and features of musical notation 
(e.g. Bass clef, key signature) were presented verbally in the order given below (Table 5.1 ~). 
Sections of a score were selected in which all the listed features appeared on 3 pages, whtch 
were presented in isolation. This design was intended to limit the demands of visual processing 
required to locate items, and to minimise time and memory demands required to complete the 
task. 
Procedure 
Items were presented verbally and repeated on request. The task was for the subject to indicate 
the named part on the score provided, locating each item in turn as presented. One practice 
trial was given. The score used was Brahms Symphony no. 4 in E minor Op.98 (pp.-3 & 88-
91 ). 12 Only spontaneous self-corrections were allowed. 
Table 5.15 











Experiment 2: Ordering Musical Words 
Materials 









20. Treble Clef 
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A set of 8 cards was created each showing a musical word typically used to give tempo 
indications. Words were in Italian and printed in Italics, as they would typically be encountered 
within a score in Western classical idiom. (Italian being most frequently encountered for such 
musical references.) 
Procedure 
This task was designed to assess recognition of musical words out of context, and (in relation to 
tests of musical vocabulary) to compare comprehension of musical words in relation to non-
musical vocabulary. The subject was presented with a set of musical words (Italian) for tempo 
markings (Table 5.16). These were given visually and were not read aloud by the experimenter. 
The task was to order these in terms of relative speed (slowest to fastest or reverse order). The 
items were presented in random order. 
Table5.16 
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5.3.8 Results 
On experiment 1 (identifying parts of the score), MR scored 20/20 and was clearly able to relate 
spoken musical terms to musical symbols, identify an interaction between language and musical 
processing on this task. There appeared to be slight inconsistency between MR's 
comprehension and production of musical as opposed to non-musical vocabulary. Nonetheless 
MR does show a slightly surprising ability to access a musical words (both receptively and 
expressively) given his general level of language processing. However, one might consider that 
words which would ordinarily be low frequency in a standard (non-musical) vocabulary may 
function as high frequency words within MR's individual lexicon. 
On experiment 2 (ordering musical words), MR scored 718, showing an ability to comprehend 
relations between written musical words. On a similar language task (ordering non-musical 
words- speeds, temperatures and lifespan), MR scored 21/22, (where words were read aloud) 
which would not be a predicted outcome given his generally poor performance and e.g., 
performance on the PALPA written sentence -picture match (5/20). However, his performance 
for orthographic input (PALPA word -picture matching) was slightly better at 31/40, and this is 
comparable with the orthographic input for musical word ordering. 
5.4 General Discussion 
Due to the level of spared musical capacity seen in MR, from a neuro-anatomical point of view 
music cognition in this case may be physically separable from language processing areas, as 
well as functionally distinct. In the case of MR, we might suggest that the extent of left 
hemisphere damage makes it unlikely that retained left hemisphere processing is capable of 
carrying such complex musical tasks, which in turn suggest shared hemisphericity or right 
hemisphere dominance for musical function in this case. The findings from MR suggest that 
receptive and some expressive music processing is seemingly functioning as an autonomous 
system in terms of complex symbolic processing. 
Indeed, perhaps the most interesting dissociation seen here is that between symbolic processing 
for music and language. Despite extremely poor performance on linguistic tasks, MR 
performed well on tests of symbolic music processing. He showed highly complex music 
reading abilities, that is, not only the ability to read musical notation out of context, but to read 
in the context of a score, follow individual parts, and recognise and interpret specific aspects of 
the score. MR showed a high level of precision in following music as demonstrated by page 
turning at appropriate points. And as noted above, errors on score reading tasks were close to 
target. Whereas MR had difficulty with phonological working memory for speech, musical 
memory was functioning effectively (allowing retention of 12-lS second extracts with ease). 
Although MR had difficulty with word reading, and profoundly impaired performance on 
comprehending written sentences, he demonstrated no difficulty with recognition of musical 
notation including fairly complex scores. This is particularly interesting because as symbolic 
systems music and language are organised in very similar ways. Both are highly structured, 
'grammatical' rule governed systems involving symbolic processing across modalities, and 
exhibiting analogous levels of decomposition: MusicaVIinguistic phrases, words/melodic 
motifs, and individual notes/letters with corresponding visual symbolic representations. Yet 
dissociated symbolic processing suggests that both in terms of auditory comprehension, and 
orthographic input and output, there is processing autonomy for decoding musical and linguistic 
structure. 
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5.4.1 Implications of Case Findings: Hemisphere Dominance 
As discussed in Chapter 3, recent work {Peretz and Bever & Chiarello), has favoured the view 
that the left hemisphere {or language dominant hemisphere) is dominant in musically 
experienced listeners and the right in musically naive listeners. With this hypothesis in mind, 
one can see the importance of establishing laterality in studies of amusia. To reiterate the points 
made in Chapter 3, the conception of music processing (as being variably Iateralised), can be 
seen to stem from more general claims that left and right hemispheres exhibit different 
processing styles or strategies. The left hemisphere mediating analytic processing, and the right 
hemisphere mediating holistic processing. It would be fair to say that this conception of 
'divided processing' is both fairly crude, and fast becoming outdated, yet nonetheless it does 
appear to gain support from evidence that musicians refer to local {or internal) features 
(intervals, harmonic structures etc.) and therefore use analytical strategies which are claimed to 
be mediated by the left hemisphere. Non-musicians refer to global features such as contour and 
therefore employ holistic processing strategies which are claimed to employ predominantly the 
right hemisphere {Peretz 1990). In light of these findings the analytic/holistic conception 
requires some further comment. 
The case ofMR provides strong grounds for rejecting this hypothesis (as do findings by Milner, 
1962; Kimura, 1964; and McFarland & Fortin, 1982). MR is seemingly using local 
information and analytical processing strategies which are necessary to perform some of the 
musical tasks. MR is a musically sophisticated subject, and was pre-morbidly strongly right 
handed and right footed which supports a left hemisphere dominance for language and this is 
obviously supported by extensive language deficits following left hemisphere lesion. 
It therefore seems highly unlikely that complex musical functions are being undertaken by the 
left hemisphere due to the extent of damage, particularly in the region of the auditory cortex. 
Such evidence therefore undermines the view that analytic processing for music is undertaken 
by the left hemisphere in all musically sophisticated subjects. In addition much of the evidence 
used in support of the analytic/holistic hypothesis relies on cases where laterality is not well 
established. One can see the implications of this for example, in the case of MR. MR might 
equaJJy be subject to re-interpretation if laterality were not well established. For example, one 
might well suggest that MR was left handed and therefore did not conform to the typical pattern 
of cognitive organisation for right handed subjects. Clearly, while there do seem to be 
differences in processing strategies employed for musicians and non-musicians the gross 
local/global distinction does not map neatly onto brain hemispheres, and there is certainly not a 
necessary relationship between formal musical training or musical exposure and hemisphere 
dominance. 
This supports the critique offered in Chapter 3. that claims for hemisphere dominance of music 
have been wrongly and very weekly made on the strength of Sever & Chiarello's unreplicated 
study, and single case studies where laterality is not clearly established. Claims of hemisphere 
dominance are clearly misplaced, and focus is turning towards bilaterally distributed processing. 
Even for language, which perhaps exhibits the strongest example of hemisphere dominance, 
there is evidence for bilateral distribution of some tasks. 
The reason MR displays analytic processing strategies because he is a sophisticated music 
listener and uses analytic strategies for decoding music in terms of a complex symbolic 'code'. 
Although I have been at pains to stress the autonomy of music and language, in terms of their 
construction as symbolic systems, there are similarities which have bearing on how one d~odes 
and analyses the information, and in this way music is analogous in many ways to language 
which also uses analytic methods. Music has its own 'grammatical' structures, particularly 
within western tonal music which has strict harmonic rules involved in its construction at many 
levels of organisation, from the structure of a few notes or chords, to musical phrases, to the 
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constructiOJ\ ordering and harmonic progressions of a whole work. in many senses this is 
analogous to language, in terms of ordering phonemes, words, and sentences into a global 
structure. An unsophisticated listener might not analyse music in such a way. Rather, they 
seem to analyse music in terms of its gross auditory patterns using melodic contour, for 
example, as opposed to whether a melody conforms to 'correct' grammatical phrase structure 
within the western tonal system. In relation to hemisphericity, the left hemisphere appears to 
operate with analytic strategies, because it is dealing with language, a highly structured, 
symbolic system, and likewise the right hemisphere may appear to employ holistic strategies due 
to the processing tasks at hand. But what one is seeing is not some abstract hemispheric 
property but a strategy which is a consequence of the input being processed. This gains further 
support form the dissociated symbolic processing exhibited by MR. I.e., one sees damage to 
specific functions, and not in terms of any abstract processing strategy. 
Nonetheless, investigation of hemisphericity for musical function has been revealing. We now 
have the opportunity to hypothesise regarding differences in processing strategies, in relation 
both subjects' differing levels of musical exposure, and the processing requirements of tasks 
themselves (e.g. temporal versus melodic). The findings from MR do support a largely 
autonomous music processing system. However, they also support my earlier claims regarding 
the need for caution in assuming any fundamental relationship between music and language, and 
the need to accommodate variation across musical and non-musical subjects, when modelling 
music cognition. 
The findings from MR also contradict claims of common processing capacities made on the 
basis of eo-occurring aphasia and amusia. It is also quite likely however, that there are some 
music and language functions which are subserved by common processing mechanisms -
functions which might depend, for example, upon shared perceptual functions. 13 For example, 
temporal processing, and melodic contour processing may not be music specific, and, for 
example, it is unlikely that a non-musician would have any music-specific motor processing 
skills, which appear to be observed in musicians.. Importantly, examining equivalent tasks 
across auditory modalities will allow us to determine which are modality specific and which are 
general purpose auditory processes. Similarly, distinguishing between receptive, expressive, 
apperceptive and associative music disorders, would be a distinct advantage in attempts to 
subdivide music cognition, localise musical functions and to make valid and substantial 
comparisons of single case studies. At present many claims are subject to wide interpretation 
due to the lack of standardisation, failure to determine laterality, and lack of distinction between 
expressive, receptive, perceptual and evaluative musical functions. Nonetheless one can still 
hypothesise, albeit carefully regarding autonomy and subdivision of musical function. In 
Chapters 6 and 7 I will use the findings presented here and in Chapter 3 to develop a broader 
model of music cognition, and to offer further criticism of existing accounts. 
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Notes 
1 Storr (1992) p.9 
2 It is debatable whether MR should be classified as a Global Aphasic Howard & Hatfield describe this as "An 
Aphasia in Which language is very severely affected in all modalities. In the most extreme cases there may be no 
evidence of any real knowledge of language remaining. Auditory comprehension is usually the least severely 
impaired modality." Howard & Hatfield (1987, p.l48). On this categorisation MR would qualifY however, on a 
more sophisticated diagnosis he has too much lexicon to be classed as global -hence the description as a 'severe' 
aphasic which I have chosen. 
3 For the Pyramids and Palm Trees test, normal performance is gauged by a score of90% or above, (which would 
be equivalent to 46.8/52) MR scored 46/52, exhibiting near-normal performance. 
4 Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music examinations. Level of difficulty fur Aural comprehension 
ranged from Grade 1 to diploma level tests. ABRSM Aural Tests Grades 1-8 Parts 1-lii Cll9n, ABRSM. 
ABRSM Aural Tests Part N, Allchin B. C. & Read, E. C 1952 ABRSM. 
5 The literal translation being spoken song. sprechtstimme is a hybrid between speech and singing., e.g. 
Schoenberg's Gurrelieder 1900-1911 and Pierrot Lunaire 1912. 
6 Excerpts were drawn from Associated Board of The Royal Schools of Music Aural tests. ABRSM Aural Tests 
Grades 1-5 (Part I) 01972, ABRSM. 
7 I have chosen to use the term 'sequence' here to refer to excerpts as opposed to 'melody' which implies pitch 
variations within the example. 
8 Mozart Clarinet concerto k. V.622 0 Boosey & Hawkes Ud. 1946. 
9 CD, Nielson Violin Concerto, Op.33, Dong Suk Kang. Myun Whung Chung. & Gottenberg Symphony Orchestra 
®&Cl 1987, BIS 
1° Further support for existing emotional classification of these works may be found in a-itical commentary. The 
Penguin CD guide, Gramophone, critical reviews, Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, Meerum Terwogt 
M, & Van Grinsen F, 'Musical expression ofMoodstates, PsychologyofMusic 19,99-1091991. 
11 These scores are determined by 'correct' classification of excerpts as sad/happy according to pre-determined 
emotional labels for excerpts. 
12 Brahms Symphony No.4 E Minor. Op.98 Eulenberg edition, Eulenberg Ud, London. 
13 Subsequent testing of MR has revealed specific perceptual deficits which may be relevant in the assessment of 
general purpose acoustic discrimination abilities. In making same/different judgements of phonological input 
(two sounds presented -are they same or different). MR showed discrimination problems where the items were 
presented by different speakers. But intact performance where the items were presented by the same speaker. 
This suggests there may be a problem with abstract phonological reoognition. Thus, where the make up of the 
acoustic signal is altered (by introducing a different speaker). MR has difficulties, I.e. not only does he have to 
recognise the acoustic pattern (words) as same/different but also other features of the acoustic signal, which 
contribute to the identity of the sound source. 
Chapter 6 
Music and Modularity: An Introduction 
6.1 Introduction 
Parts I and II of this thesis have now provided a wealth of empirical data from both impaired 
and normal function. regarding affective processing, music processing, auditory processing and 
the integration or independence exhibited by these systems. It is clear that knowledge of certain 
empirical facts bears heavily on the type of model one might propose for auditory processing 
and our conceptualisation of its subdivision. In the course of the discussion I have made some 
preliminary observations about the nature of auditory and affective processing and cognition. 
The task now is to assimilate these findings in terms of a unified model of music cognition and a 
pertinent question is to consider what type of cognitive model might be constructed, and how 
this might fit within a global cognitive architecture. 
Evidence from neuropsychology clearly lends support to a broadly modular cognitive 
architecture: that there are independent departments or sub-departments of the mind with both 
their own special subjects or domains, 1 and relatively isolated processing that proceeds quite 
irrespective of what is stored or going on elsewhere in cognition. A few modular accounts have 
emerged, targeted specifically at music (Peretz and Morais, 1989; Gardner, 1983; Jackendoff. 
1987). 
Strong critiques have been raised against assumptions of modularity and the application of such 
theoretical models within the neurosciences, and as a result certain conceptual problems need to 
be addressed before attempting to construct such a model. I do not feel that the criticisms 
discussed here are necessarily targeted at the modular hypothesis itself, and indeed this would be 
inappropriate given the very broad formulations it allows. In light of this, I do not wish this 
chapter to be interpreted as a defence of modularity, but rather as an explication of (and an 
attempt to answer) some of the criticisms surrounding its applications and the methodologies of 
empirical investigations which are used in its support. To begin, the discussion will outline the 
principal themes of modular hypotheses and the development of the contemporary modularity 
thesis. 
6.2 The Rise of Modularity 
Broadly, modularity proposes that some or all mental functions operate independently (whether 
functionally or neurologically distinct) as opposed to cognition being a globally interactive 
process. In general terms, a module is conceived as an independent sukomponent of any 
cognitive architecture. However, modules are assigned different properties depending on the 
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modular architecture in question. That is, whether modularity is postulated as a property of 
general human cognition, or merely underlies specific functions. There is incontrovertible 
evidence for distinct information processing systems at the level of perceptual processing, but a 
more problematic issue is how perceptual systems interact to perform higher-level mental 
processes. This is perhaps the source of most conflict between modular hypotheses - to what 
extent is the mind modular? Here we see a variety of views. Fodor for example, argued that 
input systems are modular, but that higher mental processes, reasoning and fixation of belief are 
non-modular. Marslen-Witson and Tyler (1987) suggest that complex language processes 
(beyond mere perceptual processes) are modular, and others e.g. Marshall, 1984, (and see 
Shallice 1988 p. & p.271.) argue that impairments of knowledge and reasoning suggest the 
mind may be modular across higher cognitive functions too. 
Modularity has an interesting history and its roots can be traced back to particular theorists, 
such as the anatomist and psychologist Franz Gall (1758-1828). It was commonly accepted 
within 18th century psychology that cognitive processes were interactive and involved sequential 
processing, a serial flow of information through various faculties. This tradition, known as 
'horizontal faculty psychology', stemmed from the thought of Aristotle (perhaps also from folk 
psychological preconceptions, as reflected in using a single verb - 'judge', 'remember' -
across several cognitive domains) and was ingrained in psychological thought and experiment 
well into the 18th century (Soernmering, 1796; Wolff, 1679-1750; Reid, 1764). The faculties 
of memory, attention and perception were assumed to be invariant from one domain to the next. 
For example, the faculty of judgement dealt with such diverse domains as the aesthetic, moral, 
legal etc., and mental processes were characterised in terms of the faculties recruited to 
complete a particular process. On such accounts, "Mechanisms are individuated by what they 
do, not what they do it to." (Marshall, 1984, p.213). They assumed that sensory information 
underwent initial processing and conversion into a common code, such that the nature of sensory 
information was irrelevant in subsequent processing. Horizontal faculties therefore, were 
individuated by their effects on input, not by the nature of input. The faculty of memory, for 
example, would function irrespective of content, whether memory for peoples' identities, 
language, music or whatever. 
Fodor expands on this division of faculty psychology: 
" .... faculty psychology exhibits two versions of the doctrine according to the 
axis along which the mind is sliced. According to the most familiar version -
which I shall call 'horizontal' faculty psychology - cognitive processes 
exhibit interaction of such faculties as, e.g., memory, imagination, attention, 
sensibility, perception and so forth; and the character of each such process is 
determined by the particular mix of faculties that it recruits." (Fodor, 1983, 
p.ll.) 
So, although there was no disagreement over the division of the mind in terms of distinct 
faculties, there was controversy surrounding the way in which these divisions were drawn. Gall 
disagreed with the idea that one might have 'generalised' faculties for judgement, memory, 
attention etc. Rather, he supported a vertical faculty psychology, proposing that, where we have 
aptitudes (or competences in a particular area2), these are distinguished by their subject matter. 
For example, mathematical aptitudes differ from musical aptitudes and these therefore are 
subserved by different psychological mechanisms. Gall commented, 
''there are as many different kinds of intellect as there are distinct 
qualities ..... One individual may have considerable intellect relative to one 
fundamental power, but a very narrow one in reference to every other ...... a 
special faculty of intellect or understanding is as entirely inadmissible as a 
special faculty of instinct" (Hollander, 1920, p.240). 
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Despite his fairly persuasive positive thesis for modular function, Gall's own critique of faculty 
psychology creates something of a stalemate. Gall argued that, if there were merely unitary 
faculties of memory, judgement, attention, imagination and the like (which operated across 
domains), then these capacities should show correlation across tasks. For example. if one has a 
good memory, (and memory is a horizontal faculty) this ability should be applicable across all 
domains and consequently one should have a good memory in any application. If this were the 
case, claimed Gall, horizontal faculty psychologists should be able to demonstrate the 
correlation of memory across cognitive domains. But this is not a particularly strong argument 
against horizontal faculty psychology. There is no reason (unless tasks are identical) why the 
same faculty should not be strong in one application and weak in another, and indeed horizontal 
faculty psychologists might have evidence both of correlation and against correlation across 
domains, varying according to individuals, which does little in the way of supporting either 
argument. 
Nonetheless, the need for task identity across modaJities is an important point and one we find 
reinforced in contemporary neuropsychology. One cannot compare performance unless tasks 
are identical in all ways except for the parameter being tested. Music test batteries provide a 
notable example of this issue. Many tests of rhythmic processing require subjects to tap, in 
response to a musical input, and yet have been used as measures of receptive function. It is 
clear, however, that these results cannot be compared with rhythm discrimination tasks as they 
involve motor co-ordination and expressive rhythmic function, which are not measures of 
receptive processing. 
This is an important issue and carries over to comparison of tasks across domains such as 
language and music, for tasks to be equivalent they need to relate to equivalent levels of 
subdivision within these domains. For example, environmental sound discrimination would not 
seem to require the same discrete levels of discrimination as phonemic discrimination in 
language and speaker identity. (One can identify whether two sentences were spoken by the 
same voice, even if the speaker is unfamiJiar, but one doesn't (unless perhaps trained) have the 
ability to discriminate individual dog barks or duck quacks). The same applies to comparison 
of other tasks across domains - the requirements of memory, attention etc., may be 
dramatically different across domains (see further comments on this in 7.6.} 
In an attempt to distinguish between vertical faculties, Gall made reference to individual 
differences, arguing that differing aptitudes for music, mathematics and the like, demonstrate 
that these are distinct vertical faculties. Whilst this divergence in aptitude is a correct 
observation, it adds little to the argument against horizontal faculty psychology. Gall seemingly 
confused arguments of individual variance with arguments for domain specificity and had a 
tendency to misdirect the relevance of individual differences in aptitude as noted above (see 
Fodor, 1983, p. 17). Whilst Gall's account explicitly outlines several themes central to 
contemporary modularism (such as domain specificity, neural localisation and autonomous 
processing), certain misguided arguments, coupled with Gall's other beliefs, clouded his 
theoretical work. Gall held that the development of the mind was proportional to brain size, and 
that the size of the brain related directly to the size, shape and irregularities of the skull. This 
account was adopted by phrenologists. and so widely misrepresented that many of Gall's other 
writings were subsequently tainted with the claims of phrenology too. Horizontal faculty 
psychology continued to hold sway. 
6.2.1 Modular Hypotheses Explored 
Talk of 'modularity' has become fairly standard in recent philosophical and psychological 
debate. The aim of this brief overview of modular accounts is not only to give some idea of 
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their diversity. but also to identifY common strands regarding criteria for modules, the nature of 
their processing capacities and their operation within a global cognitive architecture. While 
there is no standardised notion of what constitutes a modular architecture, major variants of 
modular accounts may be summarised in terms of a tri-partite division of modules, giving 
associated possibilities for modular hypotheses: 
1) Modules as innate or developed 
2) Modules as neurally dedicated or functionally multiply realised 
3) Modules as peripheral or central (i.e. massively modular architectures.) 
The rise of cognitive neuropsychology and its broadly modular assumptions of cognitive 
architectures must be partly responsible for the resurgence in modular accounts. The study of 
selective cognitive deficits offered much support to modular hypotheses and, for the first time 
since Gall, the modular theory found new interest across a range of fields such as linguistics, 
psychology, philosophy and computational theory (AI). Modular hypotheses were consequently 
offered by Simon (1962). Marr (1976), Chomsky (1980), Morton (1981), and perhaps most 
famously in Fodor's The Modularity of Mind (1983). 
Marr's computational view (Marr, 1976) outlines perhaps the most basic argument, the 
'evolutionary programming argument' for modular organisation. founded mainly on general 
considerations of evolutionary design as applied to cognitive engineering. Were the mind 
constructed as an interactive system, utilising general processing capacities, any changes to the 
system would require overhauling the whole mechanism. Whilst not advantageous in 
evolutionary terms, neither does such an architecture match the patterns of breakdown and 
patterns of normal processing demonstrated across a large number of cognitive domains. As 
Marr states, 
"Any large computation should be split up and implemented as a collection of 
small sub-parts that are as nearly independent of one another as the overall task 
allows. If a process is not designed in this way, a small change in one place 
will have consequences in many other places. This means that the process as a 
whole becomes extremely difficult to debug or to improve, whether by a human 
designer or in the course of natural evolution, because a small change to 
improve one part has to be accompanied by many simultaneous compensating 
changes elsewhere." (quoted in Shallice, 1988, p.IS). 
Indeed, if the mind were a wholly interactive system, it would be profoundly difficult to offer an 
explanation of patterns of breakdown resulting from such a system (for example, to account for 
amusia without aphasia, agnosia or any other deficit). 
Within linguistics, Chomsky (1980) offered a modular hypothesis which, though structurally 
similar to Marr's account, differs in its underlying claims for modular organisation. In striking 
contrast to Marr, Chomsky places little reliance upon evolutionary considerations, and is 
strangely agnostic on the question of whether human linguistic capacities are the product of an 
evolutionary process. This is perhaps because postulating innate knowledge - as Chomsky 
does, for example, in the domain of syntactic knowledge - has serious implications within a 
framework of evolutionary biology. As Jackendoff notes 
"the Innateness Hypothesis has provoked various degrees of astonishment, 
disbelief, and outrage since the time it was proposed in its modem form by 
Chomsky (1965)" (Jackendoff, 1987, p.88) 
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This gives some idea as to the complexities of the modular account in relation to postulating 
biological endowments of any degree, and indeed relates to the more general issue of tying 
structure to function. Both of which I will return to in some depth below. 
Putting this problem aside for the moment, both Chomsky and Marr are concerned with 
processing strategies of specific subsystems (language and vision respectively), and both 
identity three analogous levels of analysis. 3 Chomsky noted that rules for linguistic competence 
are specific to linguistic domains (dividing language into conceptual, computational and 
pragmatic elements). 
"The simplest way to explain this relative independence of our competence in a 
particular domain is to assume that it is the product of a subsystem that is itself 
relatively independent of other subsystems." (Shallice p.l9). 
Whilst offering valuable insights regarding the nature of specific modules and their operation. 
neither Chomsky nor Marr's account attempts to answer some pressing questions concerning the 
modular hypothesis as a whole. (I) Which cognitive systems are likely to be candidates for 
modularity? And (2) How do such modular functions interact with broader (central) cognitive 
processes? For the musical case, these are issues I wish to address. In addition to producing 
models such as Marr's and Chomsky's, which are independently valid as explanations of 
specific processes, I am concerned with the validity of modularity across cognitive domains. 
Some input systems can be treated as modular without any particular commitment to the extent 
to which other parts of cognition are also modular.• For music though, any successful account 
must also explain its relationship to other functions such as language and emotion. and be 
capable of distinguishing between which aspects of music involve mandatory peripheral 
processes and which involve evaluative cognition. For example, in light of the model of 
affective processing in Chapter 1, it will need to be made clear whether auditory affective 
processing of music is music·specific (and a sub-component of a music module) or a sub· 
component of general purpose auditory processing, or a component of affective processing. 
Given the autonomy (and domain specificity) of modular processes, it must fall within one 
category. 
While Marr and Chomsky's assumptions then are equally valid for functional models of 
respective processes, the neurosciences can provide empirical evidence concerning underlying 
neural structures, to complement purely functional accounts. It is worth remembering at this 
point that neuropsychological accounts themselves may also be purely functional, and whilst 
empirically based, make no claims about the structural systems implementing the function. For 
example, many accounts of language make little address to brain issues and one should not 
assume there to be a functionaVempirical divide between the neurosciences and traditionally 
theory-based disciplines. Biological support for a modular theory of mind may be drawn from 
many sources. Domain specificity (that mechanisms act only upon restricted sets of input), is 
exemplified in a very basic and uncontroversial sense by the traditional sensory domains. The 
eye and optic nerve cannot process sound information, and other sensory modalities have 
similarly restricted sets of input. However, neurophysiology provides further evidence through 
the existence of anatomically distinct subsystems: i.e., areas of cortex (such as the visual 
cortex, or Broca's and Wernicke's areas) with highly specific functions and which cannot 
process other types of input, responding only to restricted categories or domains of stimuli e.g., 
colour, movement, dimensions, etc.' 
The speed of response to sensory input is also proposed as an argument for processing 
autonomy of modules. Responses to sensory input can be timed at around 5 milliseconds. If an 
interactive system were involved such speed is arguably not possible. 6 Domain speciticity is 
wen supported for non-sensory modalities too. For example, rules for grammar are obviously 
different from pragmatics and cannot be applied across domains, and such rules are also 
independent of conceptual considerations. One can sub-consciously learn and apply rules and 
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strategies for ordering novel information, without any awareness that one possesses, or is 
applying a particular strategy (Berry, D, 1990, 1997; Damasio, 1996). Perhaps the most 
significant empirical findings for modular hypotheses are the dissociations studied within 
neuropsychology. 7 Dissociations between cognitive functions across a wide range of domains 
offer strong support for both functionally autonomous processing and, in many cases, 
neuroanatomicallocalisation too. 
In addition to computational, physiological and linguistic models, a broader psychological 
hypothesis for modularity is offered by Fodor. Fodor's account in The Modularity of Mind 
(1983) is perhaps the most powerfully argued and influential exposition of modular theory to 
date. His account takes a functional approach which gives prominence to empirical findings, 
and it is clear from Fodor's thesis that he gives consideration to issues of underlying neural 
structures. Fodor attributes modularity specifically to input systems, which he distinguishes 
from transducers (responsible for converting sensory data, e.g. mechanical movement of the ear 
drum, into electro-chemical signals that can be read by the brain), and central cognitive systems 
responsible for higher mental processes. The distinction here is important as it marks a contrast 
with other modular hypotheses. Fodor explicitly denies that thought, or specifically non-
demonstrative reasoning (and what he calls 'central processes', e.g. fixation ofbelief)8 may be 
in any sense modular. In addition, he stresses the informational encapsulation of modules from 
conceptual analysis, arguing that there is no top-down influence on a module's representations. 
(In this sense his account differs from that of Marr, who acknowledges the need for top-down 
information in his model of vision. See Jackendoff, 1987 p.188 ) 
Within the Fodorian account modules are closed computational devices, characterised by nine 
more or less independent properties. 9 
(1) Modules are domain specific (computational mechanisms which operate only on specific 
input). Input modules do not correspond merely to the traditional sensory domains, but to 
highly specific input categories. E.g. Fodor suggests visual modules for colour perception, 
analysis of shape, and analysis of three-dimensional spatial relations. These divisions are well 
demonstrated in the case of cognitive deficits, where specific domains may be selectively spared 
or impaired. As we have seen, many aspects of language, and music for example may be 
selectively spared and damaged. And as seen in Chapter 3, neuropsychological studies of 
amusias, highlight specific impairment of musical functions, such as, rhythm ( arhythmia ), 
melody (amelodia), and memory for music (music agnosia). 
(2) Modules exhibit mandatory operation. We cannot help but interpret visual information as 
three dimensional objects, nor can we help hearing certain auditory signals as speech. The 
mandatory nature of processing is often explained in terms of its evolutionary necessity to the 
organism in question. For example, there may be a constant need to attend to perceptual stimuli 
and "in a hostile world, one would not want one's object recognition module "switched off' at 
the wrong moment." (GarfieJd, 1987, p.3). Studies of deficits show that speech, environmental 
sound, and music may be processed separately and are also 'channel specific.' 10 This means 
that we cannot choose how we hear a sound- it seems that our minds are 'programmed' to 
hear it in a certain way. For example, we have to hear certain sounds as music and others as 
environmental sounds. If we lose the ability to process one of these groups, the task cannot be 
taken on by another auditory processing module. It is for this reason that we find it so difficult 
to ignore background conversations. This 'mandatory processing' means that we will always 
hear certain sound patterns as speech. 
(3) Central systems have limited access to modules' contents or representations. A module's 
representations are not open to conceptual analysis, only a module's output will be accessible to 
central processing. 11 There is much anecdotal evidence in support of this claim. In many cases, 
information is necessarily processed to complete a task, yet is not available to the individual for 
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report. For example, one may understand the meaning of a sentence, but fail to recall the exact 
words used only moments after hearing and comprehending the utterance. 
(4) Modules exhibitfast operation. Speed of processing is tied closely to mandatory operation, 
and as with the neurophysiological evidence cited in (2) above, processing speed is often 
explained in terms of evolutionary necessity. One does not want to be deciding whether or not 
to blink when an object is approaching the eye at speed. This applies similarly to other non-
sensory modalities, where conscious analysis would impede the efficiency of the task at hand. 
(e.g., conscious analysis of grammatical structure in sentence analysis). A prime example was 
seen in Chapter 1 for the case of affective processing - producing an aversive response to an 
object which might be harmful before one has even recognised what the object is. 
(5) Modules have shallow outputs. Outputs may not be sufficient for belief fixation and require 
interpretation by central processing. Discussing visual and language processing, Fodor suggests 
outputs involve what he terms 'basic' perceptual categories which he defines as typically the 
most abstract members of their implication hierarchies (see The Modularity of Mind pp.94-95.) 
That is, the module delivers basic perceptual categories, e.g. horse as opposed to Shire horse or 
Shetland pony. Shallowness, for Fodor, seems to be principally a matter of distinguishing the 
way things look to a subject from the way that subject believes them to be, as for example 
illustrated in various perceptual illusions, such as the MUller-Lyer. Whether all modules must 
have shallow outputs is something that might be disputed by other modular theorists. There are 
also reasons for thinking that the processing of linguistic inputs is not restricted to 'shallow' 
outputs. Thus, it is quite plausible to suppose that, in many cases testimony can directly 
produce fixation of belief, without the intervention of some epistemologically sophisticated 
process of monitoring. (Otherwise, how could children learn from instruction before learning 
which instructors to trust?). It does seem that shallow outputs may be demonstrated by 
experiments in visual perception. Current experiments are providing more and more evidence 
that what we think we see (as in the MUIIer-Lyer illusion) is not what we actually see - the 
mind does a lot of 'filling in' using 'shallow outputs' and stored visual representations. 
(6) Modules are informationally encapsulated. In simple terms, modules cannot make use of a 
subject's other knowledge and beliefs. A striking example is provided by the persistence of 
optical illusions, even when one knows the visual presentation is illusory (e.g., the MOIIer-Lyer 
il1usion12). 
(7) Modules are associated with fvced neural architectures. Fodor refers to language and 
perceptual deficits as evidence for neural localisation of modular functions. However, this is a 
controversial claim, as many seemingly modular functions cannot be assigned a specific neural 
localisation (music being a notable example). This is an important issue as regards the 
assimilation of functional models with neuroanatomical structures. Indeed, neuropsychology 
was disregarded for a long period due to the "diagram maker's premature- and indeed, we 
would argue, mistaken - attempts to express their functionally modular theories as also 
anatomically modular." 13• Garfield notes 
"Even if the mind turns out to be modular, might it turn out that various 
modules have some but not all of the Fodorian properties? One could imagine, 
for instance that some cognitive function has all but neural localisation" 
(Garfield p.8). 
At the heart of the problem is what are considered as 'specific neural structures'. Functions can 
still have associated neural architectures although these may be distributed. Or, for example. a 
function may have may have different (albeit consistent) localisations across different subject 
groups. Further implications of this position will be discussed below, although it is worth 
noting that F odor does in fact concede this point. 
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(8) Modules exhibit characteristic breakdown patterns as demonstrated in neuropsychological 
studies oflanguage, vision, memory etc. 
And finally, (9) Modules exhibit characteristic pace and sequencing of development. 
Language, for example, develops in a systematic way which is surprisingly resistant to 
environmental and sensory deprivation. Deaf children of non-signing parents develop their own 
system of communication. Karmiloff-Smith notes that 
"even though they lacked the linguistic model available to hearing children and 
deaf children of signing parents, these children nonetheless invented a 
visuomanual system that displayed several of the constraints of natural 
language." (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992, p.38). 
Whilst many cognitive functions do seemingly conform to Fodorian criteria for modularity, 
F odor' s account is often deemed too restrictive for neuropsychological purposes, and in turn has 
been criticised for unquestioning acceptance of empirical findings and methodologies. 
Neuropsychological notions of modularity may frequently entail a weaker conceptualisation, 
with modules conforming to some, but not all, of Fodor's criteria. Marr's weaker notion of a 
module seems to be more consistent with models underlying neuropsychological accounts. 
Marr's concept of a module is in terms of its processing capacities and the "amount of 
interaction between two systems" (Marr, 1982 p.356). In Marr's view, different systems within 
a modular architecture may vary as regards degree of modularity and, importantly, contrary to 
Fodor, "modular systems may require or be able to call upon some general resource, such as 
Kahneman's (1973) concept of 'effort"14• Within neuropsychology then, there appears to be a 
more flexible approach towards which systems may be modular and the extent to which they 
accord with more rigid orthodox modular criteria such as Fodor's. This is not to say that I am 
searching for a unified account. Rather, my point is that differing conceptions of modularity 
across disciplines need to be acknowledged if we are to successfully contrast claims from these 
fields in the discussion of a general model for music. Importantly, Fodor claims three of the 
above properties are essential to modules: Domain specificity, informational encapsulation and 
shallow outputs, and these three properties are generally assigned to modules within 
neuropsychological theory. 15 
It is important to note at this point that both within neuropsychology and psychological theory, 
many accounts do not presuppose modularity as a general property of human cognition, but 
specific to individual systems, notably perceptual or non-evaluative processing (e.g. Chomsky: 
language; Fodor: input systems; Marr; vision). This can perhaps also be seen as a consequence 
of neuropsychological enquiries, being typically concerned with damage to a specific system. 
(Damage to multiple functions invariably complicates experimental procedures.) 
Indeed, the main variables for modular accounts as outlined above are (1) Whether modules are 
innate or developed. (2) The specific properties assigned to modules themselves (functional and 
neural realisation), and (3) Whether modularity applies to all, or only parts of the cognitive 
system. Other conflicts between accounts centre upon the specifics of interpreting empirical 
data and methodologies within the neurosciences, which I will now consider in some detail. 
6.2.2 Conflicts Between Neuropsychology and Theory 
Frequent reference has been made to neuropsychological evidence in this analysis ofmodularity, 
however, the interchange of ideas between theory and empirical studies is not without problems. 
There are certainly strong criticisms concerning the application of theoretical models within 
neuropsychology, and these deserve some consideration. We should be wary of the postulation 
of modules for various forms of cognitive processing in an overgenerous way that would tend to 
bias the case in favour of"massive modularity". 
Music And Modularity 125 
For the majority of theorists working in the neurosciences and allied theoretical disciplines, the 
evidence provided by dissociations and the relative autonomy of processing systems is readily 
accepted. However, there are still some reservations and I will consider these before moving on 
to develop a modular account in Chapter 7. Four main areas of dispute may be outlined. First, 
there are wide-ranging critiques of dissociations themselves, and the way in which these are 
interpreted. Second, the relationship between functional models and neuroanatomical structures 
is disputed. This was one of the associated possibilities for modules outlined above - whether 
modules are neurally dedicated or functionally realised and there really are versions ranging 
from purely functional models to attempts to precisely localise individual functions. Many 
theorists are wary of making assumptions regarding the relationship of functional models to 
underlying neural substrates, and at the other extreme some theorists have been overly generous 
as regards the assimilation of function to neural structures. Fodor, for example, is guilty of this 
by making neural localisation a criterion for modules. In general, however, the division seems 
to be between those approaching from purely functional perspectives who attempt to localise 
broader functions, (for example- functions represented by a particular processing task, e.g. 
rhythm discrimination, affective processing for speech) while neuroanatomists, on the other 
hand, see localisation in terms of highly specific •micro-functions', as for example in the case of 
localisation in the visual cortex (where groups of cells respond to input from specific parts of 
the visual field). Some have been too hasty to localise functions, and others resist localisation. 
This has led to some detachment between functional and neuroanatomical accounts, which in 
many cases could with a little more care have been made to complement each other. 
Third, a specific criticism from neuroscientists is that the dichotomy between central and 
peripheral processes is too rigid. This seems a valid critique in relation to (e.g.) Fodor's 
account, but certainly in contemporary theory this is not the case. More and more theorists are 
attempting to integrate central and peripheral functions more fluidly within functional models. 
Indeed, there is strong opposition to the view that there could feasibly be such diametrically 
opposed cognitive systems operating simultaneously within a global architecture. 
And finally, there is some support for interactive processing as opposed to the processing 
autonomy associated with modular hypotheses. However, as I will discuss below, this last 
critique hinges upon the commitment to encapsulation within specific modular accounts. In 
many cases interactive processing may be compatible with a broad modular architecture. 
Goldberg (1995) offers a harsh critique of modularity, which encompasses many of the 
prototypical positions outlined above, and so I will use his paper to exemplify these criticisms. 
Goldberg presents a vigorous critique of modularity as applied to particular cortical structures, 
arguing on the grounds that evidence from strong dissociations is over-emphasised whilst weak 
dissociations are discounted. Goldberg's point is that strong dissociations do not represent the 
general patterns of function following brain injury. He claims that weak dissociations16 show 
not a modular but a continuous functional distribution. For example, cases of impairment vary 
in severity, exhibiting different degrees of damage, rather than just demonstrating pure 'loss' of 
a particular function. 
Goldberg's critiques of dissociations themselves- whilst representative criticisms, do not stand 
up to scrutiny. While lack of replication is admittedly a valid critique in neuropsychology, 
dissociations of language are surely too consistent and too frequent to be cited as examples of 
atypical outcomes. 17 Investigations into aphasia have been conducted for over a century and 
this is one area in which there is replication of tests, standardised methods across subjects and 
evidence of the same dissociations occurring across single case studies. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, it is true that single dissociations have notoriously been subject to criticism, 18 but in 
any case, stronger evidence for autonomy of auditory processing is readily available. Double 
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dissociations have been well documented for a wide number of auditory functions. Double 
dissociations have been reported across modalities of music and language: lexical, orthographic, 
expressive and receptive functions. Double dissociations within musical function have been 
observed between expressive and receptive musical abilities, and between perception of melody 
and rhythm. In addition, were auditory processes subserved by a general purpose processing 
system, we would expect to see consistency in the recovery of function following brain insult, 
reflecting the respective difficulty of auditory tasks - and this is not what is observed. 19 
Neither do I agree with Goldberg's claim that there is a tendency to ignore weak dissociations as 
uninformative, as these are certainly incorporated within the general body of empirical results. 
He claims that 
"Once demonstrated to exist, however, the dissociation is assumed to be equally 
revealing of the cognitive architecture across all individuals. The combination 
of a specimen-invariant cognitive architecture and functional neuroanatomy, 
and a marksman-precision lesion, is the presumed basis of both the existence of 
a strong dissociation and its universality." (Goldberg, p.l94). 
With regard to the claim of presumed invariant neuroanatomy, I would claim that the 
Iocalisationist/anti-localisationist debate has been long left behind. Whilst it is admitted that 
certain areas of cortex may relate to aspects of perceptual processing, few theorists would revert 
to the position of Gall and attempt to narrowly localise entire cognitive domains. Apart from 
established hardwired cortical structures for perceptual processes, (e.g. vision), there is not a 
general assumption of invariance in neurocognitive architecture. In terms of presumed invariant 
cognitive architectures, theorists are aware of premorbid idiosyncrasies and these are adequately 
accounted for within the literature (e.g., Vamey et al., 1989). One of the difficulties within the 
neuropsychology of music is exactly this high level of premorbid variance between subjects, and 
lack of definition regarding musical abiJities per se. Neither do theorists assume universality 
across normal cognitive domains, being well aware of individual differences in processing 
strategies. Music again offers a prime example. Processing strategies and hemisphericity 
varying significantly dependent on musical exposure and expertise. Musicians who have had 
extensive bi-manual co-ordination training in early life (e.g. as in learning a keyboard 
instrument) may have distinctively different neural architectures to those who lacked such 
interhemispheric co-ordination tasks. The auditory system in general exhibits a remarkable 
degree of developmental plasticity. 
Previously much emphasis has been placed on hemispheric dominance for particular functions 
(e.g., Language to the left hemisphere, and visuo-spatial cognition to the right), but more 
emphasis is currently being placed upon bilateral distribution of functions and eo-processing by 
both hemispheres. The wide variation in lesion localisation across musical and non-musical 
subjects exemplifies the need for caution in assuming any invariance in neurocognitive 
architecture. In addition to the type of musical processes examined, (e.g., receptive versus 
expressive), pre-morbid musical ability, and the development of musical abilities should be 
taken into consideration (see Ponton et.al, 1996; Palmer et.al, 1998 for discussion of the 
plasticity of the auditory system). 
Goldberg claims that we must draw a distinction between strong intrinsic and weak emergent 
modularity in relation to different cortical structures. (He claims that strong intrinsic 
modularity is more characteristic of the thalamus than the cortex, i.e. that strong intrinsic 
modularity is characteristic of evolutionarily older neural systems, while the cortex. the 'newer' 
part of the human brain demonstrates interactive processing and weak modularity.) This 
distinction between strong intrinsic and weak emergent (acquired) modularity is indeed a source 
of conflict between modular theorists. Distinctions are drawn between type of processing and 
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innate versus developmental modularity (e.g., purely perceptual and hardwired versus acquired 
functions), but this distinction has generally not been applied in terms of specific neural 
structures. Many accounts have adopted a functional notion of modularity and are therefore not 
concerned with such specific issues of localisation and consequently the nature of the cortical 
structures involved. Nonetheless, that the type of cortical structure could determine the type of 
moduJarity, as Goldberg suggests, is of great significance to theorists too. Goldberg notes, 
"The advent of the neocortex may have represented an evolutionary escape 
from strong modularity as the dominant principle of neural organisation ... "20 
This in fact would provide an adequate response to the critique often raised against the Fodorian 
account (and indeed any account which postulates distinct types of processing): That it makes 
no sense that central processing should operate according to such different principles. Goldberg 
notes that "a shift from the modular thalamic to an interactive cortical principle of neural 
organisation may have represented a major step in the evolution of the brain."21 Admittedly, it 
is fair to say that, if one associates different types of processing with different cortical 
structures, then one has at least some kind of support for the case that these structures may 
operate in different ways (although to say they operate in radically different ways still seems 
incoherent when one considers that the structures, although distinct, are still subject to the same 
basic physiological modes of operation.) This is also the case for the assumption of 
analytic/holistic processing in opposite hemispheres. One of the biggest problems for this 
account is to explain why the two hemispheres should have fixed, and vastly differing, 
processing strategies (i.e. the left- analytic, right- holistic conception). Again this may 
come from assumptions of hemisphere dominance, and what is now clear is that many tasks, 
including language use both hemispheres. The fact that a task utilises a particular strategy (e.g. 
analytic) and also may be lateralised to one hemisphere (e.g. left) does not mean one can then 
attribute a fixed 'processing style' to respective hemispheres. Rather it is the case that different 
processing strategies are applied in relation to the task at hand and in accordance with 
individual variance as opposed to fixed processing strategies assigned to left and right 
hemispheres. This issue was stressed at the end of Chapter 5 in relation to case MR, who was 
seemingly using analytic strategies and the right hemisphere for processing music, supporting 
the hypothesis for task-determined processing styles rather than fixed hemispheric processing 
strategies. 
Goldberg's next critique is that "The ordering inherent in a strong cognitive/neuroanatomic 
congruence would be redundant and superfluous in a brain consisting of prededicated 
modules."(ibid. p.203). His suggestion is simply that, there is no need for such ordering if 
modules are autonomous processing mechanisms, i.e. no need for related cognitive processes to 
share neuroanatomical regions. In many respects though this critique is over simplistic, and 
assumes a very rigid view of localisation and organisation within modular hypotheses. The 
critique fails on two points, firstly, it is not clear that there is strict ordering except where 
functions correspond to gross anatomical regions (e.g. some musical functions will obviously be 
functions of the auditory cortex as will some language functions) but this hardly counters the 
modularity thesis. Indeed, it would be strange if there were not ordering of major sensory 
functions in terms of broad regions of cortex. Whilst there is indeed no necessity for such 
ordering, it makes sense for modules sharing similar input, e.g. from auditory or ~tic nerves, to 
occupy similar locations (whether these are unilaterally or bilateraJiy distributed. Secondly, it 
is not clear that ordering is inherent to cognitive/neuroanatomic congruence. Goldberg's point 
is that there are not discrete boundaries between areas of cortex (which correspond to specific 
functions) as suggested by modular theory and evidence from dissociations. He argues that the 
principle of 'continuous distributed organisation', (that is that functions are distributed across 
neural sites as opposed to having any boundaries), 
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"stems from the fundamental observation that two neocortical lesions will 
disrupt cognitively close processes if, and only if, their neuroanatomical 
territories are close., (p.l96}. 
But it is hard to see what Goldberg's reasoning is supposed to be, apart from a determination to 
judge 'closeness', both cognitively and neurophysiologically, as he chooses. 
In any case, his claim does not seem to cause any distinct problems for the modularity thesis as 
it depends on the very weak reference to 'cognitively close' functions which Goldberg makes no 
attempt to explain. On such an account it seems a large number of cognitive functions could be 
described in some way as 'cognitively close'. E.g., with the example, of affective function, 
subjects with amygdala damage might seem to exhibit very close patterns of cognitive 
impairment in relation to subjects with frontal lobe damage. An example of markedly different 
neuroanatomical structures, which both cause deficits in affective processing. (see 1.4.1 for 
further references). 
Moreover, the idea of neuroanatomic/cognitive congruence is not strictly at odds with the 
modularity thesis. Indeed, if what GoJdberg alleges were true, it seems that it might nonetheless 
be entirely consistent with a rather rigid modular doctrine. To claim that modules are associated 
with fixed neural structures, much depends on the notion of 'specificity'. Functions can still 
have associated neural architectures whether these occupy a single coherent site or a distributed 
site (e.g. as for music}. Obviously where one has two sensory transducing devices (e.g. eyes} 
which project to different hemispheres, one has a distributed system. The evolutionary 
development of modules might also support this position, (that there can still be reasons for 
ordering in a modular system}. One could certainly imagine some process of ordering, relative 
to modules • respective evolutionary development. 
Goldberg continues his attack, commenting that 
"the concept of modularity became so influential precisely because, like every 
simplistic concept, it has the illusory appeal of instant explanability (by 
introducing a new module for every new observation)."23 
The latter claim is indeed one that many neuropsychologists are careful to guard against. 
However, it is far from the case that every new observation prompts the introduction of a new 
module, rather that attempts are made to understand how such different patterns of information 
processing demonstrated by dissociations are accounted for within broader models. Hierarchies 
of modules and sub-modules are perfectly feasible within a broader modular architecture and 
economy is a strong principle operating in the neurosciences. Even if one were to admit that 
there has been a tendency for un-replicated findings to be the basis for new models, this marks a 
limitation of scientists rather than a flaw in modular theory. 
Goldberg' s critique here is directed at a very static interpretation of modularity, despite the fact 
that he himself acknowledges weak emergent modularity for the neocortex (and indeed accepts 
strong intrinsic modularity within the thalamus). This acceptance seems at odds with the fact 
that many of Goldberg' s critiques are criticisms of modularity as a whole, contradicting his 
acceptance of weak emergent modularity. A modular organisation may also encompass weak 
dissociations; i.e. can allow for degradation of input, which Goldberg claims is indicative of a 
gradiental organisation. For example, in many cases what we see is poor performance on tasks 
and not lack of performance at all. Outputs of modules must be integrated at some level, and 
damage to the integration of a module's output would conceivably result in weak dissociations 
which, Goldberg claims, show graded organisation. 
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This brings us to the suggestion of non-modular 'interactionist' models (where processing 
systems may interact with each other unlike the autonomy and encapsulation of modular 
systems). Going back to my initial comments on Goldberg's account, I noted that it bears 
similarities to interactionist accounts as discussed by Shallice (1988 pp.249-250) and others 
(e.g., Faust, Babkoff & Kravetz, 1995; Posner & Carr, 1992). I do not, however, think that 
modular and interactive models of processing are necessarily rivals. Unfortunately, calling 
one's account a modular account immediately seems to invite notions of a strict Fodorian 
modular architecture, but this does not have to be so. As I noted above, the outputs of modules 
need to be integrated and subject to further processing at some further level, so in a weak sense 
it would be true to say that modularity comes hand in hand with at least some level of 
'interactive' processing. Goldberg too comments that interactive principles of modularity may 
take the form of weak modularity (1995, p.l93). There is certainly room for interaction of 
processing subsystems, though this may vary according to task demands such that some systems 
operate autonomously and others involve interactive principles. Any critique depends upon 
what level of processing one focuses upon and the specific commitments to encapsulation within 
a particular architecture. With regard to music, there is nothing to prevent a model of music 
processing from encompassing interactive components relative to the task at hand. As we will 
see in Chapter 7, this may be necessary to such interdependent functions as rhythm and melody, 
which require integration for successful music processing. 
6.3 Summary 
Within this discussion I have highlighted some representative critiques of modularity. What is 
hopefully evident from the above discussion is that often these are methodological criticisms 
rather than critiques of the modularity thesis. Undoubtedly there will be methodological 
criticisms, as there are of any experimental discipline. However, the discussion demonstrates 
that we do not have to concede too much to these, so long as claims made are on the basis of 
well replicated, reliable, and convergent findings. Although one can see the validity in 
criticising specific applications of modular criteria in light of empirical evidence, there seems 
little point in offering a critique of modularity per se when there is so wide a variation in 
modular hypotheses. 
Nonetheless, the variability of modular hypotheses highlights problems for the development of a 
general model in Chapter 7. In relation to the tri-partite division outlined above, not only are 
there different associated possibilities for modular hypotheses but, there are degrees of variation 
within these - e.g. some modular processes within a cognitive system may be largely innate, 
while others are acquired. Some processes or sub-processes may be specifically localised, 
whilst others are distributed across multiple areas of cortex. And, some functions classified as 
domain-specific music processes may in fact be domain-general auditory processes, and these 
will come to light as specific empirical findings are considered. Nonetheless, this does not mean 
that we have no foundation for the development of a model. The empirical findings do offer a 
substantial guide, for example, as regards the degree of autonomy, universality, and domain 
specificity. 
The task of Chapter 7 will be to examine in detail which aspects of music processing conform to 
which modular criteria, and in turn to consider how these relate to other auditory functions. The 
foJlowing questions are central to the development of such a model: How does music cognition 
subdivide? Which aspects of music are domain specific and which may be subserved by general 
purpose auditory functions? Are there any innate musical functions? And, are there any 
universals in music cognition? The discussion will also serve as a forum for challenging 
existing hypotheses in light of methodological criticisms and new empirical evidence. 
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Notes 
1 Domains do not necessarily correspond to traditional divisions in perceptual processing e.g. vision, hearing, taste 
etc. Modules exhibit domain specificity in that they operate only on specific sets ofinput. 
2 Gall's terminology is unhelpfully ambiguous, aptitude implying inclinations as opposed to competences. 
3 See Stillings in Garfield, p.383 
4 While this is true, it is worth noting that Marr's account has been criticised for neglecting to account for the 
relationship of vision to e.g. motor processes. 
s These findings have chiefly related to the visual cortex -specific areas of the cortex relating to blind-spots in the 
visual field, but recently the auditory cortex has been subject to study. See Belin et al., 2000, Voice Selective 
Areas in Human Auditory Cortex. 
6 See Shallice p.l9 in defence of this claim, and also Marslen-Wilson and Tyler (Ch.2 in Garfield). Marslen-
Wilson and Tyler suggest that central cognitive processes also demonstrate such fast rates of response. 
7See ChapterS on discussion of the validity of inferences from damaged to normal cognition p. 
8 see MOM pp.38-46, & 101-119. 
9 Fodor gives examples of possible modular functions see p.47. MOM. 
10 Subjects with amusic deficits lose the ability to interpret all sounds formerly identified as music. Auditory 
domains develop fairly rigid boundaries, and other auditory faculties have set domains of input which will not 
interpret musical information. 
11 Fodor does later reduce the strength of this claim suggesting that intermediate levels of processing are 
accessible but only at a price, by imposing unusual demands on, for example, attention or memory. See 
Marshall's comments on this claim: Marshal! p.221. 
12 See Day R.H, & Knuth H, Perception, 1981126-149. 
13 p.l40 Coltheart & Langdon 
14gee Shallice, 1988 p.21, 1984, p.247 • .Kahneman's proposal was that attentional capacities might be flexible, 
such that if one placed more demands on a subject (i.e. increased the attentional demands of a task), this might 
increase arousal which in turn would serve to free up more mental resources. 
u See Moscovitch, 1995 p.l67-16, However, Moscovitch also runs together two distinct ideas -cognitive 
impenetrability and informational encapsulation. These will be dealt with in some detail below. 
16 Goldberg does not explain what he is referring to as 'weak dissociations'. However, I assume he means such 
cases for example where subjects A & Bare both impaired, (compared to controls) but e.g., A is more impaired 
than B. It might then be questionable to use A & B as convergent cases compared to normal controls, or to 
compare A & B's performance on tasks. 
17 It may be worth remarking that there is nothing very unusual about the use of dissociations to diagnose 
modularity. One might say that it is just an example of one of our most important tools of investigation into causal 
mechanisms, namely the use of contrastive explanation in cases of presumed independent causal histories, as 
typically introduced by 'Why P rather than Q?' questions. - E.g., why did life evolve on Earth rather than on 
Mars? 
18 For further discussion, See Shallice 1988 and Caramazza 1986 
19 See Mendez M.F. & Geehan G.R. (1988) Cortical Auditory Disorders: Clinical and Psychoacoustic Features. J. 
Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiatry: SI 1-9. Motomura N, Yamadori A, et al. (1986) Auditory Agnosia: Analysis of a 
case with bilateral subcortical lesions. Brain: 109 379-391. 
7D Goldberg p.193 
21 Goldberg p.203 
22See Marshal! p.228 on localisation of similar faculties 
23 Goldberg p. 194 
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Chapter 7 
Proposing a Modular Hypothesis for Music Cognition 
7.1 Introduction 
Evidence from both normal and impaired cognition suggests a broadly modular architecture for 
music processing. For example, the evidence from the case study ofMR suggests that complex 
music processing may remain intact in the presence of severe impairments in language, strongly 
supporting claims that there are autonomous subsystems not only for processing auditory input 
but also for reading and writing music and language. Chapter 7 examines the evidence for both 
a modular structure of individual information processing components and a global cognitive 
architecture for music. The approach taken is to provide an account which is compatible with 
both neuroanatomical, and functional organisation. In light of empirical research, I will assess 
which aspects of music exhibit domain specificity and which may be subserved by auditory 
domain-general processes. The case findings presented in Chapter 5 also offer the opportunity 
to challenge existing hypotheses concerning domain specificity of musical function, hemisphere 
dominance, and variability of hernisphericity and processing strategies between musicians and 
non-musiCians. Issues of localisation, and distinctions between expressive and receptive 
musical functions will be also be given consideration in relation to the proposed model. 
My aim, in the first instance, is to outline a 'basic' architecture to account for musical functions 
which might reasonably be attributed to an untrained listener following typical exposure to 
western tonal music. Experimental psychology has been able to verify facts that have long been 
known- that 'normal listeners' are able to make a wide range of musical discriminations, 
"average 'unmusical' folk know a great deal more about music than they might 
give themselves credit for. They can probably hum, or at least recognise, 
hundreds of nursery rhymes, folk songs, and popular tunes. They can probably 
spontaneously clap or tap their feet in time to pieces of music they have never 
heard before. They can probably distinguish between a competent and an inept 
performance of a piece, though they may not be able to explain what makes the 
difference. And they can make aesthetic judgements about what pieces they 
like better than others." (Jackendoff, 1987, p.213). 
My main concern is to explain adequately auditory receptive function (including auditory 
affective perception). However, I shall also consider expressive musical abilities and lexical, 
orthographic, and mnemonic functions. To begin, however, it would be useful to give a 
summary of the empirical evidence presented, and what this suggests in terms of the level of 
autonomy and broad subdivisions of auditory cognition. 
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7.2 Evidence for Autonomous Processing 
As seen in Chapters 1, 3, and 5, following brain injury, auditory (and auditory affective) 
faculties can be selectively spared or impaired. While my primary concern is music processing, 
dissociations of language and environmental sound can provide a good preliminary picture of 
auditory processing. 
The most obvious inference to make from double dissociations is to suggest that, to a large 
degree, music, speech and environmental sound are processed separately in the brain. For 
example, if one loses the ability to process environmental sound or speech, one loses the ability 
to process a fixed set of auditory signals. In terms of damage to receptive auditory 
comprehension, these subdivisions are demonstrated by: cases of pure amusia, Peretz & 
Kolinsky, 1993 (CN); pure word deafuess (an isolated loss of the ability to comprehend spoken 
language), Tanaka et al., (1987), Klein & Harper (1956); and loss of environmental sound 
processing, Spreen et.al., (1965). As such cases demonstrate, one cannot simply choose to hear 
a sound in a different way, for example, to hear speech as singing in an attempt to bypass the 
damaged system. The processing of sounds by distinct systems is mandatory and our brains 
exhibit 'channel speci:ficity' 1, that is, each subdivision of auditory processing is 'trained up' or 
'programmed' to deal with a specific set of inputs. If we lose the ability to process one of these 
groups, the task cannot be taken on by another auditory processing 'module'. Although we see 
these rigid boundaries in individual subjects, it is not clear whether these are consistent across 
subjects and this is an issue subject to further empirical testing. 
Initially, the evidence from dissociations of auditory processing would seem to suggest that 
music, speech and environmental sound are processed by separable subsystems, but, as I 
commented above, this provides only a preliminary picture of auditory cognition. To some 
extent it may be true that these categories of auditory cognition exhibit processing autonomy, 
but there is clearly contradictory evidence which will need to be explained. For example, whilst 
there is a great deal of evidence for separation of language and music, it remains unclear 
whether these are autonomous across all modalities (i.e. across all input and output routes • 
auditory comprehension, orthographic input and output, spoken output etc.). For example, it 
does oot seem to have been made entirely clear whether or not there might still be some shared 
temporal or contour processing capacities for auditory processing. More specifically, one must 
question whether the lack of pure cases of selective damage and sparing to environmental sound 
processing is a result of the involvement of general purpose mechanisms, as opposed to being 
the result of a neural localisation which is particularly resistant to damage. And in light of such 
considerations one must be careful not to over-generalise about fractionation of auditory 
systems based on the evidence of music and language studies. The task difficulty issue is 
important here, particularly in relation to environmental sound processing where one does not 
perhaps have such fine levels of discrimination. An 'apparent' loss of environmental sound 
processing discrimination might just be a reflection of task difficulty in this domain as opposed 
to a real loss of some processing capacity. 
In terms of affective processing we have seen that the model of affective processing in Chapter 1 
fits well with evidence from music cognition. There is good evidence to suggest that there are 
distinct processing pathways for identity of musical features and processing of auditory 
affective cues. In light of this, basic affective processing can be maintained in the presence of 
musical deficits as seen in amusic subjects. More complex affective processing would appear to 
be a post-perceptual process. In relation to affective processing however, it still remains 
unclear whether auditory affective perception (detection of emotion or affect in auditory signals 
-speech, music etc.) is specific to each auditory category or, a general property of auditory 
processing. 
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Whilst there are a number of reservations in relation to the level of autonomy exhibited by 
auditory sub-systems, these should not be seen to detract from the empirical evidence which has 
been presented so far. Within music processing itself there are a variety of ways in which 
functions are subdivided. Double dissociations provide strong evidence for the autonomy of 
musical subsystems across expressive and receptive modalities. For expressive functions, 
processing subdivides into oral-expressive, instrumental-expressive, and orthographic 
processing. For receptive abilities, one sees subdivision in terms of rhythmic, melodic, tonal, 
visual orthographic functions and also associative processes - matching musical input to 
stored representations. Further deficits however, may cut across these modalities, mnemonic 
problems for example, can be specific to receptive, expressive or both areas - i.e. a failure to 
access stored input representations or failure to retrieve of stored output representations. In 
musical terms, an inability to play or sing from memory, or an inability to recognise melodies. 
Whilst there are clear subdivisions in relation to specific musical features, one must be careful 
over attempts to pinpoint the underlying cause of a particular type of processing deficit as in the 
case of the receptive /expressive distinctions above. A further distinction needs to be made 
between apperceptive and associative deficits, and this is analogous to both language and visual 
processini. Apperceptive deficits involve difficulties de-structuring or analysing the auditory 
input, and typically result in a perceptual deficit, e.g. an inability to discriminate between 
aspects of auditory input. Associative deficits involve post-perceptual processing, a failure to 
link the results of perceptual processing to stored musical knowledge, or simply a failure to 
access stored musical knowledge at all. Apperceptive deficits typically result in an inability to 
recognise music as familiar or novel, or an inability to retrieve items from musical memory. 
In support of such existing studies, case MR (presented in Chapter S) provides evidence of 
autonomous processing for a variety musical functions, and raises questions regarding many 
implicit assumptions in the literature on musical deficits. Perhaps most importantly, MR 
suggests that many complex musical functions do not depend on any form of language-
processing. Whilst auditory memory for speech is poor, musical memory functions effectively 
aUowing retention of 12-15 second extracts with ease. MR shows remarkable sparing of highly 
complex musical abilities in the presence of severe language deficits. Whilst MR is severely 
impaired for sentence reading, he has no problems reading an orchestral score and detecting 
errors in performance, exhibiting a dissociation between the grammatical processing (or ability 
to decode the structures) of language and music. To recap from ChapterS, the retainment of 
analytic processing strategies as demonstrated by MR refutes the suggestion that there are 
abstract processing strategies associated with left and right hemispheres. The extent of left 
hemisphere damage suggests that MR is processing music almost exclusively in the right 
hemisphere and also using analytic strategies, contradicting the suggested analytic/holistic 
dichotomy. Case MR also provides clues as regards neurological differences between musicians 
and non-musicians, not only does MR contradict current thoughts on lateralisation, but also 
allows us to suggest that there may in fact be no differences at the gross level of lateralisation 
for musical and non-musical subjects. 
In light of earlier criticisms, it is important to note that unlike many cases of musical deficits, 
MR is well replicated in the literature, and indeed, by some very high profile cases of musical 
sparing. The Russian composer, Shebalin lost all language abilities after suffering a stroke, yet 
managed to continue composing highly acclaimed works. The composer Ravel lost written and 
verbal language abilities, but was still able to enjoy music, teach students and criticise 
compositions and performances of his contemporaries. Whilst both these cases are of 
professional musicians, other well documented replications of MR appear in the literature (see 
Morgan & TiUuckdharry, 1982; Two Cases of Aphasia Without Amusia; Assal, 1973, Aphasia 
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Without Amusia in a Pianist). It therefore is surprising that claims that musicians use the left 
hemisphere to process music have been sustained in the face of this contradictory evidence. 
To summarise, by drawing carefully from empirical evidence, one has a good basis upon which 
to begin building a general model. One can see for example, that there is a clear fractionation of 
music cognition in terms of melodic, rhythmic, mnemonic, and tonal functions, and clear 
division of expressive and receptive functions, analogous to the subdivision of language. 
Apperceptive and associative deficits also provide evidence for distinct perceptual and post-
perceptual processes. The dissociation of affective processing from the capacity for 
identification shows different routes for perception of affect and identification of musical 
features. The evidence therefore suggests both separate processing routes for different types of 
information, and separate phases of processing within a route (associative and apperceptive). 
Contradictions in the literature are also useful in terms of modelling music cognition. For 
example, there is not clear evidence for differences in hemispheric lateralisation of music for 
musicians/non-musicians, and in light of this, I would not adhere to an account offering variable 
hemisphericity in relation to musicality. As discussed in Chapter 3, attempts to lateralise music 
have been misdirected, and whilst it is not appropriate to attempt to lateralise gross musical 
function, it may be possible to lateralise and localise in relation to different types of processing 
tasks or different types of input. While this is highly speculative, finer divisions do need to be 
drawn between types of musical processing tasks if one wants to attempt to localise functions. 
7.3 Discussion: Assessing Music as a Candidate for Modularity 
The evidence that there are autonomous functions for different aspects of music processing fits 
well with Fodor's idea of domain specificity: that the sensory modules are likely to be 'highly 
specialised computational mechanisms'3 tailored to process specific sets of input. But whereas 
Fodor's account operates at the level of macrodomains, the evidence goes beyond Fodor's 
notion into micro-domains, and thus we need an account with further fractionation of functions. 
Whilst Fodor's account only touches on music as a possible module, other accounts have gone 
further to offer specific conceptualisations of music as a candidate for Modularity: e.g., Peretz 
and Morais, 1989; Gardner, 1983; and Jackendoff, 1987. Several theorists have even gone so 
far as to suggest that music serves as a good model of cognition as a whole. Peretz comments, 
"Since music data are systematic, relatively clear and accessible, it is 
theoretically and methodologically advantageous to study music as a way to 
study the mind"(l989, p.279). 
Jackendoff raises a similar point, 
"The examination of musical processing ought to be of more than parochial 
interest: the issues it raises concerning musical processing bear on larger 
questions of the brain's overall "style.",,. 
It needs to be examined then, in what sense musical processes are candidates for modularity and 
which modular characteristics are observed. Although I am not advocating a strictly Fodorian 
model, it may be useful to assess music in terms of the modular characteristics Fodor expounds 
in The Modularity of Mind. This comparison allows us to see not only how music conforms to 
orthodox modularity, but also, to what extent music deviates from the orthodox modular thesis. 
In Chapter 6, I also noted that one could construct a basic tri-partite division of associated 
possibilities for modular hypotheses: Modules as innate or developed, Modules as neurally 
dedicated or functionally multiply realised, and Modules as peripheral or central (i.e. massively 
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modular architectures ). In light of this I would like to evaluate the empirical findings in relation 
to these divisions, which allow us to characterise the type of modularity proposed, i.e. as in 
Goldberg's comparison of weak emergent and strong intrinsic modularity. 
7.3.1 Modules as Innate or Developed: Evolutionary Plausibility and 
Modularity 
The channel specificity observed in auditory dissociations offers strong support for mandatory 
processing of music. However, as I noted in Chapter 3, this presents specific problems for the 
musical case. This is because the mandatory nature of processing is usually explained in terms 
of its evolutionary necessity to the organism in question. And whilst one can see the advantage 
of mandatory processing for most sensory domains in terms of recognising threats in the 
environment, one is hard pressed to explain the mandatory nature of music processing in terms 
of any such evolutionary advantage. This has been a recurrent concern in attempting to offer 
evolutionary explanations of musical function comparable with language, or vision. In light of 
this, one might be tempted to equate music with functions such as reading, which are not 
acquired without explicit tutoring. As Jackendoff notes, "Thus music tends to be regarded as 
one of those specialised learned skills like chess or tennis or mathematics.'' (1987, p.213). 
However, one should not equate acquired functions with those requiring explicit tutoring. 
Functions can be acquired with minimal input, and the view of music as a 'specialised, learnt 
:function' misrepresents the variety of functions encompassed by music cognition, many of 
which are acquired with minimal auditory input e.g., natural preferences for tonal scales. 
Jackendoff comments on this problem for music, whilst acknowledging that there are both innate 
and acquired aspects to the :function as a whole: 
"There appears to be no evolutionary justification for such a capacity: unlike 
language, it is hard to think of convincing reasons why such a capacity should 
be adaptive. However, the principles and representations organizing the 
cognition of music are in part peculiar to music, and all of Fodor's criteria for 
input modules apply to music perception. Thus it appears that one must 
acknowledge a separate specialization in this capacity as well. Music shares 
with language a culture-dependent component: one must be exposed to the 
music of one's culture to fully comprehend it. That is, the ability to understand 
pieces of music is in part acquired." (Jackendoff, 1992, p.71). 
As noted in Chapter 3, a typical response to the evolutionary problem is to cite the social role of 
music, (e.g. Peretz, 1993; Dowling & Harwood, 1986; Sloboda, 1985), suggesting that music 
has evolutionary plausibility in terms of its adaptive advantage to the social group as opposed 
to the individual, allowing shared social activity, emotion, group cohesion and perhaps 
refinement of motor and vocal skills. 
I criticised this 'sociological' argument in Chapter 3. However, I also noted that there is a 
tension between claiming music has colonised pr~existing auditory systems, and also claiming 
that it is music per se that is selected for in evolution. I offered a tentative solution to this 
problem, but this deserves further comment here and I would like to defend my earlier critique 
by offering a more detailed account of music in relation to evolutionary development. This 
issue is particularly important in relation to a modular architecture as regards whether the 
modules postulated are innate or acquired. If one postulates innate capacities, then one does 
need to account for these in terms of their adaptive advantage. As noted in relation to 
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Chomsky's account, there is a tine balance between postulating innate abilities and conforming 
to a framework within evolutionary biology. 
One can resolve this tension if one considers that some functions which appear to be music 
specific processes are in fact auditory domain general processes. Not every response to music 
will be music specific. For example, auditory affective responses and startle responses seem 
more likely to be domain general processes (albeit ones that require further explanation). There 
might seem to be some confusion here as regards domain generality and this point will bear a 
little further explanation. 
There is certainly plenty of scope for confusion over what is meant by 'a domain', and 
consequently for misleading disagreements over what is 'domain-general• and 'domain-specific'. 
One point that needs attention in relation to division by domain in evolutionary arguments is the 
distinction between proper domains and actual domains. For example, certain spatial abilities 
might originally have functioned in their adaptive environment to enable hunters to track down 
their quarry. But that may be a far cry from the functions to which such cognitive 
specializations are applied by modem humans - navigating their cars through city streets, for 
example (part of the actual domain). The proper domain is what a cognitive capacity was 
selected for in evolutionary history, the actual domain is the range of deployment of that 
capacity in current processing and behaviour. Naturally these two sorts of domain may differ in 
extent. So we need to consider whether music is to be taken as the proper domain of certain 
processing systems, or the actual domain of systems which evolved for other purposes. 
A second source of confusion arises from the fineness with which domains are discriminated. 
By 'domain-general' processing one might intend only some form of processing that can be 
applied across any domain whatsoever. Domain-generality in this unrestricted sense is probably 
something of a straw target for the advocates of modularity. When neuropsychologist& talk of 
'domain-general' processes they usually intend to refer to processes that are general within some 
fairly substantial division of cognition (e. g. auditory or visual processing) and are general 
across a number of quite fmely discriminated capacities within that domain. So for example, 
affective and startle responses might be general within auditory processing (across music, 
speech, environmental sound), or even within any form of perceptual input processing. The 
sense of domain generality I refer to in relation to 'auditory domain general' is just this general 
purpose processing within a particular cognitive division and not domain generality in terms of 
an abstract processing strategy which might apply across any cognitive domain. 
Returning to the problems of affect, affective cognition for music has been seen as a sub-
component of music processing, possibly due to the misconceptions of confounding affective 
perception with other forms of cognition. Indeed, post-perceptual processing of music will 
depend on recognition and evaluation of musical features. Nonetheless, the direct effects of 
music on our auditory systems may be a function of a general purpose auditory affective 
mechanism (and as yet, there is no evidence this system is music specific). One might see music 
specific responses, but this does not imply a music specific system. Rather that it is an auditory 
domain general system, which responds with different associated possibilities for different 
acoustic inputs. 
What is adaptively advantageous are fine-tuned auditory processing abilities, in addition to an 
auditory-motoric conversion ability (e.g., startle responses to sound, affective responses to 
sound, imitation of sounds and an ability to tap to rhythmic patterns). With these mechanisms 
in place, one can acquire an endless variety of complex capacities, including the subsequent 
development of some music specific predispositions and input specific response patterns. Put 
simply, nature equipped us with a number of general purpose auditory processing mechanisms 
' 
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and mandatory processing of music may be inherited as a by-product of mandatory processing 
for other auditory input. 
To resolve this case fully, one would need to examine the evidence for iMate pre-dispositions 
and universals in music cognition. I have noted the general lack of investigations into music 
processing, and correspondingly there are even fewer attempts to investigate the music 
processing abilities of infants. Nonetheless, some studies have been conducted, and the results 
replicated, such that we may begin to develop hypotheses regarding music processing 
predispositions. Despite the obvious limitations imposed on experimental procedures, studies of 
infants' responses to music have revealed a number of processing predispositions and 
similarities between infant and adult music perception are striking. Adults who have had 
significant exposure to musical stimuli perform no differently in basic perceptual discrimination 
abilities from infants who have had minimal exposure to musical stimuli. 
"For example, infants and adults focus largely on the pitch contour and rhythm 
of novel melodies, reflecting a disposition to attend to relational pitch and 
timing cues rather than to specific pitches and durations. Moreover, infants 
and adults retain more information from sequences whose component tones are 
related by small-integer ratios (2:1, 3:2) than by large-integer ratios (45:32). 
Infants remember the component tones of scales more readily when the scale 
steps are of unequal size (e.g. tones and semi-tones), as in the major scale, 
rather than of equal size. CSJ Furthermore, they encode more details of a melody 
when its rhythmic arrangement is conventional rather than unconventional." 
(Trehub, 2000, p.427). 
The majority of tests have been conducted on infants around 6-8 months old with 'minimal 
musical exposure', but one could argue that such infants have already had sufficient exposure to 
develop processing strategies for music. In response to this critique, convergence of evidence 
across tests would seem to refute this suggestion, in favour of pre-dispositions to attend to 
certain aspects of sound. If infants were to develop their own idiosyncratic methods of 
processing, there are a variety of musical features they might attend to in order to facilitate 
memory and comparison of musical structures. Added to this, the degree of variation in musical 
cultures and exposure to music would also suggest that one might see a significant variation in 
the patterns of infant responses, but this is not the case. 
In light of the findings Trehub, (2000) proposes three processing universals: 
[I] "the priority of contour over interval processing; [2] the priority of temporal 
patterning over specific timing cues; and [3] the relevance of gestalt principles 
of grouping." 
For example, with regard to (3], pauses inserted within groups of tones are detected more 
readily than pauses between groups of tones. i.e., one naturally groups notes into categories, so 
a pause between categories is not as readily detectable as a pause inserted in what would 
typically form a whole musical unit. 
To add further support to her claims, Trehub notes the relationship between the favoured 
processing cues and universals in cross-cultural structuring of music: 
"The proposed processing universals that were derived from infants' perceptual 
abilities have their counterparts in universals or near-universals of musical 
structure. Indeed, examination of music from different regions and historical 
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periods reveals greater relative emphasis on global features (e.g., contour, 
rhythm, than on local details (e.g., specific pitch levels and durations)" 
Trehub presents a compelling case. But do universals and infant competencies really reflect 
specifically on music or on the more general auditory processing capacities? None of her 
evidence rules out the possibility that the responses seen are auditory domain general as 
opposed to music specific. In contrast to evidence from double dissociation, the fact that the 
stimulus is music does not necessitate the response being a function of a music specific system. 
Whilst the relationship of processing predispositions to universals in music is biologically 
plausible, it also highlights a paradoxical situation in relation to musical universals. Are the 
cross-cultural universals in music due to processing predispositions?- e.g. a superior ability to 
remember or discriminate certain types of auditory structure? Or, have the processing pre-
dispositions developed from their constrained inputs i.e. the universal structuring of musical 
systems around naturally occurring sounds and ratios? Whilst this does not cause any 
complications for the model being proposed, it does call for caution in relating musical 
structures or auditory structures to processing: i.e., one should be cautious about making claims 
regarding the development of musical cultures, based purely on evidence from processing pre-
dispositions. One could then be subject to criticism for tailoring stories of cross-cultural and 
evolutionary musical development to fit the results observed. 
Developmental psychology also provides some evidence regarding pace and sequencing of 
development. The study of developmental stages in language may provide an interesting 
parallel with music. Within the study of language development, changes in task parameters 
have allowed experimenters to reveal and lower the ages at which significant developmental 
stages are reached. For music, the same revision of developmental stages might certainly be 
seen, subject to suitable task parameters. Nonetheless, the evidence is still not conclusive as 
regards whether there is a fixed sequencing for the development of tonal knowledge, (awareness 
of 'correct' and deviant tonal structures within the musical system one is exposed to), and other 
musical capacities. In comparison with language, where there may be some degree of variation 
between children in reaching developmental stages, this may well be more exaggerated in music. 
Nonetheless, there is some strong evidence that encoding pitch information in terms of tonal 
scales occurs without explicit tutoring in the early stages of development. 6 
In light of the empirical evidence, I would argue that there are at least some basic 
predispositions specific to the auditory domain and, whilst I am not convinced these are music 
specific, they may nonetheless have bearing on the acquisition of music specific functions. 
Indeed, the predispositions outlined by Trehub would seem well placed to fulfil something like 
Karmiloff-Smith's notion of domain-specific predispositions: 
"That nature specifies initial biases or predispositions that channel attention to 
relevant environmental inputs, which in turn affect subsequent brain 
development" (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992, p.5) 
Indeed, in postulating domain-specific predispositions, one is not postulating innate, hardwired 
modules, which follow their own developmental agenda, but rather, that all that is needed is an 
initial bias in favour of certain attentional preferences. Despite the initial bias, the system 
should still allow for flexibility in attentional preference, and in relation to environmental 
stimuli. Examples of 'perfect pitch' demonstrate that one can override the initial attentional 
bias (e.g., in this case an ability to focus on specific pitches as opposed to pitch as a relational 
property.) Notably some musical systems (e.g., Gamelan,) do place more emphasis on 
individual pitch than on pitch relations. and it would be useful to examine attentional biases in 
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such cultures. This leads us on to the next issue in the development of a modular thesis: 
whether there are localised structures for music. For if one allows for a process of gradual 
modularization, one then has scope to account for the diversity of neural substrates associated 
with music. 
7.3.2 Modules as Neurally Dedicated or Functionally Multiply Realised 
This brings us to perhaps the most controversial and indeed problematic issue in developing a 
modular account of music -whether music may have specific neurallocalisations. Obviously 
music strongly exhibits characteristic patterns of breakdown and domain speciflcity for those 
areas subject to selective damage and sparing. In terms of functional separation then, there are 
distinct subdivisions in processing and relatively rigid boundaries between domains. It is 
certainly feasible to develop a functional model irrespective of neuroanatomical correlates, but 
underlying neural hardware might well place constraints upon its corresponding functional 
processes (e.g. as we have seen in the case of affective processing). Nonetheless, there does 
seem to be some level of correspondence between function and structure, and I aim to develop a 
functional model which, though valid in its own right, is also compatible with (and indeed 
supported by) neuroanatornical fmdings. In addition, I will examine evidence for specific 
localisation of functions. 
As previously observed, one of the main aims of studying amusias has been to establish 
hemisphere dominance for music cognition. However, both left and right hemisphere lesions 
have reportedly resulted in musical deficits, leading to contradictory claims for lateralisation. I 
want to suggest that there may, however, be discernible reasons for the observed differences in 
lateralization of music processing. The debate about lateralisation for musical function might 
be resolved by referring to specific subject differences (e.g., developmental influences), and to 
specific musical capacities, and it is more likely the case (as noted in Chapters 3 and 5) that 
gross musical function caMot be systematically lateralised in the same way as language 
processing has been. The 'dominance' debate, however, is beginning to be somewhat archaic. 
There is much more emphasis on eo-processing by hemispheres, e.g. a highly lateralised 
function like speech is also bilaterally organised - with for example, right hemisphere 
involvement in prosodic processing and possibly also the perception of vowels. 
Whilst issues of hemisphere dominance are still unresolved, more recently attention has turned 
to attempts to localise specific musical functions. Receptive musical deficits have been broadly 
associated with damage to the temporal lobes and selective damage to musical components does 
suggest specific neural circuitries in operation for music. Indeed the problems of hemisphere 
dominance and gross lateralisation of musical function are not a problem for the notion of 
specific neural localisation. The issue here is specified neuronal systems, but no necessity that 
the total function is mediated by processors which are anatomically adjacent.7 
There is nonetheless a particular need to distinguish between type of musical deficit when 
attempting to lateralise musical function, and, whilst this would seem obvious, it is all too often 
ignored. It seems likely, for instance, that expressive musical functions may exhibit quite some 
variation in terms of lateralisation. For example, expressive musical abilities may involve 
motor co-ordination, which is left hemisphere dominant, (the left hemisphere being responsible 
for co-ordinating motor activity) but if one plays an instrument, which requires fine motor co-
ordination of one hand, it is reasonable to assume that this motor ability will nonetheless be 
affected by damage to the contralateral hemisphere. In addition it has recently been suggested 
that melodic and temporal processes may be lateralised to right and left hemispheres 
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respectively (e.g., Peretz, 1985). Many of the problems for lateralisation perhaps relate back to 
the problem of using expressive responses to measure receptive abilities. 
Whilst lateralisation is concerned with gross musical function, these concerns apply to issues of 
localisation too, and surprisingly contemporary studies still do not appear to offer sufficient 
dist~ctions between expressive and receptive deficits. 
However, there is little point arguing specifically about localisation until one has a good body of 
evidence, i.e. cases where pre-morbid laterality, lesion localisation and premorbid musical 
ability are well established, eo-occurring deficits are documented, and equivalent tasks are being 
compared across subjects. One also has to allow for subject variations in task processing, as 
not all subjects will process tasks in the same way. Given the above evidence of processing 
predispostions and suggested attentional biases, one could move towards more accurate 
assessments of hemisphericity and localisation. Indeed, if processing predispositions are iMate, 
then it is perhaps these that should be the focus of localisation studies, although merely because 
they are innate tendencies does not guarantee rigid invariance in cognitive architectures. The 
case for gradual modularization may in fact account for the variability in localisation. 
I commented earlier that one needs to examine responses to specific input to establish neural 
correlates, (as has been the case in studies of visual processing). Some investigations have 
adopted this approach in relation to affective responses which are known to have some 
associated neural structures. The resulting studies have succeeded in relating positive and 
negative affective responses to music to different neural structures, but these are still widely 
distributed across hemispheres and regions of cortex (see Blood et.al, 1999). The lesions 
acquired by accidental damage are often diffuse rather than lesioning precise anatomical 
structures. And for this reason it is often difficult to determine whether all or only some of the 
damaged structures are responsible for resulting deficits. A different method is to examine the 
deficits resulting from exact surgical excisions, providing a further source for convergence of 
evidence. Such studies also allow for testing of musical function before surgery, so an accurate 
comparison of functions can be made. 
Liegois-Chauvel et. al, 1998, examined musical functions in epileptic subjects who were due to 
have specific surgical excisions in order to control their epilepsy. They found that removing 
certain parts of the temporal lobes did correspond to the occurrence of specific music deficits. 
Right-sided temporal cortectomies were detrimental to processing contour and interval. Left. 
sided cortectomies were detrimental to interval processing, but not to contour processing. The 
findings suggest that the posterior part of the right superior temporal gyrus is critical in melodic 
processing. The anterior portion of the superior temporal gyrus (left or right) led to deficits in 
judgements of metre (grouping of rhythmic structure), also providing evidence of a double 
dissociation between metre and rhythm (see Peretz, 1990; Polk & Kertesz, 1993). These 
fmdings do indicate that looking at specific musical tasks and processing strategies may be 
revealing in attempts to identifY neural substrates. However, whilst this seems to be pressing 
evidence, it is contradicted by case MR, who does not exhibit interval processing deficits, whilst 
exhibiting severe damage to the left temporal lobe. In the above study subjects were non· 
musicians, and the proposed hypothesis was that, 
"a right hemisphere lesion, by disrupting the processing subsystem required for 
representing the melody contour, deprives the intact left hemispheric structures 
of the anchorage points necessary for encoding interval information. Thus, 
unilateral brain damage in either hemisphere can affect the extraction of 
interval information. In the case of damage to the left hemisphere structures, 
the neural circuitry necessary for dealing with the interval features would be 
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disrupted while leaving intact that involved in building the global melody 
representation in the right superior temporal gyrus." (Liegois-Chauvel et. al, 
1998, pp.l863-1864) 
In light of case MR, it is perhaps the case that musica1ly sophisticated subjects perform 
differently, or that .in some cases interval processing may also be localised in the right 
hemisphere. This highlights the need for caution in assuming invariance in cognitive 
architectures across subject populations. 8 
7.3.3 Modules as Peripheral or Central? Independence and Interaction of 
Perceptual, Post-Perceptual and Evaluative Cognition 
The next question I wish to address is to what extent 'music modules' exhibit autonomy from 
other cognitive systems. Informational encapsulation is perhaps the most debated aspect of 
modularity, and the aspect that Fodor deems essential to any modular architecture. It is 
important, however, to distinguish informational encapsulation from cognitive impenetrability. 
The former concerns a module not being able to make use of something 'known' elsewhere in 
cognition. The latter concerns representations within the module not being available to the rest 
of the system - there is limited central access to a module's representations. These distinct 
ideas are run together by Peretz and Morais (1989). For example, they cite Shepard as 
providing some evidence for cognitive impenetrability for tonal encoding of pitch, 
"First, Shepard (1982} has noted that the application ofthe knowledge that we 
have about musical scales appears mandatory and cognitively impenetrable. 
Phenomenologically, when listening to the eight successive tones of the major 
scale (do, re, mi, .... do), we tend to hear the successive steps as equivalent, [this 
is a good introspective experiment!] even though we know that two of these 
intervals (mi-fa and ti-do) are only half as large as the others." (Peretz & 
Morais, 1989, p.288}. See Shepard & Jordan9 for evidence of this 
phenomenon. 
In fact, the example given can be used to exemplify both cognitive impenetrability and 
informational encapsulation, but as Peretz and Morais present it, (and compare it to optical 
illusions), they use the example to exemplify informational encapsulation as opposed to 
cognitive impenetrability by demonstrating that the module does not access information held 
elsewhere (i.e. regarding our knowledge of the division of pitches in a scale). The proposed 
'module' for tonal encoding of pitch is informationally encapsulated. The module's 
representations cannot access (or make use of) our knowledge that the percept is otherwise, in 
an analogous way to the MOller-Lyer illusion (i.e. we know that the scale is not equally divided 
but we cannot hear it otherwise, just as we know that the two lines in the illusion are really of 
equal length.) 
The example could also be used to exemplify cognitive impenetrability, but here one should 
stress the inability to access the module's internal representations, (i.e. we hear the steps in the 
scale as equivalent, and we know they are not equivalent, but we cannot access the internal 
analysis ofpitch relationships}. 
Peretz and Morais add further confusion when they later comment that tonal knowledge is 
modular but that the module's internal representations must be accessible to central processing. 
They note, 
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"Assuming that the output of such a system [tonal encoding of pitch] is a 
representation of pitches coded in terms of scale steps, music listeners, unlike 
speech listeners must still have access to the "uncategorized" frequency 
information, that is to early encodings in terms of pitch height. Otherwise, a 
chord, for instance, could not be heard as out of tune, by less than the smallest 
musical unit." (Peretz & Morais, 1989, p.290. Bharucha and Stoeckig, 1986, 
1987, provide some evidence for this phenomenon). 
Peretz and Morais argue then, that if one only had access to the module's output then one could 
not hear a note as 'out of tune' as the output only provides us with a percept in terms of an 
equally divided tonal scale. And in fact we are quite sensitive to hearing discrepancies in tuning 
of instruments. (We all know what an out of tune piano and an off-key singer sound like). 
That may be so, but it would seem that Peretz and Morais are mixing their modular functions. 
The tonal encoding of pitches in terms of internalised musical scales (i.e. relating pitches in 
terms of their relationships within a sequence) does not necessitate discrimination of discrete 
pitches and may only require mapping of musical scales and pitch patterns onto existing 
internalised representations. This would seem to be a post-perceptual process concerned with 
perhaps utilising contour information in addition to internal pitch relationships. If this were the 
case, then so long as scales mapped onto contour representations, they would be heard as 
'correct' in terms of their global relationships, whether or not specific intervals were deviant. It 
would be more likely that a pitch perception (interval processing capacity), or melodic 
processing module would deal with pitch height relationships which might then feed into a tonal 
encoding module. An appropriate analogy might be to consider a melody played on an out of 
tune instrument. One can still access tonal relationships, e.g., harmonic progressions and key 
changes (and thus recognise a familiar tune) whether or not the pitches are exactly right. 
This hypothesis would seem to be supported by one of Peretz's own subsequent cases GL., 
(Brain, 1994) who demonstrated intact pitch discrimination in the presence of a tonal encoding 
deficit. One can then have access to pitch information from a perceptual interval processing 
capacity, and this does not have implications for the cognitive impenetrability of a tonal 
encoding 'module'. 
Returning to the issue of cognitive impenetrability, developmental evidence would seem to 
provide further support. Children naturally learn and abide by tonal contours through exposure 
to music but, while having this capacity available when singing and recognising melodies, they 
seemingly cannot access this information and employ this implicit knowledge of tonal structures 
in discrimination tasks (Peretz and Morais, 1989). This also relates to the issue of Shallow 
output. It is difficult to determine what levels of representation different subsystems {or 
modules) might produce, given the complex breakdown of musical structure, and as noted 
above, the necessity for access to specific information at some stages in the analysis. 
Speed of processing has been used as an argument for modular as opposed to interactive 
processing. It is argued that the speed of processing demonstrated by perceptual processing 
systems would not be possible in an interactive system. There have been few tests specifically 
targeted at determining the speed of musical responses. Nonetheless, empirical evidence does 
seem to suggest patterns of response which correspond to those in visual and language domains. 
Subjects are quick to distinguish music from other auditory events as Peretz notes, 
"One surprising finding in the present study concerns the rapidity with which 
subjects perform the happy-sad distinction. Subjects were found to be able to 
distinguish happy from sad music with as little as a half-second from the 
beginning of the music."10 
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This latter claim might be interpreted as ambivalent evidence, as it is not as yet clear whether 
emotion recognition is a domain-general as opposed to music-specific function. Direct evidence 
though is seemingly provided by the music listening process itself. in which music is analysed as 
it occurs in time, analogous to the claims Fodor makes for sentence comprehension in The 
Modularity of Mind: 
"the recovery of semantic content from a spoken sentence can occur at speeds 
quite comparable to those achieved in the two-choice reaction paradigm. [two-
choice reactions for example being to press or not press a button in response to 
a stimulus] In particular, appreciable numbers of subjects can 'shadow' 
continuous speech with a quarter-second latency (shadowing is repeating what 
you hear as you hear it) and, contrary to some of the original reports, there is 
now good evidence that such 'fast shadowers' understand what they repeat. 
(See Marslen-Wilson, 1973.) Considering the amount of processing that must 
go on in sentence comprehension (unless all our current theories are totally 
wrongheaded), this finding is mind-boggling. And, mind-boggling or otherwise, 
it is clear that shadowing latency is an extremely conservative measure of the 
speed of comprehension. Since shadowing requires repeating what one is 
hearing, the 250msec. of lag between stimulus and response includes not only 
the time required for the perceptual analysis of the message, but also the time 
required for the subject's integration of his verbalization." (The Modularity of 
Mind, p.61). 
However, I do not accept that arguments from speed of processing are necessary or sufficient 
conditions for supporting a modular hypothesis. First, it is hardly clear what counts as 'fast' 
processing, when in many cases one also has to incorporate response speed into the equation. If 
one considers auditory responses, it takes only 8ms for sound source to reach the brain stem, yet 
it may take 250 ms for us to make a response. In light of such considerations, it hardly seems 
an appropriate measure to determine which are peripheral as opposed to central processes (see 
Marslen-Wilson and Tyler, in Garfleld, 1987). 
Indeed, in Fodor's case the claim that non-demonstrative thought is a 'central' process seems to 
gain little from the notion of fast processing. We do not know the neural processes involved, 
(for example) in decision making, but it is perfectly plausible to suggest that a large number of 
modular functions contribute to the process, although each in itself may exhibit 'fast 
processing'. And as Marslen-Wilson and Tyler point out (at least for the case of linguistic 
processes), there does not seem to be any noticeable time lag between perceptual processes and 
those which require top-down influences. 
Overall, there seems to be much support for autonomous subsystems within music cognition, 
and to a large degree these conform to general criteria for modularity, though not strictly to a 
F odorian account. In addition to music perception, a chief concern of this study was to offer an 
explanation of musical affect, and as such an account of auditory affective perception and 
cognition would have to be compliant with the account of music and associated subdivisions in 
processing. In light of this I will consider the case for modular organisation of auditory 
affective processing. 
7 .3.4 Modularity of Affective Processing 
As discussed in Chapter 3, processing of musical emotion occurs in distinct stages, dividing 
primarily into a 'perceptual' affective stage and a post-perceptual evaluative stage, giving:-
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(l) Initial physiological affective responses caused by direct effects of sound and; (2) What we 
might more reliably recognise as 'emotional responses', incorporating physiological affect and 
additional cognitive components, relating to extra-musical information. It is important to note 
therefore, that what are often termed 'emotional' responses to music, may be largely affective or 
non-cognitive responses (though they may be subsequently cognized in tenns of agents• beliefs 
and desires)n. 
In light of the suggestions for other perceptual mechanisms, auditory affective perception may 
be a perfectly good candidate for modularity, particularly as basic affective systems are hard-
wired, stimulus-bound, and mandatory in operation. For example, non-cognitive 'chiJI" 
responses to music are direct physiological responses to sound, and play a part in an overall 
assessment of music as 'emotional', or in the arousal of musical emotion. In light of these 
considerations, some hypotheses have been offered as regards the subdivision of affective 
processing. 
Panksepp 1982, suggests four basic modes of affect: rage, panic, expectancy, and fear, 
associated with circuits of the limbic system. 12 This assimilation of affective modes to primitive 
brain circuitries offers a conception of affective perception, as opposed to conceptual, emotion 
processing, and the involvement of the limbic system is endorsed by other theorists. Zajonc 
comments within his account that, 
"The limbic system that controls emotional reactions was there long before we 
evolved language and our present form of thinking. It was there before the 
neocortex, and it occupies a large proportion of the brain mass in lower 
animals. Before we evolved language and our cognitive capacities, which are 
so deeply dependent on language, it was the affective system alone upon which 
the organism relied for its adaptation. The organism's responses to the 
environment were selected according to their affective consequences." (Zajonc 
1980 pp.l69-170). 
Arousal of musical emotion may involve just these basic emotional mechanisms, (the limbic 
system), inducing physiological responses (shiver down the spine, lump in the throat, tears, 
racing pulse) commonly referred to as musical 'chi11.' 13 - such reactions appearing to be 
throwbacks to basic evolutionary mechanisms for affective responses. 
Panksepp's idea of musical chill certainly has evolutionary plausibility, and music specific 
physiological responses may indeed be induced (Panksepp, 1995}. The hypothesis that affect 
may be a direct perceptual process is given added support from neuropsychological findings in 
terms of separation of auditory affective responses and perceptual discrimination for music. An 
ability to recognise music's emotional content may be preserved in the presence of other 
perceptual music deficits. Peretz et. al, 1998 report on such a case. Subject I.R., a non-
musician, demonstrated sparing of emotional responses to music in the context of severe deficits 
in music processing following brain damage. IR showed a severe impairment for recognition of 
familiar melodies (e.g., Happy Birthday), and performed at chance on pitch and temporal 
discrimination tasks, and slightly above chance (56.7%) on error detection tasks. Nonetheless, 
I.R. performed emotional classifications (sad/happy distinction) with ease, scoring 97%, 88% 
and 97% compared to controls' 94%, 93% and 95%. 
Although IR could not recognise musical features, and could not discriminate between two 
pieces, altering certain structural features had an effect on sad/happy ratings. A common 
observation regarding 'emotive' music is that 'happy' (or positive emotion-evoking) pieces 
typicaUy have a fast tempo and are in major keys. 'Sad' (or negative emotion-evoking) pieces 
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typically have a slow tempo and are in minor keys. When these structural features were altered 
they did influence the assessment of extracts as sad/happy and when both features were altered 
within the same excerpt this had a cumulative affect on judgements (see Peretz et. al, 1998, 
pp.133-135). In light of this, it is plausible that structural features of music - mode 
(major/minor) and tempo, are seemingly major determinants of emotional classifications (i.e. 
these features may be causal factors in producing happy/sad responses, whether or not they are 
identified by the subject). Changing other factors such as specific instrument or natural versus 
synthesised sound did not produce any significant difference in response. On this account then, 
specific musical features may be sufficient to allow basic emotional discrimination, independent 
of other perceptual processing for music. There is therefore evidence that emotional affective 
responses to music may operate autonomously, and exhibit modular characteristics. 14 
Nonetheless, in relation to Panksepp and Zajonc's accounts of affective perception, Peretz 
explicitly denies that a module for musical emotion processing could be assimilated with 
primitive neural mechanisms. She states, 
"Emotional responses to music appear to recruit brain circuitries that are 
particularly resistant to damage. Such resistance should not, however, be 
equated with the functioning of a primitive sub-cortical system. Emotional 
appreciation of music requires, in all likelihood, the use of sophisticated 
knowledge of musical structure." (1993, p.374). 
But Peretz's claims seem to lack both clarity and empirical support, and even to be countered by 
a subsequent case report on the same subject IR, (Patel et. al, 1998, to be discussed below). 
Peretz fails to distinguish between affective perception and emotional responses. She refers to 
the gross distinctions made by IR as 'emotional' when in all likelihood these are gross auditory 
affective responses. Indeed the nature of the responses seems well matched by the accounts of 
non-conceptual affective perception outlined in Chapters 1 and 3. 
There is no evidence that such basic affective responses to music (as demonstrated by IR) 
require knowledge of musical structure. Gross features of an acoustic signal may be sufficient 
to trigger these responses to music via the limbic system, in the same way as gross visual 
patterns (something that resembles a snake~ or moves suddenly), can mediate startle responses. 
Indeed. mode and tempo, as Peretz states, may indeed be determinants of affective responses but 
not due to any implicit musical knowledge as she claims, rather due merely to the properties of 
the acoustic signal and their direct effects on us. 
Specific affective response patterns are reported for music (Panksepp, 199S), but this does not 
imply that music processing at this level is necessarily channel-specific. If responses may be 
induced by particular structural aspects in an auditory signal, these are perhaps stronger or 
more frequent in music as opposed to other auditory domains (but not necessarily specific to 
music). Indeed, if music is tapping into the limbic system due to its similarities to crying 
offspring -which Panksepp suggests may be the original function of this auditory pathway -
then in terms of auditory features, music may certainly resemble such sounds far more closely 
than speech. 
7 .3.5 Domain..Speclfic or Auditory Domain-General Affective Perception? 
Although it is not unduly problematic in terms of music perceptual processes. it would be useful 
for a modular account if one could offer firm evidence for either a domain general or domain 
specific affective perception system. Empirically this would not seem a challenging issue but 
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neuropsychology provides conflicting evidence. In speech, a variety of articulatory (prosodic) 
cues are used for conveying emotional tone, with intonation, pitch level, and stress being 
primary examples. So, for example, by altering the tone of voice, stress on individual words 
and intonation (rise and fall of pitch contours), the phrase 'I want to see you now' may be given 
as a simple statement or as an angry demand. In music, melodic contour and tempo also 
contribute to affective content. so the question is whether the expression and perception of these 
affective cues in speech and music are subserved by a common mechanism, and presumably the 
same would be true of environmental sound cues. 
On the one hand there are cases of aphasic subjects who are able to sing expressively, whilst 
lacking speech prosody, and this has led to suggestions of autonomy for affective processing in 
speech and music (see Sidtis in Gazzaniga (ed.) 1984). On the other hand, in terms of receptive 
processing there are subjects with preserved affeetive processing for music and speech, whilst 
perceptual aspects of music processing are impaired (Peretz, Gagnon and Bouchard, 1998). 
Neuropsychological evidence as to whether there are real dissociations between the same 
mechanisms in music and speech is conflicting. Here I will examine these conflicts and suggest 
that the problem really lies in a flawed experimental approach, rather than an actual conflict 
between empirical evidence. As one can see from the examples above, expressive and receptive 
aspects of affective processing are confused. Evidence of an expressive dissociation between 
speech and singing does not warrant the same inferences for receptive function. In any case, 
singing in aphasic subjects may merely represent an intact over-learnt or early acquired motor 
function, of which producing affective contour is merely an integral part, functioning in a 
similar fashion to aphasic subjects who may retain a few over-learnt phrases, whilst having little 
real knowledge of language remaining. 
Prosodic deficits can be satisfactorily explained without positing channel-specific affective 
processing at the initial stages. Indeed, one needs to consider carefully the experimental 
methods used within such studies. Where affective aprosodia has been studied (the loss of 
ability to add affective contours and stress to speech), this has not been in terms of the basic 
positive/negative affective responses examined in music. Studies of verbal aprosodia do not 
offer equivalent examinations of auditory affective recognition: often vocal aprosodia is not 
examined in isolation, but in the context of studies of gesture and facial expression too, 
examining an overall ability to communicate affect. Aprosodias divide into many differing 
subcategories; global, motor aprosodia, conduction aprosodia, etc. 15 To compare affective 
content of language and music directly, specific prosodic aspects of speech need to be tapped 
which relate to those in music e.g. harmony, stress in phrase structures, melodic contours etc. 
Otherwise, one might be comparing only rhythmic aspects, or gross tonal distinctions, which 
might indeed be subserved by the same process for speech and music, but may not be 
comparable in terms of complex affective responses to both. 
The problems inherent in such investigations are evident in the account of Patel et. al, 1998, 
who attempt to investigate whether melodic (intonation) and temporal (rhythmic) prosody are 
subserved by a general purpose auditory system. Whilst they suggest shared neural resources 
for prosodic aspects of music and speech, this may not relate specifically to affective responses 
as their investigations examine perceptual discrimination of musical features one might, for 
example, be able to discriminate the rhythmic and melodic contours of music and speech, but 
still be unable to decipher any complex emotional significance from one or the other.. Whilst 
melodic contour and temporal structure may be determinants of affect, the ability to identify 
these independently does not necessarily relate to the ability for affective processing. As we 
have seen earlier, recognition of affective content can be separated from identity of musical 
features. 
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Other tests have attempted to target specifically the affective elements. For example, Gorelick 
& Ross, 1987, used sentences presented in different emotional tones of voice and required 
subjects to identifY the emotional tone (e.g., happy, sad, angry) of the same sentence presented 
in different affective tone (without seeing the speaker). In such studies, it may well be the case 
that, whilst subjects are indeed impaired at a cognitive level for complex emotional evaluations 
of sentences, 'basic' affective distinctions (e.g., positive/negative, for auditory input in general) 
remain intact. The evidence also suggests the involvement of a number of different neural 
locations in affective vocal processing, and notably not simply the deep brain structures of the 
limbic system (Gorelick & Ross 1987; Ross, 1993). Perhaps therefore, prosodic deficits in 
speech reflect a problem with reintegration of affective responses with semantic knowledge, as 
opposed to suggesting channel specific auditory affective processing for language. 
Returning to the modular architecture, whether music specific or auditory-general, it seems 
reasonable to hypothesise an emotional processing module for auditory affect, along similar 
lines to models proposed for peripheral visual processes (e.g., Marr), with its output determined 
by specific parameters of input, e.g., melodic and temporal features of music and speech. For 
music this would allow a happy/sad distinction but not complex emotional descriptions which 
may depend upon extra-musical factors and acquired associations. 
In terms of predispostions and universality of affective perception, differences between 
languages, (see Ross, 1993 ), suggest limitations on hardwiring of affective tone. When listening 
to an unfamiliar language, one may be able to recognise the general mode of affect but not more 
specific emotional intonations which can vary from culture to culture (see Jauregui, The 
Emotional Computer, 1995). This shows some similarity to the cultural variations in music 
and corresponds to the ability to distinguish between general but perhaps not culture specific 
affective contours. 
As a whole such a model of auditory affective perception would seem compatible with the idea 
ofmusical structures as determinants of emotional responses (Peretz, 1998; Sloboda, 1991) and 
with contemporary accounts of emotional cognition and affective perception as presented by 
LeDoux, (1984, 1996), Panksepp (1982) Zajonc (1980) and Damasio (1994). 
Unfortunately, there is a present lack of specific empirical support for an auditory affective 
processing module, not only due to the above conflicts as regards determining whether there is 
music/speech specific affective processing, but also due to the nature of affective processing 
substrates. Damage to such deep brain mechanisms invariably involves for example, the same 
blood supply to areas controlling major homeostatic functions, making survival unlikely and 
therefore it is unlikely that one will see cases of selective damage to this •basic' type of affective 
processing. At some stage however, it seems that affective information must be re-integrated in 
musical analysis, and possibly a deficit could also occur at this level. Perhaps in light of this 
and with refined methods for testing music and speech specific prosody, the question of 
specificity may be resolved. 
7.4 Proposing Music Modules: A Model of Receptive Musical Function. 
Proposing a modular account of receptive music processing in terms of distinct perceptual 
processes then is not unduly problematic. Empirical evidence strongly supports autonomous 
subsystems, some innate predispositions (at least for auditory-general if not specific processes), 
and associated neural architectures. Initial processing of musical affect also seems to be 
autonomous, though this suggests a slightly different organisation. 
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This initial model will attempt to capture perceptual music discrimination abilities as 
exemplified by apperceptive disturbances (deficits in perceptual processing). I will attempt to 
offer a model of music processing from auditory input, to analysis and discrimination of musical 
features, and in light of this I will also make some suggestions for similar ftactionation of other 
auditory domains. I will then go on to look at associative functions (relating analysed features 
to existing representations), musical functions in other modalities, (reading, writing and 
playing), interaction of music subsystems, and the relationship of music to other faculties. 
Bearing in mind the variation in musical aptitudes across listeners, one must ask the question, 
'What type of listener does the model represent?' I would reply that, functionally, the model 
represents any normal listener whether musically nai've or musically experienced. In terms of 
neuroanatomical correlates there is, as we have observed, variation across subjects, and below I 
will offer an explanation of the suggested differences between musicians and non-musicians. 
To begin, initial perceptual analysis subdivides along two major dimensions: melodic 
organisation (discrimination of pitch, interval, melodic contour,) and temporal organisation 
(rhythm and metre). Robust dissociations support the functional autonomy of melodic and 
temporal processing, with amefodia and arhythmia being among the more frequently reported 
examples of musical damage and sparing. Further ftactionation is demonstrated within these 
domains. 
Temporal processing subdivides into processing of rhythm (internal temporal divisions) and 
metre (regularities in internal temporal grouping). Melodic processing subdivides into interval 
and contour processing (respectively discrimination of individual pitch relationships, and 
discrimination of the overall pitch-height contours of a melodic sequence). Again these 
subdivisions are supported by double dissociations, as documented in table 7.1 This 
ftactionation of music corresponds to existing models in speech perception which is also 
mediated by such 'micromodules', providing good grounds for similar subdivision of musical 
function. 
Table 7.1: Reported Melodic and Temporal Dissociations 
Function Intact Fuaetion Impaired Case Reports 
"' 
JC 
Rhythm"' Metre JC Liegeois-Chauvel et. al, 1998; Polk & 
Kertesz, 1993. 
Metre.; Rhythm JC Peretz 1990 
. Interval .; Contour JC Peretz 1993. 
Contour.; Interval JC Liegeois-Chauvel et. al., 1998. 
At present, this conception would provide us with a model essentially like fig. 7 .1. The outputs 
of temporal and melodic processes may then be subsequently integrated and fed into further 
modules/auditory lexicons. 
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Fig.7.1: Initial Auditory and Perceptual Processing 
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The fractionation of melodic and temporal organisation into metre, rhythm, interval and contour, 
(fig. 7.2) also relates to the processing predispositions outlined in 7.3.1: "the priority of contour 
over interval processing; the priority of temporal patterning over specific timing cues; "(Trehub, 
2000, p.431.). Whilst the specificity of auditory processing predispositions must be left open to 
question, this does nevertheless allow an alternative explanation of the divergence in processing 
strategies (or divergence in preferred processing strategies) observed between musicians and 
non-musicians. 
Fig. 7.2: Fractionation of Melodic and Temporal Organisation 
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Within the model represented by Fig. 7.2 we do see a local/ global distinction, but this is not to 
say I wish to endorse the claims for abstract processing strategies which I criticised earlier 
(5.4.1). Rather, it is the case that processing strategies do differ due to the nature of the input to 
which they are exposed and the task demands placed upon modules. Hence one may see 
differences between musicians and non-musicians due to the task demands placed upon their 
respective auditory processing capacities. For musicians undertaking specific musical tasks 
either to play an instrument or in listening to and analysing music, attending to local features 
(perhaps in addition to global features) gives more finely tuned discrimination abilities. As in 
the above model, metre and contour require attention to global features, while interval and 
rhythmic processing require attention to local ' internal ' aspects of musical structure. 
In terms of processing predispositions, the attentional biases are for attending to 'global ' 
features: metre (grouping) and melodic contour. Listeners have attentional biases for processing 
global features, (and hence this is perhaps why we do see musician/non-musician differences). 
Unless needing to apply further discrimination abilities, these may be sufficient for ' basic' 
music processing. However, exposure to a wider range of musical stimuli and placing more 
demands on the auditory system would allow further development of capacities for processing 
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local features. The explanation of the local/global distinction in terms of processing 
predispositions offers a more comprehensive explanation of musician/non-musician differences 
in processing strategy. All listeners develop both capacities, but perhaps through training, 
learning the musical language (which requires one to attend to local features), musicians may 
more often utilise local strategies - offering a slightly different perspective as regards the 
differences in processing strategies between musicians and non-musicians. In relation to the 
modular account, both modules and strategies then are to some extent prespecified in terms of 
attentional biases e.g. to global rather than local features. These attentional predispositions are 
supported by narve listeners responses, but a process of gradual modularization allows other 
strategies to be developed. 
Peretz, (1985), and Peretz and Morais, (1989) also suggest a module for tonality, (determining 
whether music conforms to the 'grammatical' rules of one's tonal system e.g. western tonal 
music), and this does have some empirical support. In a group study by Frances, Lhermitte, 
and Verdy, 1973, aphasic patients were presented with pairs of melodies, their task being to 
judge which note in the melody had been changed on its second playing. Half the melodies were 
tonal (having a definable 'key" or tonal centre and conforming to rules of western tonal music) 
and the other half a-tonal (no key or tonal centre and not conforming to the 'rules' of western 
tonal construction). The aphasic subjects did not show the expected predisposition for tonal 
recognition, suggesting some loss of 'tonal knowledge', and the findings were replicated in a 
single case study by Peretz, 1993. In further support of these findings, neonates have also 
demonstrated preference for tonal stimuli (Trehub, 1987). Such results seem to indicate that a 
module for tonality might be identified in the near future, but this will require careful 
investigation. On my account, I would argue that tonality is a post-perceptual function i.e. the 
encoding of pitch in terms of tonal scales and sequences occurs after pitch discrimination, as a 
function of a music lexicon. That is, after initial perceptual discrimination, the percept can then 
be mapped onto existing representations which are consistent with the tonal constraints of the 
particular musical genres one has been exposed to. There may be some natural (and perhaps 
universal) preferences for certain intervallic or scale structures due to the nature of the auditory 
system, but it is not problematic for these to develop as part of a music lexicon, even perhaps as 
an autonomous modular or sub-modular 'tonal lexicon'. 
Nonetheless, the aim of the model is explain processing from input to perceptual discrimination, 
but it is clearly wrong to suggest that sound input feeds directly to domain specific modules. 
The model must also incorporate initial acoustic analysis which is then relayed to modules. The 
importance of this is demonstrated if one considers channel-specificity. On the account above, 
(fig. 7.1), modules would be receiving all auditory input and discarding irrelevant items- not 
only does this seem implausible on the grounds of efficiency, but it would also require a 
complex explanation of how such modules come to 'choose' their inputs in this way. It seems 
more than obvious to suggest that one must propose some level of initial acoustic analysis. 
However, existing discussions do neglect this point - for example, Peretz and Jackendoff both 
fail to account for initial acoustic analysis in any detail. 
Implicit within accounts of central auditory processing is the fact that hearing the signal can be 
dissociated from its interpretation. Amusic subjects still hear the input but cannot process it in 
terms of any recognisable form. The input is heard as squeaks and grates - i.e. the signal is 
somehow registered, but then does not get any further than initial analysis. Signals are still 
being routed channel-specifically but the music specific system cannot deal with them when 
they arrive. Similarly, if one posits autonomous modules and distributed sites for different 
auditory processes, then one must account for some initial channelling of auditory signals, 
which can be subject to damage, just like modality specific parts of the processing system. If 
this were not the case, then to explain global auditory agnosia (inability to interpret all auditory 
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input - which is fairly common) one would have to have lesions affecting a wide number of 
perceptual processors for all areas of auditory processing. What makes more sense is to suggest 
that there is initiaiJy a simpler process, or set of'acoustic feature detectors' which can deal with 
gross acoustic discrimination, and which can be damaged, subsequently preventing further 
analysis of acoustic signals. 
Presumably, all neuropsychological accounts of auditory processing must allow some initial 
analysis, before domain-specific perceptual processing, but there is a significant lack of 
attempts to explain the interaction of initial sensory analysis and subsequent processing. In light 
of this neglect, models such as Peretz's and Jackendoff's still end up looking essentially like 
figure 7.1. 
There is then, a need to make explicit the stages of processing involved: i.e. mechanical 
processing of sound, some streaming at cochlea level, and integration/contralateral processing of 
sound at the levels of brainstem and primary auditory cortices 16• It should not be an implicit 
assumption that there is obviously some initial acoustic analysis which does not require 
explanation, as this bears heavily on notions of channel-specificity and the nature of domains in 
relation to initial processing predispositions. 
A particular concern is to explain how sound is channelled specifically for these separate 
domains. As above, one could suggest that domain specific perceptual modules all receive all 
the auditory input, but this not only seems to go against the principles of economy behind 
evolutionary development, it also requires that modules 'decide' which input to respond to and 
this causes problems in terms of explaining domain specificity. Ultimately this problem results 
from a top-down approach to auditory processing. If one starts from the perspective of the 
auditory input, one can postulate that modules have developed domain-specificity because they 
have been fed specific sets of input, resulting from initial acoustic analysis. 
There is some evidence in support of these claims. Griffiths, for example, has investigated the 
intermediate processing of complex sound, i.e. the relationships between basic audiometry and 
central auditory processing tasks. He suggests that there are enough differences between types 
of acoustic signals to support some preliminary 'spectrotemporal' acoustic analysis. 
"in the crudest terms, speech contains a mixture of filtered harmonic 
complexes, broad-band noise and silent gaps, with accurate transitions between 
these three stimuli controlled with millisecond-level precision. Apart from 
abrupt transitions, speech is also characterised by smoother changes in filter 
frequency occurring over tens of milliseconds, and prosody (pitch and stress 
contour, and rhythm) at the level of seconds. Natural and mechanical 
environmental sounds may also contain harmonic complexes or noise, often 
without the complexity of the temporal transitions seen in speech. It does not 
require a detailed knowledge ofpsychoacoustics to appreciate that the 'moo' of 
a cow or the sound of a motorbike running contain many fewer changes in 
acoustic structure over time than an equivalent length segment of human 
speech. Music often contains discrete harmonic sounds with a variation of 
temporal 'local' structure at the level of hundreds of milliseconds or more, 
whilst 'global' processing of musical features might occur at the level of 
seconds or tens of seconds ... From even this crude description, it will be 
apparent that there are differences in spectrotemporal structure in these three 
types of sound, and also that these sounds contain a mixture of different 
acoustic features with some overlap. Thus, a deficit in processing of a given 
acoustic feature might be expressed as a higher level processing deficit specific 
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for speech, environmental sounds or music. It may also lead to a deficit for 
more than one type of processing if it affects the processing of a shared 
acoustic feature." (Griffiths et. al, 1999, p. 373.) 
This allows us to formulate a revised model along the lines of figure 7.3, with initial domain-
general processing of all auditory input, which then feeds into specific domains. 
Fig. 7.3 Receptive Music Processing 
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The failure of neuropsychological accounts to consider the early auditory pathways probably 
stems from a top-down approach to sound processing. There is a tendency to resort to too much 
in the way of modules and representations (in mature systems), without paying sufficient 
attention to signals - which may sculpt the system in acquisition (more on this will be said 
later). Looking at the processing of sound in the ascending pathway to the auditory cortex gives 
an idea of how initial sensory and perceptual deficits could be distributed across this system (see 
Griffiths, 1999 p.367). Just as we need to consider whether deficits are apperceptive or 
associative, one also needs to consider whether 'perceptual' deficits are due to domain-general 
sensory disturbances or domain-specific discriminatory abilities. Griffiths notes that, 
"disorders of environmental sound and musical perception can also be caused 
by disordered complex sound perception. The apparent expression of these 
disorders in distinct cognitive domains may be a feature of differences in the 
acoustic structure of these types of sound" (Griffiths et. al, 1999, p.365). 
That is, a perceptual deficit in analysing music-specific acoustic features might be expressed in 
terms of a music-specific deficit, but like the case of affective processing this may not be 
because the auditory feature detectors are domain-specific, but rather that music provides a 
specific pattern of input and has an associated pattern of specific responses. That there are 
basic acoustic featural detection systems might also support the associations observed between 
auditory deficits, e.g. aphasia and amusia - an underlying 'acoustic detection' deficit could 
subsequently affect both functions. 
"We suggest that the marked overlap between agnosias may be due to the fact 
that, the underlying deficit, in many cases, is not in sound perception at the 
level of words, music or environmental sounds, but at an intermediate level of 
analysis ofspectrotemporal pattern in sound." (Griffiths et. al, 1999, p.373). 
There is some evidence for deficits across the spectrum of this initial auditory processing, and 
importantly, measures of 'deafness' (i.e. intensity and frequency thresholds) do not always 
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reflect subsequent deficits in complex sound analysis which are a consequence of hearing loss. 
For example, 
"cochlear disease does not just affect the thresholds for hearing tones, but also 
affects aspects of auditory analysis which may impair higher level pattern 
recognition, even when the threshold change is accounted for by appropriate 
adjustment ofthe stimuli." (Griffiths et. all999 p.367). 
Brainstem lesions can also cause deficits relating to specific aspects of the signal (e.g. temporal 
processing), but as in the case of affective processing. survival is unlikely with damage to such 
systems. It is certainly plausible that any initial processing deficit (i.e. damage to processes on 
the way to the auditory cortex) may result in an auditory domain general deficit, whilst specific 
damage to areas of auditory cortex may lead to modality-specific deficits. This then would 
explain some of the contradictions between domain-specific and auditory domain-general 
deficits. 
In light of this mode~ there is a need to investigate and identify different stages of information 
processing within music cognition - some of which may in fact be domain-general auditory 
processes and others which are domain-specific. A question to be raised in relation to the 
findings is whether common temporal and melodic processing might be a candidate architecture? 
There is conflicting evidence in the neuropsychological literature, e.g. on the one hand, we have 
specific rhythmic and melodic disturbances for music in subjects who did not present 
disturbance in any other auditory function (expressive or receptive). On the other hand, we 
have evidence for domain-general initial acoustic analysis, and some suggestions for shared 
neural resources across speech and music in light of eo-occurring deficits. 
Peretz shows a significant change of opinion on this matter across papers, (Peretz et. al, 1994 
and within Patel et. al, 1998) giving some example of the disagreements on this matter within 
the field. But the examples to follow also show the necessity to distinguish between perceptual 
and post-perceptual processing. Domain-specificity in one aspect of processing does not 
necessitate domain-specificity across the board. In the 1994 paper (Brain, 117), Peretz rejects 
domain-general auditory processing in light of an observed dissociation between good lyric 
identification and poor melody identification in subject CN. But both these processes operate at 
the level of post-perceptual knowledge stores. Domain-specificity here does not allow the 
rejection of domain-general perceptual processes. 17 
In the 1998 paper (Patel et. al, 1998), the aim was to examine whether there may be common 
processing of melody and temporal across speech and music. In this study, musical stimuli 
were developed to mimic the melodic and temporal patterns of speech at the global level of 
contour and metre. On same/different classifications for each group of stimuli (speech/music) 
one subject was found to be impaired across prosodic and music discrimination tasks, and the 
other subject to have intact performance on both, suggesting shared cognitive resources for 
these processes. However, while Patel et. al might be on the right track as regards the idea that 
there may be some shared resources, it is not clear that this is so at the level of processing they 
propose. The subject IR who showed impaired performance also showed a failure to hold 
musical stimuli in short term memory, and it may be this disturbance which is responsible for 
her similar performance across domains as opposed to shared temporal and melodic resources. 
IR does, however, suggest there may be shared mnemonic resources for holding melodic and 
temporal information in short term memory. The conflicts between these two studies exemplify 
the difficulties in isolating stages of processing and equivalent tasks across domains. But, 
nonetheless, there is an important attempt to equate stimuli from different domains here. 
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In light of these considerations, identicying interactive stages of processing is important as 
otherwise we will fmd contradictory data, as in the case of processing of pitch and temporal 
data (Peretz & Kolinsky, 1993). Findings will be dependent upon which stage processing tasks 
are tapping into, i.e., before or after aspects are integrated. Evidence would suggest integration 
of temporal and melodic processing is at the later decision-making stages of processing. Given 
that melodic organisation and temporal organisation exhibit evidence of functional autonomy, it 
would make sense to posit these as separate modules, even though it is unclear how the outputs 
of these modules subsequently come to seem to be integrated into a unified experience. With 
this in mind, one can see the scope for conflicting reports. There may be domain-general initial 
acoustic processing, subsequent domain-specific processing, and then, for later stages of music 
processing, integration of percepts from systems which are functionally autonomous. 
Nonetheless, whilst there is room for a variety of further empirical investigation, peripheral 
systems, as outlined above, do conform to a strong modular hypothesis. Evidence from 
amelodia, and arhythmia strongly suggest peripheral processing of music is divided into 
autonomous and prespecified modules for these functions, with further fractionation as seen in 
figure 7 .2. Given evidence from selective sparing and damage to other auditory functions, it is 
reasonable to assume that the other auditory domains - speech and environmental sound -
will be similarly organised at this initial level of processing, with varying numbers of modules, 
dedicated to major acoustic or structural divisions for that domain. Affective processing is also 
represented within the model, showing the direct routing of auditory input to the limbic system. 
At present, it is not clear at what stage affective processing is integrated with other aspects of 
music cognition. There is no firm evidence to suggest that such processing is music-specific. 
However, where music is the input, it is true that specific response patterns are observed. 
7.5 A Global Model of Music Cognition? 
The above discussion and empirical evidence allows the generation of a fairly well-structured 
model of perceptual music processes. Proposing modularity for receptive music processing in 
terms of peripheral processes seems a highly plausible endeavour. Difficulties arise, however, 
when attempting to explain broader musical abilities and their interaction with other cognitive 
functions. For the present, however, it is possible to develop a general cognitive architecture for 
music, aspects of which wilt vary according to musical training and exposure. 
It still remains to explain how perceptual processing as outlined above is then utilised for 
complex musical tasks, recognition, interaction with language, production of music, and internal 
musical representations. In addition to perceptual discrimination modules for interval, contour, 
rhythm, metre, and affect, one also needs an ability to map these features onto existing musical 
representations to facilitate recognition of familiar examples, and deviations from 'normal' 
structure. Input and output orthography (reading and writing music), also need to be accounted 
for in a global architecture which incorporates both expressive and receptive musical abilities. 
Further evidence from neuropsychological studies is invaluable here. Deficits in music writing 
and reading, musical alexia, and agraphia, and sparing of these faculties in the presence of 
language deficits (e.g., as in the cases of MR and Shebalin) provide grounds for proposing 
orthographic and visual music modules - grown modules which are the result of explicit 
tutoring, like orthographic language modules. 
In addition to perceptual processing of music, there must be access to stored musical 
representations such that one can recognise familiar melodies, and assess novel constructs 
within the constraints of one's own tonal system. Evidence from damage to music recognition 
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abilities, whilst perceptual abilities are spared, (e.g., Eustache et. al, Case 2, 1990) suggests 
such a music lexicon or store of musical representations. Perceptual processing may map onto 
these existing representations, or produce new representations within existing rules. This allows 
us to build on the perceptual model above to propose, somewhat tentatively, an architecture as 
presented in fig.7.4: 
Fig. 7.4: A Global Architecture for Music Processing 
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The model presents a clear analogy with models of language processing. For example, with 
speech input processing - word sound deafness (perceptual level, inability to interpret speech 
input) and word form deafness (associative level, inability to associate sound analysis with 
lexical information) relate to music perceptual processing and access to the music lexicon 
(stored musical representations) respectively. 
The idea of shallow access is not specifically problematic, but again reflects attentional bia es 
applied in processing tasks. When listening to songs, attention is typically directed towards 
processing the musical rather than linguistic content. We can by choice attend to the words, but 
in doing so we may not fully process the musical content. It seems we cannot do both ta ks at 
once, and there is an attentional preference for processing the musical content in this task. This 
is not specific to the musical domain. For example, the same effect is observed in speech, when 
one is attending to speech in a noisy environment, one only processes the inputs, which are the 
focus of attention. Auditory working memory can be incorporated into the model, but this is not 
best represented in terms of a specific location, rather, it consists in an ability to capture the 
auditory representations at different stage of processing. I.e., one can hold in memory a tune 
that one has heard, recalled from memory, or a novel tune that one has hummed or sung in one's 
head. 
In classical neuropsychology, there is a distinction between apperceptive agnosia (perceptual 
level) and associative agnosia (access to a lexicon) and the global model for music processing 
must be able to account for both these types of deficit. This apperceptiveJassociative distinction 
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is demonstrated in music processing by the cases of CN and IR (Patel et. at, 1998). Both 
apperceptive and associative music agnosias resulted in an impairment in the recognition of 
familiar melodies. In CN, by apparent damage to music perceptual abilities and in IR, by 
inability to access the music lexicon. For example, case CN, (Patel et. al, 1998) presents 
damage to musical 'memory' (recognition of familiar tunes) and damage to melodic perceptual 
abilities. However, recognition of once familiar lyrics (sung or spoken) remained intact, as did 
memory for other auditory domains. The melodic perceptual deficit may in fact be responsible 
for this music recognition deficit, an inability for the music to be processed sufficiently such that 
it can be mapped onto existing representations. This is compatible with the above account -
i.e. if we conceptually lesioned one of the music perceptual modules, there would still be an 
ability to do some perceptual discrimination, but perhaps not enough to facilitate mapping onto 
existing representations. Damage to input systems that facilitate the mapping process may 
cause problems for a variety of musical tasks, both for expression of (playing, singing and 
notating) once familiar works, and for aural recognition. 
However, the fact that CN could not sing melodies from memory complicates this scenario in 
terms of the relationship between expressive and receptive functions and on this issue, the above 
model might be subject to criticism. In other examples of auditory agnosia (e.g .• for speech), 
perceptual processing deficits are held responsible for the inability to recognise sounds. The 
problem with CN's case is that she shows only very minor perceptual deficits and it might be 
argued that these should not prevent recognition of music (given also, that one can grossly 
distort melodies and still recognise them, one might argue that a minor perceptual deficit should 
still leave the subject with sufficient input to recognise music). However, one can reconcile 
these findings with the model. An explanation ofCN's case may lie in eo-occurring damage to 
the music lexicon itself, or may indeed be merely a result of perceptual difficulties leading to a 
degraded input to the lexicon and thus allowing insufficient feedback in singing, or simply a eo-
occurring expressive deficit. Interestingly, CN's perceptual problems were specific to pitch 
discrimination, which is seemingly a chief factor in tune recognition (see Peretz 1996). 
Importantly the difficulties in interaction between expressive and receptive function may be a 
consequence of bilateral damage to the auditory cortex. Case IR, mentioned above, had a 
similar pattern of bilateral damage and exhibited both expressive and receptive difficulties. 
Cases such as CN, with loss of recognition in the face of minimal perceptual deficits, can be 
satisfactorily reconciled with the current model. However, the occurrence of subjects with 
intact recognition of melodies but inability to do perceptual discrimination presents a further 
problem (Eustache et al., 1990, case 2). It is nonetheless worth attempting to explain these 
findings within the model outlined. It is possible in such cases that there are sufficient 
perceptual abilities intact to facilitate recognition, indeed, many factors are not determinants of 
tune recognition - e.g., deviations in speed (tempo), key, and register do not stop us 
recognising a tune as familiar. 18 This might seem to contradict the explanation offered in 
relation to CN, above. However, the important issues here would appear to be the nature of the 
perceptual deficit in question, with some perceptual features of music acting as major 
determinants for recognition. Whereas you can test a language lexical input system by getting it 
to discriminate forms with small differences between them - e.g. 'house', 'mouse', 'louse', 
'mouth' - changing minimal features of music does not necessarily result in a different form in 
melody. For example, one can hear an out of tune, out of tempo melody, played on a different 
instrument at an unusually high pitch with various melodic distortions and yet still recognise the 
melody as a familiar tune. Composers have indeed exploited this mapping ability throughout 
history by producing whole works which are variations on a theme, within which we can 
recognise the original theme throughout the work. 
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For music (and song), it is conceivable that a combination of shallow access from the language 
lexical system, (see 7.6.1), the affective system and some intact perceptual discrimination is 
sufficient for recognition. Indeed this would seem to be supported by severe recognition deficits 
seen in case IR, who suffered severe discrimination deficits for both temporal and melodic 
features, leaving very little, if any, perceptual information to facilitate recognition. Both the 
case of CN and Eustache et. al's findings invite caution about suggesting a single route of 
access to musical representations by perceptual analysis of sound. Suggesting separate 
perceptual detection systems and other access to musical representations (via language, vision, 
affect etc., as in figure.7.4) goes some way towards solving this problem. It is perfectly 
plausible given existing models of language processing. that the lexical and grammatical 
systems continue to process lyrics - but the output for this 'shallow' language processing does 
not go any further into central systems unless, that is, by selective attention, you consciously 
decide to attend to the lyrics of the song. This suggestion also complements the observation that 
linguistic ambiguities are not readily detected in lyrics 
7 .5.1 Music and Language 
Findings from retained lyric recognition in amusic subjects may allow us to elucidate upon 
interactions with linguistic processes and expressive/receptive differences. A variety of 
hypotheses emerge for the explanation of singing, but often there is oversimplification of music 
and language interaction. Jackendoff 1987, claims that, 
"In perceiving singing, for instance, the incoming information must be 
processed both as music and as (temporarily and intonationally distorted) 
language" (p.232). 
Jackendoff's comment, however, needs further explanation. It is certainly not the case that there 
is full flow of information between music and language processing. This is highlighted by 
anecdotal evidence from normal music cognition, suggesting shallow interaction. One often 
cannot remember the words or meaning of songs that one has heard, and processed, or even 
sung many times (hymns might be a prime example here.) Indeed, there is little dependence 
between melody and lyrics - one does not have to remember lyrics to remember a melody and 
vice versa. In the case of CN (Peretz et. al, 1994) lyrics were recognised irrespective of whether 
they were presented with the correct or an arbitrary melody. Further evidence may be provided 
by aphasia studies. For many years clinicians have reported the phenomenon of profoundly 
aphasic subjects who could nonetheless sing familiar songs from memory. Such findings again 
suggest very shallow linguistic involvement. It seem likely that spared singing abilities in 
aphasics are more in line with automatic 'over-learnt' motor skills than any residual language 
abilities. 
7.6 General Discussion 
A common assumption is that a modular account advocating domain-specificity and 
prespecitied modules (as proposed here) is strictly at odds with connectionist theory. 
Connectionist models, however, do not really pose much of a problem for Nativist views. 
Although the initial aims of connectionist networks were to simulate domain-general learning, 
('domain-general' referring here to functions across domains as opposed to functioning across 
sub-categories within a sensory domain as in auditory domain-general processing), this has not 
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been supported by empirical evidence. Networks with unbiased weights (e.g. analogous to a 
system with no attentional preferences) do not simulate human learning, e.g., where a single 
exposure is sufficient to learn a new word. Rather, they require thousands of training attempts 
before success. Networks with biased weights, however, (although biased no more than innate 
predispositions as suggested for music) mimic human learning more effectively. 19 
Karmiloff-Smith also supports the idea that connectionism is compatible with a nativist 
perspective. She notes, 
"there is nothing about the connectionist framework that precludes the 
introduction of initial biased weights (i.e., weights that are the equivalent of 
innately specified predispositions) rather than random weights." Karmiloff-
Smith, 1992, p.l79 
The conflict between domain-general and domain-specific principles is perhaps also 
overemphasised .... 
"In favour of domain generality, connectionists stress that their models use the 
same learning algorithms for different categories of input presented to different 
networks. But no single network has been presented with an array of inputs 
from different domains (e.g., language, space, physics) ...... .In other words, the 
fact that each network is dedicated to a specific type of input, in a specific 
learning task, turns out to be equivalent to domain specificity (or modularity) in 
the human." (Karmiloff-Smith, p.l80-181.) 
Indeed, more connectionist theories are beginning to acknowledge the role of domain-specific 
constraints upon processing tasks. A specific example for music is offered by Bharucha ( 1987), 
who presents a connectionist framework for music cognition. Bharucha claims that "music is 
(at least in part) a consequence of a general-purpose structure-abstracting process exposed to a 
highly structured acoustic environment." (Bharucha, 1987, p.2). He goes on to say that 
"domain-specific representations that are acquired on the basis of domain-general principles 
may function in a modular fashion., (p. 2) Nonetheless he still holds that this is at odds with a 
broader modular architecture. He stresses the conflict with modular theory (and the supposed 
support for the connectionist model), by noting that connectionist networks support top-down 
processing. However, this is not necessarily in conflict with a weak modular view, if one 
considers that top-down processing is not implicated at certain levels of representation. 
Specifically, it is not required at the level of perceptuaVperipheral modularity that I am 
proposing here, and as we have noted above a bottom-up or data-driven model may be 
advantageous. 
Bharucha's connectionist model of harmony could certainly be reconciled with a modular 
theory. It is perfectly feasible to suggest that a submodule or processing strategy operating 
within a modular system operates upon principles of parallel processing. And indeed modular 
characteristics might not be necessary at some levels of processing, depending on the task to 
hand. Bharucha, nonetheless, attempts to add further support to the connectionist model and 
appears to have assimilated modularity with serial processing, which is simply a confusion: 
"given the speed with which musical intuitions are engaged, melodies are 
recognized and structure is extracted, and given the sluggishness of neuronal 
transmission, there is strong support for a theory that posits the simultaneous 
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satisfaction of harmonic constraints. Parallel processing permits the 
simultaneous activation of memory traces. A serial search through long-term 
memory would be implausible given the rapidity with which we recognise 
pieces we have not heard for years." p.25 
Again this is not incompatible with a modular idea of a musical lexicon, the internal operation 
of which employs parallel processing strategies. There is no assumption of serial processing 
within the music lexicons outlined above or within perceptual modules themselves. 
Peretz, however, offers a fairly severe critique of connectionist models. She notes, 
"according to these new models - known as connectionist networks or parallel 
distributed processing - the representations cannot be altered without also 
altering the perceptual processes." (1993, p.206-207). 
This would indeed be true for a connectionist model which attempted to model broader 
subdivisions of music or music cognition as a whole. However, it is feasible that connectionist 
networks may operate within a hierarchy of levels of processing. Indeed within her own model 
(fig. 7.5~ acoustic analysis may be performed by a connectionist network, the output of which 
is then fed into the 'representations' model. This, then, invalidates the critique that associative 
agnosias (involving perception but lack of recognition) are not compatible with connectionist 
models. The internal operation of these peripheral modules, though, is more problematic. 
Peretz does advocate parallel processing of pitch and temporal information in initial perceptual 
stages, but she suggests serial processing within these 'modules'. Her claim concerned melodic 
processing and the finding that interval processing cannot function in the presence of contour 
deficits: contour processing, however, may remain intact when interval processing is damaged. 
This may be interpreted as suggesting that melody is processed serially in the order: contour -
interval - scale. Further support for this model might have invalidated the claim for parallel 
processing within peripheral modules. However, a subsequent finding by Peretz, showed that 
there could be isolated damage to interval processing without a deficit in contour processing. 
So parallel processing after all may be an acceptable proposal for the internal operation of 
modules. In any case, there is no particular reason why the advocate of modularity should 
object to the possibility. 
Fig 7.5 Peretz 1993, Melodic and Temporal Processing 
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The supposed conflict between connectionist and modular theory is perhaps overemphasised as 
one can see there is room for both modular and connectionist characteristics within a global 
architecture. 
7 .6.1 Summary 
A modular hypothesis is highly plausible for music cognition. provided that it exhibits far more 
flexibility than an orthodox Fodorian account. One cannot propose fixed modular 
characteristics which are applicable across all musical functions, nor even within for example a 
specific subdivision such as auditory receptive processing. Many problems are incurred by top-
down conceptualisations of processing - starting with higher level processing of complex 
sound sources, as opposed to starting with the signal. 
If one starts with the signal, taking notions like those of Griffiths' on processing of sound in the 
ascending auditory pathways, and also notions like different frequency components of the 
signal, one has a picture of auditory cognition which more closely resembles visual processing. 
At the subcortical level one may get different cell assemblies activating to different parts of the 
signal. These then relay on to particular cortical structures (e.g., in the case of spatial 
processing of sound, superior olive to right parietal; see Griffiths, 1999, pp.232). Different 
sounds will end up in different areas and there will be overlaps where sound components are 
common across 'domains'. However, the total network of activations obtained is likely to be 
distinctive for categories of auditory input - music, speech and environmental sound. This 
avoids as noted in section 7.5, the need for modules all sampling inputs and 'deciding' to 
disregard some of them. 
This approach may also avoid the need for a tier of initial analysis, and as such, the above 
model with domain·specific music perceptual processes will be largely a functional account as 
opposed to correlating closely to underlying neural networks. More analysis of intermediate 
processing begins to suggest that the studies of behaviour in the past have not considered the 
detail of the acoustic signals they were using - what frequency band were they drawn from, 
what temporal characteristics, etc. Musical signals do form an acoustically distinctively 
different grouping from phonological signals. So in adopting a bottom-up conception of 
processing we then get our 'domains' for free as a consequence of restricted acoustic inputs-
modules simply develop as a consequence of the extent of the input they receive. 
To conclude, there is a real need for investigation of interacting levels of processing and in 
terms of central auditory processing an acknowledgement of the restraints imposed by initial 
auditory analysis. Many accounts of auditory dysfunction do need to consider carefully whether 
deficits are really at the level of perceptual processing or initial acoustic analysis. Nonetheless, 
one can begin to develop more consistent accounts of processing such as those suggested here, 
which are supported by robust empirical data. In terms of developing a global model, there are 
many empirical conflicts which could be effectively resolved. Empirical methods are available 
for further investigation, and systematic analysis from the bottom-up perspective of the acoustic 
signal may be fruitful across the domain of auditory cognition and perception. 
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Notes 
1 Subjects with amusic deficits lose the ability to interpret all sounds formerly identified as music. Auditory 
domains develop fairly rigid boundaries, and other auditory faculties have set domains of input which will not 
interpret musical information. 
2 E.g., word sound deafuess is a perceptual disorder in which the listener is unable to establish the phonemic 
structure of inputs (analogous to apperceptive problems in music) and word form deafuess is a lexical processing 
disorder where sound analysis can occur, but that analysis cannot be associated with lexical information 
(analogous to associative music deficits). 
3 See Fodor 1983 p47. 
4 Jackendoffl992 p.l25 
5 This supports an automatic model of processing which is not open to introspection, as we show a superiority fur 
processing scales of unequal steps, although phenomenologically we hear the steps of the major scale as 
equivalent. (see below, section 7.3.3. 
6 See Trehub, (1987), Infants' Perception of Musical Patterns, Perception and Psychophysics 41,635-641. 
7 This also provides a further objection to Goldberg above, as regards his claims for inherent ordering of 
functionally related processes. 
1 A point of detail here in relation to these findings, is that subjects with early onset epilepsy may not have typical 
patterns of brain organisation. Because the epilepsy reflects a neural abnormality, this may trigger a process of re--
organisation of function and brain organisation atypical of the general population. In this way, late onset lesions 
(as in stroke) may enable more inferences re; normal patterns of localisation. Functional brain imaging is likely to 
be able to resolve some of these issues and add further insights as regards issues oflocalisation. 
9 Jordan D & Shepard R. (1987) Tonal Schemas: Evidence Obtained by Probing Distorted Musical Scales, 
Perception and Psychophysics, 41 621-634. Shepard R, & Jordan D, (1984) Audilory 1//usions Demonstrating 
That Tones are Assimtlated to an Internalised Musical Scale. Science 226, 1333-1334. 
10 p.I34 Cognition 68. It is interesting to compare to emotion recognition with liuniliarity. Subjects need around 
2 sewnds to recognise a highly familiar tune. 
11 See the earlier discussion of cognitivism in Chapter 2. 
12 The idea of basic affective categories has other supporters. Ekman, Johnson·Laird agree here, but propose 
slightly differing groups. See Charland p.284. 
13 It has been suggested by several theorists, notably Jaak Panksepp that the emotional responses we have to 
music are a throwback from an early mechanism to recognise the crying of offSpring. This term 'musical chill' 
which has now been adopted more widely was coined by Jaak Panksepp and colleagues at Bowling Green State 
University. Panksepp has studied both animal and human responses to music. See New scientist supplement 
'Emotions' 27th Apri196. 
14 In addition to mandatory operation, there is some eviderwe fur pace and sequencing of development, but as yet 
this has not been experimentally verified. Peretz et. a1 (1998, pp.l34) comment. that "sensitivity to mode via 
emotional judgements appears precociously, around the age of 3 years, (Kastner & Crowder, 1990)." However, 
other authors have failed to replicate this finding, instead suggesting that the .. systematic relation between mode 
and emotion emerges later, at the age of8 years." 
"See Gorelick & Ross, 1987, fur further details on specific aprosodias. 
16 See Griffiths et. al, Neurocase, 1999. 
17 There are many inconsistencies across the two papers, that the authors fuil to point out to the reader, In the 
1994 paper, CN is misclassitied as an apperceptive agnosic, but in the 1998 paper ()()ITCCtly becomes an 
associative agnosic. CN also perfurms diffi:rently across the two papers in 1994 she dissociates between speech 
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prosody and tune pitch variation but not in the 1998 paper. This demonstrates the need for caution in comparison 
of studies. The authors fail to signal the change in views to readers, nor to attempt to explain the difference in 
CN's performance across the papers. 
18 Eustache et at's findings may be queried. One must question the similarity of the two tasks here (recognition 
and discrimination) ht particular, did the same/different task involve working memory? If one task Involves a 
memory component and the other does not, this result may have few implications for the model presented here. 
19 See Ashcraft, Human Memory and Cognition 1994 for an introduction to oonnectionist networks. 
20 Peretz, Auditory Agnosia: a Functional Analysis, fig. 7.2 p.214. 
Conclusion 
Throughout this investigation I have noted that there is far more empirical work to be 
undertaken, and theory it seems is perhaps a little ahead of its empirical counterparts. However, 
rather than being a daunting prospect, the scope for further empirical work promises to provide 
real solutions to some of the divergent explanations which have featured here. Despite the still 
fledgling stage of studies, there are some interesting conclusions to be drawn, in addition to 
specific suggestions for further research. The overall aim of my investigation was to assimilate 
fmdings from diverse fields in terms of a unified account of music and music-emotion 
processing. This resulted in a model of musical expression as proposed in part one of the thesis, 
and a broader account of music cognition, which was compatible with this account of 
expression. 
The initial investigations of emotion theory revealed a cognitive/physiological divide in 
conceptions of affective states. In particular, it needs to be noted that affective terminology has 
become so deeply ingrained in its uses that it is assumed to be revealing of actual divisions in 
affective states. In truth, affective states do not conform to such clearly defined boundaries. 
This is reflected in the continued failure of attempts to classifY moods, emotions, feeling, and 
affect as distinctive categories of affective state. In light of this, if one considers affective states 
in terms of a multidimensional continuum, varying in terms of duration, intensity, and cognitive 
and physiological components, it appears that cognitive and physiological accounts are 
complementary: they merely reflect differing explanations of constituents of affect, as opposed 
to being seen as contradictory accounts of differing affective constructs. Indeed, perhaps the 
most significant finding raised was that states which we typically refer to as emotions can be 
largely non-cognitive. In certain circumstances, one can have an 'emotion• without being 
consciously aware of, or able to verbalise, the emotion-object or cause. 
This revised conception of affectivity proved to be extremely useful in terms of musically 
expressed and aroused emotion. Rather than cognitive and physiological accounts both failing 
to explain adequately musical emotion as a whole, they could be seen to offer explanations of 
different components of musical affect. The hypothesis I proposed here was that musical 
emotions are evoked both directly (by the effects of sound on the auditory system), and also by 
means of conditioned associations (including extra-musical associations). The hypothesis of 
direct affective processing of sound suggests that music taps into an evolutionarily ancient 
cognitive system for detecting emotion, which might have functioned as a defence mechanism 
and for detecting crying offspring. This direct channelling of auditory affect was shown to be 
independent of identity processing, in as much as one can detect emotion in a sound source 
without being able to identity that sound source or discriminate its individual features. 
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The hypothesis proved to be well supported by a variety of empirical data from studies of 
normal and brain-damaged subjects, and from knowledge of visual affective processing, and 
language affective processing. Indeed the two distinct types of affective processing proposed 
for music, are mirrored by 'emotional cognition' and 'affective perception' in non-musical 
contexts, and are also matched in terms of emotional deficits associated with different neural 
localisations. The hypothesis also supports the notion that one can recognise emotion expressed 
in music without any necessity for its arousal in the listener. Empirical studies confirm that one 
can recognise an emotion in music without undergoing any physiological affective response, 
supporting the rejection of theories which promote recognition of emotion as a by-product of 
arousal. 
Nonetheless, there were two distinct problems for this account. Firstly, what was the nature of 
interaction between direct and extra-musical modes of processing? And secondly, were the 
auditory affective detection systems music-specific or auditory-general? In response to the first 
problem it seems that there is an amalgamation of cognitive and physiological affective 
responses across these modes of expression, and this makes it hard to detach the two. For 
example, recognition via 'extra-musical' modes of expression is certainly not restricted to a 
process of conscious analytical evaluation. Expression via acculturation can be extremely fast 
and ingrained as demonstrated by responses to film soundtracks and typical musical 'styles'. In 
addition, it may be possible that each mode of expression has the ability to 'override' the other, 
(perhaps depending upon the intensity of the response) and this might be something subject to 
further empirical study. Using subjects with differing emotional deficits, amusic subjects and 
normal subjects, could well offer an opportunity to examine different modes of arousal and 
recognition in isolation. 
In response to the issue of specificity. it appears more likely that there is an auditory-general 
affective mechanism than a music-specific function, but the empirical findings on this matter are 
not conclusive. This is an issue which can be effectively resolved by further empirical studies. 
Designing equivalent tasks for the detection of vocal affective prosody, musical affect, and 
affect in environmental sound (cries of pain, anger, etc.) would then allow us to see whether 
subjects ·who claimed to exhibit dissociated affective prosody were really providing evidence of 
an affective function specific to music, language, or environmental sound specific function. 
It is my hope that the model proposed represents a significant advance in contrast to existing 
theories. It can explain the frequently reported inconsistencies in ascriptions of emotion to 
music, and most significantly provides evidence that processing of musical affect is neither 
dependent upon recognising musical features, nor a subsidiary of processing emotion in the 
voice. This allows us to reject theories which claim music is expressive due to its similarities to 
vocal contours, and those theories which claim that identity of specific musical features are 
necessary for expression. This framework clearly has some strong implications for aesthetic 
accounts of expression. Specifically, the mode of expression that one adheres to has 
implications concerning the specificity of emotional response that can be claimed. If one claims 
that music expresses directly, then by this means of expression music may only convey a very 
basic range of affective responses. Expression theories, therefore, must account for the 
differing modes of expression which are identified by empirical studies, and are clearly wrong in 
so far as they claim that music expresses by one means only. 
Having developed a revised account of expression in Part I, the aim in Part 11 was to develop a 
broad account of music cognition, specifically an account of receptive music processing which 
was compatible with the account of expression outlined in Part I 
In Chapter 3 I outlined some existing hypotheses regarding hemisphere dominance and 
processing strategies for musicians and non-musicians. A widely accepted notion is that the left 
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and right hemispheres employ abstract processing strategies, with analytic processing being 
assigned to the left, and holistic processing to the right hemisphere. As a consequence of this 
conception, the apparent differences in hemisphere dominance between musicians and non-
musicians are attributed to the employment of these different processing strategies, the claim 
being that musicians employ analytic strategies (and therefore the left hemisphere), and non-
musicians employ 'general purpose' holistic strategies (and therefore the right hemisphere). 
Case MR, presented in ChapterS, provided a welcome opportunity to reject these assumptions. 
The evidence provided by case MR, and other examples in the literature, in fact demonstrates 
that there is no necessary relationship between musical ability and lateralisation of musical 
function, and there are no differences at the gross level of lateralisation for musical and non-
musical subjects. 
The differences one sees between musicians and non musicians are due to the processing 
strategies applied. But this is not evidence of abstract processing strategies associated with left 
and right hemispheres. Rather, it is the case that musicians and non-musicians may differ in the 
strategies they recruit to complete the task at hand, and this may vary according to each specific 
task, and according to individual differences. The observed differences are not indicative of any 
abstract hemispheric strategy and in this respect the hypothesis gains further support from the 
contradictory claims for hemisphere dominance which were presented in Chapter 3 and allows 
us to move away from the claims that musicians and non-musicians have such radically 
different neural architectures. Rather, it is the case that musicians acquire the ability to apply 
different strategies through exposure to music and specific musical training. 
Assimilating the evidence from dissociations, nonnal cognition and musician/non-musician 
variance, a dear picture of music processing begins to emerge. The auditory system as a whole 
is highly fractionated, with relatively autonomous processes exhibiting distinct patterns of 
breakdown. Auditory processing subdivides at many levels, both across input and output 
modalities, at perceptual and associative levels, affective perception and auditory memory. This 
picture is clearly consistent with a broadly modular account of cognition. exhibiting 
characteristic patterns of breakdown, functional autonomy, domain specificity, and mandatory 
operation. 
The model I present is chiefly concerned to explain receptive musical function. but the findings 
regarding auditory subdivisions are also worthy of note. Despite assumptions to the contrary, it 
is not clear that music, speech, and environmental sound form entirely autonomous subsystems. 
Whilst some aspects of processing may be domain-specific, there may also be some shared 
processing capacities. For example, the neuropsychological evidence does not rule out the 
possibility of some shared temporal or contour processing capacities and this must be borne in 
mind within any proposed model. This again is an area subject to further empirical study, and 
holds the possibility of conclusively determining whether specific functions are auditory-general 
or domain-specific. 
Nonetheless, the subdivisions within music processing itself are well documented and exhibit 
processing autonomy. Music exhibits clear division in terms of expressive (productive) and 
receptive processes. Expressive processing subdivides further into oral-expressive, instrumental 
expressive, and orthographic processing. Receptive functions subdivide into rhythmic, melodic, 
tonal, visual orthographic functions, and also lexical processing (matching input to stored 
representations). In addition. processing divides in terms of apperceptive and associative 
functions. So music is processed at two levels, firstly involving discrimination of the auditory 
signal (apperceptive), and secondly involving matching the auditory signal to existing 
representations (associative). Deficits can occur at both these levels and can occur across the 
subdivisions outlined. 
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The model represents how one deconstructs the auditory signal and this is consistent across 
individuals. Where one does see differences is at the finer levels of discrimination by which 
listeners analyse the input. For non·musical subjects it may be that some 'general purpose, 
auditory mechanisms are recruited for contour processing and temporal processing - though 
again, this is subject to further study. What is clear is that musicians are often able to make 
finer discriminations and employ different strategies for analysing the signal, and again this is 
why one observes musician/non-musician differences. The musical system is trained up to 
attend to different musical features and therefore applies a different strategy which may be more 
effective in terms of the task at hand. 
In light of subject variance a major question is whether music modules are innate or developed. 
Very recently evidence has been presented for innate music processing predispositions. 
However, analysis of the fmdings did not provide conclusive evidence that infant responses were 
music specific. Nonetheless, auditory general predispositions are still relevant for a model of 
music. That we have biases for attending to global, as opposed to local features, matches the 
processing strategies observed in non·musicians and supports the claim that musicians' abilities 
are the result of acquired strategies, rather than any original difference in abstract processing 
strategies. 
To summarise, we have a model of receptive music processing and auditory affective processing 
which is a good candidate for a modular architecture. The system exhibits autonomous 
subdivisions which are supported by robust dissociations. The acquisition of music processing 
and differences between subject groups can be explained both by initial attentional biases, and 
specific musical training and input, which can sculpt the system during acquisition. Looking at 
the auditory signal itself explains many difficulties which arise with the modular account. A 
particular concern is to explain how sound is channelled to specific domains. If one looks at the 
signal, there appear to be sufficient distinctions between the three auditory categories (speech, 
music and environmental sound) to allow some initial channelling of input by early acoustic 
analysis. It then follows that modules develop domain specificity by being fed specific sets of 
input. An understanding of the early stages of auditory analysis may prove to be invaluable in 
providing a full account of music cognition. Indeed, more work is needed in terms of clarifYing 
the nature of auditory deficits, many of which may be occurring much earlier in the stream of 
auditory processing than predicted, and this will allow the much needed clarification of which 
functions are domain-specific and which are auditory·general. 
On a concluding note, while studies of musical brain damage may give us insights into the 
independence of music as a cognitive function. they certainly leave us with further problems. If 
music and language are seemingly such autonomous systems, how do we account for their 
frequent interaction? Music and speech often come bundled together, singing after all involves 
language, and we have music with narrative, poems set to music, and music intended to tell 
stories or represent a situation. Environmental sounds and music are not rigidly differentiated 
either, music often uses sound effects such as birdsong, car horns, trains, etc., and we certainly 
hear music as part of the 'environment, on many occasions. I have only touched upon these 
problems in this account, but it is clear that empirical research has the potential to resolve some 
of these issues, in many cases merely by refining task parameters. One important prospect is 
that, as we begin to understand how music is deconstructed, how its structures act upon our 
auditory affective systems, and how music may influence other functions in acquisition, we may 
develop an enhanced level of control of the ways in which it is possible to tailor music to suit 
our processing predispositions, to tap into our affective responses, and to exploit the limits of 
boundaries between auditory functions. 
Appendix I 
Summary of Amygdala Function 
Chapter 3 gives further consideration to the role of physiological affective responses. For 
present purposes, I will explain the role of the amygdala. to give a broad idea of the type of 
responses being referred to. The amygdala is not the only structure responsible for such 
responses as it seems the limbic system as a whole is involved. However, research into the role 
of the amygdala demonstrates that affective responses may be induced by perceptual stimuli, 
that affective processing is distinct from identity of perceptual stimuli, and that there are 
subsequent links from affective processing to evaluative thought. Importantly, studies of such 
responses demonstrate why there might be adaptive advantage in such mandatory affective 
responses. LeDoux, gives a summary of the amygdala: 
"Many emotional-processing functions are critically dependent on the 
amygdala. It has been known for some time that the amygdala, a small 
structure buried deep in the temporal lobe, plays an important role in the 
coding of the emotional significance of sensory stimuli (Kluver & Bucy, 193 7; 
Weiskrantz, 1956; Gloor, 1960; Downer, 1961; Goddard, 1964). Animals 
with amygdala lesions respond normally to the immediately available or 
remembered perceptual features of objects but are insensitive to the emotional 
significance of the same objects (for reviews, see Aggleton, & Mishkin, 1986; 
LeDoux, 1987) . ., (LeDoux, 1994 in Ekman And Davidson, pp218-219). 
Figure 1 gives a schematic account of the direct sensory routes to the amygdala. Auditory inputs 
function in the same way as the visual example given here. Figure 2 gives a functional 
representation of connections to the amygdala (further discussion is given by LeDoux, in Ekman 
and Davidson, 1994 ). 
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Fig. I 
Brain Pathways ofDefense. (Fig. 6-14 p. 166, LeDou:x 1996). 
"as the hiker wallcs through the woods, he abruptly encounters a snake coiled up behind a log on the 
path (upper right inset). The visual stimulus is first processed in the brain by the thalamus. Part of 
the thalamus passes crude, almost archetypal, information directly to the amygdala. This quick and 
dirty transmission allows the brain to start to respond to the possible danger signified by a thin, 
curved object, which could be a snake, or could be a stick or some other benign object. Meanwhile, 
the thalamus also sends visual information to the visual cortex (this part of the thalamus has a greater 
ability to encode the details of the stimulus than does the part that sends inputs to the amygdala). The 
visual cortex then goes about the business of creating a detailed and accurate representation of the 
stimulus. The outcome of cortical processing is then f ed to the amygdala as well. Although the 
cortical pathway provides the amygdala with a more accurate representation than the direct pathway 
to the amygdala from the thalamus, it takes longer for the information to reach the amygdala by way 
of the cortex. In situations of danger, it is very useful to be able to respond quickly. Th time saved 
by the amygdala in acting on the thalamic information, rather than wailing for the cortical input, may 
be the difference between life and death. It is bel/er to have treated a stick as a snake than not to have 
responded to a possible snalce. Most of what we lcnow about these pathways has actually been learned 






Sensory Cortex Polymodal Cortex 
(Association) - (Perirhinal) 
I: stimulus features 
AMYGDALA 2: perceptual objects 
3: polymodal representation 
4: contexts 
EMOTIONAL AUTONOMIC NEURo-ENDOCRINE 
SYSTEM BEHA VIOR NERVOUS SYSTEM 
Fig.2 
Schematic representation of input and output for the amygdala: 
From LeDoux (p.221 in Ekman & Davidson). 
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An important aspect to note is that the amygdala receives sensory input directly, but also 
subsequent interpretations of sensory input via the sensory cortex. This highlights the adaptive 
advantage of the amygdala as a defence mechanism, and again LeDoux puts this very 
succinctly: 
"Although the thalamic system cannot make fine distinctions, it has an 
important advantage over the cortical input pathway to the amygdala. That 
advantage is time. In a rat it takes about twelve milliseconds (twelve one-
thousandths of a second) for an acoustic stimulus to reach the amygdala 
through the thalamic pathway, and almost twice as long through the cortical 
pathway. The thalamic pathway is thus faster. It cannot tell the amygdala 
exactly what is there, but can provide a fast signal that warns that something 




Fig. 1 Left and Right Cerebral Hemispheres. 
The convolutions (foldings) seen in the cortical surface allow the large cortical surface area to be 
neatly packed into the skull. The fissures seen here are also known as sulci, and these separate 
the gyri, which mark some of the main structural divisions as seen below in fl~t. 2. 
Fig. 2 Lateral View of the Left Hemisphere 
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shows major features of the cortex, sulci and gyri, and division into 4 cortical lobes: Frontal, 
Temporal, Occipital and Parietal. 
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Distribution of the left middle cerebral artery, showing blood supply to areas of corteL 
Disruption of blood supply (stroke) may be caused by cerebral haemorrhage (spontaneous 
bleeding into the brain), or by a blockage in one of the arteries, cutting of blood supply to 
surrounding tissue. 
gyri» 





Fig. 5 The limbic system is, (indicated by the darker coloured areas) is compri ed of a et of 
structures which surround the brainstem, the major structures are the cingulate gyrus, 
subcallosal gyrus and parabippocampal gyrus. 
Figure Credits: Figures l & 5, adapted from Gazzaniga lvry and Mangun, (ed .) ognitive 
Neuroscience: The Biology of The Mind, 1998. Figure 2 & 3 from azza niga, I ry and 
Mangun, (eds.) Cognitive Neuroscience: The Biology of The Mind, 1998. 
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Test References 
111.1 Language Tests 
PALPA: Kay, J, Lesser, R & Coltheart L, (1992) Psycholinguistic Assessment of Language 
Processing in Aphasia, Psychology Press, Hove. 
BORB: Riddoch M. R, Humphreys G. W, (1993) Birmingham Object Recognition Battery, 
Lawrence Erlbaum Hove. 
Pyramids and Palm Trees: Howard, D. & Patterson, K. (1992). The Pyramids and Palm 
Trees Test. Thames Valley Test Company: Bury St Edmunds. 
Recorded Examples 
111.2 Perceptual Discrimination Experiment 1: Sound Source Discrimination. 
1. Schoenberg Pierrot Lunaire, Erika Sziklay Soprano, Budapest Chamber Ensemble ® & C Hungaroton 1987 
STEREO HCDII385-2 
2. Messiaen Catalogue D'Oiseaux Peter Hill, Piano, ~1988 Unioorn-Kanchana Reoords, London 0 1988 
Unicom-Kanchana Records, London. DKP(CD)9062 
3. Steve Reich, Early works CD® & C 1987 Electra/ Asylum/Nonesuch Records (US) & WEA Inc. (Non-US) 
CD979169-2 
4. Humming Familiar Sounds Cassette, Taskmaster Limited DLM 139 
S. Side 2 Band 4a. BBC Sound effects No. 4 (Cassette). ~1977 0 1977 BBC. London UK 
6. track 22, BBC Essential Sound Effects CD ®BBC World-wide Ltd. C 1990 BBC World-wide Ltd. London, 
UK. 
7. Side IBand 6a. BBC Sound effects No. 4 (Cassette). ®1977 0 1917 BBC, London UK 
8. Side 1 Band Sb. BBC Sound effects No. 4 (Cassette). ® 1977 0 1977 BBC, London UK 
9. Track 74. BBC Essential Sound Effects CD. ®BBC World-wide Ltd. C 1990 BBC World-wide Ltd. London, 
UK. 
10. Steve Reich, Early works CD~& C 1987 Electra/ Asylum/Nonesuch Records (US) & WEA Inc. (Non-US) 
CD979169-2 
11. Concert hall Track 76. BBC Essential Sound Effects CD ®BBC World-wide Ud. 0 1990 BBC World-wide 
Ltd. London, UK 
12. Track 2 BBC Essential Sound Effects CD ®BBC World-wide Ltd. 0 1990 BBC World-wide Ud. London, 
UK 
13. Familiar Sounds Cassette, Taskmaster Limited DLM 139 
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14. Track 81 BBC Essential Sound Effects CD <l!l BBC World-wide Ltd. 0 1990 BBC World-wide Ltd. London, 
VK. 
15. Familiar Sounds Cassette, Taskmaster Limited DLM 139 
16. Familiar Sounds Cassette, Taskmaster Limited DLM 139 
17. Familiar Sounds Cassette, Taskmaster Limited DLM 139 
18. Track 45 BBC Essential Sound Effects CD BBC World-wide Ltd. 0 1990 BBC World-wide Ltd. London, 
VK 
19. Familiar Sounds Cassette, Taskmaster Limited DLM 139 
20. Track 20 BBC Essential Sound Effects CD BBC World-wide Ltd. 0 1990 BBC World-wide Ltd. London, 
VK 
21. Track 56 BBC Essential Sound Effects CD BBC World-wide Ltd. 0 1990 BBC World-wide Ltd. London, 
UK 
22. Track 4 BBC Essential Sound Effects CD BBC World-wide Ltd. 0 1990 BBC World-wide Ltd. London. 
VK. 
23. Familiar Sounds Cassette, Taskmaster Limited DLM 139 
24. Familiar Sounds Cassette, Taskmaster Limited DLM 139 
25. Familiar Sounds Cassette, Taskmaster Limited DLM 139 
26. ADA Comprehension Battery Franklin, S. Turner, J. Elks, A. 0 1992 
27. ADA Comprehension Battery Franklin, S. Turner, J. Elks, A. 0 1992 
28. ADA Comprehension Battery Franklin, S. Turner, J. Elks, A. 0 1992 
29. Pulp Fiction Sound Track CD Track 9 
30. Track 4 Steve Reich, Early Works CD <l!l& 0 1987 Electra/Asylum/Nonesuch Records (US) & WEA Inc. 
(Non-US) CD 979 169-2 
31. ADA Comprehension Battery Franklin, S. Turner, J. Elks, A. 0 1992 
32. Track 24 BBC Essential Sound Effects CD. <l!l BBC World-wide Ltd. 0 1990 BBC World-wide Ltd. London, 
UK.. 
33. ADA Comprehension Battery Franklin, S. Turner, J. Elks, A. 0 1992 
34. Medieval Music- (0 Maria Maris .. ) Medieval Music CD Hilliard Ensemble <1!)1990 Macmillan Inc. 
35. Familiar Sounds Cassette, Taskmaster Limited DLM 139 
36. Glenn Miller Band -From Glen Miller CD ®1991 Pickwick international Inc. (Great Britain) Ltd 
37. Verdi 'La Force Del Destino-Romantic Times CD 41)1994 Delos International Inc. 01994 Conifer RC(IOI'ds 
38. 'Sapphire' from Cassette -Bill Holcomb • Contemporary Flute Solos In pop/jazz styles, 0 Musicians 
Publications. 
39. Schubert 'Widmung' Romantic Times CD ®1994 Delos International Inc. 01994 Conifer Records 
40. Medieval Music CD Hilliard Ensemble ® 1990 Macrnillan Inc. 
41. Britten String Quartet Modem Times CD <1!)1994 Conifer Records Ltd. 01994 Conifer Records 
42. Space Spiders Female of the Species Gut Music Publishing Limited <l!l & C 1996 Gut Records, London. 
43. Copland Clarinet Concerto Modem Times CD 4').1994 Conifer Records Ltd. 01994 Conifer Reoords 
44. Grieg Holberg Suite Romantic Times CD ®1994 Delos International Inc. 01994 Conifer Records 
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111.3 Perceptual Discrimination Experiment 8: Instrument Discrimination. 
1. Mozart Clarinet Concerto 2nd Movement, Josef Luptacik (Clarinet) Mozart Academy, Bratislava c:ond. 
Richard Edlinger. ®1988 HNH International Ltd. 01992 HNH International Ltd 
2. Debussy- La Fille Aux Cheveux de Lin. Nicholas Yorke (Piano) ApolJo Classics ®Wisepack Ltd. 199S 
Wisepack Ltd. 199S 105 Freston Road. Holland Park, London Wll 4BD 
3. Mozart Bassoon Concerto 2nd Movement Peter Hanzel (Bassoon) Mozart Academy, Bratislava c:ond. Richard 
Edlinger. ®1988 HNH International Ltd. 01992 HNH International Ltd. 
4. Gluck -Dance of the Blessed Spirits from orpheus and Euridice. Helmut Rucker (Flute), Herbet Kegel 
Cond. Meditation, Classical relaxation Vol.1 C1991 Delta Music. 
5. Rodrigo, Concierto de Ananjuez, 2nd Movement, Zoltan Tokos Guitar, Budapest strings, Meditation Vol. 4 
CD 0 Delta Music I 991 
6. Scarlatti Cat's Fugue (from 30 Essercizi per Gravicembalo) Joseph Paync (Harpsichord) Baroque Times CD 
®1994 Grammofon AB BIS OConifer Records 
7. Yeardley, D Drum Machine sample 
8. Bartok Viola Concerto 2nd movement: Adagio Religioso Universal Edition, Rivka Golani (Viola) ®1990 
Budapest Symphony Orchestra. From Compilation 'Modem Times' p 1994 Conifer reoords Limited 1994 
Conifer records Limited. 
9. Britten Young Persons Guide to the Orchestra, Andre Previn & Royal Philharmonic Orchestra. ® & OTelarc 
1986 Cleveland Ohio US. 
10. Vivaldi The Four Seasons, Allegro from Winter. Drottningholm Baroque Ensemble, Leader Nils-Erik Spar£ 
Baroque Times CD ® 1994 Grammofon AB BJS CConifer Records. 
11. Mozart Horn Concerto No.3 3rd Movement. Sebastien Weigle (Horn) Dresden Philharmonic; Jorg-Peter 
Weigle Cond. Meditation Vol.S ®1991 Delta Music 
12. Albinoni Adagio from Concerto Op.9 No.2 Ludwig Guttler (Trumpet) Christoph Kircheis (Organ) Meditation 
Vol. I a!>l991 DeltaMusic 
13. Poulenc, Sonata for Oboe and Piano, (1962) Movement 3. Maurice Bourgue (Oboe) Jacques Fevrier 
(Piano). Poulenc Chamber Music ®1973 EMI Path6 Marconi S.A 
14. Vivaldi Concerto in C minor RV 441, Movement 3: Allegro. Dan Laurin (Reoorder) Drottningholm Bamque 
Ensemble, LeaderNils-Erik Spar£ Baroque Times CD ®1994 Grammofon AB BIS OConifer Reoords 
111.4 Perceptual Discrimination Experiment 9: Type Cla11lflcat1on 
1. Feeling Good: The Very Best ofNina Simone, PolyGram TV, London,® & Cl994. 
2. Rough Guide World Music CD Complied by Phil Stanton, C World Music Network 
3. Rough Guide World Music CD Complied by Phil Stanton, CWorld Music Network 
4. 1-'Ani' (J.F. Cortes/J. F. Amador) CD- Flamenoo Total El Mondao Y Su Orupo, EUMC 1089 AMC 
Musikverlag Hamburg 
S. North Indian Instrumental Music Anthology Des Musiques Traditionellcs OAudivis/lKMSD/Unesco 1980 
®Audivis-Unesco 1972/1989 
6. Beethoven symphony No.S in C minor Op.67 111 movement. Classical Times compilation, ® 1994 Telarc 
International Corp. OConifer records limited, 1994. 
7. Gamelan Semarpegulingan Tirtha Sari ensemble ofPeliatian Village, JVC world sounds ® & 01990 
8. Royal Opera House Ballet Highlights, Orchestra of the Royal Opera House, Cond. Mark Ermlcr, 
Tchaikovsk.y Swan Lake, Act I No.2 Waltz CConifer Records 
9. Rough Guide World Music CD Complied by Phi! Stanton, World Music Network 
10. Extreme, Pomograffitti, Track 7, Its a Monster,® & CA & M, 1990. 
11. Brahms, String Quintet No.2 in G m~Yor, Op.lll 3111 Movement. Romantic Times CD ® 1994 Delos 
International !ne Cl994 Conifer Records. 
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12. Haydn. symphony No.31 in D mlijor 3nl movement. from Classical Times compilation, ~1994 Telarc: 
International Corp. C Conifer reoords limited, 1994. 
13. Schubert -Wintereisse D911 Peter Schreier, Tenor, Sviatoslav Richter Piano. Schubert Wintereisse CD, 
Phillips 4162892 Cl & ®1985 Phillips. 
14. Carmina Burana London Symphony Orchestra conducted by Richard Hickox IMP Productions, London (A 
division of Pickwick International) ® 1987 
15. North Indian Instrumental Music Anthology Des Musiques Traditionelles OAudivis/IKMSDIUnesco 1980 
<!lAudivis-Unesco 1972/1989 
16. Samba Sur (F.F. Cortes/J.F Amador) -CD 'Flamenco' Total El Mondao Y Su Grupo, EUMC 1089 AMC 
Musikverlag Hamburg 
17. Schubert -Wintereisse 0911 Peter Schreier, Tenor, Sviatoslav Richter Piano. Schubert Wintereissc CD, 
Phillips 4162892 0 & (!)1985 Phillips. 
18. Carrnina Burana London Symphony Orchestra conducted by Richard Hickox IMP Productions, London (A 
division ofPickwick International) ®1987 
19. Glenn Miller CD ®1991 Pickwick International. UK 
20. Act H Danses des Cygnes, Tchaikovsky Swan Lake, Royal Opera House Ballet Highlights, Orchestra of the 
Royal Opera House, Cond. Mark Ermler, OConifer Records 
21. Rough Guide World Music CD Complied by Phil Stanton, OWorld Music Network 
22. The Doors, Morrison Hotel, track 9 ~ & 01970, Elektra. 
23. Feeling Good: The Very Best ofNina Simone, PolyGram TV, London, ~ & 01994. 
24. BriUen String Quartet No.2nd Movement Brindisi String Quartet from 'Modern Times' compilation p 1994 
Conifer records Limited 01994 Conifer records Ltd. 
25. Gamelan Semarpegulingan Tirtha Sari ensemble ofPeliatian Village, JVC world sounds ~ & 01990 
26. Glenn Miller CD ~1991 Pickwick International. UK 
111.5 Symbollc\Notatlonal Testa Experiment 7: Identification of Note/Reat values. 
Scores; 
1. Brahms Symphony No. 4 in E minor, Op.98. Eulenberg Edition (No,428) Eulenberg Ltd., 
London. 
2. Haydn String Quartet, in B-flat Major, Op. 76/4, Eulenberg Edition (No. 56) Eulenberg Ltd., 
London. 
111.6 Symbollc\Notatlonal Tests Experiment 7: Identification and Uae of Dynamic 
Markings. 
Recorded Examples: 
1. Weber, Grand Duo Concertant, Mikhail Pletnev/Michael Collins, ~1990, Virgin Classics, London. 
2. Brahms, Sonata for Piano and Clarinet, Mikhail Pletnev/Michael Collins, ®1990, Virgin Classics. 
London. 
3. Poulenc, Sonata for Clarinet and Piano, Poulenc Chamber music CD, Fevrier, Menuhin, Foumier etc. 
EMI <!l I 973 EMI Patlt6 MlllllOni S.A 
Scores: 
I. Weber, Grand Duo Concertant, Op.48, For Piano & Clarinet, Edition No.3317. Pub. CF Peters, Frankfurt, 
London, New York. 
2. Brahms, Sonata for Piano and Clarinet Op.J20 no.2 Ed.Jost Michaels. 0 1973 Wiener Urtext Edition, UT 
50016. Musikverlag Ges.m. b. H & Co., K.G., Wien. 
3. Poulenc, Sonata for Clarinet and Piano, 14th Edition 1993. Chester Music, London. 
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111.7 Emotion Experiment 1: Emotion Recognition 
1. Jools Holland, Lost Chord, from CD: The full Compliment, 019911RS Records Ltd. <!'>1991 IRS Records 
Ltd. UK 
2. Philip Glass, Facades from minimalists CD 
3. Saint-Saens, Carnival of the animals, Finale, Cassette, 0 1985, Suprahon Prague. 
4. Birdsong, Canary. BBC Sound effects No. 4 (Cassette). ®1977 0 1977 BBC, London UK 
5. Krystoff Penderecki, Threnody For the Victims of Hiroshima, From compilation CD, Polish Radio and 
Symphony Orchestra <!'> 1988 0 1988 Conifer Records Ltd. 
6. Jamiroquai, Didjerama. From CD, Travelling Without Moving. 01996 Sony music (UK) Ltd. 
7. Schubert, Standchen, (seranadeO Budapest Strings. Meditation-Classical Relaxation Vol.4 <!'>1991 Delta 
Music Germany. 
8. Dave Brubeck. Take Five, Cassette, 'We're all together again for the first time' 0 & 0 1973, Atlantic New 
York. 
9. Mussourgsky Night on the Bare Mountain, CD, Strasbourg Philharmonic Orchestra, ® 1977 editions 
Constellat 01987 Conifer records Ltd. 
10. Barrel Organ:. BBC Sound effects No. 4 (Cassette). ®1977 0 19n BBC, London UK 
1 I. Debussy, Clair de Lune, (Suite Bergamasque No.3) Kath.ryn Stott, Piano. Modem Times CD, <!'> 1994 
Conifer Records Ltd. 0 1994 Conifer Records Ltd. 
12. Steve Reich, Drumming, CD: 'Works' 2 1965-1995,01997, Nonesuch Records, Warner Music Group. 
13. Hoist Planet Suite, Royal Philharmonic Collection, RPO and Ambrosian atorus. ® Trina International Plc. 
14. Beethoven, CD, Symphonies I & 2, Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra® 1985 Polydor, Germany. 
15. Commissioned Composition by Julian Butcher, Sheffield UK 1998. 
16. Dukas, Sorcerers Apprentice, Ravei\Dukas CD, Oslo Philharmonic Orchestra ®1990, EMI records, Hayes, 
Middlesex UK 
17. Mozart. Andante from Piano Concerto no.21, CD 'Meditation' .Classical Relaxation Volume llstvan 
Szekely, Franz Liszt Chamber orchestra, Cond. Janos Rolla. <!'> 1991 Delta Mu.'lic Germany 
18. Hoist Planet Suite, Royal Philharmonic Collection, RPO and Ambrosian Chorus. ® Tring International Plc. 
19. Shostakovich, I Oth Symphony, CD, Simon Rattle, Phi! harmonia Orchestra 01986 EMI records, Haycs, 
Middlesex UK 
20. Prokofiev & Britten CD, Andre Previn, Royal Philharmonic Orchestra, f) & 0 1986, Telarc, Cleveland 
Ohio, US. 
m.8 Table of Test Parameters 
Test No. of Inter-trial Duration of No. of 
Excerpts (& Interval Excerpts Repetitions 
trialsl (Secondsl (Secondsl 
Sound Source Discrimination 41 (3) 8 0.5·2.5 
Detection of pitch change and 2S (3) 8 1.5 2 
,. .. 
Melodic Contour discrimination 22 (2) 8 2.5-4.5 
Tempo discrimination 22 (2) 8 2.5-4.5 I 
Rhythm discrimination 20 (2) 10 2.5-4.5 I 
Chord analysis 22 (3) 6 4.0 2 
Discrimination of musical instruments 14 (0) 12 15.0 
Discrimination of type of music 25 (I) 12 15.0 
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Transcriptions of Test Materials 
IV.l Perceptual Discrimination Experiment 2: Pitch Change and Direction. 
Transcriptions of extracts in order of presentation. Numbers 1-3 were given a practice trial . 
I 2 
,, r J 11 14 F J 11 
3 4 
I' j j ,, r r 5 6 





14 J ~r ,, j j 11 
11 12 
I' r r 11 ,, J -r 11 13 14 
14 r r 11 ,, r F 11 
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15 16 
I' r r 11 I~ j t;J 11 17 18 
,, J J 11 ,, r J 11 
19 20 I' ~J CJ 11 ,, j -r 11 
21 22 
if~w r 11 ,, J J 11 
23 24 
,, J J 
25 26 
I' t J 11 if j r 11 27 28 
,, r F 11 
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IV.2 Perceptual Discrimination Experiment 3: Melodic Contour Discrimination. 
Transcriptions are given in order of presentation. Examples forming the ' different ' ub et are 
marked A & B. Numbers 1& 2 were given as practice trials. 
1 
1j1Y r 1nJ jl 
2A 
,, ill J. Jcr r lr J J 11 
28 
JIJ] J IJ r r 11 
3 
''- 1 JJ JJ lr';rp ~ 
4A 
r J IJ. JtJ 11 
48 
,, .~~ lr r J IJ. ;r I 
5 
if •• r 0 
6 
I' I J F r F IF' ' Ef F 'I 
7A 
JfJ lfJ J 
' 
:I 
78 I' i IF' ~ fJ I!J J t :11 
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SA 
lj #g I J 
88 If 111 J 
9A 
r r IJ. , ~ I 
9B 





11- 1 m= 1 E ~ r r I Er J J 11 
128 
,~-1?' ~ ~ 
., c v r r IJ r r 
13A 
ljtJ lr· H Hlr J - I 
13B 
ljfJ IJ. JJ iJ IJ g _ 
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14 
ifi Br F IF 'r =11 
l5A 








if & I ..qr ., r ihl[ ,, r ' 11 
168 
ifi I J1r ., r , le , J ' 11 
17 
I f 11# I J r r I r 'IF 11 
18 
if •1 ~n JJJJiilJ' =11 
19A 
lfi•IJ J l:a([r L I 
198 
if ll• 1 u 1u i:J1c:;r r 11 
20 
If • I J J J. J lii B r jl 
21A 
if IJ J IJ· cJ] iF 
21B 
ifiJ ,J IJ. cJ]W 
22A 
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r 1r s s 11 
-r I r ' ' 11 
~ftlijiE ~c!r1r t t 1 
1f' 101r 1~Etf1r t s 1 
23 
24 
lt••tJ JJcfulrrr- :11 
184 
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IV.3 Perceptual Discrimination Experiment 4: Tempo Discrimination 
Extracts are given in order of presentation. Metronome markings are given, For 'Same' sub et, 
excerpts were repeated at the given tempo. For the different subsets comparison excerpt were 




1 I J. tu ~· 11 
2- A: MM=66 B: MM= 132 
,,IJ 3 J M 11 
3- A:MM=75 B: MM= l32 
1~1r r r 1t r 1r lirrw 11 
4- A: MM= I44 B: MM=72 
I ~ IJ J J J U J J J J 11 
5- MM=88 
1r 11 
6- A: MM=88 B: MM= 168 1' 1r r u 1r u tJir· 11 
7- MM=160 
8- MM=90 
9- MM=SO I' ••I r EJfllr- 11 
10- A: MM=SO B: MM= l36 
111r J J W I J J J J I. 11 
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11- MM=81 
lli\tJ lr J J lr J I J. )J 1r 11 
12- A: MM=60 B: MM= 136 
I ~ 1•~ I r · ;,b I r t.Ufll J J IJ I 
13- MM=90 1l 11r bfUIJ. ,P u IJ I 
14- MM=I08 
J J I 0 11 
15- A: MM=160 B: MM=80 
I ~ 11 I J. ~ J , I J -b J I If. 
16- MM=96 
I ~ 1 I J H J I r:r t r I r , JJ I J. I 
17- A: MM=186 B: MM=96 
l'il.. lr I JJBI.. 11 
18- MM= IOO 
19- A: MM=IOO B: MM= I64 
I~ i~V I p r pI DEJif r I r 11 
20- A: MM=61 B: MM= IIO 
1' lr 1 r s 1 J J)l 11 
21- MM= l04 
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11 
J 
22- A: MM= ISO B: MM=69 
11 
23- A: MM=61 8: MM=80 
' '
1
•1JJQir J r- ,intflr 11 
24- MM=60 
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IV.4 Perceptual Discrimination Experiment 5: Chord analysis 
Transcriptions are given in order of presentation. Excerpts 1-3 were given as practice tria l . 
1 




- I 11 I 
5 
1 !lii - ~ii 11 
6 





I' : - I~ 11 9 
,,#: - I#: 11 
10 
-& .g. 
12: - 1: 11 
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11 
12 
.D. .D. 1,- -- 11 
13 
175 - 15 1  
14 
,, 







iflw> - m: 11 
17 
,, ~~ 









- I n 11 
21 
ifln - j#n 11 
Appendix I V 190 
22 
ifia - 1~1 11 
23 
















l?~o - ~~a 11 
28 
,,: - ~~ .. 11 
.g. 
191 
IV.5 Perceptual Discrimination Experiment 6: Rhythm Discrimination 1 
Examples are given in order of presentation. Examples forming 'different' subset are marked A 
& B. Numbers I & 2 were given as practice trials. 
I 
I f I J. I J J I J. jl 
2A 
I f I J J J Oil J J I J J Oil J 11 
28 
ifl JOJJOJJOJJ iJOJJ J J 11 
3 
I f I ~I J Oil J J J J I £lJ f =11 
4A 












I j j I j j j 11 
68 
,. I j J J IJ j j 11 
7 
if I j J j I J. jj =I  
8A 
I' I J J J J j j ljj jj 11 88 
,, I J J J J J J iJ J j 11 
9A 
~~ I ~ J"Jll@ J J J 11 
1,1 ~JitlJJiJJ..O, 
10 11 
''In iJ J J iJ n iJ J J iJ 
IJA 




J J I J J J?)J 11 
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I~ I J J J J IJ J J J I J J j 
14A 
I f I J J J I J J J I J J J. 1 
ISA 
'~!· JJJJ ohiJ jJ obil 
'~'I n n JJ iJ •Us 11 
lttnJ £JinJ l =11 
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I £]£]£1£11 f]f]J J 11 
- J 11 I 1'8AtJ IJ J llifqJ J J 
if I n1J nJ n 1J J _ 
188 - I 
119fA In IJ f]J lliJ J - 11 
if I J J J iBJ iJ J J :DJ 
I f I J. J n I J J J 1 J J J 20 :- - ~ iJEZOU 11 
- - 8~~ J la I' I J J J id J !? J 
21A 
ifl J jJ n IJ. JIJ 11 
2 18 
ifl J J 1n n jJ. ihiJ 11 
22 
if I a IJ J 
' 
IJ J J 
23 
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24A 
I'IJJJJJJiJ. J. iHJJ JliJ. 
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IV.6 Perceptual Discrimination Experiment 7: Rhythm Discrimination 2 
Numbers I & 2 were given as practice trials. Each example shows a target and comparison 
melody. Comparison melodies divide into 4 groups -identical melody, rhythm only varied, 
melody only varied, and both melody and rhythm varied. 
1 
I'IJ J J IJJ J J J 11 
I'IJ J J IJJ J J J 11 
2 if N IJ f:J iJ r 11 
if M IJ .n In r 11 
3 
if. eJ J J IJ J J ! 11 
if• eJ J J J IJ n J ! 11 
4 
if~ eJ J j IJ J j 11 
if• eJ J j IJ J j 11 
5 
I' IJ J IJ. )J IJ J J U. 11 
ifiJ MJ IJ :43 IJ J #J 0 I I I 
6 
if lE u r u IF E r 11 
lftr u E u IF r r 11 
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7 
lftJ. ibJ J IJ J n J IJ J. 11 
If IJ J J n IJ J J i J IJ J. 11 
8 
lfaJ J J lr· , r t 11 
If ej J J lr' , r s 11 
9 
I f ,~ I JJ J JJ 3 I £J 3 llJ I 
If il' I JJ J JJ J In 3 ifll 11 
10 
If 1 I J JJlJitf P 11 
If 1 I J Gtf PI 
I I 
I' M I IJ!jl]J";QJll! J!. n 1J l I 
I ' 1 I ~ jJ?];i;Q£J ' iOQt];j"]QJ:J f I 
12 
lftniJ nJ J 1t JJJ • 11 
lftniJ nnJ 1J aJ t 11 
13 if a an J ! J1an J 1 11 
1 f 1 ilfllJ t J joilllJJJ , 1 
14 
I f -I r r r r lEE B J I 
if•turrrrrriEruJ I 
15 
It I E F F lE. ~ J I 
It IF r r iOJ 11 
16 
It M I J1 E iarJ I 
I f M I J1 E itrrJ 11 
17 
1f1J J J IJ. :JJ 11 
1f1J J J IJ. :a;J 11 
18 
ifiJ Gr r le J 
if I j ~lr r IF J 
19 
if i I J !] IJ r ltl J] IJ 11 
ifi I J !] IJ:l J ltl J3 IJ 11 
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lr· 11 
lr· 11 
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20 
I' •" I Or:r J J IJ J t ihg llJ F' ~ lr r - I 
I' •" I Or:r J J iJ J ' ihg lij r· ~ lr r - I 
21 
1f1J IJ J J?)J I I 11 
lfiJ IJ. )£11J ! J 11 
22 
lfit,ltJfHfJ'JiJJJJIJ 'JIJJJJIJ I 11 
1fi!1nQ£JI;StJIJ 3 IJ tJIJ 3 IJ t I 
23 
lflJ £3 :£3 lr r J IJ J J J J IJ 3 I 11 




I' i I JJtj IJ. J!ltt FJ lr· 'I 
I' i I Dij IJ J 1[1 rJ lr· ' I 
25 
,, •. IF lr F r u IJ r J 13 IJ J r r r r lr· • 11 ,, •. IF lr F r tf IJ J J1 IJ J 
" 
u lr· I 11 
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• 11 
• 11 
) " ':J J ,. I 11 
t IJ J1, J I j ':t J' ' 11 
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IV.7 Perceptual discrimination Experiment 8: Instrument Discrimination 
No practice trials were given on this task. . Pictures for response choices were taken from The 
New Harvard dictionary of Music. Response choices are listed below table I, and given in 
order of presentation (corresponding to excerpts listed on page 8). 
Table I: Response Choices 
Response Choices in Order of Choice From: (in order: top left, top right, bottom left, 
Presentation bottom right.) 
1- Clarinet Cornet, French Horn, Clarinet, Double B-tlat Baritone. 
2- Piano Harp, timpani, Piano, Euphonium. 
3- Bassoon Flute, Bandurria (guitar), Alto Saxophone, Bassoon. 
4- Flute Bugle, Flute, Euphonium, Trombone. 
5- Guitar Guitar, Oboe, Trombone, Cello. 
6- Harpsichord Guitar, Oboe, Trombone, Cello. 
7- Drums Double B-tlat Baritone, Gong, Drums, Guitar. 
8- Viola Pan Pipes, Viola, piccolo, Trumpet. 
9- Harp Clarinet, Harp, Xylophone, Guitar. 
10- Violin Bugle, Violin, Cello, Banjo. 
11- French Horn French horn, Violin, Guitar, Bugle. 
12- Trumpet Cor Anglais, Trumpet, Recorder, Bassoon. 
13- Oboe Oboe, Euphonium, Cornet, Piccolo. 
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IV.8 Perceptual Discrimination Experiment 9: Type Classification. 
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IV.9 Symbolic Tests Experiment 1: Score reading- Error Detection. 
A- Original Score Mozart Clarinet Concerto bars 1-166. 
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CLARINET CONCERTO '-·- ,_.---· ..... .,.., 
CLARINET 





~Tu~· --c·· ~ ~ _ 
n £ F' v I E r ! r i I Fq ' r ' I r J ' i I 
10 
~ ~'1 . . - ==' F~ I CJ F i 1r~' r~' I( 
.,._ 
Clr' Ell 
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30~ ~ t f· piCltf4#1tl@!QiJIDqJ dft iE!E!Jtr F I 
~ r i · ~ f"--@lt r · 1t fl1E 'L'trFFrlt E ~ i I 
.,. tr 
'ficEit1rruo li2Df!g , 1:mfi'ih 1 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ fr irSi . . . i • £±J J¥"6 ~ 1 • r Ffv ' , r srv lj 1 'i fit tttr r r r 1 
. f 
' Otet mJ;Qjj liih J fj J l14 t a ftJ I,Dgrcrt r[ff ' 1 
.. 
---~ 60 ,.....--:;; j E tr ( et J r If i ! 10 ! I r F ! E" n t I t'l ' ~ ' ! 
~ Q' J. JJ. J lrr&?l)J1PJ!#IE1ffr?ljOJjJ9001 
~ 8ilJrrFrfrFrlr FE i 11' 018Ur i IQ'Q'I 
~ r--r i le';;;cm@ I@ () I W'#ffiit 9 I~ i - I 
~ "'" : tEJiiWftfefCEI11~gmw@ t ~V I 
l. _ 70 n~ ~ 
i¥ ¥Flir * ~CEtimJg lg LJ_EJF' Ut¥ ltu-J 
~ fEttillQJ}j3 Q[rf1tfltriqf fir * - I ! I 
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A5.9 B-Edited version of score. Edited sections are marked D. 
CLARINET CONCERTO ·-- =·--u ··--· 
CLARINET 





~Tu~· ~c·· ~ _ 
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'IJJIIrerrFrfnr f r i lr fl lfUtr i IQ[]! I 
' F-r i IC ... rrrr@ l£tlfft ltifiERff t1 lr i - I 
'·I? =ttiiitfcfcill~~rumr@t'fr=l 
'f?f~ ' ~Vttltt~ tj (]{fifilj 1f55Ua 
'fEtennJ]nor!#lff-rrfWi t]* - 1 ~ 1 
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Appendix IV 216 
I ! I 
4 ' ~ I • "!"' • 11 , 
" . 3 
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IV.lO Symbolic Tests Experiment 2. Identification of Excerpts in Notational Form 
Transcription of Nielson Violin Concerto I st movement, provided to accompany recorded excerpt 
of bars: I; 13-14; 31-32; 24-25; 47-48; 38, 4-5; 18-21; 29-30; 10-11; 26-27; 7; 16-17; 34 . 
- : :: ;;: - ..!= 0 
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IV.ll Symbolic Tests Experiment 3: Discrimination of Dynamics. 
The edited versions of the scores below were provided to accompany this test. Scores were 
edited to remove some dynamic markings. lA & IB Brahms Sonata: Bars 1-47. 2A & 2B 
Weber Grand Duo Concertant: Bars 1-69. 3A & 3B Poulenc Sonata: Bars 1-44. Edited 
S . . d' d 0 lAB h 0 . . I S ect10ns are m tcate ra ms: ngma core. 
SON ATE ES-DUR 
eingerichtet von I edited by Opus 120 No. 2 Jost Michacls 
Allegro amabile 1894 
Johannes Rrahms 
'~ -~ JifFJF "JiTJ. j) ~~ ~ BF P~lf>J " ' )! I ~Ef:L?I p 
11 ~ ~ 
'b r')' gonD · '~~£41l9 f! jf I fi!J.' J! JiJDJ J)~JjJ~ i~ I p•up 
··~ JjjjiJJ crpr& 
' 
,w lr 
' ·W lr 'JifD I <:: P -<> -<:: :;::::-do/ce 
If 2 ~f ~ a 
'b r " ~J111r t - I I I f . 9 9 
10 
'b 
9 ~~ tl@ ltJ J J J @qJ J); J ' u a i 'lJ y ,. I ~2.__ -di·m. - '-.jt pRo/lo f!Oce 
If ~ 
'b t}Jj_) I~J_!) i I@ i I~J22_J1 1 [}&J ltJ J Ji I pp ~ 
-===-
.fl) 
.9~ '~ 9 wgaJttlJ IJ J [!?9 I qtJ JJJJ I IJ JJJ J ...:::::::_.... do/cc __l ~im. 
14 
'b 
9 JjJ i I - i 
' 
]11 wgaJ2Qij I J~t±!lJiW I ::::::=-
cre~c. 
IlB 
aur¥ f}f) q ,..--...... 
'b ~ I ~ lt 1 fEr Er} ,,mm•' f ===-- f 
.., 
f ~ r---r-' 2 '~ IJl_!!!J J t IJ_!i!!J J i I I I ~s J ~s f 
..._______.,_. 
(() 191) by Wimer Urtnt E4i.tioll, M•ri.hcrlaa Ges, m. h. H. !t Co., K. 0 ., Yiu 
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lB Brabms: Edited Score 
SONATE ES-DUR 
Cc.~ t97J br itoMr Urtut E4itia., Musihcrla• Get. • · b. H. 8: Co., k . C., Y'Mn 
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W ber, Op 4 







===- perdQI/dO I. 
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2B Weber: Edited Score. 
s annette 111 GRAND DUO CONCERTANT 
Weber, Op. 4 




3A Poulenc: Ori inal Score. 
for Clarinet in B~ and Piano 
CLARINET in B~ 
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FRANCIS POULENC 
(1962) 
3A Poulenc: Edited Score. 
IJ Its miMoirl d• Arflulr Hougg1r 
SONATA 
for Clarinet in B~ and Piano 
CLARINET in B~ 
I. ALLEGRO TRISTAMENTE 
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FRANCIS POULENC 
(1962) 
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IV.12 Symbolic Tests Experiment 4: Completion of Familiar and Novel Melodies. 
Excerpts are given in order of presentation. Familiar and novel extracts are identified. 
Asterisks mark missing notes requiring completion by the subject the 'Familiar ' subset 
(Excerpts 1, 3, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 17, 20, 21, 22) correspond to table 4 (p. lO) where they are listed 
in order of presentation. Examples 1 &2 were given as practice trials. 
1 -Familiar * 
,,. fr- I 
2-Novel * 
J 11 
3-Familiar * if NI J J J IJ. JJ lr r r lr· JJ jJ J J IJ. 
4-Novel * 
''tr r r r lr r r I 
5-Novel * 
,,. tr r r 
' 
IJ J r 
' 
lr J J J la 
6-Novel * 
,,.r J r J IF r r I 
7-Familiar * 
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8-Familiar * * 
9-Familiar * * if- IJ I J J lr· ~~ r IJ J IJ I 
10-Novel * * 
,,~ tr J J J I r r r 11 
11-Familiar * * * 
12-Novel * * * 
If IJ J :J J IJ J 3 J I I 
e 
13-Novel * * * if IEJF HJ IF , J. 11 
14-Familiar * * * 
,, i tr r F r le r r J lW J J r lr· JJ I 
15-Novel * * * * 
If i IJ 3 J IJ J r lr r r lr· 11 
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16-Novel ** * * 
iftJ nuJ lr F r 11 
17-Familiar * * ** 
I 
IS-Novel * * * * 
1f1J r flDIJ J)J I 
19-Novel * * * * * 
I 
20-Familiar * * * * * 
,, IJ. ~J J r lr J. ;IJ J r lr I 
21-Familiar * * * * * 
ifiJ J J IJ J J IJ J J. ;I .. 11 
22-Familiar * ** * * 
,,. I Frffi~J r r I Err Ejrfi~J J ~'err 11 
Appendix V 
Testing Recognition of Emotional Expression in Music. 
Introduction 
The following test was devised to act both as a pilot study for material to be used in 
neuropsychological testing, and also to derive information regarding the relationship of musical 
experience to emotional description and levels of consensus for emotional responses. In addition, 
the experiment was constructed to examine the relationship of musical preferences and familiarity to 
emotional arousal and labelling, and to examine any difference in the responses of musically trained 
and untrained listeners. 
Materials 
A set of20 excerpts was constructed, using examples taken from professional recordings (Table 1), 
mean duration 44.7 seconds. The set comprised 18 musical excerpts in western tonal idiom, 
covering a range of musical periods and genres e.g. contemporary classical, pop music, jazz etc. In 
addition two environmental sound effects with musical content were added to allow comparison of 
responses to these sound sources which would be heard in context as environmental sound. 
Table 1 List of Recorded Excerpts. Full References are Given in Appendix ID. 7 
Excerpts in Order of Presentation 
1. Jools Holland, Lost Chord 
2. Philip Glass, Facades 
3. Saint-Saens, Finale: Carnival of the Animals 
4. BBC Sound Effects: Canary singing 
5. Penderecki, Threnody 
6. Jamiroquai, Didgerama 
7. Schubert, Standchen 
8. Dave Brubeck, Take Five 
9. Mussourgsky, Night on the Bare Mountain 
10. BBC Sound Effects, Barrel organ 
11. Debussy, Clair de Lune 
12. Steve Reich, Drumming, Pt. 3 
13. Hoist, Planets Suite: Mars 
14. Beethoven, Eroica Symphony 2nd Mvt. 
15. Julian Butcher, Untitled composition 
J 6. Dukas, Sorcerer's Apprentice 
J 7. Mozart, Piano Concerto No.2 I: 
Andante 
18. Hoist, The Planets Suite: Jupiter 
19. Shostakovich 10111 Symphony 3nt Mvt. 
20. Prokotiev, Peter And The Wolf. 
To provide a point of reference for consensus oflisteners' responses, 14 musical excerpts with pre-
existing emotional labels were selected. These pieces were chosen in consultation with a number of 
trained musicians, and in light of existing critical commentary. Agreement that the pieces 
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represented the specified emotions was then reached by two professionally trained musicians (a 
performer and a composer) and by four non-musicians.' For 6 of the extracts, 100% agreement was 
reached, that they expressed the stated emotions (Table 2) The remaining 8 extracts listed below 
did not reach 100% agreement however a high degree of consensus (S/6, 83.33%) was still reached 
(Table 3) therefore the examples were included in the study. In addition to the environmental sound 
excerpts, the remaining 4 excerpts were to act as controls, chosen from popular and contemporary 
classical examples without pre-existing emotional labels, including a specifically composed excerpt 














Table l Excerpts Reaching lOO% Agreement 
Extracts From: 
Saint Saens: Carnival of the Animals 
Schubert: Standchen, Debussy: Clair de Lune 
Penderecki: Threnody to the victims of Hiroshima 
Hoist: Mars from the Planets suite 
Beethoven: Eroica symphony, 2nd Mvt. 
Table 3 Additional Excerpts 
Extracts From: 
Dave Brubeck: Take Five; Hoist: Jupiter from the Planets Suite 
Mozart: Piano concerto No 21 Andante 
Mussorgsky: A night on bare mountain, Dukas-Sorcerer's 
Prokofiev: Peter and the wolf 
Shostakovich's: Tenth Symphony 
Grieg: Ase's death from Peer Gynt 
Excerpts were pre-recorded onto audio cassette in the order given in Table I. Two questionnaires 
were prepared to accompany auditory stimuli, (Fig.lA & Fig.IB). Subjects were given 
approximately 30 seconds between extracts to supply their answers. It has previously been 
suggested (Gaver & Mandler, 1987; Krugman, 1943) that existing emotional state, and familiarity 
with music may influence emotional responses. For this reason, additional questions were added 
asking subjects to describe their mood before the test and whether they liked each extract in 
question. 
Procedure 
2 groups of subjects were used, (1) A group of 10 undergraduate philosophy students. (2) A group 
of 11 undergraduate music students. The groups subdivided into 14 musicians and 7 non-musicians 
(subjects with no formal musical qualifications or training, who did not play an instrument, or read 
music). Within each group, half the subjects were given questionnaire A and the remaining half 
questionnaire B. 12 respondents used questionnaire A and the remaining 9, questionnaire B. 
Respondents using questionnaire B provided their own emotional terms to describe the extracts, 
providing a contrast for the subjects where emotional terms were supplied. Auditory stimuli were 
presented at a level comfortable for the listeners in an environment free from auditory distraction. 
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Consistent sound level and tone were maintained across stimuli. Subjects were not permitted to 
discuss their answers during the test. 
Results 
Full analyses of results are given (Tables 1-6). All individual responses are documented and levels 
of consensus are given by percentage of subjects giving the same response. Two schemas were 
applied to the data, offering differing categorisation of emotional labels into broader groups. 
Schema 1 classified emotions on two dimensions: arousaVnon-arousal, and intensity. Schema 2 
divided emotion terms used into broader groups. Full details of schemas 1 and 2 are given (fig.s 2 
&3 ). Results were also classified in terms of positive and negative emotional responses. 
Speclflclty of Agreement 
For categorisation in terms of emotional tone: positive, negative and neutral responses, a high level 
of consensus was reached across both musicians and non-musicians. There was no correlation 
between subjects preceding emotional state and emotion labelling or reported arousal. Neither was 
there a correlation between preference (liking or disliking excerpts) and emotion labelling or arousal 
but a high degree of preference was shown for known examples. Only one 'known' example was 
disliked (57% of respondents). Musicians showed a higher degree of agreement for emotion 
labelling on 10/20 excerpts, and musicians showed a higher level of agreement on arousal responses 
(14/20). There was a clear correlation between labelling and arousal of responses within this 
categorisation. Only 2/18 musical examples showed no overall consensus for emotional arousal in 
terms of positive/negative/neutral affect. 
It is clear then that there is a high level of consensus for gross distinctions in terms of emotional 
tone. The idea that specific emotion labelling is dependent on extra-musical features would also 
seem to be supported here. This is reflected in the relationship between level of agreement on 
emotion terms and 'known/unknown' excerpts and the difference seen between high levels of 
agreement for wen known 'classical' examples, and the lower levels of agreement seen for 
contemporary classical and pop examples. The previously 'unlabelled' examples failed to reach a 
high level of agreement for emotional description or arousal, supporting the idea that familiarity 
may influence emotional description and arousal. The higher levels of agreement for musical 
subjects may well be explained by their knowledge of musical conventions and techniques for 
emotional expression. 
To conclude, emotional tone both for description and aroused emotion is easily detected by musical 
and non-musical subjects. At this level of discrimination there is no real difference in performance 
between the two groups. More specific emotional descriptions would seem to be related to 
convention, extra-musical associations and knowledge of musical techniques. This suggestion is 
well represented within other studies on emotion recognition for music. Familiarity also played a 
role as regards preference, and may in turn influence the emotional polarity assigned to the music 
although this was not demonstrated in the results obtained. With the latter claim diffaculties arise 
due to the enjoyment of negative emotion in music. Whilst subjects may report a negative emotion 
aroused, they may nonetheless show preference for the piece. 
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Fig. lA 
QUESTIONNAIRE A 
YOU WILL HEAR A SERIES OF MUSICAL EXTRACTS EACH FOLLOWED BY A THIRTY 
SECOND PAUSE. IDENTIFY BY CIRCLING ONE TERM FROM THE LIST AN EMOTION 
WHICH BEST DESCRIBES EACH EXTRACT, AND SPECIFY WHETHER YOU 
EXPERIENCE ANY EMOTION MOOD OR FEELING ON HEARING THE EXTRACT BY 
CIRCLING ONE TERM FROM THE LIST GIVEN. INDICATE BY CIRCLING THE 
APPROPRIATE ANSWER 1-IF YOU THINK YOU HAVE HEARD EACH PIECE BEFORE 
AND 2-WHETHER YOU LIKE EACH EXTRACT. 
BEFORE BEGINNING HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR PREDOMINANT MOOD, 
EMOTION OR FEELINGS DURING THE LAST FEW HOURS ? 
r 1 
EXTRACfl 
GIVE AN EMOTIONAL TERM TO DESCRIBE THE PIECE (CIRCLE) 
HAPPINESS HOPE FEAR SADNESS ANGER 
GRIEF NEUTRAL- (NO EMOTION) DON'T KNOW 
DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL ANY EMOTION? (CIRCLE) 
HAPPINESS HOPE FEAR SADNESS ANGER 
GRIEF NEUTRAL· (NO EMOTION) DON'T KNOW 
DO YOU THINK YOU HAVE HEARD THIS PIECE BEFORE? (CIRCLE) 
YES \ NO \ DON'T KNOW 
DO YOU LIKE THIS PIECE? (CIRCLE) 
YES \ NO \ DON'T KNOW 
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Fig.lB 
QUESTIONNAIRE B 
YOU WILL HEAR A SERIES OF MUSICAL EXTRACTS EACH FOLLOWED BY A THIRTY 
SECOND PAUSE. IDENTIFY AN EMOTIONAL TERM WHICH BEST DESCRIBES EACH 
PIECE AND STATE WHETHER YOU EXPERIENCE ANY EMOTION MOOD OR 
FEELING ON HEARING THE EXTRACT. YOU MAY SPECIFY IF YOU FEEL AN 
EXTRACT BRINGS NO EMOTIONAL TERM TO MIND AND YOU MAY USE THE SAME 
TERM MORE THAN ONCE. INDICATE BY CIRCLING THE APPROPRIATE ANSWER I· 
IF YOU THINK YOU HAVE HEARD EACH PIECE BEFORE AND 2-WHETHER YOU 
LIKE EACH PIECE 
BEFORE BEGINNING, HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR PREDOMINANT MOOD, 
EMOTION OR FEELINGS DURING THE LAST FEW HOURS ? 
L 
EXTRACT I 




DOES IT MAKE YOU FEEL ANY 
EMOTION?[L----------------------'1 
DO YOU THINK YOU HAVE HEARD THIS PIECE BEFORE? (CIRCLE) 
YES \ NO \ DON'T KNOW 
DO YOU LIKE THIS PIECE? (CIRCLE) 
YES \ NO \ DON'T KNOW 
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Fig.l Schema 1 
Schema I classified emotions in terms of physiological arousal. As demonstrated in fig.2 all term 
given as responses in the questionnaires were listed and divided into the above categorie a in 
table. I. There were however, difficulties with this method of classification. In addition to many 
respondents using non-emotional terms to describe the piece and their own felt responses, many 
emotions may vary as regards their level of arousal. E.g. it makes perfect sense for someone to be 
mildly agitated, with no physiological symptoms, but also for them to be highly agitated, 
accompanied by perhaps a rise in temperature, trembling and other physiological effects. For thi 
reason, I have attempted to classify emotions in terms of their typical application to emotional 
states, and in consultation with other arousal classifications (see Parkinson Ideas & Realities of 
Emotion.) 
Method for Classification in Terms of Arousal 
Positive S t ron g 
P os iti ve Aro u s al [ Positive W oak 
Posi ti ve 0 th cr 
YES 




No Arousa l + No n -E mo t ion 



























cga t lve t rong 
N eg ativc W cak 
Nega t ive Other 
Po ltl e Other 






Negative Arousal & Non-Emotional Terms 
Negative Strong Negative Weak Negative Other 
Aggressive Scared Annoyance Tentative Dark Anti ipnti on 
Anger Sinister Anxious Uncomfortable lleavy 131ast! 
Bitterness Tense Apprehensive Unsettled Mysterious Bombastic 
Dislike Threatening Bored Uptight Nightmare Braver 
Distress Confused Yearning Oppressive Ou 
Edgy Disconcerted Worry Pressured hildish 
Fear Gloomy Wistful Remote omi I 
Foreboding Impatient Doomed ool 
Fraught Irritating Detached 
Fury Lonely Dramatic 
Grief Melancholic Epic 
Malicious Nervous Expectation 
Painful Restless lndi !Tcrcncc 
Regretful Shyness Intensity 
Sadness Spooky Joi nty 
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Schema 2 
Schema 2 attempted to divide responses into distinct categories of emotion, without combining 
similar emotion types such as Annoyance/Anxiety. Using as a guide those emotion terms which 
were given most frequently as responses, this led to division into 14 categories, which exhibit 
distinct characteristics: anger, annoyance, anxiety, calm, excitement, fear, grief, hope, happin 
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Table 1: Summary of Emotional Description of Excerpts 
Extract No: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Known\Unknown Unknown Unknown Known Unknown Unknown Unknown Known Known 
% 76.19"/o 90.48% 80.95% 90.48% 85.71% 85.71 % 85.71% 90.48% 
Musicians Unknown Unknown Known Unknown Unknown Unknown Known Known 
% 78.57% 92.86"k 85.71% 92.86"k 78.57% 85.71% 92.86% 92.86% 
Non-Musicians Unknown Unknown Known Unknown Unknown Unknown Known Known 
% 71.43o/o 85.71% 71.43% 85.71% 100.00% 85.71% 57.14% 85.71% 
Llked\Disllked Liked Liked Liked Disliked Disliked Liked Liked Liked 
% 85.71% 47.62% 100.00% 42.86% 76.19% 42.86% 95.24% 95.24% 
Musicians Liked Liked Liked Disliked Disliked Disliked Liked Liked 
•;. 78.57% 57.1 4% 100.00% 57.14% 78.57% 42.86% 92.86% 100.00% 
Non-M uslcians Liked \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ Liked Liked Disliked Liked Liked Liked 
'Yo 100.00% \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 100.00% 57.14% 71 .43% 57.14% 100.00% 100.000,{, 
Same Emotion Tenn (No.) 10 Happiness BFear 14 Happiness 12 Neutral BFear 6 Neutral 6 Sadness 7 Happiness 
'Yo 47.62% 38.10% 66.66"k 57.14% 38.10% 28.57% 28.57% 33.33% 
Muslclans 57.14% 42.86% 71 .43% 57.14% 50.000/o 21 .43% 21.43% 42.86% 
Non-M usiclans 42.86% 28.57% 57.14% 57.14% 28.57% 42.86% 28.57% 28.57% 
Positlve\Negatfve (No.) 17 Pos. 15 Neg. 21 Pos. 14 Neutral 20 Neg. 10 Neg. 16 Neg. 14 Pos. 
'Yo 80.95% 71.43% 100.00% 66.66% 95.24% 47.62% 76.19% 66.66% 
Musicians 85.71% 78.57% 100.00% 71 .43% 92.86% 57.14% 78.57% 71.43% 
Non-M usiclans 71 .43% 57.14% 100.00% 57.14% 100.00% 28.57% 71 .43% 40.000/o 
Schema 1 Classlftcatlon (No.) 12PS 13NS 17PS 12 0 1BNS 70 10NS 11 PS 
•;. 57.14% 61.90% 80.95% 57.14% 85.71% 33.33% 47.62010 52.38% 
Musicians 64.29% 71 .43% 92.86% 57.14% 85.71% \\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 50.000k 64.29% 
Non-Musicians 4286% 42.86% 57.14% 57.14% 85.71% 57.14% 42.86% \\\\\\\\\\\1\\\\ 
Schema 2 CLasslftcatlon (No.) 12 Happiness 9 Fear 18 Happiness 12 Neutral 9 Fear \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 10Sadness 1 0 Happiness 
% 57.14% 42..86% 85.71% 57.14% 42.86% 1\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 47.62% 47.62% 
Musicians 64.29% 50.00% 85.71% 57.14% 50.00% \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 42.86% 42.86% 
Non-M uslclans 42.86% 28.57% 85.71% 57.14% --~-57% \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ L______E_.14% L__ ___ - 57.14% 
'----------- --






























































Table 1 Cont. Summary of Emotional Description of Excerpts 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Known Unknown Known Known Unknown Known Known Known Unknown Unknown 
90.48% 71 .43% 80.95% 80.95% 71.43% 61 .90% 100.00% 80.95% 52.38% 76.19% 
Known Unknown Known Known Unknown Known Known Known Unknown Unknown 
100% 64.29% 92.86% 85.71% 71.43% 64.29% 100.00% 92.86% 50.00% 71.43% 
Known Unknown Known Known Unknown Known Known Known Unknown Unknown 
71.43% 85.71% 57.14% 71 .43% 71.43% 57.14% 100.00% 57.14% 57.14% 85.71% 
Liked \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ Liked Liked Disliked Liked Liked Liked Liked \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
95.24% \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 76.19% 76.19% 61 .90% 61 .90% 90.48% 85.71% 76.19% \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
Liked Liked Liked Liked Disliked Liked Liked Liked Liked \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
100.00% 42.86% 71.43% 71.43% 71.43% 64.29% 92.86% 78.57% 71 .43% \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
Liked \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ Liked Liked \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ Liked Liked Liked Liked \\\\\1\\\\\\\\\ 
85.71% \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 85.71% 85.71% \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 57.14% 100.00% 100.00% 85.71% \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
11 Sadness 9 Neutral 6 Fear 14 Grief \\\\\\\1\\\\11\\ \\\\\1\\\\\11 I \1 SHope SHope 10 Sadness 8 Anger 
52.38% 42.86% 28.57% 66.66% \\\\\\\\\\\\\1\1 \\\\\1\\\\\\\\\\ 28.57% 38.10% 47.62",{, 38.10"/c 
50.00% 42.86% 33.33% 71 .43% 28.57% 28.57% 35.71% 36.00% 50.00% 50.00"/c 
57.14% 42.86% 42.86"k 57.14% 28.57% \\\\\1\\\\\\\\\\ 28.57% 42.86% 43.00"k 28.570fc 
14 Neg. 10 Neutral 17 Neg. 19 Neg. 15 Neg. 13Neg. 17 Pos. 17Pos. 18 Neg. 16Neg. 
66.66% 47.62% 80.95% 90.48% 71.43% 61 .90% 80.95% 80.95% 85.71% 76.19"/c 
57.14% 57.14% 78.57% 100.00% 78.57% 71.43'ro 92.86% 78.57% 92.86% 78.57o/c 
42.86% 42.86% 85.71% 71.43% 57.14% 42.86% 57.14% 85.71% 71.43% 71 .43o/c 
12NS 120 15NS 19NS 10NS 11 NS 13NS 15PS 15NS 14NS 
57.14% 57.14% 71 .43% 90.48% 47.62% 52.38% 61 .90% 71 .43% 71 .43% 66.66"1. 
50.00% 57.14% 64.29% 100.00% 64.29% 64.29% 71 .43% 71.43% 78.57% 71.43"1. 
71 .43% 57.14% 85.71 % 71 .43% 42.86% 42.86% 57.14% 71 .43% 57.14% 57.14°A 
11 Sadness 9 Neutral 7Fear 14 Grief \\\\\1\\\\\1\\ I\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 8 Happiness 8\8 Happ\Hope 12Sadness BAnger 
52.38% 42.86% 33.33% 67% \\\\\\\\\\\\\ \\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 38.10% 38.10% 57.14% 38.1~ 
50.00% 42.86% 57.14% 71.43% \\\\\\\\\\\\\\ \\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 57.14% \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 57.14% 50.~ 





Table 2: Summary of Emotional Arousal by Excerpts 
Extract No: 2 3 4 5 6 
Known\Unknown Unknown Unknown Known Unknown Unknown Unknown 
% 76.19% 90.48% 80.95% 90.48% 85.71 % 85.71% 
Musicians Unknown Unknown Known Unknown Unknown Unknown 
% 78.57% 92.86% 85.71% 92.86% 78.57% 85.71% 
Non-M uslclans Unknown Unknown Known Unknown Unknown Unknown 
% 71 .43% 85.71% 71 .43% 85.71% 100.00% 85.71% 
Llked\Disllked Liked Liked Liked Disliked Disliked Liked 
o/. 85.71% 47.62o/o 100.00% 42.86% 76.19% 42.86% 
Musicians Liked Liked Liked Disliked Disliked Disliked 
% 78.57% 57.14% 100.00% 57.14% 78.57% 42.86% 
Non-M uslclans Liked \\\I\\\\\\\\\\\\ Liked Liked Disliked Liked 
% 100.00% \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 100.00% 57.14% 71.43% 57.14% 
Same Emotion Term (No.) 9 Happiness 8 Neutral 13 Happiness 14 Neutral 5 Fear 5 Neutral 
·~ 42.86% 38.10% 61 .90% 66.67% 23.81 % 23.81 % 
Musicians 57.14% 42.86% 71 .43% 78.57% 41 .67% 28.57% 
Non-M uslclans 14.29% 28.57% 42.86% 42.86% 0.00% 14.29% 
Posltlve\Negatlve (No.) 14 Pos. 8Neg. 20Pos. 14 Neutral 14Neg \\1\\\\\1\\\\\\\ 
·~ 66.66% 38.10% 95.24% 66.66% 66.66% \\1\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
Musicians 64.29% 28.57% 100.00% 78.57% 78.57% \\\\\\\\1\1\\\\\ 
Non-Musicians 71 .43% 57.14% 85.71% 42.86% 42.86% 1\1\\\\11\\\\\\\ 
Schema 1 Classification (No.) 9PS 90 17PS 130 12NS \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
•t. 42.86% 42.86% 80.95% 61 .90% 57.1 4% \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
Musicians 57.14% 42.86% 9286% 71 .43% 6429% \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\1 
Non-M uslclans 14.29% 42.86% 57.14% 42.86% 42.86% \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
Schema 2 Classification (No.) 12 Happiness 8 Neutral 17 Happiness 14 Neutral \\\\\\1\\\ I 1\\\\ \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
% 57.14% 38.10% 80.95% 66.66% \\1 I 11\ I\\\\\\\\ 1\\\\\1\1\\\\\\\ 
Musicians 57.14% 42.86% 85.71% 78.57% \\\\\\\\\\1\\\\\ \\11\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
Non-M uslclans 57.14% 28.57% 71 .43% 42.86% \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ \\\\\\1\\\\\\\\\ 















































16 Pos. 10 Neg. 
76.19% 47.62% 
78.57% 85.71% 
71 .43% 57.14% 




13 Happiness 8 Fear 
61 .90"/o 38.10% 

































Table 2 Cont.: Summary of Emotional Arousal by Excerpts: (Cont.) 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Known Unknown Known Known Unknown Known Known Known Unknown Unknown 
90.48% 71 .43% 80.95% 80.95% 71 .43% 61 .90% 100.00% 80.95% 52.38% 76.19% 
Known Unknown Known Known Unknown Known Known Known Unknown Unknown 
100% 64.29% 92.86% 85.71% 71.43% 64.29% 100.00",{, 92.86% 50.00"/o 71 .43% 
Known Unknown Known Known Unknown Known Known Known Unknown Unknown 
71 .43% 85.71% 57.14% 71 .43% 71.43% 57.14% 100.00% 57.14% 57.14% 85.71 % 
Liked \\\\\\\\\1\\\\\1 Liked Liked Disliked Liked Liked Liked Liked \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
95.24% \\\\\\\\\\\1\\\\ 76.19% 76.19% 61 .90% 61 .90% 90.48% 85.71% 76.19% \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
Liked Liked Liked Liked Disliked Liked Liked Liked Liked \\1\\\\1\1\\\\\\ 
100.00% 42.86% 71 .43% 71.43% 71.43% 64.29% 92.86% 78.57% 71 .43% \\\\\\\\1\\\\\\\ 
Liked \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ Liked Liked \1\1\\\\\\\\\\\1 Liked Liked Liked Liked \\\\\1\\\1\\\\\\ 
85.71% \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 85.71% 85.71% \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 57.14% 100.00% 100.00"/o 85.71% \\\1\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
8Sadness 11 Neutral 6 Fear 9Sadness 7 Neutral Fear6 7 Happiness 7 Neutral 11 Sadness 8 Neutral 
38.10% 52.38% 28.57% 42.86% 33.33% 28.57% 33.33% 33.33% 52.38% 38.10% 
42.86% 64.2:90.<: 41 .67% 42.86% 42.86% 41 .67% 42.86% 28.57% 64.29% 41 .67% 
28.57% 28.57% 14.29% 42.86% 14.2:90/o 14.29% 14.29% 42.86% 28.57% 42.86% 
14 Neg. 11 Neutral 10Neg. 16 Neg. 12 Neg. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 15Pos. 11 Pos. 14 Neg. 9 Neutral 
66.66% 52.38% 47.62% 76.19% 57.14% \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 71 .43% 52.38% 66.66% 42.86% 
71 .43% 64.2QOk 50.00% 85.71% 50.00% \\\\1\\\\\\\\\\\ 78.57% 64.29% 71 .43% 42.86% 
57.14% 28.57% 42.86% 57.14% 71.43% \\\\1\\\\\\1\\1\ 57.14% 28.57% 57.14% 42.86% 
10NS 120 7NS 15 NS 8NS 8NS 10PS 10PS 11 NS 8NS 
47.62% 57.14% 33.33% 71.43% 38.10% 38.10% 47.62% 47.62"k 52.38% 38.10% 
57.14% 64.29% 42.86% 78.57% 71.43% 50.00% 57.14% 57.14% 64.29% 50.00"/o 
28.57% 42.86% 14.29% 57.1 4% 42.86% 14.29% 28.57% 28.57% 28.57% 14.29% 
9Sadness 11 Neutral \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 10 Sadness 8 Neutral \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 9 Happiness 8 Happiness 12Sadness 9 Neutral 
42.86% 52-38% \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 47.62% 38.10% \\\\\\\\\\\1\\\\ 42.86% 38.10% 57.14% 42.86% 
50.00% 64.29% \1\\\\\\1\\\\\1\ 50.00% 50.00% \\\\1\\\\\\\\\\\ 50.00% 50.00% 64.29% 42.86% 








































































Table 3: Question 1 Responses. 
2 3 4 5 
Fear Happiness Neutral Grief 
Fear Happiness Neutral Fear 
Fear Happiness Neutral Grief 
Grief Hope Neutral Fear 
Don't Know Happiness Don't Know Anger 
Fear Happiness Neutral Anger 
Neutral Happiness Happiness Fear 
Fear Happiness Happiness Fear 
Hope Happiness Neutral Fear 
Hope Happiness Neutral Fear 
Fear Happiness Don't Know Grief 
Fear Happiness Hope Grief 
Foreboding Happiness Neutral Neutral 
Anxious Extravert Carefree Bitterness 
Tense Jolly Bright Anxious 
Fear Happiness Neutral Fear 
Expectant l..iYely Calm Fear 
Don't Know Jd<ey Don't Know Tense 
Det<dled Happiness Neutral Distress 
Tense Upbeat Neutral Fraught 
Neutral Bombastic Neutral Nightmare 
6 7 8 
Fear Fear Hope 
Don't Know Hope Happiness 
Don't Know Sadness Hope 
Neutral Sadness Happiness 
Don't Know Hope Happiness 
Neutral Sadness Happiness 
Fear Grief Sadness 
Fear Grief Happiness 
Neutral Hope Hope 
Neutral Sadness Don't Know 
Neutral Sadness Neutral 
Neutral Hope Happiness 
Irritating Remote Neutral 
Passionate Melancholic Soulful 
Dart< Melancholy/R Relaxed 
et axed 
Ominous Sadness Neutral 
Anger Wistful Happiness 
Heavy Painful Neutral 
Relaxed Melancholic Contentment 
Oppressi'Je Up Cheerful 


















































11 12 13 14 15 
H~ Neutral Anger Grief Fear 
:H~ Neutral Anger Grief Fear 
Sa:iness Don't KnCNI Fear Grief Anger 
H~ Neutral Grief Grief Anger 
Sadness Don't KnCNI Fear Grief Anger 
Sa:iness Happiness Fear Grief Anger 
Sadness Neutral H~ Grief Fear 
Sadness Happiness Hq>e Grief Anger 
Sadness Don't KnCNI Fear Grief Don't KnCNI 
Grief H~ Anger Grief Fear 
Sadness Neutral Fear Grief Neutral 
Sadness Hq>e Anger Grief Hq>e 
Neutral Busy Neutral Sa:iness Neutral 
PensiYe Indifference Malicious Regretful Don't KnCNI 
Nostalgia Jolly ~on Sa:iness Spcld(y 
H~ Neutral Fear Grief Tense 
Sadness Neutral UnsEttled Sa:iness Restless 
Simplistic Rhythmic Tense Neutral Jointy 
Sadness Neutral Anger Glief Disconcerted 
Sa:iness Up Awe Sadness Confused 
Nostalgic Neutral Foretxxiing Epic Neutral 
Table 3 Cont. : Question 1 Responses 
16 17 18 19 
Anger H~ H~ Sadness 
Anger Happiness Don't KnCNI Sadness 
Fear H~ Happiness Sadness 
Anger H~ H~ Grief 
Fear Sa:iness Happiness Sadness 
H~ H~ H~ Grief 
Fear Happiness H~ Sadness 
Fear Happiness Happiness Sadness 
Anger Hq>e H~ Grief 
Anger H~ H~ Sa:iness 
Fear Sadness Hq>e Sadness 
Don't KnCNI Happiness H~ Sa:iness 
Warlike Pleasant Neutral Lonely 
Don'tKnCNI LOYe Don't KnCNI Tentative 
Excitement Relaxed Content mysterious 
Tense Happiness Happiness Sa:iness 
Excitement LOYe PesitMty Calm 
Passionate Light Neutral Heavy 
Bravery Confident Happiness Lonely 
Martial Sadness Playful Regret 
Barbaslic Don'tKnCNI Gay Don'tKnCNI 





















Don'tKnoN On edge 




























































































Table 4: Question 2 Responses 
1 2 3 4 
Fear Happiness Neutral 
Neutral Happiness Happiness 
Fear Happiness Neutral 
Neutral Hope Neutral 
Don'tKnCNV Happiness Don't KnCNV 
Neutral Happiness Neutral 
Neutral Happiness Neutral 
Neutral Happiness Neutral 
Neutral Happiness Neutral 
Don'tKnCNV Happiness Don't KnCNV 
Neutral Neutral Neutral 
Fear Happiness Don't KnCNV 
Alert Happiness Neutral 
Don't KnCNV Humour Contentment 
Anxious Jolly Neutral 
Anxious Happiness Neutral 
Relaxed Uvely Neutral 
Uneasy Jolly Awa<..e 
Neutral Happiness Neutral 
Sinister Upbeat Relaxed 
Anticipatory Strong Neutral 
5 6 
Fear Fear 
Neutral Don't KnCNV 
Grief Don't KnCNV 
Neutral Don't KnCNV 





Grief Don't KnCNV 
Don'tKnCNV Neutral 





Nervous Don't KnCNV 
Sleepy Heavy 
Neutral Relaxed 

















































10 11 12 13 
Don't Know Grief Fear Grief 
Neutral H~ Neutral Neutral 
Neutral Sadness Neutral H~ 
Fear Neutral Neutral Fear 
H~ Sadness H~ Fear 
Sadness Sadness Anger Fear 
Happiness Sadness Neutral H~ 
Neutral Sadness Happiness H~ 
Don't Know Sadness Neutral Fear 
Sadness Sadness H~ H~ 
Neutral Neutral Neutral Neutral 
Don't Know Don't Know Don't Know Don't Know 
H~iness Thoughtful Neutral Neutral 
Annoyance Nostalgia Neutral Righteoos 
Happiness Nostalgia Bored Docmed 
Neutral 1-tqle Neutral Fear 
lrrpatient Unhappy Neutral Intensity 
Scared Serene Rushed Nenious 
Neutral Sadness Neutral Fear 
Bored Nostalgia Don'tl<no.v Don'tKno.v 
Calm Nostalgia Irritated Apprehensi-.e 
Table 4 Cont.: Question 2 responses 
14 15 16 17 18 
Grief Fear Fear Neutral Sadness 
Neutral Neutral Neutral Happiness Neutral 
Neutral Anger Fear H~ Happiness 
Sadness Neutral Anger Neutral Happiness 
Grief Anger Fear Sadness H~iness 
Grief Anger H~ H~ H~ 
Sadness Neutral Fear Happiness Happiness 
Sadness Neutral Fear Happiness Happiness 
Grief Neutral Anger Happiness H~ 
Sadness Fear Fear H~ H~ 
Grief Neutral Neutral Neutral Neutral 
Don't Know Don't know Don't Know Don't Know Don't Know 
Sadness Neutral Neutral Pleasant Neutral 
Sadness Confusion Don't Know Security Neutral 
Gloany Expectant Excited Happiness Content 
Sadness Tense Neutral Happiness Neutral 
Grief Neutral Happiness Calm Cheerful 
Neutral On edge Neutral Content Jolly 
Sadness Wonied Neutral Happiness Neutral 
Sadness Uptight Motivated Sadness Don't Know 











































Don't Know Anxious 











































































Table 5: Question 3 
2 3 4 
No Yes No 
No Yes No 
No Yes No 
No Yes No 
No Yes No 
No Yes No 
No Yes No 
No Yes No 
No Yes No 
No Yes No 
No Yes No 
No No No 
Doo't Know Don't Know Yes 
No Yes No 
No No No 
No Yes No 
No Yes No 
Yes Yes Yes 
No Yes No 
No Yes No 
No No No 
5 6 
No No Yes 
Don't Know No Yes 
Yes No Yes 
No Don't Know Yes 
No Yes Yes 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
No No No 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
Don't Know No Yes 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
No Yes Yes 
No No Yes 
No No No 

















































11 12 13 14 15 
Yes No Yes Yes No 
Yes Don't Kno.v Yes Yes No 
Yes No Yes Yes No 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Don't Kno.v 
Yes No Yes Yes Don't Kno.v 
Yes No Yes Yes Don't Kno.v 
Yes No Yes Yes No 
Yes No Yes Yes No 
Yes No Yes Yes No 
Yes No Don'tKno.v Yes Don't Kno.v 
No No No Yes No 
Yes Don't Kno.v No Yes No 
Yes No Yes No No 
Yes No Yes No No 
Yes No Yes Yes No 
Yes Don'tl<nON Yes Yes Don'tKnON 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No No Yes No No 
Yes No Yes Don'tKnON No 
Yes No Don'tl<noN Yes No 
Table 5 Cont.: Question 3 Responses 
16 17 18 
No Yes Yes No 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No Yes Yes Don't Kno.v 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Yes Don't Kno.v 
No Yes Yes No 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Yes No 
No Yes Yes No 
Yes Yes Don't Kno.v Don't Kno.v 
No Yes No Yes 
Don'tKno.v Yes Don't Kno.v No 
No Yes Yes No 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Yes Yes Yes No 














































































Table 6: Question 4 Responses 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Yes No Yes No No No Yes Yes No No J 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ! 
Yes Yes Yes Don't Kno.v No No Yes Yes Yes No 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Yes Don'tl<no.v Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Don't Kncm Yes No No Don't know Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Don't Kno.v Yes No No Don't know Yes Yes Don't know Yes 
No Yes Yes Don't Kncm No No Don't Kncm Yes Yes No 
Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes No 
Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Don't Kncm Yes Don't Kncm No No Yes Yes Yes No 
Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes I 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No I 
Yes No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Don't Know 
Yes Yes Yes No No Don't know Yes Yes Yes Don't Know 
Yes Don't Know Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Yes Don't Know Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Yes No Yes Don't Know No Don't kne»" Yes Yes Yes No 
Yes Don't KnoN Yes Yes Don't Kne»' Yes Yes Yes ~- Yes 
---------- - ---
11\14 Yes 8\14 Yes 14\14 Yes 8\14 No 11\14 No 
7\7Yes \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 7\7Yes 4\7 Yes 5\7No 
78.57% 57.14% 100.00% 57% 79% 
100% \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 100.00% 57% 71 % 
6\14 No 13\14 Yes 14\14 Yes 
4\7Yes 7\7Yes 7\7Yes 
43% 92.86% 100% 













Table 6 Cont. : Question 4 Responses 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
Yes No No Yes No No No No Yes 
Yes Yes yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes No yes No No Yes Don't Kno.v Yes Don't Kno.v 
Yes No yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Don't Kno.v 
Yes Don't Kno.v yes Yes No Don't Kno.v Yes Yes Don't Kno.v 
Yes Don't Kno.v yes Don't know No Don't Knc:w Yes Yes No 
Yes Yes yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
Yes No yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Yes Yes yes Yes Don'tkno.v Don't Knc:w Yes Yes Yes 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Don'tl<nON yes Yes Don'tkno.v Yes Yes Don't Kno.v Yes 
Yes No yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Yes No yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Don'tl<nON yes Don'tkno.v Don't kno.v Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Don't Kno.v yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
14\14 Yes 6\14 Yes 10\14 Yes 10\14 Yes 10\14 No 9\14 Yes 13\1 4 yes 11\14 yes 10\14 Yes 
6\7 Yes \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 6\7 Yes 6\7Yes \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 4\7 Yes 7\7 Yes 7\7Yes 6\7Yes 
100% 42.86% 71 % 71% 71% 6429% 93% 78.57% 71 % 
































References: Recorded Examples. 
l. Jools Holland, Lost Chord, from CD: The full Compliment, 01991 IRS Records Ltd. f) 1991 IRS Records Ltd. 
UK 
2. Philip Glass, Facades from minimalists CD 
3. Saint-Saens, Carnival of the animals, Finale, Cassette, 0 1985, Suprahon Prague. 
4. Birdsong, Canary. BBC Sound effects No. 4 (Cassette).<!) 1977 0 1977 BBC, London UK 
5. KrystoffPenderecki, Threnody For the Victims of Hiroshima, From compilation CD, Polish Radio and Symphony 
Orchestra (]!!) 1988 0 1988 Conifer Records Ltd. 
6. Jamiroquai, Didjerama. From CD, Travelling Without Moving, 01996 Sony music (UK) Ltd. 
7. Schubert, Standchen, (seranadeO Budapest Strin~. Meditation-Classical Relaxation Vol.4 <!) 1991 Delta Music 
Germany. 
8. Dave Brubeck, Take Five, Cassette, 'We're all together again for the first time' (]!!) & 0 1973, Atlantic New 
York. 
9. Mussour~ky Night on the Bare Mountain, CD, Strasbourg Philharmonic Orchestra, ®1977 editions Constellat 
C 1987 Conifer records Ltd. 
10. Barrel Organ:. BBC Sound effects No. 4 (Cassette). ®1977 0 1977 BBC, London UK 
11. Debussy, Clair de Lune, (Suite Bergamasque No.3) Kathryn Stott, Piano. Modern Times CD, (]!!) 1994 Conifer 
Records Ltd 0 1994 Conifer Records Ltd. 
12. Steve Reich, Drumming. CD: 'Works' 2 1965-1995, 01997, Nonesuch Records, Warner Music Group. 
13. Hoist Planet Suite, Royal Philharmonic Collection, RPO and Ambrosian Chorus. <!) Tring International Plc. 
14. Beethoven, CD, Symphonies 1 & 2, Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra(]!!) 1985 Polydor, Germany. 
IS. Commissioned Composition by Julian Butcher, Sheffield UK 1998. 
16. Dukas, Sorcerers Apprentice, Ravei\Dukas CD, Oslo Philharmonic Orchestra (]!!) 1990, EMI records, Hayes, 
Middlesex UK 
17. Mozart, Andante from Piano Concerto no.21, CO 'Meditation' -Classical Relaxation Volume 1Istvan Szekely, 
Franz Llszt Chamber orchestra, Cond. Janos Rolla. (]!!) 1991 Delta Music Germany 
18. Holst Planet Suite, Royal Philharmonic Collection, RPO and Ambrosian Chorus. <!) Tring International Plc. 
19. Shostakovich, lOth Symphony, CD, Simon Rattle, Philharmonia Orchestra f) 1986 EMI records, Hayes, 
Middlesex UK 
20. Prokofiev & Britten CD, Andre Previn, Royal Philharmonic Orchestra, (]!!) cl C 1986, Telarc, Cleveland Ohio, 
us. 
i Further support for existing emotional classification of these works may be found In critical commentary. The 
Penguin CO guide, Gramophone, critical reviews, Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, Meerum Terwogt M, 
cl Van Grinsen F, 'Musical expression ofMooclstates, PsychologyofMusic 19, 99-109 1991. 
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